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THE PROBLEM WITH PRETEXT
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY M. TYMKOVICH
t
ABSTRACT
When deciding whether to grant a party summaryjudgment or a di-
rected verdict, appellate courts ordinarily evaluate whether the plaintiff
produced sufficient evidence to establish each element of his claim. In
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,1 the Supreme Court deviated from
this long-standing practice, and held that in Title VII cases courts must
evaluate evidence of discrimination under a novel three-part burden-
shifting framework. While the Supreme Court initially insisted this inno-
vation was necessary to ensure that plaintiffs have their day in court,
many scholars, practitioners, and judges now recognize that the
McDonnell Douglas framework creates complication and confusion. In
this article, I survey the competing methodologies and suggest the time
might be right for a simpler, more direct method of evaluating the ques-
tion of discrimination.
INTRODUCTION
Under the now familiar McDonnell Douglas framework, a court
must proceed through three phases to determine liability in an employ-
ment discrimination case.2 First, the employee has the burden of estab-
lishing a prima facie case of discrimination by the preponderance of the
evidence. The prima facie case of discrimination4 must consist of evi-
t Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. I gratefully acknowl-
edge the contributions of my law clerks David Strandness and James Wawrzyniak.
1. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
2. Although initially developed for cases arising under Title VII, the McDonnell Douglas
framework was subsequently expanded to cases arising under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA). Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985); Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), Berry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 490 F.3d 1211, 1220 (10th Cir. 2007); and
Family and Medical Leave Act, Metzler v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164,
1170 (10th Cir. 2006).
3. See, e.g., Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 483 F.3d 1106,1113 (10th Cir. 2007).
4. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
at 802. The prima facie case differs depending on the plaintiff's protected status. In every case,
however, the plaintiff must present some evidence of the employer's intent to discriminate because
of the protected status. To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must show:
(1) membership within a protected age group; (2) evidence of satisfactory work; (3) an adverse
employment action; and (4) some evidence the employer discriminated based on age. E.g., Pippin v.
Burlington Res. Oil and Gas Co., 440 F.3d 1186, 1192-93 (10th Cir. 2006). To establish a prima
facie case of disability discrimination, a plaintiff must show: (1) a disability under the ADA; (2)
qualification to perform the job; and (3) some evidence the employer discriminated because of the
disability. E.g., MacKenzie v. City & County of Denver, 414 F.3d 1266, 1274 (10th Cir. 2005). To
establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) protected opposition to dis-
crimination; (2) an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection between the opposition
and the employment action. E.g., Somoza v. Univ. of Denver, No. 06-1488, 2007 WL 4465244, at
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dence that (1) the victim belongs to a protected class; (2) the victim suf-
fered an adverse employment action; and (3) the challenged action took
place under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. 5
If the employee succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the bur-
den of production shifts to the employer to articulate a "legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason" for the adverse employment action.6 The court
need not believe the employer's reason, so long as it is plausible. Once
the employer supplies its reason, the presumption of discrimination at-
tendant to the plaintiffs prima facie case is rebutted.7
The third-and most important-step in the tripartite scheme then
arises: the pretext inquiry. In this final step, the employee must carry
the burden of proof in showing that the employer's action stemmed from
the discriminatory basis alleged.8 That is, the plaintiff must prove the
employer's proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reason was pretex-
tual.
To prove pretext, the plaintiff must produce evidence of "such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contra-
dictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that
a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence
and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted nondis-
criminatory reasons." 9 "The relevant inquiry as to a proffered reason's
falsity 'is not whether the employer's proffered reasons were wise, fair or
correct, but whether it honestly believed those reasons and acted in good
faith upon those beliefs."' ' 1° Because this pretext inquiry is necessarily a
motive inquiry, a great deal of subjectivity inevitably attaches.
If the plaintiff succeeds in showing evidence of pretext, summary
judgment1' in favor of the employer is inappropriate and the case should
go to the factfinder. 12 Likewise, summary judgment at this stage in favor
*3 (10th Cir. Dec. 21, 2007); Haynes v. Level 3 Commc'ns, LLC, 456 F.3d 1215, 1228 (10th Cir.
2006).
5. E.g., Sorbo v. United Parcel Serv., 432 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2005).
6. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 506-07.
7. Id. at 507.
8. Id. at 507-08.
9. Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Olson v. Gen. Elec.
Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1996)); see also Argo v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1203 (10th Cir. 2006); Bryant v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 432 F.3d 1114,
1125 (10th Cir. 2005).
10. Nguyen v. Gambro BCT, Inc., 242 F. App'x 483, 489 (10th Cir. June 20, 2007) (quoting
Rivera v. City and County of Denver, 365 F.3d 912, 924-25 (10th Cir. 2004)).
11. It is important to emphasize that the McDonnell Douglas framework was not initially
developed as a tool for evaluating summary judgment motions. Wells v. Colorado Dep't of Transp.,
325 F.3d 1205, 1227 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., concurring). The opinion makes no reference to
summary judgment. The Supreme Court did not apply the framework to a summary judgment
motion until twenty-three years later in O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S.
308 (1996). As I will explain below, McDonnell Douglas has its greatest impact at the summary
judgment stage of a case.
12. Ingels v. Thiokol Corp., 42 F.3d 616, 622 (10th Cir. 1994).
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of the employee is also inappropriate.' 3  Thus, "if a plaintiff advances
evidence establishing a prima facie case and evidence upon which a fact-
finder could conclude that the defendant's alleged nondiscriminatory
reasons for the employment decisions are pretextual, the case should go
to the factfinder."'
' 4
As I will show, this focus on pretext has shifted the emphasis of an
employment discrimination case away from the ultimate issue of whether
the employer discriminated against the complaining employee. By
adopting this unique burden-shifting framework in lieu of the more cus-
tomary sufficiency of the evidence standard, the Supreme Court has left
the entire area of law confused.
I. THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS FRAMEWORK
A. Supreme Court Case Law
When deciding whether to grant a party summary judgment or a di-
rected verdict, appellate courts ordinarily determine whether the plaintiff
produced enough evidence to establish each element of the claim.' 5 In
McDonnell Douglas v. Green the Supreme Court announced that courts
should deviate from this long-standing practice in Title VII cases, and
instead evaluate the evidence under a three-part burden-shifting frame-
work. 16
Although the Court imposed a framework that substantially devi-
ated from past practices, it failed to explain or justify its decision.
Scholars and judges initially concluded McDonnell Douglas was a
"plaintiff-friendly opinion,"' 7 designed to "ease the evidentiary burdens
13. See, e.g., Ingels, 42 F.3d at 621-22 ("[A] factfmder may, but is not required to, find dis-
crimination when a plaintiff presents evidence that the defendant's proffered reasons are unworthy
of credence."); Whittington v. Nordam Group Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 993 (10th Cir. 2005) ("A showing
that the employer's justifications for its behavior are pretextual permits a finding of intentional
discrimination.") (quoting Exum v. U.S. Olympic Comm'n, 389 F.3d 1130, 1135 (10th Cir. 2004)).
14. Ingels, 42 F.3d at 622; Bryant, 432 F.3d at 1125; see also Morgan, 108 F.3d at 1323.
15. Wells, 325 F.3d at 1221 (Hartz, J., concurring).
16. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (describing the three-part
burden-shifting framework); see also Wells, 325 F.3d at 1221 ("The McDonnell Douglas framework
is a departure from the approach appellate courts customarily use in evaluating the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain a plaintiff's case, whether reviewing judgments after trial or summary judg-
ments."); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of
Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 215 (1993) (explaining in
McDonnell Douglas "the Court departed from the traditional order of proof in a civil case"); Sandra
F. Sperino, Flying Without a Statutory Basis: Why McDonnell Douglas is not Justified by Any
Statutory Construction Methodology, 43 HOuS. L. REV. 743, 753 (2006) ("The three-part burden-
shifting framework was a significant change from the tests that other lower courts previously had
used in disparate treatment discrimination cases."); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, 'Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le
Roi!': An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title
VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a 'Mixed Motives' Case, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 71, 84-
92 (2003) (explaining how the McDonnell Douglas framework departed from "common-law plead-
ing and practice").
17. Wells, 325 F.3d at 1224 (Hartz, J., concurring) (explaining that McDonnell Douglas was
"viewed at the time as a plaintiff-friendly opinion").
2008]
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on employment discrimination plaintiffs, who rarely are fortunate
enough to have access to direct evidence of intentional discrimination.,
18
In subsequent opinions, the Court concurred with this assessment.
1 9
The Court's groundbreaking opinion also created substantial confu-
sion in the lower courts. Most notably, a circuit split developed over the
question of what constituted the defendant's burden at the second stage
of the McDonnell Douglas analysis-the employer's explanation of the
adverse action. Some courts, 20 including the Tenth Circuit, 21 concluded
the defendant had the burden of persuasion: In order to rebut the pre-
sumption of discrimination, the defendant had to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence the existence of a non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse action. Other courts interpreted McDonnell Douglas as merely
requiring the defendant to produce some evidence of a legitimate reason
for the action.22
The Supreme Court settled this debate eight years later in Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.23 In order to rebut the
presumption of discrimination, the defendant must only satisfy a burden
of production. The burden, furthermore, is relatively easy to overcome.
The "defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually moti-
vated by the proffered reasons .... It is sufficient if the defendant's evi-
dence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against
the plaintiff.,
24
The Burdine opinion implies that once a plaintiff satisfies an initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, little differ-
ence exists between a case evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas
framework and a case evaluated under a traditional sufficiency of the
evidence standard. 5 Because a defendant almost always satisfies its
burden of production,26 the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas
18. Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 595 (11 th Cir. 1987); see also McGinley,
supra note 16, at 215 ("Because a plaintiff alleging discrimination under the disparate treatment
theory must prove that the defendant intended to discriminate, and intent is generally difficult to
prove absent a smoking gun, the Court departed from the traditional order of proof in a civil case.").
19. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) ("The shifting
burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the plaintiff [has] his
day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. See Burdine v. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 608 F.2d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 1979); Williams
v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
21. See Higgins v. Gates Rubber Co., 578 F.2d 281,284 (10th Cir. 1978).
22. Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1980); Jackson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 624 F.2d
436, 443 (3d Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1025 (1st Cir. 1979) (Bownes, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
23. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
24. Id. at 254.
25. See Wells v. Colorado Dep't of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1224 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J.,
concurring) ("Burdine did not, however, dispel all confusion. Indeed, by clarifying that the prima
facie case did not shift the burden of persuasion, it raised the question whether the McDonnell Doug-
las framework accomplished much of anything.").
26. Van Detta, supra note 16, at 101 ("This 'burden' to 'articulate' a legitimate nondiscrimi-
natory reason ... is really no burden at all.").
[Vol. 85:3
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framework-the pretext stage-becomes the most critical. Burdine's
description of this step, furthermore, is similar to a description of the
analysis a court would undertake in evaluating the sufficiency of the evi-
dence in a non-Title VII case: The plaintiff "may succeed in [proving
discrimination] either directly by persuading the court that a discrimina-
tory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing
that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. 27
Thus, starting with Burdine, the Supreme Court began to move in
the direction of returning to a traditional sufficiency of the evidence
standard. The cases that followed Burdine reinforced the new approach
in two main ways. First, the Court clarified that when considering evi-
dence of pretext, courts should analyze the adequacy of the plaintiffs
evidence in the same manner they would evaluate it under a traditional
sufficiency of the evidence standard. Second, the Court limited the rele-
vancy and applicability of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
1. Pretext Analysis and the Traditional Sufficiency of the Evidence
Standard
In two opinions following Burdine, the Court clarified that the pre-
text stage of the McDonnell Douglas test is no different than an ordinary
sufficiency of the evidence analysis.
a. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks
2 8
In the first case, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, the plaintiff al-
leged that he was demoted and discharged because of his race. After a
bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the employer.2 9
The court explained that although the defendant's proffered reason for
firing the plaintiff was not credible, the plaintiff failed to carry his ulti-
mate burden of proving race was the reason he was terminated. 30 The
Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that as soon as the employee proved all
of the employer's proffered reasons for the adverse action were pretex-
tual, the employee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 31 The
Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's conclusion,
explaining "nothing in law would permit us to substitute for the required
finding that the employer's action was the product of unlawful discrimi-
nation, the much different (and much lesser) finding that the employer's
explanation of its action was not believable." 32 At the pretext stage,
therefore, a court should analyze the evidence under an ordinary suffi-
27. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
28. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
29. Id. at 505.
30. Id. at 508.
31. Id. at 508-09.
32. Id. at 514-15.
2008]
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ciency of the evidence standard and determine whether the plaintiff satis-
fied his burden of showing evidence of intentional discrimination.
b. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.
33
The Court reinforced this view several years later in Reeves v. San-
derson Plumbing Products, Inc. In Reeves, the jury concluded the de-
fendant violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
when it fired the plaintiff.34 The district court denied the defendant's
motion for a directed verdict, and the defendant appealed.35 The Fifth
Circuit reversed, holding that evidence satisfying the plaintiff's prima
facie case plus evidence that the defendant's proffered reason was not
credible was not sufficient to prove intentional discrimination.36
The Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's conclusion, holding
that "a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to
find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the
trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.
37
In reaching this decision, the Court once again strongly implied that at
the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a court should
evaluate the plaintiff's evidence of intentional discrimination no differ-
ently than it would evaluate evidence under a traditional sufficiency of
the evidence standard.38 The Court explained, for example:
In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer
from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to
cover up a discriminatory purpose. Such an inference is consistent
with the general principle of evidence law that the factfmder is enti-
tled to consider a party's dishonesty about a material fact as affirma-
tive evidence of guilt.
39
2. Limiting the Relevancy and Applicability of the McDonnell
Douglas Framework
In a series of four cases, the Court substantially limited the rele-
vancy and applicability of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
a. United States Postal Service Board v. Aikens
40
In United States Postal Service Board v. Aikens, the plaintiff filed
suit under Title VII, alleging his employer discriminated against him on
account of his race by refusing to promote him.4 1 After a bench trial, the
33. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
34. Id. at 138-39.
35. Id. at 139.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 148.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 147 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
41. Id. at 712-13.
[Vol. 85:3
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district court entered judgment in favor of the employer, holding the
plaintiff failed to prove a prima facie case of discrimination. 42 The Su-
preme Court concluded the court erred in granting the defendant judg-
ment on this basis. It explained, "[w]here the defendant has done every-
thing that would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out
a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer rele-
vant."
43
Aikens implies that as long as the defendant satisfied its burden of
producing evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for its employment
action, the court should evaluate the plaintiff's evidence under a tradi-
tional sufficiency of the evidence standard. 44 In essence, Aikens makes
the McDonnell Douglas framework irrelevant at the directed verdict
stage of a trial because "the employer will present evidence of a proper
motive in almost every case."45 To the extent that McDonnell Douglas
still matters, it only affects how judges evaluate motions for summary
judgment. 46
b. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston
47
The Supreme Court further limited the applicability of the McDon-
nell Douglas framework in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston. The
Court held the burden-shifting framework "is inapplicable where the
plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination."48  In Thurston, the
plaintiffs alleged the employer violated the ADEA by implementing a
system that forced airline pilots to either retire by age sixty or obtain
employment as a flight engineer through a bidding procedure.4 9 Because
the retirement system itself constituted direct evidence of age discrimina-
tion, the Court concluded the district court erred in evaluating the evi-
dence under the McDonnell Douglas test.50  The tripartite scheme was
designed for claims based on indirect evidence alone.
42. Id. at 713.
43. Id. at 715.
44. Id. at 715-16 ("On the state of the record at the close of the evidence, the District Court in
this case should have proceeded to this specific question directly, just as district courts decide dis-
puted questions of fact in other civil litigation."); see also id. at 716 ("[N]one of this means that trial
courts or reviewing courts should treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of
fact. Nor should they make their inquiry even more difficult by applying legal rules which were
devised to govern the allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof .... (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
45. Wells v. Colo. Dep't of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1226 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., concur-
ring).
46. Id. at 1226-27.
47. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
48. Id. at 121.
49. Id. at 116-18.
50. Id. at 118, 121.
2008]
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c. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins5'
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court further limited
the applicability of the McDonnell Douglas framework by concluding it
does not apply in mixed motive Title VII cases.52 A mixed motive case
involves evidence showing that an employment decision was made based
on both legitimate and illegitimate considerations.53 In contrast, in a
pretext case, the plaintiff alleges a prohibited consideration was the sole
cause of the employment action, and the employer's proffered reasons
were merely pretextual.54
In Price Waterhouse, partners in a professional accounting firm
proposed a female candidate for partnership." After deliberation and a
vote, the partners ultimately decided to hold her candidacy for reconsid-
eration.56 When the partners refused to repropose her for partnership, she
sued the firm, alleging sexual discrimination in violation of Title VII.
The district court concluded the partners had legitimate concerns about
the candidate's interpersonal skills, and these concerns did not serve as a
pretext for discrimination.57 At the same time, the court decided the firm
still violated Title VII because certain sexist remarks made by the part-
ners indicated discrimination played a role in the decision.58 The D.C.
Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.59
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it an "unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any indi-
vidual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin."60 In interpreting this language, Justice Brennan's plurality
opinion,6' Justice White's concurring opinion, and Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion all agreed the statute permitted courts to hold em-
ployers liable for employment decisions based on both permitted and
prohibited considerations.6' They also agreed courts should not apply the
McDonnell Douglas framework when evaluating such cases.63 A new
framework was needed. Within the scope of that new framework, if the
employee met the initial burden of proof, an employer could still avoid
51. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
52. Id. at 245-47 (Brennan, J., plurality); id. at 260 (White, J., concurring); id. at 270
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 246-47 (Brennan, J., plurality); id. at 260 (White, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 260 (White, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 233 (Brennan, J., plurality).
56. See id. at 232-33.
57. Id. at 231-32, 236.
58. Id. at 236-37.
59. Id. at 232.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
61. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Ste-
vens.
62. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 240 (Brennan, J., plurality); id. at 259-60 (White, J., concurring); id.
at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 246-47 (Brennan, J., plurality); id. at 260 (White, J., concurring).
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liability if it proved by a preponderance of evidence that it would have
made the same decision even if it had not taken the prohibited considera-
tion into account.
64
Justices Brennan, White, and O'Connor disagreed, however, about
what constituted the plaintiffs initial burden of proof. Justice Brennan
explained the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that a prohibited characteristic played a motivating part in the employ-
ment decision.65  Justice White required the plaintiff to show that the
66unlawful motive was a substantial factor in the adverse employment.
Finally, Justice O'Connor argued the plaintiff must prove by "direct evi-
dence ... an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the deci-
sion.' ,67 In subsequent cases, several circuits, 68 including the Tenth Cir-
cuit,69 followed Justice O'Connor's approach and required plaintiffs to
produce direct evidence of discrimination in order to establish liability
under a mixed motive theory.
d. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa
70
After Price Waterhouse, few plaintiffs pursued claims under the
mixed motive framework because most circuits concluded direct evi-
dence was necessary to prove liability under that theory. Because most
employment discrimination cases involve only circumstantial evidence,
the McDonnell Douglas framework continued to be the dominant
framework courts used to determine whether the plaintiff's Title VII
claims survived summary judgment.7' Partly in response to the Price
Waterhouse decision,72 Congress amended Title VII when it enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. The new statutory language clarified that "an
unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a moti-
vating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice.
73
64. Id. at 244-45 (Brennan, J., plurality); id. at 261 (White, J., concurring); id at 270
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 244-45 (Brennan, J., plurality).
66. Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
68. See, e.g., Mohr v. Dustrol, Inc., 306 F.3d 636, 640-41 (8th Cir. 2002); Fernandes v. Costa
Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 580 (1st Cit. 1999); Trotter v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 91
F.3d 1449, 1453-54 (11 th Cit. 1996); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cit. 1995).
69. See, e.g., EEOC v. Witel, Inc., 81 F.3d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir. 1996); Heim v. Utah, 8 F.3d
1541, 1546-47 (10th Cit. 1993).
70. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
71. See Carey v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 321 F. Supp. 2d 902, 915 (S.D. Ohio 2004).
72. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 94.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006) (emphasis added). The 1991 Act also altered the em-
ployer's affirmative defense. Under the Price Waterhouse framework, an employer does not violate
Title VII if the employer can satisfy its burden of persuasion. Under the 1991 Act, however the
employer still violates Title VII if the employer proves it would have made the same decision in the
absence of the protected characteristic. Under such circumstances, the plaintiff could obtain declara-
20081
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In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,74 the Supreme Court interpreted the
meaning of this new language in an opinion that could dramatically in-
crease the number of cases that are analyzed under the mixed motive
framework and decrease the number of cases examined under the
McDonnell Douglas framework. The potential implications of this case
will be further explored below."
B. Tenth Circuit Case Law on Pretext
To prove pretext in the Tenth Circuit, a plaintiff must produce evi-
dence of "such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoheren-
cies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for
its action that a reasonable fact finder could rationally find them unwor-
thy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the as-
serted nondiscriminatory reasons., 76 Because this pretextual inquiry is
necessarily a motive inquiry, the court is expected to probe the mental
status of the decision maker involved. Thus, "[t]he relevant inquiry as to
a proffered reason's falsity 'is not whether the employer's proffered rea-
sons were wise, fair or correct, but whether it honestly believed those
reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs.'"77
Tenth Circuit cases also address the typical situation where the em-
ployer has proffered multiple nondiscriminatory reasons for its employ-
ment decision. The general rule in these cases is an employee "must
proffer evidence that shows each of the employer's justifications is pre-
textual. 78 But this general rule is subject to numerous qualifications. If
the plaintiff "casts substantial doubt on many of the employer's multiple
reasons," for example, then summary judgment is not appropriate and the
case should go to the fact finder.79 Moreover, if one of the employer's
stated reasons for its action predominates over the others, "demonstrating
that reason to be pretextual is enough to avoid summary judgment.
8 0
1. Evidence Generally Used to Prove Pretext
As the case law surrounding pretext has developed, the Tenth Cir-
cuit determined certain types of evidence were sufficient to show pretext
in individual cases. Subsequent plaintiffs often try to shoe-horn the evi-
tory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. The plaintiff, however, could not obtain damages.
See id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
74. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. 90.
75. See infra Part II.C.
76. Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., 452 F.3d 1193, 1203 (10th Cir. 2006); Bryant
v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 432 F.3d 1114, 1125 (10th Cir. 2005); Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319,
1323 (10th Cir. 1997).
77. Nguyen v. Gambro BCT, Inc., 242 F. App'x 483, 489 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Rivera v.
City and County of Denver, 365 F.3d 912, 924-25 (10th Cir. 2004)).
78. Tyler v. RE/MAX Mountain States, Inc., 232 F.3d 808, 814 (10th Cir. 2000).
79. Id.
80. Bryant, 432 F.3d at 1127; accord Jaramillo v. Colo. Judicial Dep't, 427 F.3d 1303, 1310
(10th Cir. 2005).
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dence they have of pretext into these talismanic categories. Although
these categories are found neither in Congress's statutory language nor in
the Supreme Court's relevant case law, plaintiffs continue to invoke
them to make their required showing of pretext. The most common
categories of evidence are the following:
General Bias. Evidence in this category tends to show various su-
pervisors of the employer harbored discriminatory animus toward indi-
viduals in the plaintiffs protected class. For example, there may be a
"pattern and practice" of failing to promote employees of a certain
status,8 ' a "long history" of discriminatory conduct,82 or a "culture of
racial hostility., 83  Because it is so generalized, this type of evidence,
standing alone, rarely suffices to show pretext. 84 The plaintiff must show
"the alleged general discriminatory animus on the part of the employer
played a direct role in the adverse employment decision in the plaintiffs
case." 85 .' [S]ome nexus between the circumstantial evidence of general
bias and the decision to terminate is required."'
86
Disparate Treatment / Prior Treatment of Plaintiff Adverse em-
ployment actions or generally bad treatment of the plaintiff may, in some
cases, lead to an inference of discrimination. 87 For example, being disci-
plined for reading on the job-while other similarly-situated employees
not in a protected class were not-may point toward discrimination in a
later adverse employment decision.88 "A plaintiff seeking to show pre-
text often does so by providing evidence that he was treated differently
from other similarly-situated employees who violated work rules of
comparable seriousness., 89 "Similarly situated employees are those who
deal with the same supervisor and are subject to the same standards gov-
erning performance evaluation and discipline." 90 This "same-supervisor
81. See generally Ortiz v. Norton, 254 F.3d 889, 896 (10th Cir. 2001) (explaining the type of
evidence a plaintiff should produce to show that the defendant's reason for its actions is "merely
pretext").
82. See generally Pippin v. Burlington Res. Oil and Gas Co., 440 F.3d 1186, 1197 (10th Cir.
2006) (explaining that the court can infer discrimination from a plaintiff's showing of such regular
conduct on the part of the defendant).
83. See generally English v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 248 F.3d 1002, 1010 (10th Cir. 2001)
(explaining that in order to show a "culture of racial hostility" the plaintiff must show some connec-
tion between the culture of hostility evidence and the defendant's decision to terminate the plaintiff).
84. See Bullington v. United Air Lines, 186 F.3d 1301, 1319 (10th Cir. 1999).
85. Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 483 F.3d 1106, 1118 (10th Cir. 2007).
86. Id. at 1117-18 (quoting English, 248 F.3d at 1010).
87. See Mohammed v. Callaway, 698 F.2d 395, 399 (10th Cir. 1983) (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (noting that the employer's treatment of the
employee during his term of employment is relevant to the employee's showing of pretext)).
88. Cf Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep't of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Servs., 165
F.3d 1321, 1331 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting this type of behavior may demonstrate pretext in some
cases, but not where the incident occurs "years before" the employment decision challenged).
89. Timmerman, 483 F.3d at 1120 (quoting Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Serv. Inc., 220 F.3d
1220, 1230 (10th Cir. 2000)).
90. Id. (quoting Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1404 (10th Cir. 1997)).
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rule" does not apply when the plaintiff alleges a company-wide discrimi-
natory reduction in force ("RIF"). 91
Statistical Evidence. "It is uniformly recognized that statistical data
showing an employer's pattern of conduct toward a protected class can
create an inference that an employer discriminated against individual
members of the class. 92 At the same time, "[s]tatistics taken in isolation
are generally not probative of... discrimination. ' The usefulness of
statistics depends on their relevance to the individual plaintiffs case.
"[A] plaintiffs statistical evidence must focus on eliminating nondis-
criminatory explanations for the disparate treatment by showing dispa-
rate treatment between comparable individuals."
94
Disturbing Procedural Irregularities / Company Policy. Evidence
of pretext can be shown if the defendant acted contrary to a written com-
pany policy or an unwritten policy or practice.95 The alleged irregularity
must have disadvantaged members of the protected class alone, rather
than all employees. 96 "[D]isturbing procedural irregularities surrounding
an adverse employment action may demonstrate that an employer's prof-
fered nondiscriminatory business reason is pretextual. ' '97  Courts may
infer pretext from procedural irregularities for the simple reason that the
employer may have concocted different policies for the sole purpose of
discriminating against the plaintiff.
Use of Subjective Criteria. The Tenth Circuit has held, "the pres-
ence of subjective decision-making can create a strong inference of dis-
crimination .... 98 "The use of such subjective criteria as 'dedication'
and 'enthusiasm' also 'may offer a convenient pretext for giving force
and effect to ... prejudice."'9 9 Because the court evaluates whether sub-
jective criteria were used in the employment decision in an objective,
91. Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2006); see also
Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164, 1175 (10th Cir. 2006); EEOC v.
PVNF, L.L.C., 487 F.3d 790, 805 (10th Cir. 2007).
92. Fallis v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 944 F.2d 743, 746 (10th Cir. 1991).
93. Jones v. Unisys Corp., 54 F.3d 624, 632 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Ortiz v. Norton, 254
F.3d 889, 896-97 (10th Cir. 2001).
94. Fallis, 944 F.2d at 746.
95. Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1230 (10th Cir. 2000); see also
Fallis, 944 F.2d at 747.
96. Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1230 n.9 (quoting Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 454 n.20
(10th Cir. 1995)).
97. Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 483 F.3d 1106, 1122 (2007); see also Simms v. Okla-
homa ex rel. Dep't of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1329 (finding no
procedural irregularities because defendant-employer's hiring actions were consistent with its pub-
lished policies); Doebele v. SprintlUnited Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1138 n.1 1 (10th Cir. 2003).
98. Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1045 (10th Cir. 1981).
99. Mohammed v. Callaway, 698 F.2d 395, 401 (10th Cir. 1983) (quoting Thornton v. Coffey,
618 F.2d 686, 691 (lOth Cir. 1980)).
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reasonable light, an employee's allegation of pretext based on a self-
assessment of his abilities is insufficient.'00
2. Evidence Used to Show Pretext in Reduction in Force Cases
The Tenth Circuit has treated allegations of pretext somewhat dif-
ferently in RIF cases. In a RIF case, a plaintiff can demonstrate pretext
in three main ways: (1) plaintiff's termination does not accord with the
RIF criteria; (2) defendant's RIF criteria were deliberately falsified or
manipulated in order to terminate plaintiff; or (3) the RIF was generally
pretextual.' 0°
The third category generates the most heated disagreements because
it is the most open-ended. A RIF can be deemed generally pretextual in
various ways. First, the RIF is likely pretextual if the employer actively
sought to replace RIF-terminated employees with new hires during the
RIF general time frame. 10 2 Although "leaving out new employees from
RIF decisions does not establish pretext," hiring new ones does.1
0 3
Second, the RIF is likely pretextual if the employer evaluates and
ranks employees using "wholly subjective" criteria.1 4 As with evidence
of subjective criteria more generally, however, "[t]he subjective nature of
the evaluations may be a factor to consider in pretext but it ordinarily is
not by itself sufficient to establish pretext.''
0 5
Third, an employee may establish pretext by showing his or her job
was not in fact eliminated in the RIF.10 6 "Where an employee is selected
for RIF termination solely on the basis of position elimination, qualifica-
tions become irrelevant and one way that employee can show pretext is
to present evidence that his job was not in fact eliminated but instead
remained a single, distinct position."'
10 7
3. Evidence of Pretext Must be Linked to the Decision Maker
Despite the various pretext categories crafted by the Tenth Circuit,
there must be some evidence the decision maker had a discriminatory
intent. To make out a claim of employment discrimination, there must
100. See Simms, 165 F.3d at 1329 ("[A]n employee's own opinions about his qualifications do
not give rise to a material factual dispute.") (quoting Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 487 (7th Cir.
1996)).
101. See, e.g., Beaird v. Seagate Tech., 145 F.3d 1159, 1168 (10th Cir. 1998).
102. Id.; Pippin v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co., 440 F.3d 1186, 1193 (1Oth Cir. 2006).
103. Pippin, 440 F.3d at 1194; Fallis v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 944 F.2d 743, 745 (10th Cir.
1991).
104. Pippin, 440 F.3d at 1195 (citing Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1218
(10th Cir. 2002)).
105. Id.; see also Furr v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 82 F.3d 980, 987 (1996); Simms, 165 F.3d at
1328.
106. Pippin, 440 F.3d at 1194 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Id.
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be some nexus between the decision maker's unlawful discrimination
and the employment decision.1
0 8
In Belcher v. Boeing,l0 9 for example, the plaintiff failed to establish
a case of race discrimination where the defendant responsible for plain-
tiff's termination did not know plaintiff was African-American.1 0  The
court held, "the inference of discrimination does not make sense when
the decision maker is unaware of the employe[e]'s membership in a pro-
tected class.""' In two alleged retaliation cases, the plaintiffs could not
make out a case because the decision maker never knew of the protected
conduct. 1 2  In Henderson v. Echostar,113 the court held plaintiff had
failed in his case of disability discrimination, because it was undisputed
the employer "was not made aware of any such impairments until after
[plaintiff] was fired."' 1' 4 In Rakity v. Dillon Cos.,' 1 5 the court held that
whether one supervisor may have considered plaintiff disabled was im-
material in light of the undisputed fact that a different supervisor was
responsible for the adverse employment action.1 6  Thus, despite the
categorical label placed on a plaintiffs evidence of pretext, the plaintiff
must link up the evidence with an intent to discriminate on behalf of the
decision maker."l
7
C. Other Circuits' Case Law on Pretext
1. Evidence Generally Used to Show Pretext
Other courts of appeals have adopted categories of pretext evidence
similar to those used by the Tenth Circuit. Sometimes the formulation of
the category is slightly different, but often the exact phrases are used.
Thus, it is obvious the courts of appeals are looking to each other to fig-
108. Cf Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1233 (10th Cir. 2006)
(Tymkovich, J., dissenting) ("Even taking as true [plaintiff's] assertion that these witnesses would
provide credible evidence that managers other than [the decision maker in this case] were motivated
by discriminatory animus, this does not in and of itself support the conclusion that [decision maker]
was so motivated."). The Supreme Court recently heard oral argument in Mendelsohn on the issue
of whether a district court must admit testimony by nonparties alleging discrimination by company
managers not involved in the adverse employment action at issue (i.e., "me too" evidence).
109. 105 F. App'x 222 (10th Cir. 2004).
110. Id. at 227.
111. Id. at 226.
112. Jones v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 1260, 1269-70 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that where decision
maker was unaware of plaintiff's outspokenness, plaintiff failed to establish causation requirement
for retaliation claim); Williams v. Rice, 983 F.2d 177, 181 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting "the supervisor
who made the decision to remove Plaintiff[] was not aware that Plaintiff had filed any EEO com-
plaints").
113. 172 F. App'x 892 (10th Cir. 2006).
114. ld. at 895.
115. 302 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2002).
116. Id. at 1163.
117. The only possible exception to this rule is referred to as a "cat's paw" or "rubber stamp"
decision making process. In those situations, a biased subordinate lacking decision-making power
uses the formal decision maker to trigger a discriminatory employment action. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v.
BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 484-89 (10th Cir. 2006) (describing the
theory behind liability in "cat's paw" situations).
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ure out how to conduct the pretext analysis as set forth in McDonnell
Douglas. Although this helps ensure some level of consistency across
the country, the focus is misplaced: The courts should instead focus on
the issue of the employer's discriminatory motives. Tenth Circuit cate-
gories used in other circuits include:
General Bias. Many circuits also cognize a category of general bias,
including the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits.
118
Disparate Treatment / Prior Treatment of Plaintiff Every court of
appeals recognizes that disparate treatment or prior bad treatment of
plaintiff may give rise to an inference of pretext on the part of the de-
fendant-employer. 1
19
Statistical Evidence. At least the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and
D.C. Circuits recognize statistical evidence may be used by a plaintiff
to prove pretext.
20
Disturbing Procedural Irregularities / Failure to Follow Company
Policy. Most circuits, including the Second, Eighth, and D.C. Cir-
cuits, have held a plaintiff may demonstrate pretext by showing the
employer's employment decision was filled with disturbing proce-
dural irregularities or the employer failed to follow company poli-
cies.
12 1
Use of Subjective Criteria. The Fifth Circuit agrees with the Tenth
that use of subjective criteria in making an employment decision can
lead to an inference of discrimination.1
22
In addition to the categories used by the Tenth Circuit, other circuits
have fashioned additional categories of evidence that plaintiffs can use to
show pretext. These categories include:
118. Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 26 F.3d 1277, 1295 (5th Cir. 1994); Hernandez v.
HCH Miller Park Joint Venture, 418 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2005); Vaughn v. Roadway Express,
Inc., 164 F.3d 1087, 1091 (8th Cir. 1998); Diaz v. AT&T, 752 F.2d 1356, 1364 (9th Cir. 1985).
119. Nasti v. CIBA Specialty Chems. Corp., 492 F.3d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 2007); Boumehdi v.
Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 790-92 (7th Cir. 2007); McClain v. NorthWest Comm. Cor-
rections Ctr. Judicial Corr. Bd., 440 F.3d 320, 334 (6th Cir. 2006); 2922 Sherman Ave. Tenants'
Assoc. v. Dist. of Columbia, 444 F.3d 673, 684 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 417
F.3d 845, 853 (8th Cir. 2005); Raad v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185,
1192-95 (9th Cir. 2003) (prior treatment of plaintiff); Che v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.3d 31,
39 (1st Cir. 2003); Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 43 (2d Cir. 2000); Hughes v. Bedsole,
48 F.3d 1376, 1384-85 (4th Cir. 1995); Richardson v. Leeds Police Dept., 71 F.3d 801, 805-07 (11 th
Cir. 1995); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 538 (3d Cir. 1992).
120. Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420, 1442 (2d Cir. 1995); Anderson, 26 F.3d at 1290;
Mister v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 832 F.2d 1427, 1435 (7th Cir. 1987); Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488
F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007); Krodel v. Young, 748 F.2d 701, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
121. Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel, 143 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1998); Ledbetter v. Alltel
Corporate Servs., Inc., 437 F.3d 717, 722 (8th Cir. 2006); Krodel, 748 F.2d at 711.
122. Payne v. Travenol Labs, Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 827 (5th Cir. 1982).
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Anecdotes or Anecdotal Evidence. The Second, Fifth, and D.C. Cir-
cuits have a category called anecdotal evidence that can be used to
show pretext. 123
Qualifications Jump off the Page and Slap You in the Face. The
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted a standard whereby an em-
ployee may make out a case of pretext by showing an individual who
was hired instead of the aggrieved plaintiff was obviously not as
qualified. 124
Substantial Changes in Proffered Reason. The Fourth and Eighth
Circuits allow an inference of pretext where the employer has made
substantial changes over time in its proffered reason for an employ-
ment decision.
125
2. Evidence Must be Linked to the Decision Maker
Most circuits agree with the Tenth Circuit that the decision maker
must know about the employee's protected status for the employee to
make out a case of employment discrimination. 126  This accords with
Supreme Court precedent.' 27 In Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez,128 for ex-
ample, the Court ruled in favor of the defendant as a matter of law where
the decision maker did not know of the plaintiff-employee's protected
status. The Court held, "If [the decision maker] were truly unaware that
such a disability existed, it would be impossible for her hiring decision to
have been based, even in part, on [plaintiffs] disability.'
129
In sum, the courts of appeals have adopted various categories of
evidence into which prospective plaintiffs try to fit their claims of pre-
text. This accords with the practice in the Tenth Circuit. The problem
123. Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1438-39; Anderson, 26 F.3d at 1289-90, 1294; Krodel, 748 F.2d at 710-
11.
124. Lee v. GTE Florida, Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11 th Cir. 2000); Deines v. Tex. Dept. of
Protective and Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 1999). But see Road, 323 F.3d at 1194
("We have never followed the Fifth Circuit in holding that the disparity in candidates' qualifications
must be so apparent as to jump off the page and slap us in the face to support a finding of pretext.")
(internal marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit has adopted a formulation where the aggrieved plain-
tiffs qualifications need only be "clearly superior." Id.
125. E.E.O.C. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d 846, 852-53 (4th Cir. 2001); Kobrin v. Univ.
of Minn., 34 F.3d 698, 703 (8th Cir. 1994).
126. See, e.g., Schreiner v. Caterpillar, Inc., 250 F.3d 1096, 1099 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding
sexist comments "are relevant only when attributable to the person who made the adverse employ-
ment decision"); Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 217 (4th Cir. 2007)
("[U]ltimately, it is the perception of the decisionmaker which is relevant."); Medina-Munoz v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1990) ("The biases of one who neither makes nor
influences the challenged personnel decision are not probative in an employment discrimination
case.").
127. As noted supra note 108, the Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments in
Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn, which also concerns the relevance of evidence of
discriminatory animus harbored by non-decision makers. See Transcript of Oral Argument, 128 S.
Ct. 435 (2007).
128. 540 U.S. 44 (2003).
129. Id. at 55 n.7.
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with this approach is that the categories of pretextual evidence divert the
attention of judges and juries away from the ultimate issue in every case:
whether the adverse employment decision resulted from the employer's
unlawful discrimination.
II. PROBLEMS WITH MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
Several problems arise out of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
A thoughtful concurrence in Wells v. Colorado Department of Transpor-
tation highlights some of them. 30  First, the compartmentalization of
evidence causes courts to put on blinders, looking at categories of evi-
dence narrowly while the totality of the evidence may point to discrimi-
nation. 131 Second, the framework creates an artificial distinction between
direct and circumstantial evidence. 132 Third, the three-part test emptied
the field of other equally plausible ways of examining evidence, ways
that might not fit in the formalistic categories established by the Supreme
Court. 33 Finally, the courts are confused about what McDonnell Doug-
las means for cases that go to the jury. In this Part, I will further describe
these problems, as well as other conundrums.
A. Over-Compartmentalization of Evidence
The tripartite scheme leads factfinders (or more precisely courts
considering motions for summary judgment) to (unwittingly) over-
compartmentalize evidence. In Reeves, the Supreme Court suggested
that the Fifth Circuit erred by "ignor[ing] the evidence supporting peti-
tioner's prima facie case" in reviewing whether there was discrimination
during the pretext stage of analysis. 134  Reeves rebuked over-
compartmentalization of the evidence in the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work when it noted "the trier of fact may still consider the evidence es-
tablishing the plaintiffs prima facie case and inferences properly drawn
therefrom... on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is pre-
textual."'
1 35
130. Wells v. Colo. Dep't of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1221-28 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J.,
concurring); see also Zamora v. Elite Logistics, Inc., 478 F.3d 1160, 1167 (10th Cir. 2007) (Hartz,
J., concurring, joined by Tymkovich, J.) ("I continue to believe that we should not apply the frame-
work of McDonnell Douglas ... to review a summary judgment when the existence of a prima facie
case is not disputed.... Applying that framework is inconsistent with Supreme Court authority,
adds unnecessary complexity to the analysis, and is too likely to cause us to reach a result contrary to
what we would decide if we focused on the ultimate question of discrimination vel non.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
131. Wells, 325 F.3d at 1221-28.
132. Id. at 1225.
133. Id. at 1224.
134. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 146 (2000).
135. Id. at 143 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Vasquez v. County of Los
Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 649 (9th Cir. 2003) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) ("The trier of fact may con-
sider the same evidence that the plaintiff has introduced to establish a primafacie case in determin-
ing whether the defendant's explanation for the employment decision is pretextual.") (quoting Lowe
v. Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 1985)).
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In Reeves, the Supreme Court chastised the Fifth Circuit for failing
to consider all the evidence of discrimination. In reversing the jury's
verdict in favor of the employee, the court of appeals "ignored the evi-
dence supporting petitioner's prima facie case and challenging respon-
dent's explanation for its decision." 136  The Fifth Circuit thought the
plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence for the
trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its decision, was nevertheless insufficient as a matter of law to
sustain a jury's verdict in favor of plaintiff.13 7  The Supreme Court
thought otherwise. It held, "In appropriate circumstances, the trier of
fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the em-
ployer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose."'
138
In Hicks, decided seven years earlier, the Supreme Court had al-
ready warned against over-compartmentalization of evidence. The Court
made clear the factfinder's rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons
permits the trier of fact to infer the employer discriminated, but does not
require such an inference.' 39 The Court held, "the Court of Appeals'
holding that rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons compels
judgment for the plaintiff disregards the fundamental principle of Rule
301 that a presumption does not shift the burden of proof, and ignores
our repeated admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the
'ultimate burden of [persuasion].'"140
Despite the Court's repeated warnings against over-
compartmentalization of evidence, there is widespread evidence it still
plagues the lower courts today. A case from the Northern District of
Illinois typifies the problem. In Jarosz v. Seko Air Freight, Inc., the
plaintiff alleged discrimination on the basis of her gender.' 4' The em-
ployer's defense was that it fired plaintiff because she was improperly
maintaining relationships with defendant's competitors in violation of
company policy. In applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, the
court decided some of the employer's evidence could not be introduced
to rebut plaintiffs showing of a prima facie case, but instead had to wait
until the employer was obliged to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the employment action. The court ruled, "Defendant's allega-
tion that Plaintiff defied Defendant's orders . . .is more appropriately
introduced as a legitimate reason for terminating Plaintiff rather than as
136. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 197 F.3d 688, 693-
94 (5th Cir. 1999)).
137. Reeves, 197 F.3d at 693.
138. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147.
139. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
140. Id. (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)); see
also Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV.
2229, 2282-90 (1995).
141. Jarosz v. Seko Air Freight, Inc., No. 92-7246, 1994 WL 11649 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 1994).
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evidence that Plaintiff was not meeting Defendant's reasonable perform-
ance expectations."'
142
By dividing the presentation of the evidence into three stages, the
ultimate fact of discrimination can easily become lost. Courts are overly
concerned with fitting the evidence available in a particular case into
artificial categories of "prima facie case," "legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason," and "pretext." Instead, they should be focused
on gathering all evidence tending to show the defendant-employer dis-
criminated.
B. Direct Versus Circumstantial Evidence
Another fundamental problem with the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work is the artificial distinction it creates between direct and circumstan-
tial evidence. Under existing doctrine, courts need to classify evidence
as either direct or indirect because the type of evidence produced by the
plaintiff determines whether the courts should apply the McDonnell
Douglas framework. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,143 the
Supreme Court held courts do not need to apply the McDonnell Douglas
framework in an ADEA case if the plaintiff produces direct evidence. At
least prior to the Desert Palace decision, a plaintiff also needed to pro-
duce direct evidence in order to pursue a case under a mixed motive the-
ory.
144
Frequently it is difficult to classify evidence as direct or circumstan-
tial. Judge Hartz in a concurring opinion in Wells v. Colorado Depart-
ment of Transportation145 thoughtfully addresses this conundrum. The
appeal involved a claim of retaliation arising from complaints of gender
discrimination. In evaluating the evidence produced at the summary
judgment stage, the concurrence observed:
In this case, for example, would testimony that Mr. Moston called
Plaintiff's lawsuit a "firivolous ... pain in the ass" be direct evidence
of discrimination? If the evidence is "direct evidence," must we then
abandon the McDonnell Douglas framework in our review of the
case? If it is not "direct evidence," how does it fit within the McDon-
nell Douglas framework?
146
Another problem with the direct and indirect evidence dichotomy is
that it is based on the assumption that direct evidence is inherently more
reliable than circumstantial evidence. But "[t]he authorities are legion
that circumstantial evidence can be every bit as compelling as direct evi-
142. Id. at *4.
143. 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).
144. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
145. 325 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2003).
146. Id. at 1225 (Hartz, J., concurring).
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dence."'147  Often the direct evidence of a positive eyewitness can be
quite undone by contradictory circumstantial evidence.
Finally, this inquiry distracts the court from what it should be focus-
ing its attention on: determining whether the plaintiff produced suffi-
cient evidence of discrimination. As Judge Hartz observed in Wells:
I would have thought that by now the distinction between direct and
circumstantial evidence would have been disregarded in considering
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a claim. [This demon-
strates] how the use of the McDonnell Douglas framework so readily
lends itself to consideration of formalities instead of the essence of
the issue at hand.
1 48
C. Mixed-Motive Cases
Another problem is the artificial distinction between mixed motive
and single motive Title VII cases. As explained above, this distinction
was created by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse.149 Under a sin-
gle motive theory (i.e., McDonnell Douglas framework), a plaintiff ulti-
mately must prove that discrimination was the sole factor influencing the
employment decision, while under a mixed motive theory, a plaintiff
must merely show that discrimination was a motivating factor. Nothing
in the text of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, indicates that Con-
gress intended courts to maintain this dichotomy. The statute plainly
states, "an unlawful employment practice is established when the com-
plaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though
other factors also motivated the practice."'50 In this Part, I will explain
why the Supreme Court's decision in Desert Palace creates additional
confusion about when courts should evaluate Title VII cases under the
mixed motive framework rather than the McDonnell Douglas formula.'
5'
1. Potential Implications of Desert Palace
In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,152 an employee sued her employer
under Title VII, alleging gender discrimination. The district court pro-
posed to give the jury the following mixed motive instruction:
147. Whittington v. Nordam Group Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 996 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Rogers v.
Mo. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n.17 (1957)); The Robert Edwards, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 187, 190
(1821); United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2d Cir. 1933); IA John Henry Wigmore,
EVIDENCE § 26 (Peter Tillers rev. 1983).
148. Wells, 325 F.3d at 1225 (Hartz, J., concurring).
149. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
151. At least one circuit has concluded Desert Palace also affects mixed motive claims that are
brought under statutes other than 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). See, e.g., Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc.,
376 F.3d 305, 311-12 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding the Court's analysis of mixed motive Title VII cases
in Desert Palace is also applicable to ADEA claims).
152. 539 U.S. 90, 96 (2003).
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You have heard evidence that the defendant's treatment of the plain-
tiff was motivated by the plaintiff's sex and also by other lawful rea-
sons. If you find that the plaintiffs sex was a motivating factor in the
defendant's treatment of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your
verdict, even if you find that the defendant's conduct was also moti-
vated by a lawful reason.
However, if you find that the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff
was motivated by both gender and lawful reasons, you must decide
whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages. The plaintiff is entitled to
damages unless the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant would have treated plaintiff similarly even if
the plaintiff's gender had played no role in the employment deci-
sion. 1
53
The employer objected, arguing the plaintiff was not entitled to such an
instruction because she had failed to produce any direct evidence of dis-
crimination.1 54  The district court rejected the objection, and the jury
found for the plaintiff.155 An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's judgment, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
156
In affirming the Ninth Circuit's judgment, the Supreme Court ex-
plained that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 clarified that a plaintiff pursu-
ing judgment under a mixed motive theory does not need to prove his
case using direct evidence. 57 Therefore, in order to obtain a mixed mo-
tive jury instruction, "a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for
a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [a
prohibited characteristic] was a motivating factor for any employment
practice."' 158 This holding implies courts should apply an ordinary suffi-
ciency of the evidence standard in determining whether the plaintiff has
satisfied the burden.
Although Desert Palace's opinion is about jury instructions, several
judges, 159 practitioners, 16 and scholars' 6 1 have suggested that the Su-
preme Court's elimination of the direct evidence requirement carries
153. Id. at 96-97.
154. Id. at 97.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 97-98.
157. Id. at 101-02.
158. Id. at 101.
159. See, e.g., Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 740 (8th Cir. 2004) (Magnuson, J.,
concurring).
160. See, e.g., Bettina Plevan et al., Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination Cases
After Desert Palace, in 745 LITIGATION STRATEGY: PREPARING AND DEFENDING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MOTIONs 815 (2006).
161. See generally T.L. Nagy, The Fall of the False Dichotomy: The Effect of Desert Palace v.
Costa on Summary Judgment in Title VII Discrimination Cases, 46 S. TEX. L. REv. 137 (2004); Van
Detta, supra note 16.
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over into the summary judgment context. 162 One judge went so far as to
claim 163 the Court's reasoning in Desert Palace should be extended to
the summary judgment context because the reasonable jury standard used
to determine whether the court should issue mixed motive jury instruc-
tions is the same as the standard used to determine whether the plaintiffs
claims survive summary judgment. 164
If plaintiffs no longer need to produce direct evidence to survive
summary judgment, potentially every Title VII case could be analyzed
under both the mixed motive approach and the McDonnell Douglas sin-
gle motive approach. 65 If both options are available to plaintiffs, most-
if not all-plaintiffs would likely choose the mixed motive theory. As
Judge Magnuson explains, "a plaintiff that prevails under either theory
obtains the same relief .... There is no need for a plaintiff to prove the
more onerous single-motive case, when all that Title VII requires a plain-
tiff to prove is that discrimination was a motivating factor in the em-
ployment decision." 66
Based on this reasoning, Judge Magnuson and others have sug-
gested Desert Palace makes the McDonnell Douglas framework essen-
tially irrelevant at the summary judgment stage of a Title VII case. They
suggest courts should instead simply apply a traditional sufficiency of the
evidence standard to determine whether unlawful discrimination was a
motivating factor in an employment decision, and whether the employer
can establish an affirmative defense.
1 67
162. See generally Plevan et al., supra note 160 (summarizing cases); Nagy, supra note 161;
Van Detta, supra note 16.
163. Griffith, 387 F.3d at 745 (Magnuson, J., concurring).
164. Judge Magnuson reasoned:
Although the context of the decision applied to jury instructions, the practical effect of
Desert Palace nonetheless affects the analysis used at summary judgment. The reason-
able jury standard is the same as the summary judgment standard: whether the plaintiff
has presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could logically infer that
the adverse employment action resulted from an improper consideration of a protected
characteristic. Moreover, there is no support for the proposition that the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 compels different analyses at different procedural stages of a Title VII case. Ap-
plying the more onerous McDonnell Douglas paradigm at summary judgment and then
applying the Civil Rights Act of 1991 at trial is inconsistent and impractical. This ap-
proach requires the plaintiff to prove at summary judgment that an invidious characteris-
tic was the but-for cause of the employment action, but then at trial only requires the
plaintiff to prove that this characteristic was a motivating factor in the employment deci-
sion. This inconsistency further interferes with the ultimate issue of whether there is any
evidence that supports a finding that discrimination motivated the employment decision.
It is absurd to require the plaintiff to satisfy a higher burden at summary judgment when
the lesser burden is all that is required under the statute.
Id. at 745 n.9.
165. Id. at 744 (Magnuson, J., concurring) ('[P]rinciples of statutory interpretation compel the
conclusion that Congress never envisioned a dichotomy between single and mixed-motive cases.").
166. Id. (Magnuson, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 747-48.
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2. Confusion in the Tenth Circuit and Other Circuits
Nonetheless, courts throughout the country have struggled to inter-
pret the meaning of the Desert Palace opinion. One cause of this confu-
sion is the fact that the Supreme Court, in a footnote, explicitly declined
to address the affect the case had on the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work. 68 In a subsequent opinion-Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez'69-the
Supreme Court applied the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework
and made absolutely no reference to the Desert Palace opinion. As
Judge Magnuson commented, "Just as the Supreme Court ignored
McDonnell Douglas in the Desert Palace opinion, the Supreme Court
likewise ignored Desert Palace in the Raytheon opinion. These inconsis-
tencies further demonstrate the confusion that McDonnell Douglas cre-
ates. 170
This confusion clearly manifests itself in the Tenth Circuit's post-
Desert Palace decisions. One unreported decision, analyzing the impact
Desert Palace had on summary judgment motions, held that a court may
apply the mixed motive framework even if the plaintiff only produced
circumstantial evidence of discrimination.' 7' A decision published the
same year, however, did not mention Desert Palace and suggested the
direct evidence requirement still existed.
72
Assuming plaintiffs are permitted to pursue a Title VII claim under
the mixed motive framework without direct evidence, it is unclear when
courts should apply the framework. In one unreported case, the em-
ployee argued the district court erred in only applying the traditional
McDonnell Douglas framework, and not the mixed motive analysis.
73
The panel declined to reach the issue because the plaintiff did not spe-
cifically raise the mixed motive theory before the district court.17 4 In a
different unreported case, the Tenth Circuit implied that the mere presen-
tation of evidence of a mixed motive triggered the district court's obliga-
tion to evaluate the plaintiffs Title VII retaliation claim under a mixed
motive analysis. 
75
168. "This case does not require us to decide when, if ever, § 107 applies outside of the mixed-
motive context." Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 n. 1 (2003).
169. 540 U.S. 44, 50 (2003).
170. Griffith, 387 F.3d at 747 n. 1I (Magnuson, J., concurring).
171. Cuenca v. Univ. of Kansas, 101 F. App'x 782, 787-88 (1Oth Cir. 2004).
172. Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1075-76 (10th Cir. 2004).
173. Furaus v. Citadel Commc'ns Corp., 168 F. App'x 257, 260 (10th Cir. 2006).
174. Id.
175. McNulty v. Sandoval County, 222 F. App'x 770, 774 (1Oth Cir. 2007).
Ms. McNulty first complains that defendants did not raise a mixed motive analysis until
oral argument on their summary judgment motion. She argues that the district court erred
in employing this untimely-raised affirmative defense in granting summary judgment to
the defendants .... While Ms. McNulty is correct that the Supreme Court has described
the mixed-motive approach as most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense ... this
court has indicated that a mixed-motive analysis should be employed whenever it is ap-
propriate, not necessarily only when the defendant invokes it .... The district court in-
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Finally, it is unclear whether Desert Palace requires the Tenth Cir-
cuit to modify the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework. In a re-
cent unpublished opinion, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that "some
courts and commentators have viewed the Desert Palace holding as re-
quiring a either a departure from or a modification of the McDonnell
Douglas framework."'' 76 The panel, however, declined to reach the issue.
The Tenth Circuit is not the only circuit that has struggled with the
meaning of Desert Palace. Other circuits have reached conflicting con-
clusions about its implications. 7 7  For example, the Fourth Circuit con-
cluded Desert Palace did not alter or nullify the traditional McDonnell
Douglas framework. 78 The Fifth Circuit, in contrast, extended the
court's reasoning in Price Waterhouse and Desert Palace to an ADEA
case, and adopted a "modified McDonnell Douglas approach" for analyz-
ing summary judgment motions. 179 Under this standard:
[T]he plaintiff must still demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation; the defendant then must articulate a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its decision to terminate the plaintiff;
and, if the defendant meets its burden of production, the plaintiff
must then offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact either (1) that the defendant's reason is not true, but is in-
stead a pretext for discrimination (pretext alternative); or (2) that the
defendant's reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its con-
duct, and another "motivating factor" is the plaintiff's protected char-
acteristic (mixed-motive[s] alternative).
180
Finally, the Ninth Circuit permits plaintiffs to decide whether to
proceed under the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework or a mixed
motive analysis. As the court explained in McGinest v. GTE Service
Corp.:181
[A]lthough the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework is a
useful tool to assist plaintiffs at the summary judgment stage so that
they may reach trial, nothing compels the parties to invoke the
McDonnell Douglas presumption. Rather, when responding to a
summary judgment motion, the plaintiff is presented with a choice
terpreted Ms. McNulty's arguments and the evidence presented before it as requiring a
mixed-motive analysis. Given that defendants cited four reasons for terminating Ms.
McNulty's employment, and that one of the reasons was arguably retaliatory while the
others were unquestionably legitimate performance-based concerns, that interpretation
was reasonable.
Id. at 773-74 (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. Furaus, 168 F. App'x at 260.
177. For an overview of cases addressing Desert Palace's impact on the McDonnell Douglas
framework, see Plevan et al., supra note 160.
178. See, e.g., Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 317-18 (4th Cir.
2005).
179. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004).
180. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
181. 360 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2004).
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regarding how to establish his or her case. [The plaintiff] may pro-
ceed by using the McDonnell Douglas framework, or alternatively,
may simply produce direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating
that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated [the em-
ployer]. 1
82
As these cases demonstrate, there continues to be substantial confusion
in the Tenth Circuit and in other circuits about the implications of Desert
Palace.
D. Jury Confusion
A circuit split exists over whether the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work should be used when a case goes to the jury. Some courts permit
the jury to hear a burden-shifting instruction; others find that instruction
too confusing.
The Tenth Circuit has held that juries should not use the McDonnell
Douglas framework. 83 "Because the employer will present evidence of
a proper motive in almost every case, the ultimate question for the jury
simply becomes 'which party's explanation of the employer's motivation
it believes.'" 84  This stems from the Supreme Court's observation in
Aikens: "Where the defendant has done everything that would be re-
quired of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case,
whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant."'' 85 Thus, after a
case goes to the jury, a reviewing court's only role is "to review the re-
cord for substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict.'
186
The court has "disapproved jury instructions which delineate the in-
tricacies of McDonnell Douglas because a jury is not well equipped to
understand the shifting burdens of such a formulation.' ' 8 7 "Our concern
with a McDonnell Douglas instruction is not that it favors one party over
another. It is that it unnecessarily complicates the jury's job, and unnec-
essary complexity increases the opportunity for error."'
' 88
A majority of circuits agree with the Tenth Circuit that the McDon-
nell Douglas burden-shifting scheme should not be introduced to the jury
through the jury instructions. Most conclude the only question that
182. Id. at 1122 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
183. Whittington v. Nordarn Group, Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 993 (10th Cir. 2005); Abuan v. Level 3
Commc'ns, Inc., 353 F.3d 1158, 1169 (10th Cir. 2003).
184. Whittington, 429 F.3d at 993 (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711, 716 (1983)).
185. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715.
186. Whittington, 429 F.3d at 993.
187. Messina v. Kroblin Transp. Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir. 1990); Whittington,
429 F.3d at 998. But see Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419, 1425, 1425 n.3 (10th Cir.
1993) (finding no error in a jury instruction that incorporated the entire McDonnell Douglas frame-
work because the instructions set forth the proper allocation of proof and directed the jury that age
must be the determinative factor in the failure to hire).
188. Whittington, 429 F.3d at 998.
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should go to the jury is the ultimate question of discrimination. 189 The
First, Second, and Seventh Circuits have taken a more ambiguous ap-
proach on the issue.' 90 The Sixth Circuit alone has not disparaged the
use of the McDonnell Douglas framework in jury instructions.191
III. REPLACING THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK
The current framework, stemming from the tripartite scheme first
announced in McDonnell Douglas, should be reconsidered in favor of a
simple sufficiency of the evidence approach. The plaintiff should main-
tain the burden of proof to convince the judge or jury that the adverse
employment decision about which the plaintiff complains resulted from a
discriminatory motive. In this way, the focus of the case is on whether or
not the employee suffered from discrimination.
Furthermore, an ordinary sufficiency of the evidence approach is
consistent with existing Supreme Court precedent. Hicks, Reeves, Aik-
ens, and Desert Palace have essentially eliminated the need for lower
courts to evaluate discrimination cases differently than other cases. No
189. Watson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 221 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that, although
it is proper "to instruct the jury that it may consider whether the factual predicates necessary to
establish the prima facie case have been shown," it is error to instruct the jury on the McDonnell
Douglas burden shifting scheme); Mullen v. Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1130, 1137
(4th Cir. 1988) (noting that the "shifting burdens of production of Burdine... are beyond the func-
tion and expertise of the jury" and are "overly complex"); Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co., 952 F.2d
119, 127 (5th Ci. 1992) ("Instructing the jury on the elements of a prima facie case, presumptions,
and the shifting burden of proof is unnecessary and confusing. Instead, the court should instruct the
jury to consider the ultimate question of whether defendant terminated plaintiff because of his
age."); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 849-50 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Loken, J., in Part II.A.
of the dissent, which a majority of the court joined) (holding that "the jury need only decide the
ultimate issue of intentional age discriminatien," and usually need not make findings on the prima
facie case or whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual); Sanghvi v. City of Claremont, 328
F.3d 532, 540 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[I]t is error to charge the jury with the elements of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case."); Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11 th Cir. 1999)
("[I]t is unnecessary and inappropriate to instruct the jury on the McDonnell Douglas analysis.").
190. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st Cir. 1979) ("McDonnell Douglas was not
written as a prospective jury charge; to read its technical aspects to a jury, as was done here, will add
little to the jury's understanding of the case .... "); Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 381-82 (2d
Cir. 1994) (holding that, although a jury instruction that included the phrase "prima facie case" and
referred to "defendant's 'burden' of produc[tion]" "created a distinct risk of confusing the jury," in
certain instances it would be appropriate to instruct the jury on the elements of a prima facie case);
Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Once the judge finds that the plaintiff has
made the minimum necessary demonstration (the 'prima facie case') and that the defendant has
produced an age-neutral explanation, the burden-shifting apparatus has served its purpose, and the
only remaining question-the only question the jury need answer-is whether the plaintiff is a
victim of intentional discrimination."). But see Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 200
(1st Cir. 1987) ("[T]he district court was correct in using the framework in the instructions to the
jury" because "[i]t is a straightforward way of explaining how to consider whether there is inten-
tional discrimination."), abrogated on other grounds by lacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 27 (1st
Cir. 1999); Lynch v. Belden & Co., 882 F.2d 262, 269 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[I]t was proper for the
district court to instruct the jury as to the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine formula for evaluating indi-
rect evidence .... [Such an instruction] accurately informed the jury of the parties' burdens ... 
(footnote omitted)).
191. Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 167, 167 n.9 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that it was
not error to "guid[e] the jury through a three-stage order of proof as opposed to instructing solely on
the ultimate issue of sex discrimination").
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formal three-step framework is needed to allow a plaintiff to prove dis-
criminatory intent through the use of circumstantial evidence.' 
92
Moving to a sufficiency of the evidence approach would have the
salutary effect of minimizing the need for the artificial categories of evi-
dence currently used by the courts of appeals. Although these categories
have become somewhat entrenched, they are too divorced from relevant
statutory and case law to be sustained. These artificially created catego-
ries of evidence-including "disturbing procedural irregularities," "prior
treatment of plaintiff," and "subjective criteria"-could be abandoned in
favor of a simpler, more straightforward analysis. The federal courts
should be focused on the ultimate question of whether the plaintiff has
brought forth sufficient evidence for a factfinder to conclude the plaintiff
suffered discrimination. The various categories of circumstantial evi-
dence used by plaintiffs and courts today only tend to cloud the issues.
A more direct analysis would keep all parties focused on the ultimate
question of discrimination.
Ideally, courts could also eliminate the artificial distinction between
mixed motive and single motive Title VII cases. As explained above,
nothing in the text of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 supports this dichot-
omy. At the very least, courts could adopt the approach followed by the
Ninth Circuit of permitting plaintiffs to choose whether they prefer to
pursue their claim under a mixed motive or a single motive framework.
Such an approach implicitly eliminates the relevancy of the McDonnell
Douglas analysis in Title VII cases because most (if not all) plaintiffs
would prefer to pursue their case under the less onerous and more statu-
torily anchored mixed motive framework. The mixed motive frame-
work, furthermore, closely resembles an ordinary sufficiency of the evi-
dence standard.
CONCLUSION
The McDonnell Douglas tripartite scheme has survived a long time.
But that is not a sufficient justification for continuing to rigidly adhere to
its precepts. Lower courts have struggled to implement the burden-
shifting framework for over thirty years. It may now be time to replace
the framework with a simpler, more direct method of determining the
question of discrimination.
192. Wells v. Colorado Dep't of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1223 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., concur-
ring); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (It is a "general
principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party's dishonesty about a mate-
rial fact as affirmative evidence of guilt.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Martin J. Katz, Re-
claiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 109, 130 (2007) ("This chain of permissive
inferences-from error, to lie, to cover-up, to discrimination-is similar to inferences that are rou-
tinely used in other parts of the law.").
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HANDS OFF THE GUN!
A CRITIQUE OF UNITED STATES V. JAMESON





When Ben Cecala went to his brother's funeral, he did not have a
gun.' After the funeral, he asked a friend to take him to the cemetery,
but just minutes after the group left the funeral, United States Marshals
stopped the car and found a gun right where Ben's feet would have
2been. Because he was a convicted felon, Ben could not legally have a
gun, and he was arrested and charged with being a felon in possession of
a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
3
The decision about how to defend the case was undoubtedly agoniz-
ing.4 The penalty for illegally possessing a firearm was up to ten years in
prison. However, witnesses from the funeral said that Ben could not
have had a gun on him during that time.6 The only evidence to link him
to the gun was the fact that it was at his feet when the car was stopped
t Attorney, Utah Federal Defender Office, and Special Counsel, United States Sentencing
Commission; Law Clerk to the Honorable Timothy M. Tymkovich, Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
2005-2006; Law Clerk to the Honorable Paul G. Cassell, United States District Court for the District
of Utah, 2003-2004; J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University, 2003. This
work was undertaken while the author was Special Counsel at the United States Sentencing Com-
mission. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
any policies or positions of the United States Sentencing Commission. I appreciate the thoughtful
feedback I received from Jeff Hurd, Erik Luna, Stew Young, Karyn Kenny, and Kent Hart and the
constant support and encouragement of my wife, Suzette.
I. Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum at 2, United States v. Cecala, No. 2:06-CR-00733
(D. Utah Mar. 16, 2007). Cecala was ably represented by Kristen Angelos of the Utah Federal
Defender Office, where I am currently employed as an attorney. I did not participate in Cecala's
case and was not privy to any confidential information. The discussion of this case is based only on
pleadings that are a matter of public record.
2. Government's Sentencing Memorandum at 2, United States v. Cecala, No. 2:06-CR-
00733 (D. Utah Mar. 23, 2007).
3. Statement by Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty at 1, United States v. Cecala, No.
2:06-CR-00733 (D. Utah Jan. 18, 2007).
4. Given the factual complexities and nuances of constructive possession cases, one scholar
suggests that attorneys should use a mathematical theorem to predict whether a particular defendant
should plead guilty or go to trial based on the probability of prevailing at trial on a constructive
possession case. David Caudill, Probability Theory and Constructive Possession of Narcotics: On
Finding that Winning Combination, 17 HOuS. L. REV. 541, 543 (1980) (arguing that Baye's Theory
provides a method for calculating a defendant's chances of winning a constructive possession case).
Under the Tenth Circuit's case law, Cecala's chances of winning would be close to zero.
5. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(a)(2) (2008).
6. Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 1, at Exhibit 1 (investigator notes of
Amy Borgholthaus interview).
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and the arresting officer's testimony that Ben made "furtive movements,"
his head "bobbing up and down," and looked like he was "playing with
something in his hands.",7 According to the officer, he "looked like he
may have placed something on the floor of the car."8 A fingerprint ex-
amination of the gun turned up a usable print, but this print did not match
up with anyone in the fingerprint database. 9 This fact meant the finger-
print could not have been Ben's-as a convicted felon, his prints were in
the system and would have shown up as a match.10 No witness could put
the gun in his hand at any point in the past or suggest that Ben ever in-
tended to pick it up at any point in the future.
Still, Ben decided to plead guilty. His plea agreement stated coldly:
On September 22, 2006, in Tooele, Utah, the car in which I was a
passenger was stopped. Officers conducted a search and found a
handgun-a Lorcin .380 pistol-and a loaded clip of ammunition on
the floor of the car, where my feet had been. I knowingly possessed
the firearm because I knew it was on the floor near my feet and I had
access to it. Thus, according to the law, I constructively possessed
it.1
Based on this admission, Ben was sentenced to four years in prison.
12
Crimes such as § 922(g), of course, aim to keep weapons out of the
hands of people who are likely to use them to do harm.13  In some cases,
prosecutors seek to punish individuals for possessing contraband not
actually within their immediate, physical control but within the broader
sphere over which they assert "dominion and control."' 4  Known as
"constructive" or "legal" possession, this judicially created doctrine has
long been a useful tool for prosecutors to prosecute "cases where actual
7. Government's Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 2, at 2.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 3.
10. Id.
11. Statement by Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty, supra note 3, at 4.
12. The actual sentence was for 46 months. Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v.
Cecala, No. 2:06-CR-00733 (D. Utah Mar. 26, 2007).
13. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) ("The legislative history of the gun control
laws discloses Congress' worry about the easy availability of firearms, especially to those persons
who pose a threat to community peace. And Congress focused on the nexus between violent crime
and the possession of a firearm by any person with a criminal record.") (citing 114 CONG. REC.
13220 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Tydings)); id. at 16298 (remarks of Rep. Pollock); United States v.
Jester, 139 F.3d 1168, 1171 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lewis, 445 U.S. at 66) (stating that Congress
enacted § 922(g)(1) "in order to keep firearms out of the hands of those persons whose prior conduct
indicated a heightened proclivity or using firearms to threaten community peace and the 'continued
operation of the Government of the United States"').
14. The terms "dominion and control" have been subject to some criticism because they are
"simply not informative in any functional manner." Charles H. Whitebread & Ronald Stevens,
Constructive Possession in Narcotics Cases: To Have and Have Not, 58 VA. L. REV. 751, 759
(1972). However, "every jurisdiction that uses constructive possession defines it in [these] terms."
id. at 759 n.26; see also SEVENTH CIRCUIT FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 323 (1999),
available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/pjury.pdf (substituting the word "direction" for the word
"dominion").
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possession at the time of arrest can not be shown, but where the inference
that there has been possession at one time is exceedingly strong."'
' 5
But what about cases like Ben's, where the defendant never has and
never will lay a hand on the gun? In recent years the Tenth Circuit has
expanded the doctrine of constructive possession such that any time a
person "has knowledge of and access to" some contraband, he is guilty
of possessing that item.' 6 This past term, in United States v. Jameson,
17
the court reaffirmed its expanded view of the doctrine and held that the
government properly established a link between a car passenger and a
gun at his feet where the passenger made "furtive movements" and
where the gun would have been in plain view but for the fact that the
passenger's feet were there.1
8
In expanding the doctrine of constructive possession as it has done,
the Tenth Circuit is unique among all other circuits. Ten other circuits
have defined constructive possession so as to require proof that the de-
fendant had not only the knowledge of and power to possess the gun (i.e.,
access to it), but also the intention to do so.19 It is time for the Tenth
Circuit to recognize that its common law definition of constructive pos-
session has unfairly broadened the scope of criminal liability and to rec-
tify that injustice by requiring evidence of intention to exercise dominion
and control in constructive possession cases.
Part I begins with Jameson and studies the expansion of this doc-
trine in the Tenth Circuit. Part II discusses two major flaws with this
development that make the doctrine overbroad and inconsistent with
every other circuit. Part III discusses a number of policy considerations
15. Whitebread, supra note 14, at 755 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see Markus
Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 829, 938 (2001) ("[The courts invented the concept of constructive possession.").
16. United States v. Jameson, 478 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2007); see also United States v.
Ledford, 443 F.3d 702, 713 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Colonna, 360 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th
Cir. 2004). For the proposition that the doctrine of constructive possession is a judicially created
doctrine, see Whitebread, supra note 14, at 751 ("Attempting to rationalize the imposition of crimi-
nal liability in situations where there is no actual possession, the courts have constructed a terminol-
ogy purportedly designed to focus factual inquiries on factors likely to reveal whether the defendant
had the ability or capacity to possess the item."); see also Mark Rabinowitz, Criminal Law Con-
structive Possession: Must the Commonwealth Still Prove Intent?-Commonwealth v. Mudrick, 60
TEMP. L.Q. 445, 449 (1986) (stating that the doctrine of constructive possession was judicially
created).
17. 478 F.3d 1204. Christopher Jameson was ably represented at trial by Lynn Donaldson
and on appeal by Kent Hart, both of the Utah Federal Defender Office. I did not participate in repre-
sentation in either forum and was not privy to any confidential information. The discussion of his
case here is based only on the published Tenth Circuit opinion.
18. Id. at 1210.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Bustamante, 493 F.3d 879, 889 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 713 (6th Ci. 2007); United States v. Introcaso, 506 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir.
2007); United States v. Jones, 484 F.3d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. McFarlane, 491
F.3d 53, 59 (lst Cir. 2007); United States v. Piwowar, 492 F.3d 953, 955 (8th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Greer, 440 F.3d 1267, 1271 (1 1th Cit. 2006); United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 222
(2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Ruiz, 462 F.3d 1082, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Scott, 424 F.3d 431,435-36 (4th Cir. 2005).
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why the court should limit, rather than expand, this doctrine. Part IV
offers specific recommendations that would apply this doctrine more
fairly.
I. TENTH CIRCUIT EXPANSION OF THE DOCTRINE OF CONSTRUCTIVE
POSSESSION
A. Background ofUnited States v. Jameson
Like Cecala, United States v. Jameson20 involved a gun found at the
feet of a felon hitching a ride in someone else's car.2 ' Jameson began
with an early morning traffic stop for a taillight that was not working.2
When he pulled the car over, the officer who initiated the stop saw four
occupants in the car.23 A male occupant in the front passenger seat
leaned forward and appeared to rummage through the glove compart-
ment.24 Another male in the back seat on the passenger side "dropp[ed]
his shoulder and lean[ed] forward, as if he were retrieving or concealing
something on the floor.,
25
Based on these movements, the officer was concerned that the pas-
sengers were hiding drugs or that they could be armed. The officer
shined his flashlight into the car but saw only food and other debris on
the floor. 26 He then asked the female driving the car for her driver's li-
cense, registration, and insurance card.27 Because her license was sus-
pended, the officer said he would impound the car unless one of the other
passengers could legally drive.28 None of them were licensed, and when
asked their names, it turned out that two of the passengers had out-
standing warrants for their arrest.
29
The third passenger was Defendant Christopher Jameson. He was
the one in the back seat whom the officer had seen drop his shoulder and
lean forward. 30 He initially told officers his name was Adam Gibbons
and provided a false birth date.3' When information from police dispatch
refuted this claim, Jameson told officers his name was Christopher Gib-
bons, but this was also refuted, and Jameson was placed under arrest.
32
20. 478 F.3d 1204.
21. Id. at 1207.




26. Id. at 1206-07.
27. Id. at 1207.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1206.
31. Id. at 1207.
32. Id.
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An officer then inventoried the car's contents and discovered a
World War II-era bayonet sitting on the back seat.33 When the officer
reached into the car to get the bayonet, "he noticed a small, unloaded .22
caliber pistol ... on the floor in front of where Mr. Jameson had been
sitting.... exactly where Mr. Jameson's feet would have been before he
exited the car." 34 No fingerprints were found on the gun. Based on these
facts, Jameson, who had previously been convicted of a felony, was
charged with illegally possessing the pistol in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1).35 At trial, Jameson requested the following jury instruction:
The law recognizes two types of possession: actual possession and
constructive possession. A person who knowingly has direct physical
control over an object or thing, at a given time, is then in actual pos-
session of it.
A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both
the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and
control over an object, either directly or through another person or
persons, is then in constructive possession of it.
More than one person can be in possession of an object if each knows
of its presence and has the power and intention to control it.
A defendant has joint possession of an object when two or more per-
sons share actual or constructive possession of it. However, merely
being present with others who have possession of the object does not
constitute possession.
In the situation where the object is found in a place (such as a room
or car) occupied by more than one person, you may not infer control
over the object based solely on joint occupancy. Mere control over
the place in which the object is found is not sufficient to establish
constructive possession. Instead, in this situation, the government
must provide some connection between the particular defendant and
the object.
In addition, momentary or transitory control of an object, without
criminal intent, is not possession. You should not find that the de-
fendant possessed the object if he possessed it only momentarily, and
either did not know that he possessed it or lacked criminal intent to
possess it.
36
While the court adopted much of this language, it replaced the second-to-




35. Id. at 1206.
36. Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions at 2-3, United States v. Jameson, No. 2:04-CR-
693-TS (D. Utah June 24, 2005).
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Where a defendant jointly occupies the place where the object is
found (such as a room or a car) constructive possession may be
shown by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence, which estab-
lishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowledge
that the firearm was contained in the place and the defendant had the
ability to access the firearm.
3 7
Based on the evidence described above and this jury instruction, the jury
voted to convict.
38
Jameson appealed, raising two claims related to constructive pos-
session.39 First, he argued that the evidence was insufficient to connect
him to the gun found on the floor of a car occupied by three other occu-
pants. 40  Second, he claimed that the jury instruction misled the jury be-
cause it failed to require proof of any connection between him and the
gun in joint possession cases.4'
B. General Principles
To understand the development of the doctrine in the Tenth Circuit,
it is necessary to understand how the doctrine of constructive possession
fits within the broader framework of federal criminal law. 42 Federal stat-
utes forbid certain types of people from possessing firearms.43  These
statutes do not define possession, so courts over the years have had to
define this term.44 The most obvious concept of possession is "actual
possession," which "exists when a person has direct physical control
37. Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1208; Jury Instructions at 23, United States v. Jameson, No. 2:04-
CR-693-TS (D. Utah June 29, 2005).
38. Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1206.
39. Jameson also raised a third claim related to a mistrial motion that is not within the scope
of this article.
40. Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1206.
41. Id.
42. For a good overview of case law relating to constructive possession, see generally Kim-
berly J. Winbush, Annotation, What Constitutes "Constructive Possession" of Unregistered or
Otherwise Prohibited Weapon Under State Law, 88 A.L.R. 5th 121 (2001); Martin J. McMahon,
Annotation, Drug Abuse: What Constitutes Illegal Constructive Possession Under 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 841(a)(1), Prohibiting Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Manufacture, Distrib-
ute, or Dispense the Same, 87 A.L.R. FED. 309 (1988).
43. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (convicted felons), (2) (fugitive from justice), (3) (illicit drug
user), (4) (mentally defective), (5) (illegally present alien), (6) (dishonorably discharged veteran), (7)
(person who has renounced U.S. citizenship), (8) (person subject to a protective order), (9) (person
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence), (10) (juvenile) (2008). Other statutes
prohibit anyone from possessing certain types of weapons. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.A. § 5861(b) (an
illegally transferred firearm), (c) (an illegally made firearm), (d) (an unregistered firearm), (h) (a
firearm with an obliterated serial number), (k) (an illegally imported firearm) (2008).
44. Whitebread, supra note 14, at 761 ("Constructive possession is a legal fiction used by
courts to find possession in situations where it does not in fact exist, but where they nevertheless
want an individual to acquire the legal status of a possessor" (emphasis added)). In contrast to the
federal definition, some state statutes explicitly define possession to clarify or expand what is essen-
tially the common law doctrine of constructive possession. Id at 759 n.26 (listing jurisdictions that
apply a constructive possession doctrine via a statutory provision).
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over a firearm at a given time. '45  This happens when the defendant is
caught "redhanded," with the object in his hands or on his person.
Of course, a person's possessions are not always physically on his
person, and frequently, the government will want to charge someone
with possessing something the defendant did not actually possess at the
time alleged in the indictment. 46 The legal theory for bringing such
prosecutions is "constructive possession." Constructive possession is
"possession in law, but not in fact.",47 It is "the gray zone between actual
physical possession and proximity to [an object]. 48 Most circuits define
constructive possession as having the power and intention to exercise
control or dominion.49
Within the Tenth Circuit, the precise definition for this concept var-
ies slightly from case to case. Some definitions have required proof that
the defendant intended to possess the item. 50  Other cases have required
the government to prove the defendant "knowingly has ownership, do-
minion or control" over the object.5 1 The definition relied on in the most
recent cases requires the government to prove the defendant "knowingly
has the power to exercise dominion or control. 52 Thus, in Jameson, the
court defined constructive possession as "when a person 'knowingly
holds the power and ability to exercise dominion and control over [an
object]."'' 53  A common example of constructive possession is an item
belonging to an individual but left in his house or car. "[O]ne can pos-
sess an object while it is hidden at home in a bureau drawer, or while
held by an agent, or even while it is secured in a safe deposit box at the
bank and can be retrieved only when a bank official opens the vault. 54
45. Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1209.
46. Courts have sometimes treated objects found somewhere other than on the defendant's
person as actual possession cases, such as when the only link between a defendant and a gun found
not on his person was testimony that a witness saw the defendant put the gun there. See, e.g., United
States v. Jones, 484 F.3d 783, 787-88 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Linares, 367 F.3d 941, 946-47
(D.C. Cir. 2004). In these cases, the location where the gun was found suggests nothing about the
defendant's relationship to the gun, so the jury must either accept the witness's testimony and find
the defendant actually possessed the gun or reject the witness's testimony and find the defendant
never had possession.
47. United States v. Zink, 612 F.2d 511,516 (10th Cir. 1980).
48. Caudill, supra note 4, at 546.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Bustamante, 493 F.3d 879, 889 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 713 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Introcaso, 506 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir.
2007); United States v. Jones, 484 F.3d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. McFarlane, 491
F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Piwowar, 492 F.3d 953, 955 (8th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Greer, 440 F.3d 1267, 1271 (1 1th Cir. 2006); United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 222
(2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Ruiz, 462 F.3d 1082, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Scott, 424 F.3d 431, 435-36 (4th Cir. 2005).
50. See e.g., United States v. Lopez, 372 F.3d 1207, 1212-13 (10th Cir. 2004); United States
v. McCoy, 781 F.2d 168, 170 (10th Cir. 1985); Zink, 612 F.2d at 516.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Avery, 295 F.3d 1158, 1177 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v.
McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1298 (10th Cir. 2000).
52. United States v. Hien Van Tieu, 279 F.3d 917, 922 (10th Cir. 2002); see also United
States v. Culpepper, 834 F.2d 879, 881 (10th Cir. 1987).
53. Jameson, 478 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Lopez, 372 F.3d at 1211).
54. United States v. Zavala-Maldonado, 23 F.3d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1994).
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Not surprisingly, this doctrine is useful "where actual possession at the
time of arrest can not be shown, but where the inference that there has
been possession at one time is exceedingly strong. '55 "The problem is
not so much with the idea as with deciding how far it should be car-
ried. 56
In cases of sole occupancy, constructive possession can be inferred
from the fact that the object was found in a place where the defendant
had exclusive control. For example, a person living alone has construc-
tive possession of everything in his apartment, even when he is at work:
"When a defendant has exclusive possession of the premises on which a
firearm is found, knowledge, dominion, and control can be properly in-
ferred because of the exclusive possession alone., 57 "This inference has
been deemed reasonable because one in exclusive control or possession
of an area is presumed to have knowledge of its contents, the ability to
control its contents, and the intent to exercise that control."58
The matter is trickier when the defendant has joint control over the
area where the object is found. "[I]n joint occupancy cases, knowledge,
dominion, and control may not be inferred simply by the defendant's
proximity to a firearm." 59 That is, the fact that a gun is found in a room
or car where the defendant is present should not establish constructive
possession if others had access to that area. Or, where the defendant was
not present, the fact that a gun was found in an area where he shared ac-
cess, such as a closet or dresser, does not establish constructive posses-
sion. "[W]hen 'two or more people occupy a given space ... the gov-
ernment is required to meet a higher burden in proving constructive pos-
session."' 60  Specifically, in the Tenth Circuit "the government must
'present some evidence to show some connection or nexus between the
defendant and the firearm."' 61 The issue for the jury, then, would be
whether one of several occupants in a car had a connection with a gun
found there, or whether an absent spouse had some connection with a
gun found in a shared closet.
The most recent discussion of the nexus requirement is Jameson,
which described the precedent defining this requirement as "cryptic.
62
55. Whitebread, supra note 14, at 755 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
56. Zavala-Maldonado, 23 F.3d at 7.
57. Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1209.
58. Rabinowitz, supra note 16, at 455.
59. Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1209.
60. Id. (quoting United States v. Michel, 446 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 2006)).
61. Id.
62. Id. The Tenth Circuit has discussed constructive possession in a couple of cases since
Jameson, but neither bears on this discussion. In United States v. Ramirez, 479 F.3d 1229, 1257
(10th Cir. 2007), the Tenth Circuit upheld a drug possession conviction based on constructive pos-
session. However, the contours of the nexus requirement was not at issue despite the fact that de-
fendant had no connection to the apartment where the drugs were found. The court stated that "the
legally determinative relationship is not the one connecting [the defendant] to the apartment, but the
relationship linking [him] to the seized methamphetaniine." Id. at 1250. The conviction was af-
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However, Jameson made some points abundantly clear. First, "where
the defendant in a joint occupancy situation has knowledge of and access
to the weapons, there is a sufficient nexus to infer dominion and con-
trol. ' 6 3 Second, in contrast to almost every other circuit, 64 "intent to pos-
sess is not required by § 922(g). 'It is not necessary to show that the
defendant intended to exercise ... dominion or control."'' 65 These two
principles eliminate the well-settled principle that proximity alone will
not support a constructive possession theory 66 by essentially allowing a
conviction to stand based on proximity alone.
C. Development of the Doctrine
A review of the development of this doctrine in the Tenth Circuit
may help us understand how the court arrived at its holding in Jameson.
1. Lucero v. United States
It appears the Tenth Circuit's first opportunity to discuss construc-
tive possession was in 1962 in Lucero v. United States.67 In Lucero, two
defendants were prosecuted for two instances of selling heroin to an un-
dercover officer. 68 In the first instance, Defendant Lucero and Defendant
Maestas sat with an undercover officer in the booth of a tavern. The
officer testified that he negotiated the price with Maestas, but when he
went to pay Maestas, Maestas responded, "No, not here., 69 Lucero inter-
jected that the officer should pay Maestas, and then they would go
somewhere else for the delivery. The officer said he would not pay until
he got the drugs, so the trio left, and at some point Lucero, not Maestas,
gave the drugs to the officer.70
In the second instance, the officer saw Maestas sitting in a car out-
side a lounge where he was to meet Lucero for another buy.7' The offi-
cer approached Maestas, who told him Lucero was inside. The officer
found Lucero and bought more heroin from him, and as the officer was
firmed based on evidence showing that the defendant directed the movement of the drugs. Id. In
United States v. Mendez, No. 06-3282, 2008 WL 192861 (D. Kan. Jan. 24, 2008), the defendant did
not raise a legal challenge to a firearm conviction, arguing only that the evidence was insufficient.
The court easily affirmed where the gun was found under a mattress next to the defendant's drug
ledger.
63. Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1209 (quoting United States v. Colonna, 360 F.3d 1169, 1179 (10th
Cir. 2004)).
64. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
65. Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1211 n.2 (quoting Colonna, 360 F.3d at 1179).
66. See Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1211 (recognizing that the instruction in the case "invites the
argument that proximity might be used as the only circumstantial evidence proving knowledge and
access" (constructive possession)).
67. 311 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1962). Although the Tenth Circuit does not appear to have previ-
ously discussed constructive possession of contraband, its use in the criminal context apparently
extends as far back as the late 1800s. Whitebread, supra note 14, at 754.
68. Lucero, 311 F.2d at 458.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 458-59.
71. Id. at 459.
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72walking away, he saw Lucero get in Maestas's car and drive away.
Both were charged with two counts of violating 21 U.S.C. § 174,73 and
Maestas challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against him.
7
4
Although the court did not articulate its own definition of construc-
tive possession, it noted a Second Circuit definition: "a person who is
sufficiently associated with the persons having physical custody so that
he is able, without difficulty, to cause the drug to be produced for a cus-
tomer can also be found by a jury to have dominion and control over the
drug, and therefore possession., 75 Thus, on the first count, the court af-
firmed because Maestas "was the moving party, ... he vouched for the
quality of the heroin, and.., he set the price. 76 This evidence, the court
stated, "shows more than mere participation in a narcotics transaction.,
77
Thus, Maestas "may not escape the consequences of his conduct by
avoiding actual contact with the contraband drug.
78
In contrast, the evidence was insufficient to convict Maestas on the
second count. "In this episode Maestas made none of the arrangements,
was not the moving party, and did nothing from which constructive pos-
session may be inferred., 79  Judge Seth issued a dissenting opinion,
which disagreed on factual rather than legal grounds. He argued that
"[t]he meaning of the word 'possession' . . . requires a much stronger
showing of dominion and control by Maestas than was made in this
case."80 He agreed that Maestas should be convicted "if the evidence
shows that [he] was able to control the drug or cause it to be produced,"
but he disagreed that the government had established "that Maestas had
such dominion or control over the drugs that he could cause them to be
produced through or by Lucero or anyone else.
81
This early opinion is significant because it makes clear that Maes-
tas's mere presence was not enough to establish constructive possession.
Even "participation" in the transaction would not have been enough to
establish constructive possession. The majority sustained the first count
because it was satisfied (unlike Judge Seth) that the level of participation
in the case established that Maestas had the ability to exercise control
72. Id.
73. Id. at 458; see also 21 U.S.C. § 174 (repealed 1970) (section set penalties for bringing
narcotic drugs into the United States, conspiring to commit unlawful acts respecting such narcotic
drugs, and made unexplained possession of narcotic drugs (constructive possession) sufficient evi-
dence for conviction).
74. Lucero, 311 F.2d at 458.
75. Id. at 459 n.7 (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 290 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1961)).




80. Id. at 460 (Seth, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 460-61 (Seth, J., dissenting).
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over the drugs. In contrast, because there was no such evidence on the
second count, that count was reversed.
2. Amaya v. United States
The first case to define constructive possession for the Tenth Circuit
was Amaya v. United States.s2 Amaya involved a controlled drug buy in
which the defendant delivered drugs to a confidential informant on mul-
tiple occasions. 83  Regarding one transaction, the defendant acknowl-
edged that he was paid to deliver the package of drugs, but he argued that
he did not know the package contained drugs. 84 In the other transaction,
he acknowledged having contact with the informant, but he claimed he
gave the informant only a piece of paper and denied having given him
drugs.8 5
On appeal, the defendant challenged the district court's instructions
regarding possession. The district court instructed the jury that
actual possession meant that the defendant knowingly had manual,
personal or physical possession; that constructive possession meant
that although the narcotic may be in the physical possession of an-
other, the defendant knowingly had the power of exercising control
over it; that possession was not limited to manual touch or personal
custody; that it was sufficient to constitute possession under the stat-
ute if the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the narcotic
and control over it; and that "power to produce or dispose of the nar-
cotic was evidence of such control."
86
The district court also told the jury "that mere presence in the vicinity of
the narcotic or for that matter mere knowledge of its physical location
did not constitute possession." 87 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that
these instructions "correctly stated the law. 88
Amaya is important because it would be cited by a number of cases
that have contributed to the Tenth Circuit's current definition of con-
structive possession as "knowingly hold[ing] the power and ability to
exercise dominion and control over [the object]." 89 However, the fact
that Amaya's standard did not include an intent requirement should not
count for too much because the question of intent or any nexus was not
82. 373 F.2d 197 (10th Cir. 1967).
83. Id. at 198.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 199.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 308 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Landry,
257 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1958)).
89. United States v. Culpepper, 834 F.2d 879, 881 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing Amaya, 373 F.2d at
199); see also United States v. Lopez, 372 F.3d 1207, 1211-12 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Culpepper
and citing Amaya for this proposition); United States v. Zink, 612 F.2d 511, 516 (10th Cir. 1980)
(citing Amaya for the same definition).
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before the court in this case. The issue for the jury was whether it should
accept the informant's testimony that the defendant gave him the drugs
and the inference that the defendant did so knowingly or whether it
should accept the defendant's testimony to the contrary. 90 Significantly,
this early definition also made clear that simply being around contraband
was not enough to establish constructive possession.
3. United States v. Culpepper
In 1987, the Tenth Circuit introduced an important caveat to the
definition from Amaya. The charge in United States v. Culpepper91 was
possessing marijuana with intent to distribute, specifically two fields
where marijuana was being cultivated for harvest and sale.92 Defendant
Culpepper told an undercover officer that he was interested in selling two
fields of marijuana that he had planted but did not have time to harvest.
93
He took the officer to the fields, taught him how to harvest the mari-
juana, and showed him where in the vicinity he could hide it. 
94
Culpepper was convicted for possessing the two marijuana fields,
and he argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to convict
him. Culpepper's primary argument was that the lack of fences or
guards, the lack of evidence to suggest recent cultivation or care, and the
fact that he did not own the property showed there was no connection
between him and the property. 95 While these factors might bear on the
question of constructive possession, the Tenth Circuit found ample evi-
dence to link Culpepper to the field: his offer to sell the fields, his state-
ment that he had planted and harvested there, and the fact that it was
ready to be harvested just as he had said.96 However, starting with the
definition of constructive possession in Amaya, the Tenth Circuit added a
new requirement: "the government must establish that there was a suffi-
cient nexus between the accused and the drug."
97
4. United States v. Mills and Subsequent Cases Regarding Intent to
Exercise Dominion and Control
Since Culpepper, the Tenth Circuit has consistently recognized the
nexus requirement and has occasionally reversed a conviction based on
the insufficiency of the evidence establishing a nexus.98 One of these
90. 373 F.2d at 198-99.
91. 834 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1987).





97. Id. at 882 (citing United States v. Cardenas, 748 F.2d 1015, 1020 (5th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Rackley, 742 F.2d 1266, 1272 (11 th Cir. 1984)).
98. United States v. Hishaw, 235 F.3d 565, 571 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Taylor, 113
F.3d 1136, 1145-46 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that the government did not establish a nexus between
the defendant and a weapon found in a jointly occupied apartment despite witness testimony that the
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cases, United States i'. Mills,99 is frequently cited in constructive posses-
sion cases because of its contributions to the development of this doc-
trine.t 00
Mills involved a convicted felon who lived in a house with guns.
01
The case began when police officers came to the home that Defendant
Ervin Mills shared with Judy Hall on June 24, 1992. The officers had a
warrant to determine whether the engine in Hall's truck was stolen.
They decided to take the truck away so they could inspect it more
closely, but before doing so, they let Mills get Hall's belongings out of
the truck.102 Mills put Halls' things in his garage, including a Ruger pis-
tol and Winchester shotgun. Six days later, on June 30, officers returned
to the home with. another warrant, this time to search for a marijuana-
growing operation on the premises. 0 3 During the search, officers redis-
covered the pistol and shotgun from Hall's truck, now in a compartment
for extra leaves in the dining room table.'04
Mills was charged with possessing the firearms on June 30 but not
with possessing them on June 24.105 At trial, Hall testified "that she
placed the guns in the dining room table without Mills' knowledge and
contrary to his instructions.'
0 6
The Tenth Circuit again emphasized the need for the government to
establish a nexus in joint occupancy cases. It stated, "[i]n cases of joint
occupancy, where the government seeks to prove constructive possession
by circumstantial evidence, it must present evidence to show some con-
nection or nexus between the defendant and the firearm or other contra-
band.' 1 7 The court continued: "A conviction based upon constructive
possession will be upheld 'only when there was some evidence support-
ing at least a plausible inference that the defendant had knowledge of and
access to the weapon or contraband.'
10 8
defendant had previously possessed a gun); United States v. Reece, 86 F.3d 994, 996 (10th Cir.
1996) (reversing conviction for possession with intent to distribute drugs where the government did
not establish a nexus between car driver and drugs found in passenger's pockets); United States v.
Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 549-50 (10th Cir. 1994).
99. 29 F.3d 545.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez, 205 F.App'x 656, 663 (10th Cir. 2006); see also
United States v. Colonna, 360 F.3d 1169, 1178-79 (10th Cir. 2004).
101. Mills, 29 F.3d at 546-47.
102. Id. at 547.
103. Id.
104. Officers also found a .22 semi-automatic pistol under Halls's mattress, a rusted rifle in a
crawl space underneath the house, and two pipe bombs in the laundry room. Id. Mills was charged
with possessing the pipe bombs but was acquitted. Id. It is unclear whether he was charged with
possessing these other two guns, but the opinion only addresses the charges relating to the two guns
originally found in Halls's truck.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 550.
107. Id. at 549.
108. Id. at 549-50 (quoting United States v. Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337, 349 (5th Cir. 1993)).
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The evidence, however, failed to establish either the connection or
the knowledge necessary to support a conviction.
Even if the jury disbelieved the entire defense testimony, that disbe-
lief could not constitute evidence of the crimes charged and somehow
substitute for knowing constructive possession in this joint occu-
pancy situation. We are unwilling to infer knowledge of "dominion
and control" over Hall's guns contained in the compartment (and out
of view) on June 24 solely because Mills handled them and placed
them in the garage six days before in cooperation with law enforce-
ment. Nor was the defense required to prove that Mills was denied
access to Hall's table or compartment; rather, the government had to
come forward with evidence to connect Mills with knowing construc-
tive possession of the firearms extending beyond his handling them
on June 24. Mere dominion or control over the dining room was in-
sufficient to establish constructive possession.1
0 9
The precise rationale for this opinion is somewhat elusive, as it is
unclear whether the court reversed on the knowledge element or the
nexus requirement. On the one hand, it appears the court was concerned
by the lack of knowledge-although Mills had dominion and control
over the compartment where the guns were found, he did not know they
were there. The court said it was "unwilling to infer knowledge" from
the earlier possession. 110
The problem with this view is that the court did not rest on the lack
of knowledge but went on to cite the lack of a connection or nexus be-
tween Mills and the guns. "[T]he government had to come forward with
evidence to connect Mills with knowing constructive possession of the
firearms.""'  Had the court been focused solely on the mens rea, it could
have reversed without discussing the nexus requirement at all. Instead,
the court specifically stated that "the government had to come forward
with evidence to prove Mills knew the firearms were within his domin-
ion and control."'1 2 The court explicitly stated that the police-authorized
possession on June 24 could not qualify as a nexus."'
This caveat is significant because it shows that knowledge and ac-
cess are not enough to establish a nexus. At the time the officers left on
June 24 and police authorization terminated, Mills had the ability to ex-
ercise dominion and control over the guns, and he knew it. Thus, to say
there was no nexus on June 24, when Mills had knowledge of the weap-
ons, is to say that knowing access to firearms cannot, by itself, establish
the required nexus. There must be something more.
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As will be argued more completely, the implicit core of this nexus is
intent to exercise dominion or control over the item. But before turning
to those recent cases that explicitly reject intent as an aspect of this
nexus, it is worth pausing to note that from time to time the court has
sanctioned an intent requirement. In 1980, the Tenth Circuit in United
States v. Zink' l4 upheld a conviction where the district court had in-
cluded an intent requirement in its definition of constructive posses-
sion. 15 In contrast to the constructive possession definition discussed
above, the court defined constructive possession as follows: "A person
who although not in actual possession knowingly has both the power and
the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing
either directly or indirectly or through another person or persons is then
in constructive possession of it." 116 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed
the conviction over a challenge to the jury instruction, stating that the
jury was "properly instructed" and calling this a "stock instruction on
this issue which has been affirmed many times."
' 1 7
Five years later, in United States v. McCoy, 118 the Tenth Circuit de-
fined constructive possession without reference to its own precedent,
citing instead standard language from the Fifth Circuit that included an
intent requirement. "The defendant had constructive possession if he had
the intent and the power to exercise dominion and control over the weap-
ons as charged."' 19
Most recently, in 2004, the Tenth Circuit again affirmed the same
jury instruction it called "stock" in 1980.120 However, that case did not
raise a question about intent, and in defining constructive possession, the
court used the standard definition going back to Amaya, which does not
include an intent requirement.' 21 In short, until 2004, the limits of con-
structive possession had been discussed primarily in terms of the nexus
requirement, though we can see the intent requirement popping up from
time to time.
5. Focusing on an Intent Requirement: United States v. Colonna
and United States v. Ledford
The first case to specifically discuss an intent requirement in the
context of constructive possession was United States v. Colonna,
122
which specifically held in 2004 that knowledge of and access to a gun
establish an adequate nexus and that the constructive possession does not
114. 612 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1980).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 516 n. I (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 516.
118. 781 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1985).
119. Id. at 171 (quoting United States v. Smith, 591 F.2d 1105, 1107 (5th Cir. 1979)).
120. United States v. Lopez, 372 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004).
121. Jd. at 1211-12.
122. 360 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2004).
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require proof that the defendant intended to exercise dominion or control
over the object.
123
The facts of Colonna are straightforward. Officers executed a war-
rant on Defendant Colonna's home and found guns and ammunition in a
dresser drawer in his bedroom, along with a marijuana pipe. 24 Colonna
claimed the guns were his wife's. Colonna's wife testified that the guns
and ammunition were in her bedside dresser, not her husband's. 25 How-
ever, she also testified that her husband had taken a marijuana pipe from
their son and put it in his bedside dresser. Another officer testified that
Colonna had admitted that he knew the guns were there, that he should
not have had them, but that the guns belonged to his wife.
126
The Tenth Circuit began with a typical recitation of the applicable
law, ending with this proviso: "In order to sustain a conviction based
upon constructive possession, the government must present 'evidence
supporting at least a plausible inference that the defendant had knowl-
edge of and access to the weapon or contraband.'" 2 7 From this proposi-
tion, the court concluded: "Thus, knowledge and access are required to
prove that the defendant knowingly held the power to exercise dominion
and control over the firearm.
1 28
One aspect of Colonna that separates it from all preceding Tenth
Circuit cases is that the defendant specifically argued that constructive
possession requires the government to prove intention to exercise domin-
ion and control. 129  The court rejected this issue of first impression.
"[W]here the defendant in a joint occupancy situation has knowledge of
and access to the weapons, there is a sufficient nexus to infer dominion
or control. It is not necessary to show that the defendant intended to
exercise that dominion or control.
1 30
In light of these legal rulings, Colonna's sufficiency argument was
doomed. The court reasoned that a jury could have concluded the
dresser where the guns were found was Colonna's, not his wife's. 131
From that inference, the jury could appropriately infer that he had
knowledge of and access to them.
123. Id. at 1179.
124. Id. at 1173.
125. Id. at 1179.
126. Id.
127. Id. (quoting United States v. Hien Van Tieu, 279 F.3d 917, 922 (10th Cir. 2002)). Inter-
estingly, the "knowledge and access" language apparently originated with Mills. Hien Van Tieu
attributes this language to United States v. Heckard, 238 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2001). Heck-
ard, 238 F.3d at 1228, in turn, cites United States v. Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 550 (10th Cir. 1994).
128. Colonna, 360 F.3d at 1179.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1180.
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While it is true that prior Tenth Circuit precedent did not require
evidence of intent, the court did not address the merits of an intent re-
quirement. This hasty rejection is particularly troubling because the
court could have easily affirmed without rejecting the rule on a fact-
based sufficiency challenge. Taken together, from the facts that the guns
were in Colonna's dresser, that he knew they were there, and that he
knew he should not have them, the jury could reasonably have found
both the power and the intention to exercise dominion and control over
them. Thus, instead of rejecting the requirement without considering its
merits, the Tenth Circuit could have left the issue unresolved and simply
affirmed under either standard.
After Colonna, the next significant case to discuss an intent re-
quirement 132 was United States v. Ledford.'33 Ledford arose out of a po-
lice response to a domestic violence complaint. Officers responded to
the home where defendant Ledford lived with his girlfriend Kathleen
Carey. Carey told officers that Ledford had threatened to kill her with a
gun, and she led them to a .41 caliber handgun in the top drawer of a
dresser inside the house and told them it was Ledford's. 134 Meanwhile
other officers arrested Ledford, who was walking nearby. One officer
asked Ledford about the gun, and he responded that a friend had given it
to him a couple of months earlier to fix, but he knew he should not have
a gun because he was a convicted felon.'
35
At trial, Ledford requested a jury instruction that would have re-
quired the government to establish that he "knowingly ha[d] both the
power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control
over a thing.', 136 The government objected to this instruction under Co-
lonna, and the court gave an instruction that did not require a showing of
intent. It told the jury:
A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has the
power at any given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing,
either directly or indirectly through another person, is then in con-
structive possession of it. To prove constructive possession the gov-
ernment must prove that the defendant had knowledge of and access
to the firearm.
137
132. Interestingly, between Colonna and Ledford, the court upheld a jury instruction that
required the jury to find both power and intent to exercise dominion and control. United States v.
Lopez, 372 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004). However, the intent requirement was not at issue in
Lopez.
133. 443 F.3d 702 (10th Cir. 2006).
134. Id. at 705-06.
135. Id. at 705.
136. Id. at 706.
137. Id. at 714.
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Ledford raised four legal arguments in support of an intent require-
ment.' 38 First, Ledford argued that Colonna was inconsistent with prior
case law, specifically those cases discussed above that ratified a jury
instruction with intent language.1 39 The court properly noted that these
cases did not "address intent because the issue was not raised on ap-
peal."'140  Moreover, these opinions themselves, along with most other
Tenth Circuit opinions, defined constructive possession without refer-
ence to intent. 141
Ledford next argued that without an intent requirement, § 922(g)(1)
became a general intent crime rather than a specific intent crime. 142 The
court did not reject this reasoning but concluded that it was not a prob-
lem: "Congress may criminalize knowing acts committed without spe-
cific intent.,
143
Third, Ledford challenged the instruction for lack of a nexus re-
quirement 44 The court agreed that a showing of some nexus was re-
quired, but it reasoned that under Colonna, the instruction was appropri-
ate: "[W]e made it clear that knowledge and access together are suffi-
cient to show nexus, and the jury was instructed on that principle.' 4a
Ledford argued that knowledge and access were insufficient to establish
a nexus in Mills, to which the court responded that Mills was factually
distinct:
There, the government failed to show sufficient evidence of construc-
tive possession when the defendant had placed guns in the garage of
a residence six days prior to the guns being found in the dining room.
We held the government did not come forward with the necessary
evidence to connect Mr. Mills with knowing constructive possession
of the firearms beyond his handling them on the prior date. Mere
dominion or control over the dining room was insufficient to estab-
lish constructive possession.1
46
In contrast, Carey linked Ledford to the gun, and Ledford himself
told two others that he knowingly possessed the gun. The court con-
cluded that this evidence was sufficient to establish a nexus, but left
138. Ledford also tried to distinguish Colonna on its facts, but the factual distinction was
inconsequential. Id. at 715.
139. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text; see also Ledford, 443 F.3d at 716.
140. Ledford, 443 F.3d at 715.
141. Id. at 715-16 (discussing United States v. Lopez, 372 F.3d 1207, 1212 (10th Cir. 2004);
United States v. Zink, 612 F.2d 511, 516 (10th Cir. 1980)).
142. Ledford, 443 F.3d at 716.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 716-17.
146. Id. (citing United States v. Mills, 29 F.3d 545 (10th Cir. 1994)). As discussed above, this
analysis of Mills falls short because it ignores the fact that the court was adamant in saying that
Mills did not have constructive possession when he knew the guns were left unsecured in his garage.
See supra notes 108 and 109 and accompanying text.
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"open the possibility that there may be a future case in which the specific
facts require a harder look at the nexus requirement."'
' 47
Finally, Ledford argued that the recent Tenth Circuit Proposed Pat-
tern Criminal Jury Instructions required an intent instruction. 148 Since
Ledford, the court has adopted a pattern instruction that does not include
an intent requirement. 149 However, at the time, a proposed pattern in-
struction would have told jurors that "[a] person who, although not in
actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention at a
given time to exercise dominion or control over an object, either directly
or through another person or persons, is then in constructive possession
of it.' 50 Although these proposed instructions included an intent re-
quirement, the Tenth Circuit declined to follow that recommendation on
the ground that the proposed instructions had not been adopted and were
subject to approval on a case-by-case basis."'l
D. Jameson and the Nexus Requirement
As noted above, 152 the Tenth Circuit most recently addressed the
content of the nexus requirement in United States v. Jameson.
53
Jameson's appeal raised two claims related to constructive possession.'
54
First, he argued that the evidence was insufficient to connect him to the
gun found on the floor of a car occupied by three other individuals.
155
Second, he claimed that the jury instruction misled the jury because it
failed to require proof of any connection between him and the gun in
joint possession cases.
56
The Tenth Circuit rejected both these claims. On the sufficiency
claim, the Tenth Circuit began by defining constructive possession.
"Constructive possession exists when a person 'knowingly holds the
power and ability to exercise dominion and control over [a firearm]."
' 157
It further recognized that "in joint occupancy cases, knowledge, domin-
ion, and control may not be inferred simply by the defendant's proximity
147. Ledford, 443 F.3d at 717.
148. Id.
149. TENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 1.31 (2006), available at
http://www.ck10.uscourts.gov/downloads/pji 10-cir-crim.pdf.
150. CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (PROPOSED) § 1.31 (REV. AUG. 9, 2004) (em-
phasis added).
151. Ledford, 443 F.3d at 717. The version that was ultimately adopted eliminated the intent
language. See TENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 149, at § 1.31.
152. See supra Part I.A.
153. 478 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2007).
154. Jameson also raised a third claim related to a mistrial motion that is not within the scope
of this article.
155. Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1206.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1209 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 372 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004)).
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to a firearm. Instead, the government must present evidence to show
some connection or nexus between the defendant and the firearm.' ' 8
The court cited Colonna for the proposition that "knowledge and
access are required to prove that [a] defendant knowingly held the power
to exercise dominion and control over [a] firearm." 159 This meant, how-
ever, that "where the defendant in a joint occupancy situation has knowl-
edge of and access to the weapons, there is a sufficient nexus to infer
dominion and control.' 160 The court again reiterated that "[p]roximity
alone . . . is insufficient to establish knowledge and access to (and do-
minion and control over) a firearm in a join occupancy case.''
Turning to the facts, the court found sufficient evidence of a nexus,
namely "Mr. Jameson's proximity to the pistol . . . coupled with [his]
furtive movements, his inferred physical contact with the pistol (his foot
was on top of it), and the pistol's being in plain view and easily retriev-
able to a passenger in Mr. Jameson's seat."
162
Having thus found a nexus, the court then turned to the jury instruc-
tion, which had eliminated any requirement that the jury find a nexus.
163
The court acknowledged that Jameson's proposed instruction "was pref-
erable to that used by the district court because it expressly stated that
mere control over the area near the firearm (in other words, proximity) is
insufficient, by itself, to establish constructive possession."''64 Further-
more, the court's instruction "invites the argument that proximity might
be used as the only circumstantial evidence proving knowledge and ac-
cess."'165 Although one would expect this defect to be fatal, the court
affirmed the instruction on the ground that a different instruction told the
jury that "merely being present with others who have possession of the
object does not constitute possession.'' 66 Coupled with the paragraph on
momentary control of an object, these instructions "adequately informed
the jury that mere proximity is not sufficient to establish constructive
possession."'167  Although Ledford had anticipated a future case that
would "require a harder look at the nexus requirement," the court de-
cided that Jameson was not that case.'
68
158. Id. (quoting United States v. Michel, 446 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 2006)).
159. Id. (quoting United States v. Colonna, 360 F.3d 1169, 1179 (10th Cir. 2004)).
160. Id. (quoting Michel, 446 F.3d at 1128).
161. Id. (quoting United States v. Hishaw, 235 F.3d 565, 572 (10th Cir. 2000)).
162. Id. at 1210.
163. For the jury instruction, see supra Part 1.A. and accompanying text.




168. Id. at 1212 (quoting United States v. Ledford, 443 F.3d 702, 717 (10th Cir. 2005)).
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II. PROBLEMS WITH THE TENTH CIRCUIT RULE
The Tenth Circuit's line of reasoning as reflected in Jameson has
two primary defects. First, the court's reliance on Colonna and that
case's rejection of an intent requirement runs contrary to every other
circuit and eliminates an important protection for defendants. Second,
allowing the district court to equate knowledge and access with construc-
tive possession, as in Ledford and Jameson, reflects an unsound exten-
sion of Colonna and effectively eliminates the nexus requirement.
A. Intent to Exercise Dominion and Control
The first defect from this recent line of cases is that it allows the
government to establish constructive possession without requiring proof
that the defendant intended to exercise control or dominion over the fire-
arm. Colonna held that "where the defendant in a joint occupancy situa-
tion has knowledge of and access to the weapons, there is a sufficient
nexus to infer dominion or control. It is not necessary to show that the
defendant intended to exercise that dominion or control.' 69
Before addressing the merits of such a rule, it is worth noting that
the court did not need to reject whole cloth an intent requirement in order
to uphold the jury verdict. In United States v. Walls, 170 the Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed a conviction where the jury had not been instructed on in-
tent. However, in doing so, it specifically noted that the evidence before
it would have supported a jury verdict had the jury been properly in-
structed as to what inferences it might make.'17 Relevant to the Colonna
analysis, the Seventh Circuit specifically noted that "[a] jury could infer
that [the defendant] had both knowledge and intent to exercise dominion
and control over [a gun] merely from its presence in the bedroom that
[the defendant] shared with [another person].' 72 Put more broadly, it is
not impossible that the facts of the case would support an inference not
only of knowledge and access, but also intent. Consistent with this prin-
ciple, the Colonna court, rather than reject the intent requirement without
any discussion of the merits of the rule, could have simply held that the
arguable location of the gun-in Colonna's bedside drawer--established
not only knowledge and access but also intent to exercise dominion and
control over the gun.
In any case, Colonna squarely conflicts with the rule in the other
circuits, which have held that constructive possession requires proof of
not only the power but also the intent to exercise dominion or control
169. United States v. Colonna, 360 F.3d 1169, 1179 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v.
Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 550 (10th Cir. 1994)).
170. 225 F.3d 858 (7th Cir. 2000).
171. Id. at 867.
172. Id.
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over an object.'7 3 Although the D.C. Circuit has not adopted such a defi-
nition in a published opinion, it has done so in an unpublished decision
74
and has also approved a jury instruction that used such a definition.
175
Consistent with this requirement, these courts have also included an in-
tent requirement in their pattern jury instructions.
176
173. See, e.g., United States v. McFarlane, 491 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[A] conviction for
constructive possession requires proof that a 'person knowingly has the power and intention at a
given time to exercise dominion over an object."') (quoting United States v. Gobbi, 471 F.3d 302,
309 (1st Cir. 2006)); United States v. Introcaso, 506 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2007) ("To demonstrate
constructive possession, the Government must submit sufficient evidence to support an inference
that the individual 'knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise do-
minion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons."') (citation
omitted); United States v. Jones, 484 F.3d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that in constructive
possession cases, "[tihe government must offer evidence to prove that the defendant (1) knew that
the thing was present, and (2) intended to exercise dominion or control over it."); United States v.
Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 713 (6th Cir. 2007) (.'[c]onstructive possession exists when a person does
not have actual possession but instead knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to
exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others."') (quoting United
States v. Kincaide, 145 F.3d 771, 782 (6th Cir. 1998)); United States v. Bustamante, 493 F.3d 879,
889 (7th Cir. 2007) ("'Defendants are in constructive possession of a gun if they have the power and
the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or
through others."') (quoting United States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 2000)); United States
v. Piwowar, 492 F.3d 953, 955 (8th Cir. 2007) ("Constructive possession 'requires knowledge of an
object, the ability to control it, and the intent to do so."') (quoting United States v. Cuevas-
Arrendondo, 469 F.3d 712, 715 (8th Cir. 2005)); United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 222 (2d
Cir. 2006) ("Constructive possession exists when a person ... knowingly has the power and the
intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through
others.") (citing United States v. Gordils, 982 F.2d 64, 71 (2d Cir. 1992)); United States v. Greer,
440 F.3d 1267, 1271 (1 1th Cir. 2006) ("Constructive possession exists when the defendant exercises
ownership, dominion, or control over the item or has the power and intent to exercise dominion or
control."); United States v. Scott, 424 F.3d 431, 435-36 (4th Cir. 2005) ("When the government
seeks to establish constructive possession under § 922(g)(1), it must prove that the defendant inten-
tionally exercised dominion and control over the firearm, or had the power and the intention to
exercise dominion and control over the firearm .... "); United States v. Terry, 911 F.2d 272, 278
(9th Cir. 1990) ("In the more difficult situation where the premises are shared by more than one
person, ... a party has knowledge of the weapon and both the power and the intention to exercise
dominion and control over it, then he has constructive possession.") (quoted in United States v. Ruiz,
462 F.3d 1082, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2006)).
174. United States v. Johnson, No. CR 91-00142-01, 1993 WL 390062, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Sept.
30, 1993) ("A person has constructive possession of an object when he knowingly has the power and
intent to exercise dominion and control over it."). The D.C. Circuit's more recent, published deci-
sions apparently limit the doctrine with a requirement similar to the Tenth Circuit's nexus require-
ment. See, e.g., United States v. Littlejohn, 489 F.3d 1335, 1338-39 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("To establish
constructive possession, the government must show that the defendant knew of, and was in a posi-
tion to exercise dominion and control over, the contraband. Thus, there must be something more
than mere presence at the scene of a criminal transaction. There must be some action, some word, or
some conduct that links the individual to the contraband.") (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
175. United States v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 272, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
176. FIRST CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 4.06 (1998) ("A person who
is not in actual possession, but who has both the power and the intention to exercise control over
something is in constructive possession of it."); THIRD CIRCUIT CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
CRIMINAL § 6.18.922G-4 (2007) ("If you find that (name) ... had the power and intention to exer-
cise control over it, even though it was not in (name)'s physical possession-that is, that (name) had
the ability to take actual possession of the object when (name) wanted to do so--you may find that
the government has proven possession."); FIFTH CIRCUIT PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL
§ 1.31 (2001) ("A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and
the intention, at a given time, to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through
another person or persons, is then in constructive possession of it."); SIXTH CIRCUIT CRIMINAL
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It is true that these circuits occasionally omit an intent requirement
from a definition of constructive possession. 177 However, these defini-
tions arise in the context of cases challenging other aspects of possession
or constructive possession. No circuit beside the Tenth has ever held that
constructive possession may be established without a showing of intent
to exercise control or dominion.
1. Making Intent a Triable Issue in Other Circuits
A brief look at some of these cases illustrates why an intent re-
quirement is so crucial. The main reason for adopting an intent require-
ment is that a defendant's intent may be the only fact distinguishing in-
nocent and guilty conduct. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has recog-
nized that constructive possession cases invite arguments about a defen-
dant's intent in ways that are not raised by an actual possession case.
178
In constructive possession cases, knowledge and intent are frequently
at issue. A defendant will often deny any knowledge of a thing found
in an area that is under his control (e.g., a residence, an automobile)
or claim that it was placed there by accident or mistake. The gov-
ernment then must offer evidence to prove that the "defendant (1)
knew that the thing was present, and (2) intended to exercise domin-
ion or control over it. In contrast, the only knowledge that the gov-
ernment must show in an actual possession prosecution is the defen-
dant's awareness that (1) he physically possesses the thing, and (2)
the thing he possesses is contraband. Intent is not an element of ac-
tual possession under § 922."
179
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.10 (2007) ("To establish constructive possession, the government
must prove that the defendant had the right to exercise physical control over the [firearm] and knew
that he had this right, and that he intended to exercise physical control over [the firearm] at some
time, either directly or through other persons."); SEVENTH CIRCUIT FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS:
CRIMINAL 922(g) (1999) ("Possession may exist even when a person is not in physical contact with
the object, but knowingly has the power and intention to exercise direction or control over it, either
directly or through others."); EIGHTH CIRCUIT MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL
§ 8.02 (2007) ("A person who, although not in actual possession, has both the power and the inten-
tion at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another
person or persons, is then in constructive possession of it."); NINTH CIRCUIT MODEL CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 3.18 (2003) ("A person has possession of something if the person ... knows of its
presence and has the power and intention to control it."); ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 6 (2003) ("A person who is not in actual possession, but who has both
the power and the intention to later take control over something either alone or together with some-
one else, is in constructive possession of it.").
177. See, e.g., United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 395 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States
v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 878 (4th Cir. 1992)). In Moye, the court stated: "Constructive possession
is established if it is shown 'that the defendant exercised, or had the power to exercise, dominion and
control over the item."' Id. However, this was an actual possession case, and the precise definition
of constructive possession was not at issue.
178. Jones, 484 F.3d at 788.
179. Id. (citation omitted).
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A couple of cases illustrate how defendants have put intent at issue
in triable ways.' 80 In United States v. Piwowar,181 the defendant was
prosecuted for possessing guns and ammunition seized from a padlocked,
walk-in refrigerator found in a building owned by him but leased to a
woman who could lawfully possess them.'8 2 It was undisputed that the
guns belonged to the defendant before he became a convicted felon. At
trial, the woman testified that she had purchased the weapons from the
defendant but had never moved them after taking possession of them.'
83
Thus, the defendant argued that he had no intention to exercise dominion
or control over these weapons that he had sold to the woman and were
kept in her part of the building.
The Eighth Circuit recognized that "[a] jury might have accepted
this testimony and concluded he no longer possessed the firearms and
ammunition.' 84  However, because the woman also acknowledged that
the defendant was the only one with a key to the refrigerator where the
guns were kept, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the jury could properly
have found an intention to exercise dominion and control and affirmed
the conviction.
185
In United States v. McFarlane,'86 Detective David Delehoy heard
the sound of gunshots and saw Antwone Moore sprinting away from the
area from where the sound came. 187 From his patrol car, Delehoy lost
sight of Moore behind some buildings but saw him emerge a few seconds
later, this time walking rapidly. Delehoy also saw Defendant Clive
McFarlane following Moore, about 100 feet behind. 18  Delehoy drove to
meet Moore, who told him McFarlane was trying to shoot him. About
that time, Delehoy saw McFarlane approach a set of trash cans along the
path that Moore had traveled. McFarlane took the liner from the trash
can, leaned into the can with both arms, and stood up to replace the
liner.'8 9 Based on this sequence of events, Delehoy arrested McFarlane
180. The cases discussed in this section are not the only ones that show why an intent require-
ment is so important. See, e.g., United States v. Paredes-Rodriguez, 160 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 1998)
(noting that omission of an intent requirement was "less than ideal" but holding omission was harm-
less on the facts of the case); United States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 605-06 (6th Cir. 2006) (hold-
ing that instruction that lacked intent requirement was improper but that defendant waived any
challenge to the error); United States v. Martin, 180 F.3d 965, 967 (8th Cir. 1999) (reversing con-
structive possession conviction on ground that "[k]nowledge of the possible location of a firearm
here is not a showing of power and intention to exercise dominion and control over an object").
181. 492 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2007).
182. Id. at 954-55.
183. Id. at 955.
184. Id. at 956.
185. Id.
186. 491 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2007).
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and then found a gun with six spent ammunition cases in the trash that
had interested McFarlane.'
90
McFarlane was charged with possessing that gun. At trial, he testi-
fied that he and Moore had gotten in a fight, during which Moore had
tried to shoot him.' 9' McFarlane testified that Moore then fled, and he
followed, stopping only to look in the trash can out of curiosity. 192 The
district court told the jury that constructive possession was "the power
and intention at any given time to exercise control or dominion of the
object" and gave an example to illustrate the concept. 93 However, the
jury presented two separate questions to the court: (1) "Does looking for
the gun constitute intent to exercise control and dominion over the gun?"
and (2) "Does opening the trash bag, with the intent to find the gun,
which is indeed there, constitute putting himself in the position to have
the power to exercise control and dominion over the gun?"' 94
McFarlane asked for a specific instruction that would have told the
jury that "mere curiosity ... coupled with a direct look at the gun...
does not establish constructive possession. ' 95 The court decided not to
specifically answer the question, committing the central issue of intent to
the jury:
As I told you, possession requires... both the ability and intention to
take physical control of an object. You are asking me to decide
whether a particular act by itself constitutes intent to exercise control
and whether.., doing something with that intent then puts the de-
fendant in the position of having the power to exercise control....
And all I can tell you is that you need to look at all of the evidence of
what occurred. You need to look-particularly with respect to in-
tent-you need to look at everything the defendant did, at everything
he said, and the circumstances that existed at the time that he acted
and spoke and decide from all of that whether he had the intent at a
particular point in time that you're considering to exercise control
over the object.
196
On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's instruction as a
proper statement of the law.' 97
McFarlane shows how a defendant's intent can be the only distinc-
tion between guilty and innocent conduct. The jury's question about
"looking for the gun" suggests the jurors may have accepted McFarlane's
story that he was chasing the person who had tried to shoot him. The
190. Id.
191. Id. at 56.
192. Id
193. Id. at 58.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 59.
196. Id. at 58-59.
197. Id. at 61.
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court's response made clear that it did not want to tell the jury there
could be no intent on these facts as a matter of law. But at the same
time, it left open the possibility that McFarlane might be innocent, de-
pending on how the jury resolved the question of his intent. If it was true
that McFarlane was just curious and had no intention to exercise control
over the gun, he should have been acquitted. Indeed, the First Circuit
recognized that "the main dispute at trial was over McFarlane's intent in
going to the trash can."'
' 98
These cases present tough factual questions suitable for a jury. Pi-
wowar is a case where the defendant claimed he tried to distance himself
from the guns but was still linked factually to them. McFarlane is a case
where the defendant claimed he crossed paths with the gun but had no
intention to take possession. In both cases, the circuit courts recognized
that a jury could have accepted the defendants' claims and acquitted.
2. Same Cases, Tenth Circuit
In contrast, neither Piwowar nor McFarlane would have posed a
triable issue in the Tenth Circuit, even if the jury accepted the defen-
dants' version of the facts. Piwowar would have no basis for acquittal
because he knew the guns were in the walk-in refrigerator (he put them
there originally) and he had access (a key to the refrigerator). McFarlane
knew the gun was in the trash can (at least by the time he looked in there)
and he had access (as seen by his rummaging). In the Tenth Circuit,
McFarlane's requested instruction-that merely looking at the gun out of
curiosity was not constructive possession-would not only have been
unwarranted. It would have been wrong. And neither case would have
any legal hope for acquittal.' 99
The First Circuit put it well:
The issue of intention is quite as important as the issue of power.
Someone might have effective power over [contraband] simply be-
cause [it was] located within reach while [its] true owner was tempo-
rarily absent; but if such a person had power over the [contraband]
(say, as a temporary visitor to the room [or car] in which [it was] lo-
cated) but had no intention to exercise that power, there might still be
no crime.
200
198. Id. at 59.
199. Under such circumstances, the only reason to go to trial would be the hope for jury nulli-
fication. This is a risky strategy because courts may not give a nullification instruction. While jury
nullification is certainly unlikely, it is not impossible. In one memorable case in the District of Utah,
the defendant charged with constructively possessing a firearm found in his bedroom closet actually
prevailed at trial on what was essentially a jury nullification theory. United States v. Morales, No.
1:03-cr-56-PGC (2003) (acquitting defendant despite admission that he had handled the gun).
200. United States v. Zavala-Maldonado, 23 F.3d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1994); see also United States v.
Terry, 911 F.2d 272, 280 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[Constructive possession] cases also add some element
that distinguishes possession from mere presence or accessibility. It is not enough that a person has
[Vol. 85:3
HANDS OFF THE GUN!
B. Equation of Nexus with Knowledge and Access
A related problem is the analytical chasm between Colonna and
Ledford that has essentially eliminated the value of the nexus require-
ment. Colonna was a sufficiency-of-the-evidence case that held upheld a
conviction where the evidence supported the inference that the defendant
had knowledge of and access to the firearm. 20 1 The court stated that
"knowledge and access are required to prove that the defendant know-
ingly held the power to exercise dominion and control over the fire-
arm. '20 2 The court continued, "where the defendant in a joint occupancy
situation has knowledge of and access to the weapons, there is a suffi-
cient nexus to infer dominion or control. 20 3 As discussed above, the
court could have stopped right here, but it continued on to hold that "[i]t
is not necessary to show that the defendant intended to exercise that do-
minion or control. 20 4
In equating constructive possession with knowledge and access, Co-
lonna cites United States v. Gorman.20 5 But a closer look at Gorman
suggests why Colonna's logic is problematic. Gorman states: "The gov-
ernment may satisfy the element of knowing possession of a firearm by
showing constructive possession: where a defendant 'knowingly hold[s]
the power to exercise dominion or control over the firearm.' 20 6 Knowl-
edge and control can be inferred where a defendant has exclusive posses-
sion of the premises, but where a defendant jointly occupies the premises
the government must "show some connection or nexus between the de-
fendant and the firearm or other contraband., 20 7  While it is true that
Gorman recognizes the importance of knowledge and access (control),
Colonna ignores the significance of the nexus requirement. The knowl-
edge and access that create an inference of constructive possession in a
sole occupancy situation do not create such an inference in a joint occu-
pancy situation in the absence of a nexus.
From Colonna, the Tenth Circuit next upheld instructions that sub-
stituted the idea of knowledge and access for the nexus requirement. In
Ledford, the court told the jury that "[a] person who, although not in ac-
tual possession, knowingly has the power at any given time to exercise
dominion or control over a thing.., is then in constructive possession of
it.' '2° 8 In Jameson, it told the jury that "constructive possession may be
shown by . . . evidence, which establishes . . . that the defendant had
the power to control the contraband, in the sense that he simply is in the presence of the contraband
and could reach out and take it.").
201. See supra notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
202. United States v. Colonna, 360 F.3d 1169, 1179 (10th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original).
203. Id.
204. Id
205. 312 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2002).
206. Id. at 1164 (citation omitted).
207. Id. (citations omitted).
208. United States v. Ledford, 443 F.3d 702, 714 (10th Cir. 2006).
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knowledge that the firearm was contained in the place and the defendant
had the ability to access the firearm."
209
The problem with these instructions is that they essentially "direct a
verdict" for the prosecution because the court, rather than the jury, de-
cides whether certain conduct rises to the level of constructive posses-
sion.210 One scholar studying constructive possession cases in Texas
state courts identified over thirty variables relevant to deciding whether
there was a nexus between a person and an object. 211 He notes:
The search for a link between the accused and the contraband is not
just a qualitative, logical exercise in thinking; the link represents a
compendium of the concrete factual elements of the case. The facts
themselves must draw the accused toward the contraband or, on the
contrary, separate the accused from the circle of control and access
which constitutes possession.
212
To say that only two of those (knowledge and access) always con-
stitutes constructive possession unfairly takes the nexus requirement
away from the jury. Rather than deciding whether a nexus exists in light
of many circumstantial considerations, the jury decides only whether two
particular circumstances exist. And if they do, under the instructions
given in Ledford and Jameson, they must convict.
A Seventh Circuit case illustrates this problem. In United States v.
Walls,213 the district court told the jury: "[C]onstructive possession as
used in these instructions is the ability to control cocaine or a gun.
' 214
The Seventh Circuit held that this instruction was improper because it
"failed to adequately apprise the jury of the need to find intent.,
215
The court then considered whether the error was harmless. On the
one hand, the trial offered ample evidence that could support such an
inference. "If the question before us were one of sufficiency of the evi-
dence, there is no doubt whatsoever that the evidence sufficed to demon-
strate constructive possession. '' 216 Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit con-cluded that "[a] jury could infer that [the defendant] had both knowledge
209. United States v. Jameson, 478 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2007).
210. This logical leap is precisely the analytical move the McFarlane court refused to make.
See supra notes 186-98 and accompanying text. In McFarlane, the district court refused to tell the
jury that certain facts could not constitute power and intent because doing so would "provid[e] the
court's view as to what the evidence demonstrated" and require it to "decide whether a particular act
by itself constitutes intent to exercise control," but that this was the jury's job. United States v.
McFarlane, 491 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2007). Cf United States v. Morgan, 914 F,2d 272, 275 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (holding that jury instruction did not "direct a verdict" for the prosecution because it
instructed the jury as to both knowledge and intent).
211. Caudill, supra note 4, at 542.
212. Id at 563.
213. 225 F.3d 858 (7th Cir. 2000).
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and intent to exercise dominion and control over [a gun] merely from its
presence in the bedroom that [the defendant] shared with [another per-
son].
2 17
On the other hand, however, "the evidence of ... [the defendant's]
knowledge and intent was [not] so overwhelming that no rational jury
would find otherwise.'218 Accordingly, the court remanded for a new
trial.
Consistent with Colonna, Walls holds that the location of the object
can support the requisite inferences for constructive possession. How-
ever, while those inferences may be justified in one case, it does not
mean they are justified in every case. Although there can never be a case
where the court finds constructive possession without evidence of
knowledge and access, not every situation where a defendant has knowl-
edge and access will establish an adequate nexus to support a finding of
constructive possession.
Thus, while knowledge and access may support an inference of con-
structive possession by a properly instructed jury, it does not follow that
in every case the jury must make that inference. In contrast to Jameson,
the Fourth Circuit reversed a conviction based on essentially the same
facts. In United States v. Blue,219 a police officer stopped an automobile
to investigate a seatbelt violation. 220 Defendant Herbert Blue was sitting
in the passenger seat, and as the officer approached the car, he saw
Blue's shoulder "dip as if ... [he] were reaching under the seat with his
right hand.",2 2 1 Then, during a consent search of the car, the officer found
a loaded .38 revolver under Blue's seat.222 Other than the officer's de-
scription of the shoulder dip and the fact that the gun was found under
his seat, no evidence linked Blue to the firearm, but he was still con-
victed for being a felon in possession of a firearm.
On appeal, Blue argued that the evidence was insufficient to estab-
lish constructive possession.223 The Fourth Circuit agreed. It held that
"[t]hese facts alone do not justify a finding of constructive possession.
To uphold a finding of constructive possession, this court requires more
evidence of dominion and control than the government has offered
here., 2 2 4 The only connection was "mere proximity," which could not
establish constructive possession.225 Thus, "Blue's shoulder dip alone
217. Id
218. Id.
219. 957 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1992).




224. Id. at 108.
225. Id.
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does not transform Blue from a mere passenger in the car to a possessor
of whatever is discovered underneath the seat in which he is sitting.
2 16
Although Blue's strikingly similar facts cast a cold shadow over
Jameson, the Blue court "emphasize[d] that the facts of this case fall
outside, but just barely, the realm of the quantum of evidence necessary
to support a finding of constructive possession., 227 How little, then, must
be added to support a finding of constructive possession? One might
conclude that Jameson crossed that line because the gun was not under
Jameson's seat but presumably under his foot. However, this fact only
goes to knowledge. It implies nothing as to any link between the person
and the gun.
More troubling is the observation in Jameson that the "inferred
physical contact with the pistol (his foot was on top of it)" 228 is really
nothing more than very close proximity. In one breath, the court writes
that "[p]roximity alone . . . is insufficient to establish knowledge and
access to ... a firearm in a joint occupancy case. 229 In the next breath,
however, it concludes the evidence, which other than the shoulder dip
was nothing more than proximity, was sufficient.
Either the gun was on the floor when Jameson got in the car, or he
put it on the floor before the officers searched the car. If it was the latter,
then we have a case of actual possession, and a constructive possession
instruction would not be appropriate.230  Although "a reasonable juror
could infer that Mr. Jameson had actual physical control of the pistol
when the car was pulled over and that he was trying to hide it underneath
the seat or under his foot, '231 one wonders whether the government
would ever have prosecuted such a case if it knew it would have to estab-
lish actual possession beyond a reasonable doubt. On the other hand, if
the gun was already in the car, then the question for the jury was whether
such conduct-stepping on a gun that happens to be in the car where
someone is getting a ride-rises to the level of possession.
To avoid injustice, it is necessary to impose an intent requirement.
It is not unreasonable to conclude that a person sitting in a car knows if a
gun is literally under his foot, and in such circumstances, the person
226. Id; see also United States v. Esquivel-Ortega, 484 F.3d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (rec-
ognizing that "a passenger may not be convicted unless there is evidence connecting him with the
contraband, other than his presence in the vehicle") (citations omitted).
227. Blue, 957 F.2d at 108.
228. United States v. Jameson, 478 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir. 2007).
229. Id. at 1209.
230. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 484 F.3d 783, 787-88 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that con-
structive possession was not warranted where the only evidence linking defendant to abandoned
firearm was witness's testimony that he thought he saw defendant put something where gun was
later found); United States v. Linares, 367 F.3d 941, 947-48 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that jury
could not have convicted on a constructive possession theory without accepting evidence that would
support proof of actual possession).
231. Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1210.
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clearly has access to the gun. But knowledge and access should not be
enough to convict. Certainly the person has never taken actual posses-
sion, and if he lacks any intention to take possession of the item, then
§ 922(g) is in no way implicated. On the other hand, if the person is
mentally planning to use the gun at some point, then it seems reasonable
to say that the person is possessing the gun. This question, of course,
may be difficult to answer. But that difficulty does not mean that the
court should take the burden away and let the prosecution infer intent
from the mere fact of proximity. To the contrary, in the absence of evi-
dence to show the defendant intended to exercise dominion and control,
the government should not be allowed to prevail at trial.
By substituting knowledge and access for the nexus requirement,
the Tenth Circuit has rendered the requirement meaningless and makes
"virtually anyone in a joint occupancy situation liable for contraband
possessed by a co-inhabitant, ' 232 a situation squarely rejected in
Lucero.233 Consider a few examples.
1. An upstanding, law-abiding, professional parent is charged with
constructive possession of drugs she knows are in her wayward son's
unlocked bedroom.
2. A convicted felon is charged with possessing an expensive hunt-
ing rifle kept on display in his neighbor's living room where he is oc-
casionally invited over for dinner.
3. A convicted felon who knows that his neighbor keeps a gun in his
bedroom is given a key to his neighbor's house while the neighbor
goes out of town.
23 4
4. A convicted felon shopping for sporting goods for his son is
charged with constructively possessing ammunition he sees on
unlocked shelves in the store.
235
5. A convicted felon working for a construction company is charged
with constructively possessing a gun he discovers (but never touches)
in the closet of a room he is hired to remodel.
In each of these situations, the government could clearly establish
knowledge and access to the contraband. Hopefully, it is equally clear
that the doctrine of constructive possession should not extend to such
232. Petition for Certiorari at 7, United States v. Ledford, 443 F.3d 702, 714 (10th Cir. 2006).
233. See supra notes 67-81 and accompanying text.
234. At oral argument in Ledford, the government conceded that under the court's instruction
there, this scenario would constitute constructive possession. See Rehearing Petition at 7, United
States v. Ledford, 443 F.3d 702, 714 (10th Cir. 2006).
235. Cf United States v. Francis, 462 F.3d 810, 815 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that employee of
a firearms store constructively possessed guns stored within its vault).
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situations.236 However, by substituting knowledge and access for the
nexus requirement, the Tenth Circuit has expanded liability to include
these situations. As defined by the Tenth Circuit, "the doctrine of con-
structive possession effectively imposes liability for being present at a
place where drugs are being used,, 237 and in the case of felons, it crini-
nalizes mere presence anywhere a gun is known to be found. Such broad
liability does not make sense.
III. OTHER POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Only the Tenth Circuit can rectify this imbalance. Significantly,
constructive possession is a judicially-created doctrine.238 Although
Congress could certainly enact a constructive possession statute, it has
not done so. Thus, "judicial use of a general possession statute to assert
the broader liability usurps the legislature's proper function., 239  Re-
cently, the Tenth Circuit refused to infer a defense to possession that was
not established by § 922(g). 240 The court should likewise refrain from
expanding liability in a way that is not required by the statute. The stric-
tures of this doctrine fall exclusively within the domain of the court, and
it has full authority to expand or limit the doctrine as appropriate. Sev-
eral policy observations suggest that the court should limit, rather than
expand, the doctrine of constructive possession.
A. Firearm Possession Is Not Inherently a Crime
First, courts must remember that firearm possession is not inher-
ently a crime. Section 922(g) "criminalizes conduct that could otherwise
be lawful based upon the status of the person engaging in that con-
duct., 24 1 Indeed, the Constitution itself secures the right to "keep and
bear arms. 242  While scholars from all political stripes have argued
whether this creates a personal right to carry arms or merely guarantees
that states may assemble their own militias,243 the existence of such a
right certainly repudiates any sense that weapon possession is somehow
inherently wrong.
236. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Crimi-
nal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 908-09 (2001) ("[If one expansively defines posses-
sion to include constructive possession, the criminalization of possession presumptively criminalizes
everyone everywhere.").
237. Whitebread, supra note 14, at 765.
238. Id. at 761.
239. Id. at 765.
240. See United States v. Baker, No. 07-3002, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 28296, at *15 (10th Cir.
Dec. 6, 2007) (holding that court lacked authority to infer a "Good Samaritan" defense to § 922(g)
"when Congress could have created the defense had it seen fit to do so").
241. United States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858, 865 (7th Cir. 2000).
242. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
243. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Amazing Vanishing Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
831 (1998); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989).
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Moreover, while it is common knowledge that convicted felons
cannot possess firearms, many of the individuals prosecuted for firearms
possession do not realize beforehand that "a misdemeanor [domestic
violence] conviction can ban [them] from gun ownership for the rest of
[their lives]. Even for the deer hunt., 244 Other defendants may not real-
ize that their state misdemeanor, which carries a maximum penalty
greater than two years, disqualifies them from lawfully possessing a fire-
arm under federal law.245 Still others may not realize they are disquali-
fied by a state felony conviction that did not include the loss of civil
rights, despite statutory language that permits possession by defendants
whose lost civil rights are subsequently restored.246 For defendants who
did not even realize they could not lawfully possess a firearm, it adds
insult to injury to allow the government to convict them of possessing a
firearm they never touched or even intended to touch.247
Aside from any misunderstanding about the statutory scheme, con-
structive possession extends liability in a way that can be counterintuitive
to defendants. One client charged under § 922(g) admitted that he saw a
friend put a gun between the driver and passenger seat when my client
was a passenger in the friend's car. He could not understand how he
could be charged with possessing the firearm if he never touched the gun
or intended to touch the gun. Those who realize they are not allowed to
possess a firearm may conscientiously avoid touching a firearm only to
discover that they have constrictively possessed a weapon merely by
moving into a position where they have access to it. It may well be that
the facts of a case discredit a defendant's claim that he was near the gun
but had no intention of possessing it. However, the law must protect
those who are, in fact, innocent without fear that a known felon might
take possession of a gun he does not currently have and might then use it
to commit a violent crime.
244. Domestic Violence: Feds Can Take Away Violator's Gun-For Life, Ogden Standard
Examiner (Oct. 27, 2004).
245. 18 U.S.C.A. § 921(a)(20)(B) (2008); Logan v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 475, 479 (2007)
("An offense classified by a State as a misdemeanor... may qualify... as a predicate for a felon-in-
possession conviction under § 922(g)[] only if the offense is punishable by more than two years in
prison."). On the flip side, some state felonies do not qualify as felonies for purpose of felon in
possession. United States v. Hill, No. 07-3034, 2008 WL 134207 (D. Kan. Jan. 15, 2008) (holding
that Kansas conviction was not a felony because defendant could never have received a sentence
greater than one year).
246. Logan, 128 S. Ct. at 479 (holding that "the § 921(a)(20) exemption provision [for one
whose rights are restored] does not cover the case of an offender who retained civil rights at all
times, and whose legal status, postconviction, remained in all respects unaltered by any state dispen-
sation").
247. Cf United States v. Chavez-Diaz, 444 F.3d 1223, 1230 (10th Cir. 2006) (acknowledging
the possibility that "circumstances may arise where a defendant's ignorance of the law may consti-
tute a mitigating sentencing factor"); United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 965 n.31 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (stating that "ignorance of law may be considered by the court in mitigation of punishment").
But see United States v. Yu, 954 F.2d 951, 956 (3d Cir. 1992) (Becker, J., dissenting) (recognizing
that ignorance based on cultural differences may warrant a sentencing reduction but "that a defen-
dant who is or should be familiar with this country's laws and traditions may not invoke ignorance
... to obtain a reduced sentence").
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B. Federal Firearm Charges Carry Harsh Penalties
Second, it is important to remember that firearm cases in the federal
system frequently receive lengthy punishments. In general, a felon con-
victed of carrying a firearm faces a sentence of up to 10 years.248 How-
ever, firearm statutes are subject to severe mandatory minimum sen-
tences, ranging from five years to life.249 Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), if
that gun was possessed "in furtherance of any [crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime]," the defendant is subject to a mandatory sentence of 5
or 25 years, in addition to any other sentence he might receive.
250
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)2 ' replaces the 10-year
maximum with a 15-year mandatory minimum for defendants with three
or more prior drug trafficking or violent felonies. 2  In contrast to
§ 924(c), which creates a separate crime for situations where guns are
linked with crimes of violence or drug trafficking crimes, the ACCA is a
sentencing enhancement. Thus, the conduct at issue is identical to any
other firearm possession case-the only difference is the status of the
offender. Because such lengthy sentences can be grossly disproportion-
ate to a defendant's conduct, the courts should narrow rather than expand
liability under these provisions.253
C. Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion
In response to these concerns, one might argue that unjust convic-
tions and excessive sentences will be avoided by prosecutors who decide
what cases to bring. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit recently rejected a defen-
dant's attempt to impose an intent requirement on actual possession, rea-
soning in part that "if the safeguard against liability ... is not provided
by the statute, it is found in the exercise of sound prosecutorial discre-
tion., 254 Unfortunately, prosecutorial discretion may not prevent prose-
cutions in the situations described above, and it certainly does not pre-
248. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(a)(2) (2008).
249. Bernard Harcourt, Introduction: Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America, 43 ARIZ. L.
REv. 261, 261 (2001).
250. It is not uncommon for § 924(c) prosecutions to be based on constructive possession
theories. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 462 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cit. 2006) (reversing § 924(c)
conviction because government failed to establish a positive link between the defendant and the
charged weapons). In United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006), which has received
wide publicity for the 55-year sentence handed down to a first-time convict, 25 years of the sentence
are attributable to a constructive possession charge. Id. at 754.
251. § 924(e).
252. Id.
253. Cf Ruiz, 462 F.3d at 1089 (citing "the mandatory nature of the sentence imposed for a
violation of § 924(c)" in support of its finding that the government had not established constructive
possession).
254. United States v. Baker, 508 F.3d 1321, 1327 (10th Cir. 2007).
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vent prosecutions where the punishment grossly outweighs the crime. 255
A number of factors may account for this.
For one thing, because the ACCA is a sentencing enhancement, a
prosecutor may not realize at the time of the indictment that a simple
possession charge will result in a mandatory 15-year sentence. The
ACCA is triggered by a defendant's prior criminal record, and it is well
settled that this prior record need not be charged in the indictment or
found by a jury.256 Thus, it is possible for the prosecutor to learn from a
Pre-Sentencing Report (PSR) that a particular defendant faces a 15-year
mandatory minimum sentence. By this time, it will typically be too late
for a defendant to try to avoid the harsh mandatory minimum by having a
trial.257
Still, a prosecutor who knows that a defendant faces a 15-year man-
datory minimum may be obligated to press charges anyway, despite the
fact that such a sentence would be grossly disproportional to the charged
conduct. In 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft instituted a charging
policy memorandum that required federal prosecutors to "charge and
pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are
supported by the facts of the case," subject to a handful of exceptions.258
Under this policy, "[t]he most serious offense or offenses are those that
255. See, e.g., id. (upholding conviction and resulting 235-month sentence of a convicted felon
who picked up abandoned ammunition to prevent trick-or-treaters from getting it and had it in his
possession for only 10 minutes while he tried to take it to the police); Angelos, 433 F.3d 754 (10th
Cir. 2006) (affirming 55-year sentence for firearms possession in connection with drug trafficking);
United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1243-47 (D. Utah 2004) (comparing 55-year sen-
tence for firearms possession in connection with drug trafficking with significantly lighter penalties
for more serious crimes); United States v. Pikyavit, No. 2106-CR-407 (D. Utah Apr. 26, 2007)
(imposing mandatory 15-year sentence for Native American defendant who lived in deceased par-
ents' home where bullets had been left by family members after years of deer hunting). I repre-
sented Pkyavit at trial.
256. See, e.g., Baker, 508 F.3d at 1327-30.
257. Although some would argue that a defendant should be aware of what prior convictions he
has that might trigger a mandatory minimum under the ACCA, the definitions for crimes of violence
and drug trafficking offenses are very technical and have been the source of much litigation at all
levels. This Term alone, the United States Supreme Court has already heard three cases arguing
technical aspects of the ACCA. See Logan v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 475, 479 (2007) ("An offense
classified by a State as a misdemeanor ... may qualify ... as a predicate for a felon-in-possession
conviction under § 922(g)[] only if the offense is punishable by more than two years in prison.");
United States v. Rodriguez (06-1646) (asking whether a prior state conviction that carried a higher
penalty under a separate rescidivist statute qualified defendant for an enhanced penalty under
ACCA); United States v. Begay, (06-1153) (asking whether a prior conviction for felony driving
under the influence of alcohol was a crime of violence under ACCA). Thus, it is unreasonable to
expect an untrained defendant to understand the full ramifications of his criminal record, and crimi-
nal records provided to counsel in discovery are sometimes incomplete. One way to avoid discover-
ing that a defendant qualifies for ACCA enhancement only after he has already pleaded guilty is to
rely on a pre-plea PSR. Anecdotally, it appears that pre-plea PSRs are common practice in some
districts but infrequent in others.
258. Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to all Federal Prosecutors (Sept. 22,
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm. The memoran-
dum further defined when a charge is "readily provable." A "charge is not 'readily provable' if the
prosecutor has a good faith doubt, for legal or evidentiary reasons, as to the Government's ability
readily to prove a charge at trial." Id.
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generate the most substantial sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines,
unless a mandatory minimum sentence or count requiring a consecutive
sentence would generate a longer sentence. 25 9  Although "charges
should not be filed simply to exert leverage to induce a plea," the policy
constricted productive plea discussions because "[o]nce filed, the most
serious readily provable charges may not [generally] be dismissed.,
260
Under this policy, a line prosecutor may be obligated to bring the "read-
ily provable" charges discussed above and prohibited from dismissing
such charges in a plea agreement.
Finally, an expansive doctrine lends itself to misuse of prosecutorial
discretion because it "creates a system of selective law enforcement.,
261
Professor Whitebread writes:
The primary utility of the doctrine arises in the group arrest context.
In a situation where the police arrest several people in one apartment
but cannot show actual possession by any one of them, the doctrine
allows the prosecutor to select those whom he will charge and those
whom he will not. Such choices are neither uniform nor consistent.
They are either based on the irrelevant fact of ownership of the prem-
ises or the fortuitous circumstance of proximity, or they flow from
the prosecutor's attitude toward drug users and the particular drug.262
Or, as seen here, they flow from the prosecutor's attitude towards fire-
arms.
263
Ultimately, it seems unlikely that prosecutorial discretion will effec-
tively prevent the injustices described here.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of these considerations, three recommendations are in order:
(1) Require proof of intent in constructive possession cases; (2) Further
develop the nexus requirement and correct the unfair practice of replac-
ing the nexus requirement with proof of knowledge and access; and (3)
Recognize that a person's intent regarding the weapon may be a mitigat-
ing factor not accounted for by the Guidelines.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Whitebread, supra note 14, at 765.
262. Id. at 765-766.
263. In a training for state law enforcement officers, one federal prosecutor asked the officers
to "get their domestic violence cases with guns moved from state court to federal court, where the
sentence can be prison instead of jail time." Domestic Violence, supra note 244. He said, "We want
more of these cases. We're not getting enough. Do it because it's fun. It's fun to send these guys to
prison. Sentences in federal prison are listed in months. When you say 84 months, these ... guys
throw up. I love it. It scares them." Id.
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A. Require Proof of Intent
The first recommendation is for courts to require proof of intent in
constructive possession cases. This recommendation applies first in the
district court. Although the Tenth Circuit indicated in Jameson that in-
tent is not required, in United States v. Zink it specifically affirmed a
constructive possession instruction that included an intent requirement:
"A person who although not in actual possession knowingly has both the
power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control
over a thing either directly or indirectly or through another person or
persons is then in constructive possession of it.''264 On appeal, the Tenth
Circuit called this a "stock instruction on this issue which has been af-
firmed many times.' 265 As recently as 2004, the court has affirmed the
266use of this instruction. Thus, district courts should exercise their dis-
cretion at sentencing by requiring evidence of intent in constructive pos-
session cases.267
In the end, however, it is not enough that district judges have discre-
tion to give such an instruction. Until they are required to give such an
instruction, there will be no sure protection for individuals who cross
paths with some contraband. Thus, it is up to the Tenth Circuit to join
every other circuit in the country and recognize that constructive posses-
sion requires proof of a defendant's intention to exercise control or do-
minion over the object.268
264. United States v. Zink, 612 F.2d 511, 516 n. I (10th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).
265. ld. at 516.
266. United States v. Lopez, 372 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004).
267. One puzzle for defendants who claim they never intended to exercise dominion or control
over a gun is whether they should assert their theory of the case at trial or simply plead guilty. On
the one hand, they would like to tell the jury that they never intended to touch the gun. However, a
defendant who goes to trial loses the benefit of a guideline reduction for pleading guilty. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1. 1(2003). To then get to that point only to have the dis-
trict court deny an intent instruction, knowing that the Tenth Circuit will affirm, adds insult to injury.
Where a district court judge is inclined to refuse an intent instruction, one approach may allow
defendants to preserve the legal issue for appeal while also receiving the reduction for acceptance of
responsibility. In contrast to the usual practice of arguing jury instructions on the eve of trial, de-
fense counsel might file a motion with the court prior to the motion cutoff, requesting a specific jury
instruction on constructive possession. If the district court agrees to give an intent instruction, the
defendant may decide to give up the reduction for accepting responsibility in exchange for the
chance to tell his side of the story. If the district court denies such a motion, the defendant may ask
to enter a conditional plea, preserving the issue for appeal. If this request is denied, a trial under-
taken only to preserve a legal issue for appeal should not disqualify him from the reduction for
acceptance of responsibility. The Guidelines make clear that "[c]onviction by trial, however, does
not automatically preclude a defendant from consideration for such a reduction" where a defendant
"challenge[s] ... the applicability of a statute to his conduct." Id. at cmt. n.2. Under such circum-
stances, a defendant may do well to stipulate to knowledge and access and point out that because he
did not intend to possess the gun, the statute does not apply to him. Because the crux of the jury
instruction request and the resultant trial would be simply to preserve the argument that the statute
did not apply to his conduct, he should receive acceptance.
268. Because a Tenth Circuit panel has expressly rejected any intent requirement, this may be
done only by the en banc court. United States v. Meyers, 200 F.3d 715, 720 (10th Cir. 2000). In the
Tenth Circuit, this can happen in a variety of ways. The most well-known way is to seek rehearing
en banc following an adverse ruling. Id. Litigants should also be aware that a Tenth Circuit panel
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Consistent with such a holding, the court should also modify its pat-
tern jury instructions to require a showing of intent. One easy solution
would be to simply add intent language to the current instruction as fol-
lows: "A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has
[both] the power [and the intention] at a given time to exercise dominion
or control over an object, either directly or through another person or
persons, is then in constructive possession of it."
269
B. Proof' Enforce Nexus Requirement
As discussed above, Ledford and Jameson weakened the nexus re-
quirement by equating it with knowledge and access. 270 Thus, the second
recommendation is that courts give greater content to the nexus require-
ment. This recommendation can be done in two ways.
First, whatever else a nexus might entail, courts should recognize
that there is no nexus unless the defendant intends to exercise dominion
or control over the object. One way to do this might be to modify the
pattern jury instructions as follows:
In the situation where the object is found in a place (such as a room
or car) occupied by more than one person, you may not infer control
over the object based solely on joint occupancy. Mere control over
the place in which the object is found is not sufficient to establish
constructive possession. Instead, in this situation the government
must prove some connection between the particular defendant and
the object. As part of this connection, the government must prove
that the defendant knowingly had the power and the intention to ex-
ercise dominion or control over the object.
271
The Ninth Circuit has required both a nexus and evidence of intent:
To prove constructive possession, the government must prove a suf-
ficient connection between the defendant and the contraband to sup-
port the inference that the defendant exercised dominion and control
over the firearms. In the more difficult situation where the premises
are shared by more than one person, the Ninth Circuit has found that
if a party has knowledge of the weapon and both the power and the
intention to exercise dominion and control over it, then he has con-
structive possession. Mere proximity to contraband, presence on
"may overrule a point of law established by a prior panel after obtaining authorization from all active
judges on the court." Id. at 721. This is often done through an "en banc footnote," a footnote stating
that the opinion has been circulated to all active judges on the court and that all judges agree the
prior opinion should be overturned. See, e.g., United States v. Atencio, 476 F.3d 1099, 1105 n.6
(10th Cir. 2007).
269. See TENTH CIRCUIT PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 1.31 (2006). With the
inserted language, this instruction is identical to the version initially proposed in the Tenth Circuit.
See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 133-68 and accompanying text.
271. See TENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 1.31 (italicized language
added).
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property where it is found and association with a person or persons
having control of it are all insufficient to establish constructive pos-
session.
272
In addition to clarifying legal standards for this nexus, courts must
take this nexus requirement more seriously in future cases. District
courts should enter judgments of acquittal, and the Tenth Circuit should
reverse convictions where the connection is as tenuous as it was in
Jameson and Blue. Allowing such convictions to stand repudiates the
longstanding principle that mere proximity is not enough to convict.
C. Sentencing: Recognize Mitigating Value of Intent
Finally, courts should recognize that a defendant's intent regarding
the firearm may justify a sentence below the applicable guideline range.
A defendant's intent with regard to the charged firearm is highly relevant
to assessing an appropriate sentence. 273 For example, a constructive pos-
session defendant in the Tenth Circuit who never intended even to touch
the gun should be punished less severely than a gang member who was
heading to a drug deal with a gun tucked into his waistband.
The Guidelines reflect the relevance of intent by imposing a 4-level
increase where the defendant "possessed... any firearm.., with knowl-
edge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in
connection with another felony offense., 274 On the flip side, the Guide-
lines provide a 6-level decrease where the weapons were possessed for
sporting purposes only.275
However, this reduction may not be broad enough in two regards.
First, while the sporting use rationale presumably applies to all defen-
dants, the decrease does not. Certain defendants-primarily those with
longer criminal records-cannot receive this reduction.276 Second, the
Guidelines do not include a decrease for defendants whose intent regard-
ing the gun may be otherwise provably harmless. 277 This aspect of the
current Guidelines is particularly problematic in the Tenth Circuit where
a defendant may not have intended to touch the gun at all. Of course,
many defendants who try to make such a claim will understandably have
272. United States v. Carrasco, 257 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
273. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 449 F.3d 1087, 1090-91 (10th Cir. 2006) (discussing
how defendant's manifest purposes regarding the rifle he possessed impacted the severity of his
sentence and noting that "[o]ne can have a purpose for possessing a firearm before actually using the
firearm for that purpose").
274. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (USSG) § 2K2.1(b)(6) (2007).
275. USSG § 2K2. (b)(2).
276. Id.
277. See, e.g., United States v. Herron, 432 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that mandatory
application of the Guidelines was not plain error in ACCA case where defendant helped his girl-
friend buy a gun for personal protection, showed her how to shoot the gun, and taught her how to
clean it).
2008]
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proof problems. But the burden is theirs,278 and a defendant who can
credibly claim that he did not intend to possess the charged firearm
should receive a lower sentence.
Fortunately, the Guidelines themselves acknowledge that a district
court is authorized to impose a sentence below the guideline range if a
mitigating factor that was "not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines ... should result
in a sentence different from that described., 279 The Guidelines continue:
"A departure may be warranted in an exceptional case, even though the
circumstance that forms the basis for the departure is taken into consid-
eration in determining the guideline range, if the court determines that
such circumstance is present in the offense to a degree substantially in
excess of, or substantially below, that which ordinarily is involved in that
kind of offense. 280 Ordinarily, a defendant guilty of knowingly possess-
ing a firearm intended to possess the weapon. Thus, a defendant who
pleads guilty to possessing a weapon he never intended to touch seems to
fall within the category whose offense is substantially below the ordinary
level.
For other defendants who intended to possess the firearm for sport-
ing purposes but are disqualified based on their prior criminal record, a
nonguideline sentence may still be appropriate. One district court re-
cently noted that sporting use "is something that the Guidelines take into
account in other areas, but for some reason do not take into account in
this particular area [where the defendant's prior record disqualifies him
from the reduction.], 28' The court relied on this fact among other miti-
gating facts as ground for imposing a nonguideline sentence.282 In similar
fashion, the Tenth Circuit should recognize that where the Guidelines do
not adequately reflect a defendant's intent regarding the weapon, a sen-
tence below the guideline range is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
None of these recommendations marks a drastic expansion of the
law. As discussed above, the Tenth Circuit has already recognized that a
district court may properly instruct a jury that constructive possession
requires proof of intent to exercise control or dominion, and it is well
established that the government must show a nexus to establish its case.
But for defendants like Ben Cecala, Chrisopher Jameson, or any other
278. Cf Sanders, 449 F.3d at 1090 (stating that defendant has the burden of proving that he
qualifies for a sporting use reduction).
279. USSG § 5K2.0(a)(1)(A).
280. USSG §5K2.0(a)(3).
281. United States v. Pikyavit, No. 2:06-CR-407, at 24.
282. Id. (imposing nonguideline sentence based on (1) the fact that defendant possessed only
bullets, (2) the fact that the bullets were used only by others for sporting purposes, and (3) the evi-
dence in the case was discovered as a result of the defendant's request that police investigate an
assault where he was a victim).
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innocent bystanders who happen to find themselves in the presence of
contraband, these protections are necessary to avoid liability for "mere
proximity" to the contraband.
As seen here, the Tenth Circuit has unfairly expanded the doctrine
of constructive possession. Although its recent cases continue to pro-
claim that "mere proximity" is not enough to establish possession and
that a "nexus" is required between the defendant and a firearm,28 3 its
holdings invalidate these proclamations. By transforming the sufficiency
of "knowledge and access" into the touchstone of constructive posses-
sion, the Tenth Circuit has eliminated the nexus requirement and broad-
ened the possession to include many situations where individuals would
never have touched the object in question. It has defined "possession" in
such a way that even a person who is conscientiously trying to live
within the limits of the law may unwittingly "possess" an item just by
discovering he has access to it. Such breadth is untenable.284 The Tenth
Circuit should join its sister circuits and recognize that possession turns
on "the possessor's manifested intent to exercise such control over the
object" 285 and require proof of intent to possess in constructive posses-
sion cases. It should also conscientiously enforce the nexus requirement
and recognize that in the world of harsh federal firearm sentences, a de-
fendant's intent may be the basis for a reduced sentence.
283. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 479 F.3d 1229, 1257 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Mendez, No. 06-3282 (D. Kan. Jan. 24, 2008).
284. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, HARV. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897)
(stating that the law must enable even a "bad man" to "predict" the "material consequences" of his
conduct, i.e., whether his conduct is legal or not).
285. Whitebread, supra note 14, at 759.
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TENTH CIRCUIT INTERPRETATIONS OF GARCETTI: LIMITS
ON FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS FOR WHISTLE-
BLOWERS
INTRODUCTION
In May of 2006, the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark
ruling in the case of Garcetti v. Ceballos,' which significantly restricted
the free speech protections of government employees.2 Justice Kennedy,
writing for the narrow majority3 proclaimed, "when public employees
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline. ' 4 The
Court concluded that although a government employee's speech may be
protected where the employee "speaks as a citizen addressing matters of
public concern,, 5 the dispositive analysis hinges on a balancing test in-
volving a number of competing contextual factors surrounding the
speech . Just because a government employee has spoken on matters of
public concern does not guarantee First Amendment protection. In fact,
rulings by lower courts interpreting Garcetti have denied constitutional
protections even when speech by whistle-blowers involved credible alle-
gations of government corruption,7 mismanagement,8 and illegality.9 In
cases where the speech occurs pursuant to a government employee's
1. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
2. Id. at 1960-61; see also John Sanchez, The Law of Retaliation After Burlington Northern
and Garcetti, 30 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOc. 539, 553-54 (2007) ("[T]he Garcetti Court ruled that any-
thing public employees say in the course of performing their assigned duties is not of public concern,
and is therefore not protected under the First Amendment"); Joel Gora, First Amendment Decisions
in the October 2005 Term, 22 TouRo L. REv. 917, 926 (2007) ("[S]peech at the public workplace
... may still be protected, but speech on the job is virtually immune from any First Amendment
inquiry").
3. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts along with
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1954.
4. Id. at 1960.
5. Id. at 1961.
6. Id.
7. Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 761 (1 1th Cir. 2006) (explaining that a university
employee's retaliation claim that she was fired after reporting financial improprieties and possible
fraud involving her supervisor, failed under Garcetti because her complaints were made pursuant to
her official duties).
8. Casey v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323, 1331 (10th Cir. 2007) (explain-
ing that a school superintendant's retaliation claim that she was fired after reporting financial impro-
prieties involving federal funding of the district's Head Start program, failed under Garcetti because
she reported the problems pursuant to official duties).
9. Williams v. Riley, 481 F. Supp. 2d 582, 583-84 (N.D. Miss. 2007) (explaining that three
police officers' retaliation claims that they were fired after reporting the beating of a restrained
prisoner by a fellow officer, failed under Garcetti because their complaints were made pursuant to
their official duties).
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official duties, the Court in Garcetti held that there is no First Amend-
ment shield.10
Interestingly, the Court declined to provide a framework for deter-
mining when speech is pursuant to official duties.1' Without a frame-
work, the federal courts at both the trial and appellate levels have had to
break new ground in this area. 12 How a court construes speech pursuant
to official duties often determines whether an employee's speech is un-
protected. 13 Predictably, different courts have taken different approaches
to this analysis.' 4  Problematically, some have interpreted the Court's
decision in Garcetti broadly, declaring more speech to be unprotected. 15
Others have interpreted Garcetti narrowly, expanding the field of pro-
tected speech relative to other courts.'
6
The Tenth Circuit has provided guidance in this developing area
1 7
and follows the broader application of the Garcetti test.'8 The impact has
been a substantial erosion of speech protections for government employ-
ees. Two opinions issued after Garcetti offered perhaps the most expan-
sive interpretation of how speech pursuant to official duties should be
construed. In Green v. Board of County Commissioners,19 the appellate
panel barred First Amendment protection because the plaintiffs speech
involved generally "the type of activities [the employee] was paid to
do.",20 The Tenth Circuit drew a similar post-Garcetti conclusion in the
2007 case of Casey v. West Las Vegas Independent School District,21 in
which the appellate court found statements relating to matters within an
employee's "portfolio" of responsibilities to be "pursuant to her official
duties. 22 The Tenth Circuit's most recent refinement of Garcetti came
10. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1962.
11. Id. at 1961.
12. See, e.g., Casey, 473 F.3d at 1328.
13. See Sanchez, supra note 2, at 559-60.
14. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at * 1, * 11, * 13, Spiegla v. Hull, No. 07-273, 2007 WL
2461589 (7th Cir. Aug. 27, 2007) (explaining how different federal courts at the trial and appellate
levels have construed the official duty analysis of Garcetti differently).
15. See, e.g., Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 761 (11 th Cir. 2006); Freitag v. Ayers,
468 F.3d 528, 546 (9th Cir. 2006); Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 646, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2006).
16. Pittman v. Cuyahoga Valley Career Ctr., 451 F. Supp. 2d 905, 929 (2006) (indicating the
court "interprets Garcetti more narrowly .... If the public employee's speech was required by his
or her job, then Garcetti applies and the statements are not protected speech. If the speech, however,
is not specifically job-related, then the statements are reviewed under a traditional Connick analy-
sis"); see also Lindsey v. Orrick, 491 F.3d 892, 897-98 (8th Cir. 2007); Jackson v. Jimino, 506 F.
Supp. 2d 105, 109-10 (N.D.N.Y. 2007); Barclay v. Michalsky, 451 F. Supp. 2d 386, 394-99 (D.
Conn. 2006).
17. Cheek v. City of Edwardsville, 514 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1230 (D. Kan. 2007) ("The Tenth
Circuit ... has provided significant guidance on this issue since Garcetti."); see also Brammer-
Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007).
18. Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1203-04; Charles W. Rhodes, Public Employee Speech
Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173, 1195-
96 (2007) (explaining the difference between narrow and broad applications of Garcetti).
19. 472 F.3d 794 (10th Cir. 2007).
20. Id. at 800-01.
21. 473 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 2007).
22. Id. at 1329.
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in the 2007 case of Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Academy,
23
in which the appellate court said "speech relating to tasks within an em-
ployee's uncontested employment responsibilities is not protected from
regulation. 24
While the Tenth Circuit's use of the term "uncontested employment
responsibilities" to define official duties in Brammer-Hoelter seems to
slightly narrow the general guidelines offered in Green and Casey, the
analysis remains broad. Broad interpretations of official duties tend to
result in more restrictions to speech because more speech can be caught
in the wide net of expansive terminology. By broadly defining when
speech is pursuant to official duties, Brammer-Hoelter, Green, and Casey
arguably limit the First Amendment protections of government employ-
ees beyond even the Court's guidance in Garcetti. Thus, the Tenth Cir-
cuit's approach has important implications for whistle-blowers and prac-
titioners.
Part I of this comment provides a brief history of the case law
through Garcetti including a description of the Garcetti razor 25 and its
consequences. Part II analyzes the Tenth Circuit cases that have inter-
preted Garcetti, and makes the argument that the Tenth Circuit has re-
stricted free speech beyond the specific application used in Garcetti.
Part III compares the Tenth Circuit's approach to other circuits that have
interpreted Garcetti, looking specifically at how the jurisprudential
framework can be the most important dispositive factor. Finally, Part IV
discusses the impacts on whistle-blowers, citizens, and governments,
concluding with some thoughts for practitioners operating in a post-
Garcetti landscape.26
I. IT WASN'T ALWAYS THIS WAY
In simpler times, before Garcetti, the "unchallenged dogma 27 as-
sumed government employers could use the employment relationship as
leverage to restrict an employee's First Amendment rights. 28 That preva-
lent attitude in the early twentieth century eventually yielded to a juris-
23. 492 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2007).
24. Id. at 1203.
25. The Garcetti razor is a term invented by the author to describe the test that often blocks
public employee speech claims from the constitutional balancing test known as the Connick-
Pickering test.
26. A common theme throughout this comment is the author's opinion that Garcetti is overly
broad, lacks predictability, and leaves too much speech unprotected.
27. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1957 (2006) ("[T]he unchallenged dogma was that a
public employee had no right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment-including
those which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights." (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 143 (1983)).
28. Rhodes, supra note 18, at 1176; see also id (quoting Justice Holmes that a policeman
"may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a police-
mall").
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prudential approach that was more sympathetic to free speech.29 This
change in philosophy evolved in the 1950s and 1960s through a string of
cases concerning government attempts to identify, blacklist, and retaliate
against former or suspected members of the communist party in Amer-
ica. 30 The cases struck down statutes and conduct aimed at restricting
government employees from exercising their rights to "participate in
public affairs., 31 The precedential seeds of those progressive cases would
bear fruit in the landmark 1968 case of Pickering v. Board of Educa-
tion.
32
A. The Pickering Balance Creates Constitutional Protections for Public
Employees
The Pickering case expanded the speech rights of public employees,
providing some First Amendment protections to those whose speech
related to matters of public concern. In Pickering, the Board of Educa-
tion [Board] fired a teacher for writing a "letter to the editor" in which
the teacher criticized the Board and superintendant for spending too
much money on athletics, and for attempting to bar teachers from pub-
licly criticizing a bond issue.33 The Court established a balancing test
weighing the interests of the public employee's speech against the gov-
ernment's interest in efficient administration of services. 4  The
Pickering Court held the teacher's speech interest prevailed because the
teacher spoke on matters of public concern, specifically taxes and elec-
tions.3- Furthermore, the Court reasoned, the exercise of the contested
speech had little impact on the orderly and efficient operation of the
school district.3 6  The Court also recognized that teachers are "most
likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to
the operations of the schools should be spent."37 Thus, while the Court
did not view the speech of government employees as having absolute
constitutional protection, the Court was willing to extend that shield if
the employee's interest in speaking on matters of public concern out-
weighed the government's interest in quashing the speech. The
Pickering test formed the modem basis for evaluating government re-
taliation claims, and remained largely unmodified until the 1983 case of
Connick v. Myers.38
29. Id. at 1176-77.
30. Connick, 461 U.S. at 144.
31. Id. at 144-45.
32. Id.; 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
33. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566.
34. Id. at 568.
35. Id. at 571-72.
36. Id. at 570-73.
37. Id. at 572.
38. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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B. Connick Makes Speech Retaliation Claims More Difficult for Gov-
ernment Employees
In Connick, the Court added an obstacle to the traditional Pickering
test by requiring an antecedent analysis of whether the speech related to
matters of public concern.39 That is, the new rule required a finding that
the speech constituted a matter of public concern before the courts could
employ the balancing test under Pickering.40 Prior to Connick, courts
generally skipped the public concern analysis and went straight to the
balancing test.
In Connick, an employee in the New Orleans District Attorney's Of-
fice, upset after being given a forced transfer, put together a question-
naire asking co-workers to share their views on issues, including confi-
dence in management and employee morale.4 ' She passed out the ques-
tionnaires to co-workers. 42 Upon learning of the employee's "mini insur-
rection, ' 43 her bosses fired her for insubordination. 44 The question for
the Court involved assessing whether the plaintiff's speech was protected
under Pickering.45 The Court reasoned that the prerequisite hurdle to
Pickering is a public concern analysis. 46 That is, the public employee
must have spoken as a citizen on matters of public concern before the
Court would employ the Pickering test. 47 The Court concluded that the
content of the employee's questionnaire amounted to speech about the
employee's personal grievances. 48 In that capacity, the Court reasoned,
the employee was not speaking as a citizen on matters of public concern
and was therefore not entitled to constitutional protection from her em-
ployer's discipline. 49 Thus, Connick, as a limiting factor, gave judges a
filter to bar certain cases from ever getting to the Pickering balance.50
This effectively restricted the First Amendment protections of public
employees by limiting the claims that would survive a summary judg-
ment challenge.5'
The combination of Pickering and Connick resulted in a four-step
analysis.52 First, did the public employee speak as a citizen on a matter
of public concern? 53 Second, if the employee spoke as a citizen on a
39. Rhodes, supra note 18, at 1178.
40. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
41. Id. at 140-41.
42. Id. at 141.
43. Characterization given by supervisor Dennis Waldron. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 142-43.
46. Id. at 145-46.
47. Id. at 147-48.
48. Id. at 154.
49. Id.
50. See Sanchez, supra note 2, at 552.
51. Id.
52. Rhodes, supra note 18, at 1179-80.
53. Id. at 1179.
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matter of public concern, did the individual's speech interest outweigh
the government's interest in efficient administration?54 Third, if the in-
dividual's speech interest outweighed the government's interest, did the
government commit a retaliatory employment action because of the em-
ployee's speech? 55 Fourth, even if the government retaliated against the
employee's speech, would the government have taken the same action if
the speech had not occurred? 56 For the adverse employment claim to be
actionable, the plaintiff must win each prong of the Connick-Pickering
test, whereas the government prevails if it can win at least one prong. 7
The Connick addition to the Pickering test made it very difficult for
public employees to have actionable claims when their speech triggered
employer retaliation. 8 The cases that typically survived the Connick
reformulation were those focusing on whistle-blowers whose speech
exposed government misconduct.59 The courts were generally more re-
ceptive of claims in which the employee had at least a partial motivation
to expose government corruption, as opposed to primarily airing personal
grievances.
60
C. Along Comes Garcetti
The Connick-Pickering analysis would undergo another restrictive
reformulation in the landmark case of Garcetti v. Ceballos.61 In Gar-
cetti, an assistant district attorney, Ceballos, wrote a memo to his superi-
ors explaining that he believed a police search warrant contained key
misrepresentations.62 He recommended that the district attorney dismiss
the case.63 During a heated meeting, Ceballos' superiors and colleagues
"sharply criticized" his conclusions and ultimately ignored them.64 Ce-
ballos later claimed he had suffered retaliatory employment action cul-
minating in his forced transfer and reassignment.65 He further alleged
that he had been passed over for a promotion in the aftermath of his
memo.
66
The Court, reasoning that his speech was made pursuant to his offi-
cial duties, ultimately rejected Ceballos' retaliation claim.67 In short, he
54. Id.
55. See id. at 1179-80.
56. Id. at 1180.
57. See id. at 1179-80.
58. See Sanchez, supra note 2, at 552.
59. Rhodes, supra note 18, at 1187.
60. Id.
61. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
62. Id. at 1955-56.
63. Id
64. Id. at 1956 ("The meeting allegedly became heated, with one lieutenant sharply criticizing
Ceballos for his handling of the case.").
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1960.
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would not have written the memo had his employer not required his
opinion on a pending case.68 According to the narrow majority, restrict-
ing "speech that owes its existence to a public employee's professional
responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have
enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer
control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created." 69
Consequently, the Court barred constitutional protection for Ceballos'
speech because he spoke pursuant to his official duties as a deputy dis-
trict attorney.
D. The Garcetti Razor
The practical impact of Garcetti is that it created another hurdle for
claimants to overcome before courts can proceed with the Connick-
Pickering analysis.7° If the speech of a government employee is found to
be pursuant to official duties, then the rule in Garcetti acts as a razor,
cutting off the possibility of constitutional protection and preventing the
court from proceeding to the Connick-Pickering test.
7'
E. Implications of Garcetti
The fallout from the Court's ruling in Garcetti is significant in that
it further limits the kinds of retaliation claims that will survive a sum-
mary judgment challenge. 72 In the aftermath, even claims by whistle-
blowers documenting government misconduct and corruption have failed
under the threshold test of Garcetti.73 For example, in Battle v. Board of
Regents,74 the plaintiff Lillie Battle, a financial aid officer at a Georgia
university, was fired after she reported instances of alleged fraud and
mismanagement involving her supervisors handling of federal monies.75
Battle sued on a retaliation claim alleging her First Amendment rights
had been violated.76 Even though state and federal audits substantially
confirmed Battle's prior allegations regarding fraud and mismanage-
ment,77 the Eleventh Circuit held her speech to be unprotected. Interpret-
ing Garcetti, the court found that because Battle's job duties included an
obligation to report fraud and misconduct, her whistle-blowing activities
fell within the scope of her official duties.78 According to the Eleventh
Circuit, Battle was not speaking as a private citizen under Garcetti, and
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Sanchez, supra note 2, at 561.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 563.
73. See, e.g., Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 761 (11 th Cir. 2006); Freitag v. Ayers,
468 F.3d 528, 546 (9th Cir. 2006); Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 646, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2006).
74. 468 F.3d 755.
75. Id. at 757-58.
76. Id. at 759.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 761-62.
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therefore her speech was not constitutionally protected.79 Thus, if a court
concludes, as a matter of law, that the speech was made pursuant to an
employee's official duties, it receives no constitutional protections even
though the content of the speech may have been of great interest to the
public.
Anticipating the whistle-blower's dilemma, the dissent in Garcetti
criticized the majority's rigid pigeon-holing of job-related speech as be-
ing pursuant to official duties. 80 This is because once speech is construed
as "pursuant to ... official duties" it is categorically barred from being a
matter of public concern. 81 If the speech is not a matter of public con-
82cern then it warrants no First Amendment protection. Justice Souter, in
his dissent, complained that the rule in Garcetti would deny constitu-
tional protections when "a public auditor speaks on his discovery of em-
bezzlement of public funds, when a building inspector makes an obliga-
tory report of an attempt to bribe him, or when a law enforcement officer
expressly balks at a superior's order to violate constitutional rights he is
sworn to protect., 83 Likewise, legal commentators have argued that Gar-
cetti's chilling effect on future whistle-blowers will ultimately undermine
the public's "right to hold government accountable," and frustrate the
public's ability to uncover waste and corruption.84
Curiously, as rigid and formalistic as the rule in Garcetti seems to
be, it nevertheless leaves much interpretative room for the lower courts.
The Garcetti Court declined to provide a framework for making the criti-
cally important determination of when speech is pursuant to official du-
ties. 85 The Court would only say that the inquiry is a "practical one," and
that formal job descriptions may not accurately describe the actual duties
expected of an employee.86 In fashioning its decision, the Court left
broad interpretive power on the table for the lower courts to flesh out.
How the courts conduct this "practical" inquiry can have an enormous,
87even dispositive, impact on the outcome of a case.
II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT INTERPRETS GARCETII
The Tenth Circuit has already begun to provide guidance in this
murky area.88 Three cases decided since Garcetti each attempted to ar-
79. Id.
80. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1966 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting)
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1966-67.
84. Sanchez, supra note 2, at 563.
85. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1961.
86. Id. at 1961-62.
87. See generally Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.
2007); Casey v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 2007); Green v. Bd. of
County Comm'rs, 472 F.3d 794 (10th Cir. 2007).
88. Cheek v. City of Edwardsville, 514 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1230 (D. Kan. 2007) ("In Garcetti,
the Supreme Court declined to articulate a comprehensive fiamework for determining when a gov-
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ticulate when employees speak pursuant to their official duties. The cases
are Green v. Board of County Commissioners,89 Casey v. West Las Vegas
Independent School District,9" and Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks
Charter Academy.91
A. Green v. Board of County Commissioners
In January 2007, the Tenth Circuit issued its first interpretation of
Garcetti in the case of Green v. Board of County Commissioners.92 In
Green, plaintiff Jennifer Green was a technician and detention officer
employed in the drug-lab of a juvenile detention center.93 She became
concerned that a particular drug test was unreliable after an apparent
false positive. 94 On her own initiative, and without her supervisor's per-
mission, she arranged a confirmation test at a local hospital.95 She also
informed the Department of Human Services about her suspicions.
96
When the confirmation test revealed the suspect test was indeed flawed,
Green notified her supervisor.97 As a result, the juvenile detention center
adopted a new policy instituting confirmation testing.98 Shortly thereaf-
ter, Green claimed her supervisors retaliated against her. 99 The detention
center transferred her out of the drug-lab and demoted her.'00 When she
failed to show up for work, the center fired her.'0'
The Tenth Circuit noted in Green that the Garcetti Court did not ar-
ticulate a framework for determining when an employee's speech is pur-
suant to official duties. 10 2 Faced with an open question, the appellate
panel in Green interpreted Garcetti to stand for the proposition that
"speech is made pursuant to official duties if it is generally consistent
with 'the type of activities [the employee] was paid to do."',
103
The speech in question had to do with Green's communications
with the manufacturer, state, and the defendant regarding the confirma-
tion test. 30 The court of appeals framed its analysis as an either/or sce-
ernment employee speaks pursuant to his or her official duties. The Tenth Circuit, however, has
provided significant guidance on this issue since Garcetti." (citation omitted)).
89. 472 F.3d 794.
90. 473 F.3d 1323.
91. 492 F.3d 1192.
92. Green, 472 F.3d 794.







100. Id. at 797.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 798.
103. Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007)
(alteration in original) (quoting Green, 472 F.3d at 801).
104. Green, 472 F.3d at 800.
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nario. Either Green was acting within the scope of her duties because
she was hired to collect samples, conduct drug tests, check equipment,
and communicate with others regarding the testing,'0 5 or she was acting
as a private citizen outside the boundaries of her job as a matter of public
concern by advocating for better testing policies and arranging for the re-
test of a suspect sample, none of which she was hired to do.
10 6
The appellate panel concluded the facts were closer to the Garcetti
scenario than to one involving a private citizen because Green had been
working internally on activities that "stemmed from" the type of duties
she was hired to do.' 0 7 According to the Tenth Circuit, the fact that she
disagreed with her supervisors on the testing policy, and sought an un-
authorized confirmation test, confirms she was working within the scope
of her official duties, even if she did not have explicit authority to take
the particular action.108  Quoting Garcetti, the appellate court said a
"government employee's First Amendment rights do 'not invest them
with a right to perform their jobs however they see fit."
' 109
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit in Green refined Garcetti's "pursu-
ant to official duties" analysis by asking whether an employee's on-the-
job speech is generally consistent with the type of activities the employee
was paid to do." 0 If the answer is yes, then the speech is pursuant to
official duties, and there is no constitutional protection from employer
discipline.
B. Casey v. West Las Vegas Independent School District
Just a few weeks after issuing the ruling in Green, the Tenth Circuit
crafted another decision interpreting Garcetti: Casey v. West Las Vegas
Independent School District.'' In Casey, the court defined the Garcetti
scope of duties broadly, declaring speech that falls within an employee's
"portfolio" to be pursuant to her official duties."
12
In Casey, the plaintiff was a school district superintendant who
oversaw the district's federally funded Head Start program." 3 Superin-
tendant Casey eventually learned the district may have improperly dis-
bursed federal monies to families that did not qualify for Head Start.
14
Fearing the payouts could jeopardize future funding, Ms. Casey notified
school board officials, who told her "not to worry about it.'' 5 Con-
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 800-01.
108. Id. at 801.
109. Id. (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006)).
110. Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007).
111. 473 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 2007).
112. Id. at 1329; Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.2d at 1203.
113. Casey, 473 F.3d at 1325.
114. Id. at 1326.
115. Id.
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cerned she had a legal duty to report fiscal improprieties, Ms. Casey or-
dered an assistant to disclose the findings to Head Start.'" 6 In response,
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services substantiated the
allegations and ultimately sought to recoup over $500,000 from the
school district."17 Several months later the school board demoted Ms.
Casey, and eventually fired her." 18 She sued the district alleging her ter-
mination was unconstitutional retaliation against her speech. 119 Defen-
dants asked for summary judgment based on a defense of qualified im-
munity. 120 After the District Court denied summary judgment, defen-
dants appealed to the Tenth Circuit. '21
The Tenth Circuit began its inquiry by again employing the first
question under the post-Garcetti Connick-Pickering test: Did the plain-
tiff speak as a private citizen on a matter of public concern?22 The ap-
pellate panel applied the rule in Garcetti that government employees who
speak pursuant to their official duties do not speak as private citizens and
thus are not protected from employer discipline.
2 1
Similar to its analysis in Green, the Tenth Circuit framed the central
question as an either/or proposition. 124 Either Ms. Casey's act of notify-
ing federal Head Start about possible improprieties amounted to a private
citizen engaging in constitutionally protected whistle-blowing, or Ms.
Casey's communication amounted to speech "pursuant" to her "official
duties," in which case it would not be protected speech.
125
The court of appeals reasoned that when Ms. Casey agreed to be-
come superintendent, she assumed an obligation to comply with federal
regulations concerning the Head Start program. 126 The panel also noted
that "with knowledge of financial irregularities [Ms. Casey] risked civil
and criminal liability by remaining silent in the face of such knowl-
edge.' 27 Despite the plaintiffs argument that her reports to federal au-
thorities constituted speech by a private citizen, the court found the
speech to be squarely within her "portfolio," and thus pursuant to her
official duties. 128 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit held that her speech
did not qualify for First Amendment protections under Connick-
116. Id
117. Id.




122. Id. at 1328.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1329.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1330.
127. Id
128. Id. at 1329, 1331-32.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Pickering as modified by Garcetti.129 Thus, the Garcetti razor settled the
matter before it ever got to a Connick-Pickering analysis.
In both Green and Casey, the Tenth Circuit interpreted Garcetti's
"speech pursuant to official duties" bar broadly, denying First Amend-
ment protection for employees' speech that either fell within theirportfo-
lio of duties 30 or was generally consistent with the type of duties they
were hired to do.' 3' The court held this to be true even though the em-
ployees' speech in both cases arguably amounted to whistle-blowing that
revealed impropriety, mismanagement, and possible fraud involving pub-
lic tax dollars.
Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit could have chosen to interpret Gar-
cetti more narrowly, as some other courts have, 3 2 which would have
allowed the Garcetti razor to cut short the case only where the speech is
required by rather than consistent with official duties. Had the appellate
court chosen such an approach in Green and Casey, the plaintiffs' claims
might have survived the Garcetti razor.
C. Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Academy
When the Tenth Circuit took its third swing at Garcetti, it ap-
proached the same speech questions somewhat less conservatively than
the previous two cases.' 33 In contrast to Green and Casey, the third post-
Garcetti case to come out of the Tenth Circuit in 2007 was Brammer-
Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Academy. 134  The court in Brammer-
Hoelter interpreted Garcetti's (speech pursuant to official duties) test
more narrowly, and thus more charitably to free speech rights, than the
previous Tenth Circuit cases. Nevertheless, Brammer-Hoelter remains
less deferential to free speech than similar cases from other circuits.
35
Brammer-Hoelter's key refinement interprets Garcetti's speech pursuant
to official duties to mean "speech relating to tasks within an employee's
uncontested employment responsibilities.' 36
In Brammer-Hoelter, the plaintiffs, a group of teachers at a charter
school, became concerned about the "operation, management, and mis-
sion" of the school. 137 They met at private homes, restaurants, and even
129. d at 1331.
130. Id at 1329.
131. Green v. Bd. of County Conun'rs, 472 F.3d 794, 801 (10th Cir. 2007).
132. For a discussion of the narrow approach to interpreting Garcetti, see Rhodes, supra note
18, at 1195-96.
133. This is the author's opinion based on what appears to be a slightly narrower application of
the Garcetti test in Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2007),
relative to Green and Casey.
134. 492 F.3d 1192.
135. See infra Part 1II.A (highlighting cases that interpreted Garcetti's rule narrowly). See
generally Rhodes, supra note 18, at 1195-96.
136. Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1203.
137. Id. at 1199.
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a church to talk about their grievances. 38 Upon learning of the meetings,
the school's principal ordered the teachers not to talk about school issues
outside of work with anyone, including other teachers and staff at the
academy.' 39 Moreover, during a mandatory meeting, the principal ad-
vised the teachers not to associate outside of work. 40 In defiance of the
principal's directives, the teachers continued to meet after hours and off
school grounds. 14 1 Eventually, the teachers voiced their grievances to the
school's board of directors. 142 A short time later, the teachers alleged, the
principal gave them poor performance reviews despite later acknowledg-
ing that no teacher had violated the school's "policies, codes, or proce-
dures."' 143  The teachers ultimately resigned and brought retaliation
claims alleging the school board had violated their First Amendment
rights. 44
The Tenth Circuit explained that Garcetti has turned the traditional
Pickering analysis of speech retaliation claims into a five step inquiry. 45
First, did the employee speak pursuant to her official duties, or as a pri-
vate citizen? 146 Second, if the employee spoke as a private citizen, was
the speech a matter of public concern? 147 Third, if the citizen's speech
was a matter of public concern, did the employee's speech interest out-
weigh the government's interest in efficient management? 48 Fourth, if
the employee's speech interest outweighed the government's interest,
was the speech a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employ-
ment action? 149 Fifth, if the plaintiff prevails on the previous factors, can
the government show that it would have taken the same action regardless
of whether the protected speech had occurred? 150 If the answer is yes,
then the inquiry ends and there is no government liability.' 5' Thus, in
order for the plaintiff to have an actionable claim the speech must be
construed: (1) as that of a private citizen speaking on matters of public
concern; (2) whose speech interest outweighs the government's interest;
(3) whose speech was a substantial motivating factor triggering the re-
taliation; and, (4) but for the speech, the employee would not have suf-
fered the adverse employment action. The high bar set for the plaintiff








144. Id. at 1202.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1202-03.
148. Id. at 1203.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 1202-03.
152. See id.
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The Tenth Circuit concluded that some of the employees' contested
speech was not made pursuant to official duties.'53 These instances in-
cluded speech about "resignations of other teachers ...[restrictions to
teachers'] freedom of speech ... staffing levels ... teacher salaries and
bonuses ...criticisms of the school board . . . lack of support, trust,
feedback.. . restrictions on speech and association... [and] upcoming
[b]oard elections."'' 5 4 Notably, the Tenth Circuit reached this finding
even though the teachers entered contracts agreeing to "support the phi-
losophy and curriculum of the [school] without reservation,"'5 5 and even
though the teachers were encouraged to "present their views to improve
the [school] and did so in the form of complaints and grievances to the
Board.q
156
D. Analysis: Brammer-Hoelter, Casey and Green
Brammer-Hoelter's notion of "uncontested employment responsi-
bilities" seems to allow more gray-area speech to survive the Garcetti
razor than Green's "generally consistent with," and Casey's "portfolio"
of duties analysis. For example, in Brammer-Hoelter, the court con-
strued speech about staffing levels, criticism of the school board, and
lack of support, trust and feedback, to be speech that falls outside of "un-
contested employment responsibilities" and thus not pursuant to official
duties under Garcetti.57 The court seemed to reason that if the speech is
arguably outside of the scope of an employee's responsibilities, then it
survives the Garcetti razor and is not considered pursuant to official du-
ties.
The same inquiry using the Green and Casey standards might have
yielded different results. Conceivably, the same speech that passed the
Garcetti hurdle under Brammer-Hoelter, might well have failed under
the previous two cases. Using the broader standards of Green and Casey,
the appellate panel might have otherwise construed speech about staffing
levels, criticisms of the board, and lack of support, trust, and feedback as
being speech "generally consistent" with the "portfolio" of tasks the
teachers were paid to do. That is, those grievances might be generally
consistent with the broader job requirement of providing high quality
education to kids and feedback to superiors. Thus, certain unprotected
speech under Green and Casey might well be protected speech under
Brammer-Hoelter.
153. Id. at 1204-05.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1204.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1203-05.
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E. Brammer-Hoelter is Still Broader than Garcetti
While Brammer-Hoelter provides a narrower analysis for excluding
speech from constitutional protection than the previous two Tenth Circuit
cases, it nevertheless remains broader than the specific application used
in Garcetti. The facts of Garcetti involved an employee whose speech
consisted of a written memo that he produced as a requirement of his
job. 5 8 The Court stated, "Ceballos spoke as a prosecutor fulfilling a
responsibility to advise his supervisor about how best to proceed with a
pending case . . . . 59 A narrow reading of Garcetti might leave the im-
pression that unless the job requires the speech in question, it does not
occur pursuant to official duties.
The Tenth Circuit did not read Garcetti so narrowly. Even Bram-
mer-Hoelter's standard of branding speech unprotected if it relates to
"uncontested employment responsibilities,"' 60 is a broader exclusion of
speech than the narrower reading of Garcetti above. There is plenty of
speech that is not required by a job, but is still nonetheless related to un-
contested employment responsibilities. For example, imagine a govern-
ment employed aviation engineer who is required by his job to report
only design flaws on the projects for which he is directly responsible. If
he notices a systemic problem on a fellow employee's project and takes
it upon himself to report it through the chain of command, he might still
be disciplined under Brammer-Hoelter because the report is related to his
uncontested employment responsibilities to produce safe aircraft. On the
other hand, a court interpreting Garcetti narrowly might conclude the
speech was not pursuant to official duties because it was not specifically
required by the job. Thus, there may be cases in which employees suffer
retaliatory discipline for their speech under Brammer-Hoelter whereas
they might otherwise have been protected under a narrower reading of
Garcetti.
III. INTERPRETATIONS OF GARCETIi
The Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all read Gar-
cetti's test broadly.16' In each circuit, the appellate panel found speech
occurring within the employment context to be pursuant to official duties
even if the speech was not specifically required by the employer. Such
interpretations arguably expand upon the vague parameters of Garcetti.
158. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1953 (2006).
159. Id. at 1960.
160. Brammer-Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1203.
161. See Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 694 (5th Cir. 2007); Battle v. Bd.
of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 761 (1 1th Cir. 2006); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 546 (9th Cir. 2006);
Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 646, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2006); see also supra Part II.A-D (ex-
plaining Tenth Circuit cases that broadly interpret Garcetti).
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A. Expansive Interpretations of Garcetti
In the case of Williams v. Dallas Independent School District,162 an
athletic director was fired after reporting financial improprieties via a
memo to the principal. 63 Even though the employee was not required by
the terms of employment to report the findings, the Fifth Circuit held the
subject of the memo related to the types of things athletic directors deal
with on a daily basis, specifically athletic accounts. 164 The panel con-
cluded the athletic director was not speaking as a concerned citizen but
rather as a government employee pursuant to his official duties and was
therefore not entitled to constitutional protection.
65
Likewise, in Mills v. City of Evansville,166 a police sergeant was dis-
ciplined after criticizing a plan by the police chief that would have
moved several officers from crime prevention to patrol. 67 The criticism
occurred after an official meeting, in the presence of other senior super-
visors, and concerned the sergeant's prediction that community organiza-
tions would resist the proposed change. 168 Despite the sergeant's claim
that she suffered retaliation for speaking on matters of public concern,
the Seventh Circuit concluded the plaintiff was in uniform, speaking as
an employee, on matters of official policy, and thus was not constitution-
ally protected from discipline.' 69 Thus, even though the employee's
speech was not specifically required by her employment, the appellate
panel held her speech was nevertheless pursuant to her official duties. 1
70
The Ninth Circuit came to a similar post-Garcetti conclusion in the
case of Freitag v. Ayers. 171 In Freitag, a corrections officer complained
to her supervisors about sexual harassment perpetrated by inmates at a
maximum security prison. 172 After her bosses ignored her repeated in-
ternal complaints, she wrote letters to state officials, including a state
senator. 173 Her supervisors eventually disciplined her and later termi-
nated her employment. 74 Shortly thereafter, a state investigation cor-
roborated the plaintiffs claims. 75  While the Ninth Circuit held her
communications to state officials were protected under Garcetti, her in-
ternal complaints to supervisors were not constitutionally protected.
76
162. 480 F.3d 689.
163. Id. at 690-91.
164. Id. at 693-94.
165. Id. at 694.
166. 452 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2006).
167. Id. at 647.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 648.
170. Id.
171. 468 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2006).
172. Id. at 533-34.
173. Id. at 533-35.
174. Id. at 535-36.
175. Id. at 535.
176. Id. at 546.
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The appellate panel reasoned that the plaintiff spoke pursuant to her offi-
cial duties when she complained to her immediate supervisors.
77
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit cases previously discussed approach the
"speech pursuant to official duties" analysis from the same vantage
point. The decisions in Green, Casey, and Brammer-Hoelter each reveal
a jurisprudential approach that categorizes instances of employee speech
to be pursuant to official duties even if the speech was not specifically
required by the terms of employment. 
1 78
The common thread tying together the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuit interpretations of Garcetti concerns the question of
whether speech that is required by the job should be distinguished from
speech that is related to the tasks of the job.179 In Garcetti, the plaintiff
lost his constitutional claim because his speech was specifically required
by his employment.' 80 To wit, Ceballos' memo that caused him to suffer
retaliatory discipline was work product required by the terms of his em-
ployment as a prosecutor.18' As an assistant district attorney, he was
required to give his opinion on the merits of a pending case. 82 Contrary
to the unique facts of Ceballos, many of the circuit interpretations dis-
cussed in this comment dealt with plaintiffs whose speech was not spe-
cifically required by the job. 83  The appellate courts interpreting the
post-Garcetti cases broadened the analysis of speech pursuant to official
duties beyond what the Garcetti Court specifically applied. 84 Thus, in-
stead of equating speech pursuant to official duties as meaning speech
required by official duties, the circuits typically construed speech pursu-
ant to official duties to mean speech that is generally consistent with of-
ficial duties. As the case holdings indicate, the broader categorization
tends to limit the speech protections for government employees.
B. Narrow Interpretations of Garcetti
Not all courts have adopted the expansive approach of the Tenth
Circuit. At the federal trial court level, some judges have rejected the
broad interpretations of speech pursuant to official duties in favor of an
177. Id.
178. Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Green v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 472 F.3d 794, 801 (10th Cir. 2007)); Casey v. W. Las
Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323, 1329, 1331 (10th Cir. 2007).
179. For a good discussion on the difference between the broad and narrow interpretations of
Garcetti, see Rhodes, supra note 18, at 1195-97.
180. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See cases cited supra note 161.
184. Id.
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approach that limits Garcetti's razor to cases in which the speech is re-
quired by the job.1
8 5
For example, in Pittman v. Cuyahoga Valley Career Center,186 the
Northern District of Ohio held that Garcetti applies as a limiting factor
only when the employee's speech is required by the job. 187 In Pittman,
an African-American substitute teacher alleged racial discrimination and
retaliation against an Ohio school. 88 One of the contested speech in-
stances involved a memo the substitute teacher had written to the princi-
pal about parking issues. 89 Because the memo was related to employ-
ment responsibilities but arguably not required by the job, the court con-
cluded Garcetti may not be determinative in barring the claim.190
Likewise, in Barclay v. Michalsky,' 9' the United States District
Court of Connecticut held that a nurse's retaliation claims, based on her
criticism of the use of "excessive restraints" on psychiatric patients, were
not barred by Garcetti.192  Even though reporting patient health and
safety issues was clearly related to the plaintiffs employment responsi-
bilities, and even though specific work rules required her to file the com-
plaints, the court nevertheless reasoned that her speech did not occur
pursuant to her official duties.' 93 The primary justification for that deci-
sion had to do with evidence suggesting the plaintiff did not know she
was specifically required by her employment to file internal reports al-
leging patient abuse; she merely acted of her own accord. 194 Thus, in
Barclay, the court not only concluded employee speech must have been
required by the job in order for a retaliation claim to be barred under
Garcetti, but the employee must have also been aware of the speech re-
quirement in order for Garcetti's razor to have impact.' 95
C. Speech Pursuant to Official Duties: All or Nothing
The Tenth Circuit, like the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, has
faithfully followed the Court's guidance in Garcetti that the analysis of
185. Rhodes, supra note 18, at 1195; see also Pittman v. Cuyahoga Valley Career Ctr., 451 F.
Supp. 2d 905, 929 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (explaining that "[a]lthough some legal analysts appear to be
interpreting Garcetti as holding that statements made by public employees will never be protected if
the employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment while making the statements, this
Court interprets Garcetti more narrowly." (emphasis added)).
186. Pittman, 451 F. Supp. 2d 905.
187. Id. at 929.
188. Id. at 910, 913-14.
189. Id. at 929.
190. Id.
191. 451 F. Supp. 2d 386 (D. Conn. 2006).
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speech pursuant to official duties is an all-or-nothing proposition.
96
That is, either a government employee's speech is pursuant to official
duties, or the employee is speaking as a private citizen. 197 Nowhere does
the majority in Garcetti account for the possibility that an employee may
be speaking both as an employee and as a private citizen on matters of
public concern.1 98 Yet, as Justice Souter argues in his dissent, "a citizen
may well place a very high value on a right to speak on the public issues
he decides to make the subject of his work day after day."'
199
For example, imagine a police department that has an unwritten pol-
icy of encouraging officers to use excessive force when arresting politi-
cal protesters. Also assume that every officer who wants to criticize po-
lice policy is required to do so through a superior. Perhaps there is an
officer who disagrees with the excessive force policy not because of his
inability to carry out the policy, but rather because of the policy's poten-
tial impact on members of his own family. The officer may fear that his
teenage son, who frequently engages in political protest, might be injured
by police officers who have no disincentive to refrain from using exces-
sive force. The officer might also be concerned that the policy could
impact his neighbors who may be afraid to engage in public political
expression because they fear injury during an arrest.
Assuming the aforementioned circumstances, imagine what would
happen if the officer, while on duty and in uniform, had taken his con-
cerns to his superiors who ultimately fired him in retaliation for his criti-
cism of the policy. While it seems clear the officer in the hypothetical
was speaking as a father, neighbor, and citizen about a policy of which
he had held a unique vantage point because of his employment as a po-
lice officer, he would nonetheless be barred from constitutional protec-
tion by the Garcetti razor. This is because he was required by his em-
ployment to voice his criticisms of department policy through the chain
of command. Because he was in uniform, on duty, speaking about de-
partment policy, and following internal procedures required by his em-
ployment, he could be construed as both speaking pursuant to his official
duties and speaking as a private citizen on matters of public concern.
Yet the rule in Garcetti and its subsequent interpretations in the Tenth
Circuit and other federal circuits would end the inquiry once the court
determined the speech was pursuant to official duties, even if the offi-
cer's primary motivation to speak had come from his perspective as a
private citizen.
196. Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007);
Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 2007); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d
528, 545 (9th Cir. 2006); Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 646, 647 (7th Cir. 2006).
197. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1965 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Similarly, in the previously discussed Tenth Circuit case of
Green,2°° the lab technician's speech to correct problems with the
county's drug testing program might well have arisen both from a desire
to better perform her official duties and to better serve her interests as a
private citizen (on matters of public concern). As a public employee, she
may have been motivated by the desire to achieve more accurate testing
results. Alternatively, as a private citizen, she may have been motivated
by a desire to ensure that the drug testing system treats fellow citizens
fairly. 20 To the extent that job related speech overlaps both domains, the
Garcetti test forces the facts into a false dichotomy. 20 2 In Green, the
Tenth Circuit employed Garcetti's all-or-nothing approach, finding that
the lab technician spoke pursuant to her official duties.0 3 Thus, even
though she may have had a compelling interest as a private citizen to
speak on matters of public concern, her speech was not protected from
employer retaliation because it was too closely related to her job du-
ties.204 The predictable and unfortunate consequence of an all-or-nothing
approach is the chilling impact on whistle-blowers whose economic need
205for a job may outweigh the desire to correct government improprieties.
IV. DIMiNISHED PROTECTION FOR WHISTLE BLOWERS
The Court in Garcetti acknowledged the importance of government
whistle-blowers whose special vantage point makes them particularly
206well situated to comment on fraud, corruption, and mismanagement.
The majority stated, "[e]xposing government inefficiency and miscon-
duct is a matter of considerable significance. 20 7 The Court also sug-
gested that governments should be open to "constructive criticism". "as a
matter of good judgment., 20 8  Yet the Court seemed little concerned
about constitutional protections for employees so situated. Instead, the
Court assumed the patchwork of existing state and federal regulations
will provide the appropriate protections. According to the majority, gov-
ernment employees enjoy "the powerful network of legislative enact-
ments-such as whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes-
available to those who seek to expose wrongdoing.', 20 9 Yet, as Justice
Souter vigorously pointed out in his dissent to Garcetti, these legislative
200. Green v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 472 F.3d 794 (10th Cir. 2007).
201. Id. at 800 ("Under this view, by arranging for the confirmation test ... , Ms. Green was
not doing the job she was hired to do, but was acting outside of her day-to-day job responsibilities
for the public good.").
202. Sanchez, supra note 2, at 560 (discussing Garcetti's per se rule and the false dichotomy it
creates between citizen speech and employee speech).
203. Green, 472 F.3d at 801.
204. Id. at 800-01.
205. Sanchez, supra note 2, at 563 (discussing the whistle-blower's dilemma in a post-Garcetti
landscape).
206. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1962 (2006).
207. Id.
208. Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983)).
209. Id. (citation omitted).
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protections are neither uniform, comprehensive, nor existent in all juris-
dictions.2t0 In fact, several recent cases have removed any lingering
doubt.
211
For example, in Williams v. Riley,212 the state whistle-blower statute
in Mississippi was not broad enough to protect several county police
officers who were fired after reporting to their supervisors that a fellow
officer had physically beaten a "restrained prisoner., 213 After their ter-
mination, the officers sued the county sheriff on speech retaliation
claims.214 Because the officers reported the alleged misconduct through
the chain of command as their job duties required, the federal trial court
found the speech to be pursuant to official duties under Garcetti.21 5 Pre-
dictably, the claims failed because the Garcetti razor categorically bars
constitutional protection for speech that is pursuant to official duties.
However, even as the court concluded the outcome "impossible to cir-
cumvent" in light of Garcetti, the court also expressed deep reservations
about the rule.2 16 In a lamenting opinion, critical of Garcetti, the trial
judge wrote, "[t]his court is gravely troubled by the effect of Garcetti on
a factual scenario such as that before the bar. It allows no federal consti-
tutional recourse for an employee of the State of Mississippi who is fired
for reporting a fellow government employee's misconduct.,
217
The lack of whistle-blower protection means fewer government
employees are likely to come forward to provide information of corrup-
tion and malfeasance. Legal commentators have criticized Garcetti's
chilling effect on potential whistle-blowers, a development that seems
likely to damage the public's ability to learn of government fraud and
mismanagement.2 t8 Similarly, Garcetti has been accused of undermining
the state's ability to operate efficiently by implicitly encouraging the
non-reporting of waste and corruption.
219
A. The Perverse Incentive
The Supreme Court offered several justifications for its dramatic
roll-back of free speech rights in Garcetti. The Court claimed compel-
210. Id. at 1970-71 (Souter, J., dissenting).
211. See, e.g., Williams v. Riley, 481 F. Supp. 2d 582, 584-85 (N.D. Miss. 2007); see also
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *21, Spiegla v. Hull, No. 07-273, 2007 WL 2461589 (7th Cir. Aug.
27, 2007).
212. Riley, 481 F. Supp. 2d 582. The state whistle-blower statute would have protected the
officers had they reported the misconduct through a state investigative agency such as the district
attorney rather than through the Sherriff's chain of command. Id. at 585.
213. Williams v. Riley, No. 2:05CV83-P-B, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46697, at *1-*2 (N.D.
Miss. July 10, 2006).




218. Sanchez, supra note 2, at 563; see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1967 (2006)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (asserting Justice Souter's criticisms of the majority in Garcetti).
219. Sanchez, supra note 2, at 563.
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ling separation of powers concerns for not wanting to second guess every
executive branch decision relating to employee discipline. 2  Moreover,
the Court asserted the smooth operation of government depends in part
on the official communications of employees being "accurate, demon-
strat[ing] sound judgment, and promot[ing] the employer's mission.
221
The majority seemed to imagine a world without Garcetti as being tan-
tamount to rabble rousers on the public payroll using the Constitution as
an excuse to say whatever they want, perform their jobs however they
see fit, and make every disciplinary case a matter of constitutional re-
222taliation.
Ironically, the Garcetti rule appears to have created a perverse in-
centive that encourages government employees to take their problems
first to the media, or any authority outside of the employee's immediate
chain of command.223 This is because a government employee who tips
off a newspaper reporter about government corruption is more likely to
have engaged in constitutionally protected speech than the government
employee who reports the same corruption through official government
channels.224
For example, if a state prison worker notices a drug dealing scheme
involving several other prison guards, she is not protected from disci-
pline if she reports the behavior through the official chain of command.
This is because her job description likely includes duties such as report-
ing health, safety, and criminal infractions to her supervisor. Thus, if her
employer fires her for reporting her fellow guards, she would have no
constitutional recourse because her speech was pursuant to her official
duties. However, if that same prison guard instead went straight to the
media to report the drug dealing scheme because she was outraged as a
taxpayer that her government was operating prisons in such a perilous
way, the result might be very different. Her speech is more likely to be
constitutionally protected because she is speaking as a private citizen on
matters of public concern.
Justice Stevens, in his Garcetti dissent, recognized the troubling
possibility that the very same speech that is constitutionally protected in
one context is barred from protection in another context.225 Likewise, in
his lengthy discussion criticizing the majority's opinion, Justice Souter
220. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1961 (explaining that to allow constitutional protection for job
related speech would "demand permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of governmental
operations to a degree inconsistent with sound principles of federalism and the separation of pow-
ers.").
221. Id. at 1960.
222. Id. at 1959 (explaining that "while the First Amendment invests public employees with
certain rights, it does not empower them to 'constitutionalize the employee grievance."' (quoting
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983))).
223. Sanchez, supra note 2, at 562.
224. See id.
225. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1963 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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said it is "no adequate justification for the suppression of potentially
valuable information simply to recognize that the government has a huge
interest in managing its employees and preventing the occasionally irre-
sponsible one from turning his job into a bully pulpit.
2 26
Interestingly, even the majority in Garcetti recognized the possibil-
ity of the perverse incentive when it advised public employers to create
internal procedures to encourage employees to share their criticisms pri-
vately.22 7 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy said, "Giving em-
ployees an internal forum for their speech will discourage them from
concluding the safest avenue of expression is to state their views in pub-
lic."
228
B. Practical Implications for Practitioners
In light of Tenth Circuit trends in the wake of Garcetti, government
employers looking to hedge their advantage may choose to define job
descriptions broadly, including specific directives that employees are to
funnel all complaints and concerns relating to possible fraud, misman-
agement, waste, and criminality to appropriate internal channels. While
the Court in Garcetti bristles at the suggestion that employers can limit
the speech rights of employees by simply imposing "excessively broad
job descriptions, 229 a growing body of case law emerging at the trial and
appellate levels seems to suggest the reality on the ground is other-
wise.230 Government employers might also strengthen their position by
mandating employees attend formal training to reinforce the expected
duties.
As for employees, it seems clear the Supreme Court and federal cir-
cuits have established a significant burden for the employee to overcome.
One possible way to preserve whistle-blower protections is to bargain for
them contractually. For employees who have leverage, via union or oth-
erwise, insisting on contractual speech protections can help avoid the
default position of having little constitutional protection should a case of
speech retaliation arise. In the event that a case of corruption, criminal-
ity, or waste comes up, the employees who cannot bargain for contrac-
tual protections are left with a choice to either stay quiet or risk losing
their jobs. Reporting outside the chain of command seems to offer more
possibility for constitutional protection if the matter is one of public con-
cern. However, employers may be able to defeat this potential shield if
226. Id. at 1967 (Souter, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 1961.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See generally Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689 (5th Cir. 2007); Battle v.
Board of Regents, 468 F.3d 755 (1 1th Cir. 2006); Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2006);
Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2006); see also supra Part lI.A-D (explaining
Tenth Circuit cases that broadly interpret Garcett0.
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the job description specifically bars employees from going to the media
or elsewhere with speech that is related to the job. Ultimately, whistle-
blowers have more to lose in a post-Garcetti landscape and less incentive
to be courageous.
CONCLUSION
Garcetti v. Ceballos significantly restricted the First Amendment
protections of government employees. The new rule acts as a razor
against retaliation claims that arise pursuant to official duties. Yet for
such an important change, the Supreme Court left a surprising amount of
discretion to the lower courts to fashion a framework for determining
when speech is pursuant to official duties. Predictably, different courts,
including the Tenth Circuit, have moved in different directions. The
Tenth Circuit, among others, seems to have expanded the specific test
used in Garcetti. The result is a broader analysis of job related speech
acts that ultimately leads to more speech restrictions. The regrettable
impact is the chilling effect on whistle-blowers. As a result, citizens are
now more likely to be deprived of information about government corrup-
tion, criminality, and waste.
Raj Chohan*
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YAvuz v. 61 MM, LTD.: A NEW FEDERAL STANDARD-
APPLYING CONTRACTING PARTIES' CHOICE OF LAW TO
THE ANALYSIS OF FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS
INTRODUCTION
The international commercial world is fraught with danger. Parties
doing business abroad face the very real prospect of litigating, unexpect-
edly, in foreign courts under foreign law. Forum selection agreements
("FSAs")' and choice of law clauses ("COLs") 2 theoretically grant par-
ties autonomy to predetermine the courts in which they will litigate, as
well as the law under which they will litigate. For decades, however,
United States courts have turned a blind eye to the potential applicability
of the parties' chosen law to the FSA analysis, choosing instead to apply
United States law with little, if any, analysis. 3 This trend limits contract-
ing parties' autonomy by restricting their ability to pre-determine where
and how they will litigate.4 This trend also reintroduces the very uncer-
tainty that parties attempt to dispel by pre-selecting the law and forum
for future disputes.5 Recently, a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision
addressed and flatly rejected this trend.6 In Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., the
Tenth Circuit announced that courts must apply the parties chosen law to
forum selection questions.7  This new autonomy-based approach is in
line with the increasingly party-centered world of transnational trade and
provides foreseeability and certainty in international transactions. The
Yavuz opinion could be the spark that revolutionizes the way federal
courts approach international commercial cases. In order for this to hap-
pen, however, the Tenth Circuit needs to build upon its holding in Yavuz
by adding clarity and doctrinal support.
1. An FSA is "[a] contractual provision in which the parties establish the place (such as
country, state, or type of court) for specified litigation between them." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
681 (8th ed. 2004).
2. A choice of law clause is "[a] contractual provision by which the parties designate the
jurisdiction whose law will govern any disputes that may arise between the parties." Id at 258.
3. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 501 (4th ed. 2007) ("[S]ome U.S. courts have concluded or assumed that
the validity and enforceability of forum clauses is governed by the law of the forum. Courts have
typically applied the forum's law without detailed consideration of other possibilities."); Jason Webb
Yackee, Choice of Law Considerations in the Validity & Enforcement of International Forum Selec-
tion Agreements: Whose Law Applies?, 9 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN. AFF. 43,63 (2004) ("United
States courts rarely engage in explicit conflict of laws analysis when determining whether an interna-
tional FSA is valid and enforceable.").
4. See Yackee, supra note 3, at 46.
5. See id.
6. Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418 (10th Cir. 2006).
7. See id. at 430.
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The scope of this article focuses on the United States federal courts'
enforcement and interpretation of FSAs that appear in contracts with
COLs. Part I of this comment considers the difficulties inherent in inter-
national trade that parties attempt to cure by employing COLs and FSAs.
Part II reviews the trends in circuit court case law concerning choice of
law in FSA enforcement and interpretation. Part III discusses the Tenth
Circuit's groundbreaking opinion in Yavuz.8 Part IV reviews circuit
cases arising after Yavuz. Part V analyzes the opinion in Yavuz and
raises questions concerning the effect it may have on courts, as well as
future litigating parties. Additionally, Part V briefly addresses the Con-
vention on Choice of Court Agreements9 and its effect on the Yavuz
holding if entered into force.' 0 Finally, in Part VI, this comment con-
cludes that, while ultimately a leap in the right direction, the Tenth Cir-
cuit's holding in Yavuz needs clarification.
I. THE PERILOUS WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE
International commercial law has reached a level of sophistication
and consistency that would have been inconceivable a few decades ago."
Advances by key international organizations such as the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law, the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law, and the International Chamber of
Commerce have led to the promulgation of transnational commercial
law. 12 Developments in international transnational commercial law have
led to harmonization 13 and unification, where, in some cases, diverse
8. Id. at 418.
9. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on Choice of Court Agree-
ments, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294, available at http://www.hcch.net/indexen.php?act=-
conventions.text&cid=98.
10. The Convention on Choice of Court Agreements requires two ratifications and has yet to
enter into force. Id. art. 31(1). As Mexico is the only ratifying country, the Convention on Choice
of Court Agreements is currently dormant. See Hague Conference on Private International Law,
Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements Status Table, http://www.hcch.net/
index en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=98 (last visited Feb. 5, 2008).
11. See Sandeep Gopalan, The Creation of International Commercial Law: Sovereignty
Felled?, 5 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 267, 269 (2004) [hereinafter Gopalan, Sovereignty Felled?] (dis-
cussing international conventions on various types of law that previously would have been unthink-
able due to a "belief that these areas of law embody aspects of national sociopolitical history and
culture, and that national sensibilities may be so strong as to render any attempt at harmonization
unsuccessful.").
12. See Ross Cranston, Theorizing Transnational Commercial Law, 42 TEX INT'L L.J. 597,
606(2007).
13. Different authorities espouse different definitions of "harmonization." See Gopalan,
Sovereignty Felled?, supra note 11, at 274-76 (reviewing different authorities' definitions of "har-
monization"). In his article, The Creation of International Commercial Law: Sovereignty Felled?,
Professor Gopalan "formulate[s] a working definition of harmonization in the field of commercial
law: any attempt by whatever instrument (international convention, model laws, restatements,
model contracts, standard form contracts, codes of practice, or usages) to minimize or eliminate
discord between national commercial laws as they apply to international commercial transactions."
Id. at 276.
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systems of laws are synthesized, often into one set of rules that trumps
domestic law in the international context.'
4
However, while the unification and harmonization of international
commercial law progresses at a staggering pace, a broad expanse of the
international commercial plane remains in discord. The impetus to har-
monize international commercial law is direct evidence of the problems
inherent in the inconsistencies between the laws of various states.15 Es-
sentially, different states have different, conflicting laws' 6 or possibly no
law at all,17 for the governance of certain commercial transactions.
Given the inconsistency present in the commercial law of various
States, contracting with parties abroad is a daunting prospect. Potential
for unforeseen liabilities or loss of claims poses grave risks to parties
engaged in extraterritorial trade.' 8 The apparent solution to this peril
arises in the form of FSAs and COLs. In theory, FSAs afford parties
predictability and certainty.19 FSAs allow parties to reduce the myriad
possible forums for litigation to one with which the parties are familiar.20
FSAs should also settle issues of jurisdiction and venue prior to litiga-
tion, thus saving parties and courts time, money, and resources. 2' How-
ever, an FSA may not be the silver bullet parties seek to avoid the uncer-
tainty posed by dealing with parties abroad.22 Despite incorporating an
FSA into their contracts, parties may spend significant time and re-
sources litigating in a seized forum.23
Problems inevitably arise when one party files suit in a forum other
than the one contemplated in the FSA. In this situation, an FSA may
14. See Cranston, supra note 12, at 606.
15. See Sandeep Gopalan, New Trends in the Making of International Commercial Law, 23
J.L. & COM. 117,124-27 (2004) (reviewing effect of differing laws within Europe).
16. See e.g., Gopalan, Sovereignty Felled?, supra note 11, at 274 (discussing discrepancies
between approaches to secured credit laws in various states). It is important to note that, alone,
"[m]ere diversity in national laws is no reason to create international commercial law." Id. at 279.
Harmonization becomes necessary when "differences in national commercial laws are an impedi-
ment." Id.
17. See e.g., id (discussing problems posed by developing countries that do not have adequate
secured transactions law).
18. See id. at 279 (quoting DR. OLE LANDO & DR. CHRISTIAN V. BAR, COMMUNICATION ON
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: JOINT RESPONSE OF THE COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW
AND THE STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 9 (2001)).
19. See Young Lee, Forum Selection Clauses: Problems of Enforcement in Diversity Cases
and State Courts, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663, 663 (1997). For other virtues of FSAs, see
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING
AND ENFORCING 3-4 (2d ed. 2006); Erin Ann O'Hara, Exploring the Need for International Har-
monization: The Jurisprudence and Politics of Forum Selection Clauses, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 301,
310-11 (2002).
20. See WILLIAM W. PARK, INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION 12-13 (1995).
21. Michael E. Solimine, Forum Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 25
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 51, 52 (1992); see also Lee, supra note 19, at 664.
22. See Lee, supra note 19, at 663 ("[W]ithin federal and state courts alike lurk difficulties
that a party may face in attempting to enforce a choice of forum.").
23. See id. at 665-66.
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have to clear several hurdles before the seized forum enforces it.24 Pro-
fessor Jason Webb Yackee 25 has organized conditions courts commonly
impose on FSAs into an analytic framework.26 The concepts employed
by Yackee that are relevant to this comment are enforceability in princi-
ple,27 quality of consent,28 and content of consent.29
Because courts require that FSAs meet certain standards, parties
will inevitably have to litigate, to some degree, in the seized forum.
Here, uncertainty 30 arises because a plethora of different systems of law
may be applicable to the FSA litigation. For instance, lexfori,31 lex loci
contractus,32 or lex rei sitae33 may be potentially applicable.34 The po-
tential for application of these various laws creates further complications
where the source of the applicable law is a federal system.35  Courts,
24. Yackee, supra note 3, at 47.
25. Professor Yackee's work deserves special consideration for two major reasons. First, he
is one of the few scholars to give the FSA/COL issue in-depth consideration. See Yavuz v. 61 MM,
Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 427 (10th Cir. 2006). Second, the Tenth Circuit in Yavuz gave Yackee's work
considerable attention and apparently adopted his major conclusions. See id. at 430 (citing Yackee,
supra note 3, at 84-85); id. at 431 (quoting Yackee, supra note 3, at 83).
26. Professor Yackee's framework organizes FSA issues into the following categories: "en-
forceability in principle; formal validity; and non-formal (or 'substantive') validity." Yackee, supra
note 3, at 47. The third category, non-formal validity, is divided further into the following subcate-
gories: "reality of consent; the quality of consent; and the content of consent." Id. at 56.
27. Enforceability in principle exists where, in practice, a seized forum will enforce an FSA
subject to certain limitations. See id. at 47. In the United States, public policy concerns or unrea-
sonableness may limit FSA enforceability. See id. at 48-49. For discussion regarding the exceptions
limiting enforceability see infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
28. Quality of consent falls under Yackee's broader concept of non-formal validity. Id at 56.
FSAs may be invalidated by "consensual vice, such as incapacity, mistake, fraud, duress, unreason-
ableness or unconscionability." Id. at 57.
29. As with quality of consent, content of consent falls under the concept of non-formal
validity. See id. at 56. Conceptually, content of consent focuses on the meaning and scope of an
FSA. See id. at 60-62. One issue commonly arising under content of consent, concerns whether the
parties intended the chosen forum to be exclusive or mandatory. See id. at 60. A second issue
concerns the claims to which an FSA is applicable (e.g., contract claims and/or tort claims). See id
at 62.
30. See Mo Zhang, Party Autonomy and Beyond: An International Perspective of Contrac-
tual Choice of Law, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 511, 529 (2006) ("In the United States, choice of law
is one of the most complex areas of the conflict of laws.").
31. Lex fori, literally "the law of the forum," is used to denote "the law of the jurisdiction
where the case is pending." BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 929. For various reasons, lexfori appears to
be an inadequate choice of law in the international commercial context. See Giesela Ruhl, Methods
and Approaches in Choice of Law: An Economic Perspective, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 801, 807
(2006) ("Prior to litigation lex fori provides for considerable uncertainty because parties do not know
where litigation will take place."); Yackee, supra note 3, at 83-84 (discussing the inadequacy of lex
fori).
32. Lex loci contractus is "[tihe law of the place where a contract is executed or to be per-
formed." BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 930. Of course, the place where the contract is executed may be
different from the place where the contract is to be performed. Thus, the designation of lex loci
contractus as governing requires the further step of deciding whether the law of the place of execu-
tion or place of performance governs the litigation.
33. Lex rei sitae is "[t]he law of the place where the property is situated." Id. at 931.
34. For additional choices of law, see Yackee, supra note 3, at 63.
35. See id.
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then, may have to decide whether the federal law or the state law ap-
plies.36
Another available option, one that should dispense with the lack of
predictability, efficiency, and certainty 37 in a manner analogous to FSA
inclusion, is the law chosen by the parties as evidenced by a COL in their
contract. Where FSAs limit the number of potential fori to one,38 COLs
limit the potential systems of law to one chosen by the parties.39 Theo-
retically, a COL should serve as a safety net for parties who, unexpect-
edly, find themselves litigating in a forum not contemplated in the FSA.
While the parties must litigate in an unforeseen place, at least they will
be able to litigate pursuant to a familiar and foreseeable law.40 Presuma-
bly, as the parties drafted the FSA with a particular law in mind, applica-
tion of that law to the litigated FSA issues should lead to an efficient,
foreseeable resolution.
This seemingly appropriate solution to choice of law problems in
FSA interpretation and enforcement has not been realized in the United
States federal court system.41  For the most part, United States courts
have failed to address adequately questions concerning the law applica-
ble to FSA interpretation and enforcement.42 For various reasons, the
possibility that the law chosen by the contracting parties might vie with
lexfori in applicability appears largely to have evaded these courts' at-
tention.43 Overwhelmingly, courts have used lexfori in interpreting and
enforcing FSAs in international agreements, notwithstanding the inclu-
sion of COLs.44 Because courts generally refrain from conducting in-
depth analyses concerning the law applicable to FSA validity and en-
forcement,45 the rationale for applying lex fori is somewhat enigmatic.46
Part II reviews the development and application of the federal standard
36. Id.
37. See Zhang, supra note 30, at 512 (discussing an international business transactional practi-
tioner's view of choice of law clauses).
38. See Park, supra note 20, at 12.
39. See BORN, supra note 19, at 119.
40. See Zhang, supra note 30, at 560 ("[l]t is important that the actors in international com-
merce have the security of knowing the possible legal consequences of their commercial activities in
a certain and predicable way. Allowing parties to specify the governing law through an agreement
under party autonomy will definitely help reach that goal.").
41. In fact, it appears that choice of law clause enforcement in United States courts in general
is neither reliable nor consistent. See id. at 533 ("[For a foreign lawyer or even a U.S. lawyer, it is
indeed a headache to predict the outcome of a contractual choice of law clause in U.S. courts be-
cause often the issue is dependent on the decision of a particular court undertaken on a case-by-case
basis.").
42. See Yackee, supra note 3, at 63 ("United States' [sic] courts rarely engage in explicit
conflict of laws analysis when determining whether an international FSA is valid and enforceable.").
43. See id. at 67 ("[United States'] [sic] courts tend instead to reflexively apply lex fori, even
when the contract contains an explicit choice of law clause selecting the laws of another jurisdiction
to govern the contract as a whole.").
44. See id.
45. See id. at 63.
46. See id. at 84 ("It is unclear why courts have hesitated to apply choice of law clauses to
international FSA agreements contained therein ... ").
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and sets the stage on which the Tenth Circuit fashioned its groundbreak-
ing departure from the lexfori trend.
II. FSAs IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
This section begins with a brief review of the history of the federal
courts' stance on FSAs. Next, it reviews more current circuit court case
law concerning FSA enforceability. The third part of this section re-
views circuit court case law concerning FSA interpretation. All of the
circuit cases reviewed in this section concern agreements that incorporate
FSAs and COLs. The common theme running through these cases is the
circuit courts' tendency to overlook the potential applicability of the law
chosen by the parties, as evidenced by COLs, to the interpretation and
enforceability of FSAs. The result of this approach is that foreign parties
find themselves litigating in an unforeseen forum pursuant to an unfore-
seen law.
A. Casting the Mold: M/S Bremen & Unterweser Reederel, GmBH v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co.
During the period leading up to the mid-1900's, federal courts gave
little regard to FSAs.47 These courts considered contractual agreements
designating alternate fora an impermissible "ouster" of their jurisdic-
tion.48 However, in MIS Bremen & Unterweser Reederel, GmBH v. Za-
pata Off-Shore Co.,49 the Supreme Court emphatically renounced the
"ouster" doctrine. 50 In Bremen, the Court crafted a new doctrine holding
FSAs "prima facie valid" and enforceable absent a showing by the resist-
ing party that enforcement would be "unreasonable., 5' The "unreason-
ableness" exception to prima facie validity constitutes the cornerstone
for rejection of FSAs in the United States.5 2 Articulations of the circum-
stances that precipitate activation of the exception vary slightly from
circuit to circuit, but overall are consistent.
53
47. See Nauert v. Nava Leisure USA, Inc., No. 99-1073, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6862, at *5
(10th Cir. April 14, 2000); Michael Gruson, Forum Selection Clauses in International and Interstate
CommercialAgreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 133, 138 ("Before 1955, federal courts... generally
entertained suits brought in violation of forum-selection clauses."); Yackee, supra note 3, at 47.
48. See Gruson, supra note 47, at 138-46 for an in-depth overview of decisions during the
"ouster" period. See also Yackee, supra note 3, at 48.
49. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
50. Yackee, supra note 3, at 48 (referring to Bremen, 407 U.S. 1).
51. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10.
52. See Yackee, supra note 3, at 48-49.
53. In Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1294, (9th Cir. 1998) (citing and quot-
ing Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12-13, 15, 18), the Ninth Circuit advised that the following circumstances
raise the exception:
[F]irst, if the inclusion of the clause in the agreement was the product of fraud or over-
reaching; second, if the party wishing to repudiate the clause would effectively be de-
prived of his day in court were the clause enforced; and third, "if enforcement would con-
travene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought."
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Notwithstanding doubts as to the strength of the Court's rationale in
crafting the rule in Bremen,54 as well as to the applicability of its princi-
ples in diversity cases,55 courts have followed the standard it set with
considerable allegiance. 6
B. Enforceability in Principle57 and Consensual Vice: 58 The Lloyd's
Cases
During the 1990's, Lloyd's of London ("Lloyd's")59 and various en-
tities within its structure became targets of a flurry of litigation initiated
by certain Names60 who alleged misconduct by Lloyd's and various in-
Similarly, in Haynsworth v. The Corporation, 121 F.3d 956, 963 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing and quoting
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991)), the Fifth Circuit advised that the
potential for unreasonableness is present in the following circumstances:
(1) the incorporation of the forum selection clause into the agreement was the product of
fraud or overreaching; (2) the party seeking to escape enforcement "will for all practical
purposes be deprived of his day in court" because of the grave inconvenience or unfair-
ness of the selected forum; (3) the fundamental unfairness of the chosen law will deprive
the plaintiff of a remedy; or (4) enforcement of the forum selection clause would contra-
vene a strong public policy of the forum state.
The third factor here is curious in that it appears to contemplate an automatic application of the
chosen forums law (i.e., if the parties litigate in their chosen forum, they will litigate under that
forum's law). It is questionable whether such a presumption is warranted. See GARY B. BORN,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 373 (4th ed. 2007) (distinguishing
between COLs and FSAs and noting that inclusion of an FSA may not automatically incorporate the
chosen forum's law). A valid and enforceable FSA, alone, does not necessarily implicate the law of
the chosen forum. See id. It would appear that factor three here belongs in a choice of law analysis
rather than a forum selection analysis. However, as will be seen infra notes 82, 93, courts, in prac-
tice, blur the distinction between choice of law and forum selection.
54. See Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291,307-13 (1988).
55. See Sun Forest Corp. v. Shvili, 152 F. Supp. 2d 367, 381 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (question-
ing the Second Circuit's application of Bremen to diversity actions); Mullenix, supra note 54, at 306
("In the major cases in which the Court has considered a problem of consensual procedure, it has
never clearly and affirmatively stated that such a doctrine of consensual jurisdiction applies in fed-
eral courts sitting on purely domestic federal cases."); Yackee, supra note 3, at 48.
56. See Mullenix, supra note 54, at 307 ("The current doctrine of consensual adjudicatory
procedure enforced throughout the federal court system is based on Supreme Court pronouncements
in The Bremen."); Yackee, supra note 3, at 48 ("[F]ederal courts have widely embraced Bremen's
principle of "prima facie validity."); Gruson, supra note 47, at 149 ("Federal courts have universally
agreed that the teaching of Bremen is not limited to admiralty cases nor to cases involving the selec-
tion of a foreign forum but applies to all forum-selection clauses .....
57. See supra note 27 (discussing enforceability in principle).
58. See supra note 28 (giving types of consensual vice).
59. Lloyd's is a 300-year-old market in which individual and corporate underwriters known as
"Names" underwrite insurance. The Corporation of Lloyd's, which is also known as the Society of
Lloyd's, provides the building and personnel necessary to the market's administrative operations.
The Corporation is run by the Council of Lloyd's, which promulgates "Byelaws," regulates the
market, and generally controls Lloyd's administrative functions. Haynsworth v. The Corporation,
121 F.3d 956, 958 (5th Cir. 1997); see also James Gange, Richards v. Lloyd's of London: The Ninth
Circuit Denies Access to the Securities Laws to American Investors, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 625, 632-
33 (discussing the Lloyd's market).
60. "Loosely speaking, Names are investors in Lloyd's syndicates, the entities that nominally
underwrite insurance risk." Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1356 (2d Cir. 1993).
"Names must become members of Lloyd's in order to participate in the market. Prospective mem-
bers are solicited and assisted in the process of joining by Member's Agents, whose duties to the
Names are fiduciary in nature." Haynsworth, 121 F.3d at 959; see also Gange, supra note 59, at
632-34 (discussing Names).
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siders within the Lloyd's structure.61 On appeal, the fate of these cases
often turned on whether the FSA in the General Undertaking, 62 "the stan-
dardized contract between Lloyd's and the individual Names" 63 was en-
forceable in principle, or if the presence of exceptions to the doctrine of
primafacie validity should bar enforcement. The Lloyd's litigation pre-
sents an interesting backdrop for FSA consideration across the circuits
because it required a number of the circuit courts to determine the en-
forceability of a single FSA. While the methodologies employed in these
circuit cases varied to a degree, the results were strikingly uniform.
1. The Tenth Circuit: Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies,
Ltd.
In Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd.,64 the Tenth Cir-
cuit addressed the enforceability of the FSA in the General Undertaking
65
and a separate arbitration clause 66 contained in agreements concerning
underwriting in the Lloyd's market.67 The Riley litigation arose when an
individual Name brought a number of claims against Lloyd's and certain
other parties, alleging various violations of federal securities law, Colo-
rado state securities law, and common law fraud.68 The district court
determined that the arbitration clause, the FSA, and the COL were valid
61. See, e.g., Haynsworth, 121 F.3d 956.
62. Concerning forum selection and choice of law, the 1986 General Undertaking states:
2.1 The rights and obligations of the parties arising out of or relating to the Member's
membership of, and/or underwriting of insurance business at, Lloyd's and any other mat-
ter referred to in this Undertaking shall be governed by and construed in accordance with
the laws of England
2.2 Each party hereto irrevocably agrees that the courts of England shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to settle any dispute and/or controversy of whatsoever nature arising out of or
relating to the Member's membership of, and/or underwriting of insurance business at,
Lloyd's and that accordingly any suit, action or proceeding (together in this Clause 2 re-
ferred to as "Proceedings "') arising out of or relating to such matters shall be brought in
such courts and, to this end, each party hereto irrevocably agrees to submit to the juris-
diction of the courts of England and irrevocably waives any objection which it may have
now or hereafter to (a) any Proceedings being brought in any such court as is referred to
in this Clause 2 and (b) any claim that any such Proceedings have been brought in an in-
convenient forum and further irrevocably agrees that a judgment in any Proceedings
brought in the English courts shall be conclusive and binding upon each party and may be
enforced in the courts of any other jurisdiction.
2.3 The choice of law and jurisdiction referred to in this Clause 2 shall continue in full
force and effect in respect of any dispute and/or controversy of whatsoever nature arising
out of or relating to any of the matters referred to in this Undertaking notwithstanding
that the Member ceases, for any reason, to be a Member of, or to underwrite insurance
business at, Lloyd's.
Id. at 959-60 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 959.
64. 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1992).
65. See supra note 62.
66. The Supreme Court has found that arbitration clauses are "a specialized kind of forum-
selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the
dispute." Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974). However, this article concerns
only traditional FSAs.
67. Riley, 969 F.2d at 954.
68. Id. at 956.
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and enforceable. 69  Accordingly, the claims were dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.70
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit engaged in a reflexive application of
federal law to consider the enforceability of the FSA, and confusingly the
COL.71 Despite the presence of the COL72 within the General Undertak-
ing,73 and its determination that the COL should be enforced,74 the court
did not consider whether it applied to the FSA. Instead, the court em-
barked on an analysis of FSA enforceability pursuant to a broad interpre-
tation of federal FSA law. In its recitation of the relevant case law, the
court reviewed the policy considerations supporting deference to FSAs.76
Echoing Bremen, the court stated that FSAs are "prima facie valid" 77 and
noted the heavy burden placed on the resisting party to rebut validity by
showing fraud or overreaching.78 The court also recognized that resisting
parties face a similar burden in showing unreasonableness or injustice of
enforcement.79
The court next turned its attention to the appellant Name's argu-
ment80 that enforcement of the FSA and COL would effectively deny
him his day in court because pursuing his case in an English court, under
English law, rather than in a United States court, under United States
law, would be considerably more onerous. 81 Reasoning that requiring
parties to litigate under laws different from or less propitious than United
States laws was not a bar to enforceability 2 and that English courts
would not be unfair,83 the court found that the Plaintiff had not met the
69. Id. at 955.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 956-58.
72. The court's failure to incorporate the COL in the FSA analysis is particularly striking
considering its statement that "[a] contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which
disputes shall be litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable precondi-
tion to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business trans-
action." Id. at 957 (emphasis added).
73. See Haynesworth v. The Corporation, 121 F.3d 956, 959-60 (5th Cir. 1997).
74. Riley, 969 F.2d at 958.
75. See id; see also Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1362 (2d Cir. 1993) (expressing
reluctance "to interpret the Supreme Court's precedent quite so broadly" as the Tenth Circuit in
Riley).
76. See Riley, 969 F.2d at 957-58.
77. Id. at 957 (quoting MS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Prior to reviewing the FSA case law, the court summarily rejected the appellant's first
argument that the FSA and COL would act as a waiver of his substantive rights under federal securi-
ties laws and, thus, should not be enforced on public policy grounds. Id. at 957.
81. Id. at 958.
82. Id (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1528 (1991)). The
court's analysis here is curious in that it apparently entertained a choice of law challenge under the
guise of a rebuttal to FSA enforcement, thus blurring the distinction between the two. In fact,
throughout its analysis the court referred to the COL and the FSA in tandem.
83. Id.
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heavy burden imposed on parties resisting FSA enforcement, 84 and de-
cided that the FSA and COL should be enforced.85
2. The Second Circuit: Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's
In Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 86 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals considered FSA validity and enforceability in the context of a
suit brought by over one hundred Names against Lloyd's and various
other parties connected to the Lloyd's market.87 The Names entered into
implicit or explicit agreements with the defendants.88 Each agreement
contained a COL and either an FSA or an arbitration clause.89 In their
suit, the Names alleged violations of United States securities laws and
RICO laws.90
In large part, the Second Circuit's methodology was similar to that
of the Riley court because it applied federal law without considering the
applicability of the law chosen by the parties. However, while agreeing
with its ultimate result, the Second Circuit voiced a departure from the
Tenth Circuit's broad interpretation of federal law in Riley.9'
In a narrower interpretation of federal FSA law, the Second Circuit
focused on the exceptions to the prima facie enforceable rule, with spe-
cial emphasis on the public policy exception. 92 Forcefully, the court ad-
vised that, upon a showing by the plaintiffs that English remedies inade-
quately deter types of consensual vice, it would implement the public
policy exception to enforceability. 94 However, finding the Names inca-
pable of making the requisite showing,95 the court affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the case96 for improper venue on the basis of the
FSAs and arbitration agreements.97
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. 996 F.2d 1353 (1993).
87. Id. at 1358.
88. See id. at 1357-58.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 1358.
91. Id. at 1362 (quoting Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 957
(1992) ("[W]hen an agreement is truly international, as here, and reflects numerous contacts with the
foreign forum, the Supreme Court has quite clearly held that the parties' choice of law and forum
selection provisions will be given effect.")).
92. Id. at 1365.
93. Specifically, the court mentioned "fraud, misrepresentation or inadequate disclosure." Id.
Notice, again, that questions of the chosen forum's law find their way into the FSA analysis.
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1366.
97. Id. at 1357.
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3. The Fifth Circuit: Haynsworth v. The Corporation
Haynsworth v. The Corporation98 concerned two consolidated cases
that arose during the Lloyd's litigation. Factually, the suits were similar
in that both arose from circumstances concerning liability for asbestos
and toxic waste risks.99 The district court dismissed the first case based
on the FSA and COL in the General Undertaking. 00 In the second case,
however, the district court declined to dismiss, choosing instead to cer-
tify the FSA/COL question for interlocutory appeal.' 0 '
Consolidating the cases, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals exam-
ined whether consensual vice'0 2 and public policy 10 3 barred enforcement
of the FSA. Departing from the rote application of federal law in Riley
and Roby, the Fifth Circuit briefly considered the applicability of Texas
law to the enforceability question.1' 4 However, despite recognizing that
all of the Names were parties to the General Undertaking and, conse-
quently, the FSA and COL, 05 the court gave no thought to the potential
applicability of the COL to the FSA determination. Tracking prior deci-
sions extending the applicability of Bremen to non-admiralty cases,
10 6
including diversity cases, 0 7 the court settled on federal law. 0 8 Applying
federal law, the Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' contentions that con-
sensual vice and public policy barred enforcement of the FSA.'09
C. Content of Consent: Permissive or Mandatory
Along with primary considerations of enforceability, FSA analysis
has brought the actual content of FSAs to courts' attention. 0 One of the
major issues concerning the content of an FSA is whether the designation
of forum is mandatory"' or permissive. 12 Whether an FSA is manda-
98. 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1997).
99. See id. at 960.
100. Id. at 961.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 963-65 (considering and rejecting plaintiffs' claims of fraud and overreaching).
103. Id. at 965-70 (considering and rejecting plaintiffs' contention that enforcement of the FSA
and COL would be unreasonable "because [the FSA and COL clause] contravenes public policy as
embodied in the antiwaiver provisions of federal securities law, Texas securities law, and the Texas
DTPA.").
104. See id. at 961-62.
105. See id. at 960.
106. Id. at 962 (citing Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Manges, 900 F.2d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 1990)
(bankruptcy case); AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. P'ship, 740 F.2d 148, 156-60 (2d Cir. 1984)
(federal securities fraud case); In re Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 588 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1979)
(Miller Act)).
107. Id. (citing Int'l Software Sys. v. Amplicon, 77 F.3d 112, 114-15 (5th Cir. 1996)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 965,970.
110. See Yackee, supra note 3, at 60-61 (discussing "content of consent").
111. Courts and authorities use the terms "mandatory" and "exclusive" interchangeably when
describing FSAs that designate one forum as the only applicable forum for dispute resolution.
Compare Yackee, supra note 3, at 60 (discussing courts' analyses in determining "whether the
parties intended [an] FSA to be exclusive or permissive") (emphasis added), with id. at 86 (discuss-
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tory or permissive will play a major role in whether it is enforced." 3
Moreover, the type of law used will likely play a decisive role in deter-
mining whether an FSA is permissive or mandatory. 14 Possibly due to
quality of the FSA in the General Undertaking," 15 the courts considering
the Lloyd's cases did not reach the issue of whether it was mandatory or
permissive. The following cases review different circuit's approaches to
the mandatory/permissive question.
1. The Tenth Circuit: K & V Scientific Co., Inc. v. Bayerische
Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft
In K & V Scientific Co., Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Akti-
engesellschaft,l 16 the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of whether an
FSA in a confidentiality agreement that also included a COL was manda-
tory or permissive. 1 7 The case arose after the termination of a working
arrangement in which the plaintiff and defendant exchanged confidential
information.' 18 The plaintiff alleged that, after severing the working rela-
tionship, the defendant continued to pursue "development and manufac-
ture" of products "designed and promoted" by the plaintiff. 19 Determin-
ing that the FSA at issue unambiguously designated the courts of Munich
as the exclusive forum, the district court dismissed the case for improper
venue. 1
2 0
At the appellate level, K & V Scientific differed from the Lloyd's
cases in that the meaning of the FSA, not its enforceability, was at is-
sue.121 While its analysis ultimately rested on federal law, the Tenth Cir-
cuit was apparently cognizant that there may be a question as to the ap-
122 12plicable law. However, the court declined to address the issue. 23 The
Tenth Circuit noted the district court's conclusion that federal law gov-
erned the interpretation of the FSA.' 24 As the parties failed to object,
25
ing the Eighth Circuit's choice of law in determining "whether an FSA was permissive or manda-
tory") (emphasis added).
112. See id, at 60-61.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 60-62 (discussing differences between United States and European determina-
tions concerning whether an FSA is permissive or exclusive).
115. See supra note 62.
116. 314 F.3d 494 (lOth Cir. 2002).
117. The FSA and choice of law clause in the confidentiality agreement stated, "Jurisdiction
for all and any disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement is Munich. All and any
disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement are subject to the laws of the Federal
Republic of Germany." Id. at 496-97.
118. Id.
119. Seeid. at 497.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 498 ("Plaintiff does not dispute the general validity of the forum selection clause
contained in the parties' ... confidentiality agreement.").
122. See id. at 497 n.4.
123. See id,
124. See id.
125. This point raises two questions. First, should courts raise the applicability of COLs to
FSA issues sua sponte? Second, that parties fail to argue the applicability of their chosen law to
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the Tenth Circuit considered the district court's conclusion the law of the
case. 126
After reviewing the federal law on point, the Tenth Circuit dis-
agreed with the district court's finding that the FSA was exclusive.
27
The appellate court noted that the FSA only addressed jurisdiction, pre-
sumably, as opposed to forum. 28 Additionally, the court pointed out the
lack of exclusive terms, such as "'exclusive,' 'sole,' or 'only"' in the
FSA. 129  Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's
judgment and remanded for further proceedings.'
30
2. The Fifth Circuit: Caldas & Sons, Inc. v. Neblett
In Caldas & Sons, Inc. v. Neblett,t31 the Fifth Circuit reached a con-
clusion similar to the Tenth Circuit's determination in K & V Scientific.
However, in passing, the court in Caldas & Sons raised an issue that in-
ferably may separate the choice of law applicable to an FSA's enforce-
ability and an FSA's interpretation.1
32
Caldas & Sons arose from alleged misconduct concerning a com-
plex series of land exchanges. 33 After the plaintiffs sued, the defendants
filed motions to dismiss based on an FSA.134 Determining the FSA per-
missive, the district court declined to dismiss.'
35
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit's analysis focused mainly on the man-
datory/permissive issue, but also included a brief, yet curious, discussion
of enforceability. 36 Ultimately, the court decided the enforceability is-
sue mooted by its determination that the FSA was permissive. 37 How-
ever, in a footnote, the court acknowledged a circuit split over the issue
of the law 38 applicable to the determination of FSA enforceability. 39
FSA issues, and fail to object when courts apply federal law, calls the much heralded COL virtue of
reliability into question. Presumably, if parties drafted FSAs with the expectation that they would be
subject to the COL, that expectation would be evidenced in the litigation.
126. See K & V Scientific, 314 F.3d at 497 n.4.
127. Id. at 498-99.
128. See id. at 500.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 501.
131. 17 F.3d 123 (5th Cir. 1994).
132. In fact, that the law applicable to validity and enforcement may be different from the law
applicable to interpretation is a point that has been acknowledged by courts, see, e.g., Phillips v.
Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 382 (2d Cir. 2007), and academics, see, e.g., BORN, supra note 53,
at 431 ("[T]he law that governs the validity and enforceability of a forum agreement need not neces-
sarily be the same as that governing the interpretation of the agreement.").
133. Caldas & Sons, 17 F.3d at 124-26.
134. Id. The FSA in question stated, "the law and courts of Zurich shall be applicable." Id. at
127.
135. Id. at 126.
136. See id at 127.
137. Id. at 127 n.3.
138. In recognizing the circuit split on the choice of law issue, the Fifth Circuit cited Manetti-
Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc., 858 F.2d 509, 512-13 (9th Cir. 1988). Caldas & Sons, 17 F.3d
at 127 n.3. In Manetti-Farrow, the Ninth Circuit addressed, at length, the question of whether state
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Additionally, the court noted that the Fifth Circuit had not ruled on the
issue. 140  Despite acknowledging that there may be a question as to the
law applicable to enforcement of an FSA, the court proceeded to apply
federal law to determine if the FSA was mandatory or permissive with-
out raising the choice of law question.' 41 The potential implication here
is that different FSA analyses may be subject to different law.
42
In its analysis, the court found that the term "shall" was not indica-
tive of the parties' intent to designate the courts of Zurich as the exclu-
sive forum. 14 3 Instead, the court decided that the language of the FSA
merely provided that the parties submitted to the personal jurisdiction of
the courts of Zurich. 144 According to the court, exclusivity requires lan-
guage that is "clear, unequivocal and mandatory.' 45  Thus, the circuit
court concluded that the district court was correct in retaining jurisdic-
tion.
14 6
III. CHANGING COURSE: YA Vuz V. 61 MM, LTD.
Review of circuit case law shows a clear pattern of federal circuit
courts applying federal law to determine FSA validity and enforceability,
notwithstanding otherwise valid COLs in the parties' contracts. Courts
conduct many of these applications without consideration of an alterna-
tive system of law.147 Even where the question of choice of law arises,
circuit courts have managed to circumvent the issue. 148 Where circuits
do examine the choice of law issue, their examinations focus on state and
federal law, not federal and foreign law. 49 Unfortunately, the available
or federal law should be applied to FSA enforcement for the purposes of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.
Manetti-Farrow, 858 F.2d at 512 (discussing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). The
determination of the applicable law turned on whether an FSA is procedural and subject to federal
law, or substantive and subject to state law. Id. The Erie issue presents an interesting potential
parallel to the choice between lex fori and the law chosen by the contracting parties. Switching
roles, if an FSA is procedural, it is governed by lex fori. Relatedly, if an FSA is substantive, it
should be governed by the law chosen by the contracting parties. Whether the Erie principles in
domestic law are freely transferable to the international context is unclear. In Phillips v. Audio
Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 384 (2d Cir. 2007), the Second Circuit cited Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d
17, 18-19 (2d Cir. 1990), in support of its conclusion that FSA enforceability is a procedural matter
and, thus, governed by federal law rather than English law. Jones, however, was a domestic case
concerned with a domestic FSA and, there, the Second Circuit reached its determination that federal
law applies to FSA enforcement via Erie. Id. at 19. Certainly, this raises an interesting question.
139. Caldas & Sons, 17 F.3d at 127 n.3 (citing Manetti-Farrow, 858 F.2d at 512).
140. Id.
141. See id. at 127-28.
142. The Second Circuit addressed this issue in a 2007 decision. See Phillips, 494 F.3d at 384.
Phillips is discussed infra Part IV.B.
143. See Caldas & Sons, 17 F.3d. at 127-28.
144. See id. at 128.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. See Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1356-57 (2d Cir. 1993); Riley v.
Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 958 (10th Cir. 1992).
148. See K & V Scientific Co., Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, 314 F.3d
494, 497 n.4 (1Oth Cir. 2002); Caldas & Sons, 17 F.3d at 127 n.3.
149. See Haynsworth v. The Corporation, 121 F.3d 956, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1997).
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case law does not shed light on the rationale for the utter disregard of
COLs in FSA analysis. A recent Tenth Circuit opinion departed from
this lexfori trend.' 0 In Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd.,15 1 the Tenth Circuit ad-
dressed, as an issue of first impression, 152 the applicability of a COL des-




Yavuz arose out of an investment relationship, concerning property
in Tulsa, Oklahoma, between an individual plaintiff of Turkish citizen-
ship ("Yavuz") 155 and a defendant Swiss corporation ("FPM") 156 con-
trolled and directed 57 by an individual defendant of dual Swiss and Syr-
ian citizenship ("Adi"). 58 In the early 1980s, Yavuz began an invest-
ment relationship with Adi.'59 Eventually, Yavuz learned of certain mis-
conduct on the part of Adi.' 60 After Yavuz confronted Adi, the parties
reached a settlement reflected by a fiduciary agreement. 16 1 This fiduci-
ary agreement contained an FSA and COL.' 62 Several years after enter-
ing into the fiduciary agreement, Yavuz raised questions concerning his
investments. 63 At some point thereafter, Adi and FPM allegedly col-
luded with 61 MM Corp. and 61 MM, Ltd., an Oklahoma corporation, in
an effort to supply Yavuz with inaccurate information regarding his in-
vestments. 164
Yavuz sued in state court.165 The case was removed to federal dis-
trict court where defendants Adi and FPM moved to dismiss for, among
other things, improper venue.' 66  Based on the FSA, the district judge
granted the motion to dismiss for improper venue.' 6 7 However, in a curi-
150. See Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418 (10th Cir. 2006).
151. Id.
152. See id. at 427.
153. Id. at 422-23.
154. Id. at 422.
155. Id. at 421.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 422.
158. Id. at 421.
159. Id. at 422.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. The FSA and choice of law clause stated, "[t]his convention is governed by the Swiss law,
in particular article 394 and following of the Swiss Code of Obligation. Place of courts is Fribourg."
Id. at 422-23.
163. Id. at 423.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 422.
166. Id at 424.
167. Id.
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ous explanation, the district judge employed a rationale that is strikingly




In Yavuz, the Tenth Circuit's FSA analysis was groundbreaking in
several respects. First, the court recognized that the parties' choice of
foreign law was an issue. 170  Second, the court recognized that, with a
few notable exceptions, 171 both the judiciary and academia had over-
looked the issue. 72 Additionally, the court identified two related prob-
lems in United States case law concerning the forum selection issue.
73
First, in considering FSA validity and enforceability, courts had failed to
examine fully the relevant choice of law implications. 74 Second, instead
of engaging in explicit analysis, notwithstanding COLs, courts "reflex-
ively apply lex fori.,', 75  Recognizing the existence of the choice of
law/forum selection issue,1 76 the lack of relevant authority on the issue,
177
and the tendency of United States courts to use lexfori,178 the Tenth Cir-
cuit set the stage upon which it would fashion a new model for applying
the law chosen by the contracting parties to the analysis of FSAs.
Treading new ground, the Tenth Circuit reached its decision con-
cerning the applicability of a COL to the analysis of an FSA by drawing
primarily from United States conflict of laws and contract principles, as
well as implications inherent in international commerce. 7 9 The court's
focus on conflict of laws and contracts principles mainly addressed the
implications of choice of law applicability to FSAs as it affects the con-
tracting parties.18  However, the court's consideration of international
trade policy reached further and addressed the implications of choice of
168. The parties apparently recognized this and "devote[d] substantial portions of their briefs to
debating whether the district court's dismissal can be affirmed under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens." See id. at 425. However, despite discussingforum non conveniens at length, the Tenth
Circuit held that "the court did not rule on that ground, and it would be inappropriate... to address
the matter in the first instance." See id. at 425-26.
169. Id. at 426-27.
170. See id. at 427 (noting that, to answer questions concerning the validity and enforceability
of a forum selection clause, "a court must first resolve a preliminary question: What law does it
apply to answer them?").
171. Id. (referring to TH Agric. & Nutrition, L.L.C. v. Ace European Group Ltd., 416 F. Supp.
2d 1054 (D. Kan. 2006) and Yackee, supra note 3, at 24).
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. Id. (quoting Yackee, supra note 3, at 67).
175. Id. (quoting Yackee, supra note 3, at 67).
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. Id. (quoting Yackee, supra note 3, at 67).
179. See id. at 427-30.
180. See id. at 427-28.
[Vol. 85:3
YAVUZ V. 61 MM, LTD.
law applicability in terms of the United States' interests in international
commerce. 18'
2. Principles of United States Conflict of Laws
Drawing from United States contracts and conflict of laws princi-
ples, the Tenth Circuit focused on two interrelated issues. First, the court
recognized the importance, and common practice, of interpreting con-
tracts pursuant to the contracting parties' choice of law.' 8 2 Because "[a]
forum-selection clause is part of the contract," the court saw no reason
why FSAs in international agreements should be governed by a law dif-
ferent from the law applicable to the rest of the contractual provisions,
i.e., the law chosen by the parties. 83 The court supported its position by
citing a prior Tenth Circuit case 184 in which the court stated "two 'prime
objectives' of contract law are 'to protect the justified expectations of the
parties and to make it possible for them to foretell with accuracy what
will be their rights and liabilities under the contract.""
85
The Tenth Circuit's concise application of traditional United States
conflict principles to the application of choice of law to FSAs appears to
provide a compelling answer. However, in making its determination, the
court made several presumptions that raise a number of difficult ques-
tions. This article addresses these questions infra Part V.
3. International Trade Policy
Transitioning from the straightforward analysis based on United
States conflict of laws principles, the Tenth Circuit next embarked on a
complex analysis of the implications of the law chosen for FSA interpre-
tation in terms of international commerce. 86 Here, the court reviewed
United States Supreme Court case law concerning the implications of
international commerce in regards to FSA enforceability. 87 The court
extended these principles to the applicability of COLs in FSA determina-
tions.188
Reviewing relevant Supreme Court case law concerning FSA en-
forcement, the Tenth Circuit identified the Court's rationale for granting
deference to FSAs.' 89 The overriding theme of these considerations ap-
pears to be that the growth of international commerce, and the United
181. See id. at 427-30.
182. Id. at 427-28 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. e
(1971)).
183. See idat 428 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 204 (1971)).
184. Boyd Rosene & Assocs. Inc. v. Kan. Mun. Gas Agency, 174 F.3d I l15, 1121 (10th Cir.
1999) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. e).
185. Yavuz, 465 F.3d at 428 (quoting BoydRosene, 174 F.3d at 1121).
186. See id. at 428-30.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. Id. at 428.
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States' role in that growth, is dependent upon the predictability and secu-
rity contracting parties gain from choosing a particular forum.' 90 Quot-
ing Bremen, the Tenth Circuit recognized:
[I]n an era of expanding world trade and commerce, the absolute as-
pects of the doctrine of [a circuit precedent holding a forum-selection
clause unenforceable] have little place and would be a heavy hand
indeed on the future development of international commercial deal-
ings by Americans. We cannot have trade and commerce in world
markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed
by our laws, and resolved in our courts.
191
Similarly, the court noted the Bremen Court's conclusion that "[t]he
elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum
acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in international
trade, commerce, and contracting."' 192 The Tenth Circuit highlighted the
Court's continued adherence to these principles, citing later Supreme
Court opinions, including Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth,193 in which the Court stated:
[W]e conclude that concerns of international comity, respect for the
capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the
need of the international commercial system for predictability in the
resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties' agreement,
even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a do-
mestic context.
1 94
The Tenth Circuit found the principles espoused by the Supreme
Court concerning FSA enforcement 95 especially germane to choice of
law applicability. 196 Accordingly, the court adopted these principles as
support for its conclusion that
[i]f the parties to an international contract agree on a forum-selection
clause that has a particular meaning under the law of a specific juris-
diction, and the parties agree that the contract is to be interpreted un-
der the law of that jurisdiction, respect for the parties' autonomy and
the demands of predictability in international transactions require
190. See id. at 428-30.
191. Id. at 429 (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1972)).
192. Id. (quoting Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13-14).
193. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
194. Yavuz, 465 F.3d at 430 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629).
195. While the Tenth Circuit leaned heavily on the Supreme Court cases favoring FSA en-
forcement, it recognized inherent differences in those cases and the case at bar. Id. Apparently
distinguishing the Supreme Court cases from the case at bar, the Tenth Circuit noted that the FSA
issue in the Supreme Court cases was enforceability, not meaning. Id. However, it is unclear if the
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courts to give effect to the meaning of the forum-selection clause un-
der the chosen law .... 197
4. The Holding
After reviewing basic principles of United States conflict of laws, as
well as Supreme Court case law on the enforceability of forum selection
law and its pertinence to choice of law application, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that the reflexive application of lexfori was unacceptable.' 98
Accordingly, the court announced a new federal rule, stating "courts
should ordinarily honor an international commercial agreement's forum-
selection provision as construed under the law specified in the agree-
ment's choice-of-law provision.
"' 199
IV. CIRCUIT COURTS POST-YA VUZ
A. The Tenth Circuit: Missing the Boat in TH Agriculture & Nutrition,
LLC v. Ace European Group, Ltd.
TH Agriculture & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group, Ltd.
200
presented the Tenth Circuit with an opportunity to clarify and expound
upon its holding in Yavuz. Regrettably, the Tenth Circuit declined.20'
TH Agriculture arose out of the alleged breach of insurance policies
connected to an FSA.20 2 The district court devoted the majority of its
opinion to issues concerning personal jurisdiction.0 3 However, after
concluding that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendants,
the district court stated that, if it did, the presence of the FSA would re-
quire dismissal for improper venue.204 The district court then proceeded
to run the gambit of applicable law in considering the validity and en-
forceability of the FSA.2 °5
First, the court considered whether the FSA was mandatory or per-
missive pursuant to Tenth Circuit law and Kansas state law.2°6 Finding
that, under both laws, the FSA would be permissive, the court declined to
determine which was ultimately applicable.20 7 Next, the court acknowl-
edged the defendants' assertion that Dutch law was applicable. 0 8 Faced
197. Id.
198. Id. at 430-31.
199. Id. at 430 (emphasis in original).
200. TH Agric. & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group, Ltd. (THAgric. 11), 488 F.3d 1282
(10th Cir. 2007).
201. See id. at 1293 n.4.
202. TH Agriculture & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group, Ltd. (TH Agric. 1), 416 F.
Supp. 2d 1054, 1062 (D. Kan. 2006).
203. See id at 1063-73.
204. See id. at 1074.
205. See id. at 1074-77.
206. See id. at 1074.
207. See id. (citing Excell, Inc. v. Sterling Boiler & Mech., Inc., 106 F.3d 318, 320-21 (10th
Cir. 1997)).
208. See id. at 1075.
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with a potentially applicable foreign law, the court opined that a choice
of law consideration is unnecessary absent conflict between the relevant
laws. 20 9 Following this principle, the court found that a conflict did exist
because, pursuant to Dutch law, the FSA was mandatory. 210 After identi-
fying the conflict, the court noted that the forum state's substantive law,
"including its choice-of-law rules," controls. 211 As Kansas was the fo-
rum state, the court proceeded to consider whether the foreign law cho-
sen by the parties was applicable to the FSA pursuant to Kansas law.
212
The Tenth Circuit recognized that Kansas courts had not addressed the
213issue. However, the Tenth Circuit decided that the Kansas Supreme
Court would reach a result similar to other courts214 that found COLs
applicable to FSA enforceability. 215  Thus, the court decided that Dutch
law was applicable to interpretation of the FSA.2 i6
After settling the question of the applicable law, the district court
further supported its designation of Dutch law, concerning the meaning
of the FSA, with rationale more in line with the Yavuz opinion.21 7 The
court also addressed the issue of enforceability as it concerns the parties
chosen law.218 With regard to the interpretation of the FSA, the court
focused on the plain language of the COL and the parties' intent.219 The
court acknowledged that the COL applied to the terms and conditions of
the parties' agreement. 220  The court found that "the forum selection
clause [was] such a 'term' or 'condition,"' so the COL applied. 22 ' This






214. See id. (citing Dunne v. Libbra, 330 F.3d 1062, 1064 (8th Cir. 2003) (enforcing Ohio
choice-of-law provision and applying Ohio law to determine the enforceability of a forum selection
clause); Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1118-19 (1st Cir. 1998) (predicting that Massachusetts
courts would enforce Washington choice-of-law provision; applying Washington law to determine
the enforceability of a forum selection clause); Gen. Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc.,
783 F.2d 352, 358 (3d Cir. 1986) (enforcing Maryland choice-of-law provision and applying Mary-
land law to determining the enforceability of a forum selection clause)).
215. See id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1076. This section of the court's opinion is curious in that it appears to be at odds
with its prior conflicts of law analysis. The two analyses are premised upon two different concepts.
The first considers United States conflict of laws principles. The second considers party autonomy
and party intent. While both analyses led to the same result, it is possible that, in other cases, they
would not. This raises the question of which analysis should trump the other. The Yavuz opinion
appears to favor the latter (i.e., the focus is on party autonomy and intent rather than the forum
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rationale was very much in line with the Tenth Circuit's rationale in Ya-
VUZ.222
Addressing enforceability, the court focused on the language of the
COL that stated "all matters arising hereunder shall be determined in
accordance with the law and practice of [a court of the Netherlands]."223
Focusing on the word "practice," the court found that the COL extended
past mere interpretation of the FSA and was applicable to the enforce-
ability of the FSA as well.224 Thus, the court, inferably, drew a line be-
tween interpretation of the FSA, presumably subject substantive to law,
and enforceability of the FSA, presumably subject to the practice of the
appropriate court.
225
Concerning the primary rationale for applying Dutch law, courts
would be hard pressed to develop a more labyrinthine analysis. 26 How-
ever, the court's consideration of the party's intent is in line with the
Yavuz opinion and expands 227 upon the notion of party autonomy. Ac-
cordingly, as the Yavuz opinion focused on the virtues of "certainty, pre-
dictability, and convenience" afforded to parties via FSAs and COLs,228
it would have been particularly appropriate, and timely, for the Tenth
Circuit to elucidate its position here. However, on appeal, the Tenth
Circuit confined its analysis strictly to the personal jurisdiction issue.
In light of Yavuz, the Tenth Circuit's failure to address the FSA is-
sue is puzzling. In Yavuz, the Tenth Circuit discussedforum non conven-
iens at length. 229 While the parties briefed the issue extensively, forum
non conveniens was not part of the district court's ruling.23° In TH Agri-
culture, however, the district court did base dismissal on improper venue
222. See Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 428 (10th Cir. 2006) ("A forum-selection clause
is part of the contract. We see no particular reason, at least in the international context, why a fo-
rum-selection clause, among the multitude of provisions in a contract, should be singled out as a
provision not to be interpreted in accordance with the law chosen by the contracting parties.").
223. THAgric. I, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 1076 (emphasis in original).
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. This round of analysis incorporated both United States federal and state law as well as the
law of a foreign nation. Contrasted with the court's second approach which focused on the intent of
the parties by looking to the language of the contract, the former approach appears exceedingly
complex.
227. This expansion concerns enforceability. In Yavuz, the Tenth Circuit did not explicitly
address enforceability in terms of the applicable law. See generally Yavuz, 465 F.3d 418. In TH
Agric. 1, the district court apparently found that the inclusion of the word "practice" brought FSA
enforceability under the scope of the FSA. See THAgric. 1, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 1076. The question
that arises is whether reference to "practice" or some corollary is a necessary condition for the appli-
cability of a COL to enforceability, and relatedly, whether the absence of such language leaves the
enforceability issue subject to lexfori.
228. Yavuz, 465 F.3d at 428 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187
cmt. e (1971)).
229. Id. at 425-27.
230. Id. at 425.
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by virtue of the FSA, 23 1 and the parties did argue the issue at length in
their briefs.232 Moreover, both parties argued over whether Yavuz finally
resolved the choice-of-law issue in the instant appeal.233 The Tenth Cir-
cuit's failure to address the issue leaves serious questions as to the
breadth of its decision in Yavuz.
B. The Second Circuit.: Phillips v. Audio Active, Ltd.
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Yavuz has already led other courts to
consider the applicability of foreign law to FSA analysis.234 In Phillips v.
Audio Active, Ltd.,235 the Second Circuit embarked upon an expansive
analysis, considering choice of law applicability to separate and distinct
FSA issues.236
Phillips arose from a dispute between a recording musician ("Phil-
lips") and a music company ("BBE").237 Phillips and BBE entered into a
recording contract containing an FSA and COL.238 A dispute arose as to
the material BBE was authorized to release, and consequently Phillips
sued BBE and others for breach of contract and infringement.239  The
district court dismissed the case for improper venue based on the FSA.24°
In an interesting approach, the Second Circuit considered the FSA
at issue pursuant to a four-part analysis. 24' In a striking display of clar-
ity, the court proceeded to define and discuss the four-parts. 242 Courts
must first determine if the FSA was "reasonably" conveyed to the resist-
243ing party. Next, courts determine whether the FSA is mandatory or
231. See TH Agric. I, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 1062 ("[D]efendant's motions are granted on the
grounds of a lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue.") (emphasis added); id. at 1079
("[Elven if the court had personal jurisdiction over defendants, it would enforce the forum selection
clause as mandatory under the law of The Netherlands and dismiss this case for improper venue.)
(emphasis added); id. ("[T]he court has already concluded that this case should be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction and for improper venue ....") (emphasis added); see also TH Agric. & Nutrition,
LLC v. Ace European Group, Ltd. (TH Agric. I1), 488 F.3d 1282, 1284-85 (10th Cir. 2007) ("The
District Court granted the Insurers' motions to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction over
the Insurers and improper venue.") (emphasis added).
232. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 39-46, TH Agric. If, 488 F.3d 1282 (No. 06-3105);
Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 32-48, TH Agric. HI, 488 F.3d 1282 (No. 06-3105); Reply Brief of
Petitioner-Appellant at 1-2, THAgric. 1H, 488 F.3d 1282 (No. 06-3105).
233. Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 1, THAgric. 1H, 488 F.3d 1282 (No. 06-3105).
234. See Phillips v. Audio Active, Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 385-86 (2d Cit. 2007); Abbott Labs. v.
Takeda Pharm. Co., Ltd., 476 F.3d 421, 423 (7th Cir. 2007); Global Link, LLC v. Karamtech Co.,
No. 06-CV-14948, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33570, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 8, 2004).
235. 494 F.3d 378 (2d Cir. 2007).
236. See id. at 383-86.
237. Id. at 381.
238. The FSA and choice of law clause states: "[tihe validity[,] construction[,] and effect of
this agreement and any or all modifications hereof shall be governed by English Law and any legal
proceedings that may arise out of it are to be brought in England." Id. at 382 (alteration in original).
239. Id. at 383.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 383-84.
243. Id. at 383 (citing D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 2006)); see
also Yackee, supra note 3, at 50, 56-57 (discussing formal validity and reality of consent).
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permissive.244 The third step requires courts to determine whether the
FSA extends to "the claims and parties involved in the suit. '245 If steps
one through three are satisfied, the FSA is "presumptively enforce-
able. 24 6 The presumption of enforceability is, however, rebuttable upon
a showing of unreasonableness or injustice, or invalidity due to fraud or
overreaching.247 In step four, courts must consider whether the resisting
party has sufficiently rebutted the presumption of enforceability.248
Next, the Second Circuit considered the applicability of a COL ac-
companying an FSA.249 The placement of this question in the court's
analysis is curious because it had already presented a framework for FSA
analysis pursuant to United States federal law.250 Accordingly, even if
the court used the law chosen by the parties to analyze the entire FSA,
the analysis would be a hybrid in that foreign law would be applied to an
analytical framework based on United States law. Moreover, by consid-
ering the applicable law after presenting the analytical framework, the
court opened the door for a more complicated arrangement where federal
law may apply to certain parts of FSA analysis, while foreign law may
apply to the remaining issues. In fact, the court did opine that this might
be a suitable result.
251
Characterizing FSA enforceability as a procedural issue,252 the court
decided that federal law, i.e., Bremen, is applicable in the fourth step of
the analysis.253 However, the court was less certain about the applicabil-
254ity of federal law to the interpretation of an FSA's meaning and scope.
In this regard, the court turned to Yavuz, and, mirroring the Tenth Circuit,
stated, "we cannot understand why the interpretation of a forum selection
clause should be singled out for application of any law other than that
chosen to govern the interpretation of the contract as a whole.,
255
Regrettably, the force of the court's reflection was lost. The court
found the parties' failure to object to the district court's use of federal
law, as well as their failure to use English law in their own FSA interpre-
tations, was indicative of their reliance on United States federal law,
244. Phillips, 494 F.3d at 383 (citing John Boutari & Son, Wines & Spirits, S.A. v. Attiki Imps.
& Distribs. Inc., 22 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1994)).
245. Id. (citing Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1358-61 (2d Cir. 1993)).
246. Id. (citing Roby, 996 F.2d at 1362-63).
247. Id. at 383-84 (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 384.
250. See id. at 383-84.
251. See id. at 384-86.
252. Id. at 384 (citing Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1990)).
253. Id
254. Id. at 385.
255. Id at 386 (citing Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 428 (10th Cir. 2006)).
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rather than English law.256 Accordingly, the court proceeded to review
the FSA pursuant to federal law.
257
V. ANALYSIS
The Yavuz opinion is a wakeup call. The opinion signals a major
departure from prior circuit FSA case law in the context of international
transactions and strongly advances the concept of party autonomy. Ya-
vuz poses a serious obstacle to circuit courts' tendency to overlook the
applicability of the law chosen by the parties to FSA analysis. This
should lead to more comprehensive and in-depth circuit opinions. How-
ever, the effect that Yavuz will have on other courts is unclear. Just be-
cause courts are in a position to consider the potential applicability of
COLs does not mean that they will conclude that COLs are ultimately
applicable. Whether or not other circuits follow the Tenth Circuit will
probably turn on their acceptance or rejection of the court's rationale in
Yavuz. While the principles espoused by the Tenth Circuit are easily
articulable, the underlying methodology is not.
A. What Will Courts Say?
In many respects, Yavuz is reminiscent of Bremen.258 While the Ya-
vuz court gave a brief nod to basic conflict of laws principles, 259 its
analysis was largely devoted to review of the international trade implica-
tions260 inherent in FSA analysis.26' To be sure, the policy considerations
are appealing. However, they provide little analytical guidance for future
courts to follow. Whether the Tenth Circuit's methodology will inspire
other circuits is unclear.
On the one hand, despite methodological deficiencies,262 federal
courts, with modest variation, generally adhere to Bremen.263 The bright
line rule from Bremen offers courts a judicially crafted substitute for a
more complex conflict of laws analysis. As Yavuz offers a similar substi-
tute, courts may find its facial simplicity appealing. However, as opin-
256. Id. Similarly, in K & V Scientific, the parties failed to incorporate their chosen law into
their FSA arguments. K & V Scientific Co. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, 314
F.3d 494, 497 n.4 (10th Ci. 2002); see also supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
257. Phillips, 494 F.3d at 386-87.
258. See Mullenix, supra note 54, at 312 ("The linchpin of The Bremen's approval of forum-
selection clauses, however, lay in policy considerations rather than doctrinal support.").
259. Yavuz, 465 F.3d at 427-28 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 187
cmt. e (1971)).
260. Id. at 428-30.
261. The Tenth Circuit's focus on international trade implications is reminiscent of the Su-
preme Court's analysis in The Bremen. See Mullenix, supra note 54, at 312 ("The linchpin of The
Bremen's approval of forum-selection clauses, however, lay in policy considerations rather than
doctrinal support.").
262. See Mullenix, supra note 54, at 306-15.
263. See Gruson, supra note 47, at 149 ("Federal courts have universally agreed that the teach-
ing of Bremen is not limited to admiralty cases nor to cases involving the selection of a foreign
forum but applies to all forum-selection clauses .... ").
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ions of the Tenth Circuit do not carry the force of Supreme Court pro-
nouncements, other courts may scrutinize the holding in Yavuz to a
greater degree than they have Bremen.
1. The Scope of Yavuz
Scrutiny of the Yavuz holding uncovers numerous problems. The
scope of Yavuz is exceedingly vague. The Tenth Circuit was clear in its
position that, where a contract contains a COL, rote application of lex
fori to consider FSAs is unacceptable.264 Moreover, the court took pains
to emphasize its holding that effect should be given an FSA, "as con-
strued under the law specified in the agreement's choice-of-law provi-
sion."265  Clearly, this mandate covers the "meaning" of an FSA.26 6
While the court did little to define "meaning," it is likely that "meaning"
corresponds to Yackee's concept of "content of consent." 267 However, it
is unclear if the mandate extends to other issues concerning enforceabil-
ity, formal validity, and aspects of non-formal validity.268
The court's failure to address enforceability is especially disconcert-
ing. There is vague evidence that the court made an effort to incorporate
enforceability into its holding. Particularly, two statements in Yavuz may
implicate enforceability. First, the court stated, "respect for the parties'
autonomy and the demands of predictability in international transactions
require courts to give effect to the meaning of the forum-selection clause
under the chosen law, at least absent special circumstances.' 269 Next,
building on Bremen, the Tenth Circuit stated, "under federal law the
courts should ordinarily honor an international commercial agreement's
forum-selection provision as construed under the law specified in the
agreement's choice-of-law provision."270 However, the court's language
here is ambiguous. It is unclear whether the terms "give effect" and
"honor" are synonymous with "enforce." On the one hand, the terms
could mean that courts should interpret FSAs pursuant to the law chosen
by the parties and enforce the FSA pursuant to that same law. Another
264. Yavuz, 465 F.3d at 430-31 (referring to Yackee, supra note 3, at 83).
265. Id. at 430 (emphasis in original).
266. Id. In passing, the court also indicated that the questions concerning which claims and
parties were subject to the FSA were to be addressed by the parties chosen law. See id. at 43 1.
267. See Yackee, supra note 3, at 60-62.
268. See id. at 47-62. This issue presents a catch-22 for courts. Inevitably, where one party
files suit in a forum not contemplated in the FSA, lexfori will be applicable to a degree. Even in an
extreme scenario, where a forum automatically enforces FSAs without analysis, the automatic en-
forcement would, obviously, be a rule of the forum (i.e, lexfori). Accordingly, the question is not
one of replacing lexfori with the law chosen by the parties, but limiting the scope of lexfori to base
preliminary matters. Choosing the FSA issues to which a COL will apply requires that the seized
court introduce a lexfori framework upon which the law chosen by the parties will apply. A pro
party autonomy approach that would limit the application of lexfori in this regard might dictate that
the law chosen by the parties shall govern all FSA issues. Here, however, the court only explicitly
addressed meaning, thus raising the question of COL applicability to other FSA issues.
269. Yavuz, 465 F.3d at 430 (emphasis added).
270. Id. (first emphasis added).
2008]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
possibility is that the scope of the court's holding concerned only mean-
ing, not enforceability. The Tenth Circuit distinguished Yavuz from Su-
preme Court cases where the only issue was FSA enforceability, not
meaning.27' However, it is unclear if the court in Yavuz was concerned
with the inverse, meaning only, not enforceability. Another plausible
interpretation is that courts should interpret FSAs pursuant to the law
chosen by the parties and enforce them pursuant to some other legal
principle, e.g., federal law. The court's guidance that courts should "or-
dinarily honor" 272 FSAs in international agreements may implicate this
latter interpretation. That the courts should "ordinarily honor an interna-
tional commercial agreement's forum-selection provision,, 273 implies
that in some circumstances they should not. Here, lexfori again enters
the picture.
It is unclear exactly when circumstances that are not "ordinary" will
arise. The court alluded to "special circumstances '274 that may occasion
a departure from honoring an FSA "as construed under the law specified
in the agreement's choice-of-law provision."275 The court noted that a
special circumstance might arise when a jurisdiction with no ties to a
case declines to entertain it.276 However, this fails to inform courts and
parties of what other special circumstances may be. Courts may find that
the Bremen exceptions are "special circumstances," thus essentially re-
storing the old federal law standard to the determination of enforceabil-
ity. If the Tenth Circuit envisioned "special circumstances" that do not
correspond to the Bremen, then Yavuz has created a new federal standard
that is perhaps contrary to the Supreme Court rule. Unless distinguish-
able, such a move may overstep the Tenth Circuit's authority.
271. Id.
272. Id. (emphasis added).
273. Id. (emphasis added).
274. Id.
275. Id. (emphasis in original).
276. Id.
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a. Procedural or Substantive?
277
As has already happened,278 courts may decide not to alter the fed-
eral law concerning enforceability at all. In Phillips, the Second Circuit
chose not to depart from the Bremen standard in its consideration of FSA
enforceability because, according to the court, enforcement is a proce-
dural issue. 279  The classification of FSA enforcement as procedural or
substantive280 adds a level of doctrinal support that that would have en-
hanced the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Yavuz. Regrettably, as the Yavuz
court did not explicitly discuss enforcement, neither did it reach the issue
of substance and procedure.281
Additionally, it is unclear if the mandatory/permissive issue quali-
fies as substantive or procedural law. Although the court in Yavuz
clearly indicated that its ruling applied to interpreting the meaning of
FSAs,282 its support for the application was largely conclusory. The
Phillips court did not rule as a matter of law that federal law does not
apply to the mandatory/permissive question. However, the Phillips court
did question the logic of interpreting an FSA pursuant to a law different
from the one employed to interpret the rest of the contract.283 In light of
277. The designation of an issue as procedural or substantive will often clarify the applicable
law. Generally, lexfori governs procedural issues, even where another law applies to substantive
issues. See Combs v. Int'l Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 568, 579 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Slater v. Mexican
Nat'l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904)); JOSEPH STORY, STORY ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 756-59
(Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1865). See generally Erwin Spiro, Forum Regit Processum (Proce-
dure Is Governed by the Lex Fori), 18 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 949, 949-50 (1969) (giving an expansive
review of theforum regitprocessum doctrine beginning with Balduinus). There is significant debate
as to whether FSA issues are procedural or substantive. See Phillips v. Audio Active, Ltd., 494 F.3d
378, 384 (2d Cir 2007) (characterizing FSA enforcement as procedural and thus subject to federal
law); Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 877 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that because the forum
selection enforcement question is essentially procedural, "[i]n federal court, the effect to be given a
contractual forum selection clause in diversity cases is determined by federal not state law."); Jones
v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Questions of venue and the enforcement of forum
selection clauses are essentially procedural, rather than substantive, in nature."); Korean Press
Agency, Inc. v. Yonhap News Agency, 421 F. Supp. 2d 775, 778 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (following
Jones). But see Sun Forest Corp. v. Shvili, 152 F. Supp. 2d 367, 381 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (ques-
tioning but ultimately following the Second Circuit's application of The Bremen to diversity ac-
tions). The distinction between matters of substance and procedure is often unclear. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 cmt. b (1971); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 59-62 (5th ed. 2006). Accordingly, some authorities
caution against the rote designation of an issue as procedural or substantive. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 cmt. b (1971). A more searching analysis may be required
as to the nature of the issue in question and the law that should govern. Id. § 122 cmt. a;
WEINTRAUB, supra, at 59-62.
278. See Phillips, 494 F.3d at 384.
279. Id. (citing Jones, 901 F.2d at 19).
280. Perhaps more appropriately, the concern should be whether the "rules prescrib[e] how
litigation shall be conducted." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971).
281. The Tenth Circuit has not addressed the issue at the domestic level either. See ADT Sec.
Servs. v. Apex Alarm, LLC, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1201-02 (D. Colo. 2006) ("The authorities are
divided on the question whether enforcement of a forum selection clause is a procedural-governed
by federal law-or substantive-governed by state law... [t]he Tenth Circuit has not ruled expressly
on this issue.").
282. Yavuz, 465 F.3d at 430.
283. Phillips, 494 F.3d at 386.
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the Second Circuit's determination that enforceability is distinguishable
from interpretation because enforceability is a procedural issue, it is in-
ferable that interpretation is not a procedural issue, but a substantive is-
sue. 28 4 However, a number of district courts have reached the opposite
conclusion, classifying the mandatory/permissive issue as procedural
and, thus, subject to federal law.285 One district court has indicated that
this is the majority rule in federal courts.286 Had the Tenth Circuit taken
a stance on the issue, it would have added a level of doctrinal support
that the Yavuz opinion needs. Unfortunately, the court failed to address
the issue, thus opening the door for courts to disregard its holding on the
grounds that interpreting the meaning of an FSA is a procedural matter
and, thus, subject to federal law.287
b. What Does Law Mean?
The fact that a forum may have different sets of law applicable to an
FSA analysis raises perhaps the most complex issue unaddressed by the
Tenth Circuit in Yavuz. Which of the chosen forum's laws should apply
and which, if any, should be excluded? Should courts look only to the
domestic law of the chosen forum or should they also consider the pri-
vate international law288 of the chosen forum?
284. See, e.g., Jones, 901 F.2d at 19.
285. In Wells Fargo Century, Inc. v. Brown, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York stated that deciding the mandatory/permissive question is the initial step of enforcement
and, as enforcement is a procedural issue, the mandatory/permissive question is governed by federal
law. 475 F. Supp. 2d 369, 370-71 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Jones, 901 F.2d at 19). In another
opinion from the Southem District of New York, the court cited a Second Circuit case classifying
forum selection questions as procedural in support of its conclusion that "[t]he validity and scope of
the [] forum selection clause is governed by federal law." Kingsway Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Pricewater-
house-Coopers, LLP, 420 F. Supp. 2d 228, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Jones, 901 F.2d at 19). In
Bentley v. Mutual Benefits Corp., the Southern District of Mississippi stated, "it appears that courts
making the initial permissive/mandatory determination also use federal law, possibly because of the
procedural nature of venue and the federal interest in venue matters." 237 F. Supp. 2d 699, 703 n.7
(S.D. Miss. 2002) (citing Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, 858 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir.
1988)). However, the court in Bentley ultimately declined to give a definitive answer to the issue as
there were no material discrepancies between the laws at issue. Id. On two occasions, the Northern
District of Illinois has indicated that the classification of the mandatory/permissive issue as proce-
dural rather than substantive and, thus, subject to federal law is the majority rule in federal courts.
Dearborn Indus. Mfg. Co. v. Soudronic Finanz AG, No. 95 C 4414, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11722,
at *10 (N.D. 111. Aug. 13, 1996); Frediani & Delgreco, S.P.A. v. Gina Imports, Ltd., 870 F. Supp.
217, 219-20 (N.D. I11. 1994).
286. See Dearborn, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11722, at *10 n.3 (stating that by employing the
rationale that the mandatory/permissive question was a procedural issue and subject to federal law, it
was "follow[ing] the opinion of a majority of the courts on this issue."); Frediani & Delgreco, 870
F. Supp. at 219-20 ("[Tlhe majority of courts have held that federal common law governs as to the
enforceability and interpretation of forum selection clauses, reasoning that venue is a procedural
issue, not a substantive issue.").
287. Alternatively, courts may take the approach that FSAs are separable from the underlying
agreement. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 3, at 501. Under this view, a COL that applies to
the underlying agreement does not necessarily apply to the FSA, unless specifically indicated. See
id Here, the substantive/procedural question is irrelevant unless the agreement specifies that the
COL applies to the FSA.
288. Private international law is synonymous with "[i]nternational conflict of laws." BLACK'S,
supra note 1, at 835.
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The latter question puts courts in the unenviable position of consid-
ering the "Sphinx-like ' 289 question of renvoi.290 A basic renvoi scenario
may implicate the law of only two States, the State of the seized court
and the State of the chosen forum.291 Applying the rule from Yavuz, the
seized court would apply the law of the chosen forum. However, for any
number of reasons, the conflict of laws rules of the chosen forum may
dictate the exclusive applicability of the seized forum's law. But the
rules of the seized court dictate the exclusive applicability of the law of
the chosen forum. As the conflict of laws rules of each forum assign
applicability to the other, the exchange will continue ad infinitum.292
A more complex situation exists where multiple States are involved.
The following hypothetical illustrates this scenario. Party A, the buyer,
and Party B, the seller, contract in State 1 for the sale of widgets manu-
factured in State 2 to be delivered in State 3. In order to pass from State
2 to State 3, the widgets must pass through State 4. The parties' contract
designates the court of State 2 as the exclusive forum and the law of
State 2 as the law governing the contract. In transit, the widgets are
damaged and held in storage in State 4. Party A then sues in State 3.
State 3, following Yavuz, employs the law, including the conflict of laws
rules, chosen by the parties, i.e., the law of State 2. However, the con-
flict laws rules of State 2 designate as applicable the lex loci contrac-
tus,293 i.e., the law of State 1. In turn, the conflict of laws rules of State 1
designate as applicable the lex rei sitae,294 i.e., the law of State 4. Con-
tinuing the trend, the conflict of laws rules of State 4 designate as appli-
cable lexfori, i.e., the law of State 3. Upon returning to the seized fo-
rum, the cycle through the laws of the concerned States will continue
perpetually, never settling on a final applicable law.
The latter subverts the essential principles from Yavuz, i.e., "cer-
,,295 .tewrtainty, predictability, and convenience, in the worst possible way.
Parties will have to litigate, not under one unforeseen legal system, but
under many. Moreover, the perpetual cycle through conflict of laws
stands to deny the plaintiff his or her day in court.
289. Martin Davies, Note, Neilson v. Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd: Renvoi
andPresumptions About Foreign Law, 30 MELB. U. L. REv. 244, 245 (2006).
290. Renvoi is "[t]he problem arising when one state's rule on conflict of laws refers a case to
the law of another state, and that second state's conflict-of-law rule refers the case either back to the
law of the first state or to a third state." BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 1324; see also Larry Kramer,
Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 979,979-80 (1991).
291. See Kramer, supra note 290, at 980.
292. See Davies, supra note 289, at 245.
293. Lex loci contractus is "[t]he law of the place where a contract is executed or to be per-
formed." BLACK'S, supra note I, at 930. This scenario employs the former.
294. Lex rei sitae is "[t]he law of the place where the property is situated." BLACK'S, supra
note 1, at 931.
295. See Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 428 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. e (1971)).
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Not surprisingly, various conflict of laws schemes set limits on the
applicability of conflict of laws rules of a State other than those of the
seized court.296 For example, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS ("Restatement") 297 addresses circumstances where a forum's
conflict of laws rules requires the application of "the law" of another
state.298 Here, subject to two exceptions,299 the Restatement counsels
courts to apply the "local law" of the other state.300 "Local law" as used
in the Restatement refers to the law of a state exclusive of that state's
choice of law rules.30 1 The traditional practice of the Hague Conven-
tions302 goes one-step further, excluding "any form of renvoi.,,303 Aca-
demics have reached varying conclusions, arguing for and against ren-
voi304
Whether courts should apply the private international law of the fo-
rum chosen by the parties is a complex question that requires intensive
consideration. Predictability and consistency, however, require clear
guidance.
B. Party Considerations
1. Autonomy, Consistency, and Predictability
The general principle articulated in Yavuz will have varying effects
on parties litigating in the Tenth Circuit. Lack of clarity in the Yavuz
holding leaves numerous questions pertaining to its scope unanswered.
Taken to one extreme, Yavuz affords parties some measure of auton-
296. One example is the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Re-
spect of Securities Held with an Intermediary art. 11(2), July 5, 2006, http://www.hcch.net/index_
en.php?act-conventions.text& cid=72. The Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations similarly excludes renvoi. See Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obli-
gations art. 15, opened for signature June 19, 1980, http://www.rome-convention.org/instruments/
i-conv orig_en.htm. Whether the Rome Convention's exclusion of Renvoi is sound has sparked
some debate. See, e.g., Adrian Briggs, In Praise and Defense of Renvoi, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
877, 880-81 (1998) (questioning the logic of the Rome Convention's exclusion of renvoi).
297. "The rules in the Restatement [of Conflict of Laws] are [] usually applicable to cases with
elements in one or more foreign nations [because] similar values and considerations are involved in
both interstate and international cases." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 10 cmt.
c (1971). For exceptions to the Restatement's general applicability in the international context see
id. cmt. d.
298. Id. § 8.
299. Id. §§ 8(2), (3).
300. Id. § 8(1).
301. Id. § 8 cmt. a.
302. "Hague Convention" is "the short name for any one of the many international conventions
that address different legal issues and attempt to standardize procedures between nations."
BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 730.
303. See Permanent Bureau, Hague Conference on Private International Law, The Law Appli-
cable to Dispositions of Securities Held Through Indirect Holding Systems at 41 (Nov. 2000, Prelim.
Doc. No. 1), http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/sec._pdO Ie.pdf.
304. See Briggs, supra note 296, at 881 (arguing in favor of renvoi), Kramer, supra note 290,
at 984-1012 (reviewing competition positions on renvoi.); id. at 1044 (summarizing an analytical
approach to the renvoi problem); Zhang, supra note 30, at 521-22 (discussing varying views on
renvoi).
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omy 30 5 and consistency. 0 6 Interpreting and enforcing FSAs pursuant to
the law chosen by the parties affords litigating parties, especially foreign
ones, some measure30 7 of predictability. 30 8 However, a necessary impli-
cation of the holding in Yavuz is that, even if it extends to enforceability,
exceptions exist in certain circumstances. 30 9  To determine whether a
special circumstance has arisen in a particular case, parties will have to
litigate under federal law, thus frustrating predictability. 310  Moreover,
uncertainty as to the applicability of the chosen forum's private interna-
tional law exacerbates the lack of predictability.
2. Enforcement
Whether the application of the parties chosen law to FSA determi-
nations will further efforts to enforce FSAs depends upon the particular
issue under consideration. In terms of the exclusive/permissive question,
the application of European law over United States law will most likely
lead to a higher rate of enforcement. As evidenced in the cases discussed
in this article,3" United States courts are inclined to find FSAs permis-
sive absent specific language to the contrary.312 The situation in Europe
is generally the opposite.31 3 There, exclusivity is presumed unless the
parties provide an alternate indication.314
Ironically, however, and depending upon the scope future courts at-
tach to the holding in Yavuz, application of foreign law may frustrate
parties' attempts to enforce an FSA. In several respects, United States
FSA law is more lenient than European FSA law.315 For example, some
European schemes incorporate strict writing requirements.316 Alterna-
tively, courts in the United States tend to be more lenient in this re-
305. See Yackee, supra note 3, at 85.
306. Id. ("This principle-that the explicitly selected law should govern the FSA ... maintains
the unity of the contract by assuring that the same law is applied to different contract provisions.").
307. The failure of parties to brief the applicability of the law chosen in their contracts in the
past raises questions as to whether there is an expectation to begin with. See, e.g., Phillips v. Audio
Active, Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 386.
308. See Yackee, supra note 3, at 45, 96.
309. See Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418, 430 (10th Cir. 2006).
310. See id.
311. See supra Part I.B.
312. See Yackee, supra note 3, at 60-62.
313. See id. at 61; see also Loi Federale Suisse sur le Droit International Prive du 18 Decembre
1987 [Federal Statute on Private International Law of December 18, 1987], FF 1988 1 5, art.5
(Switz.) (see the English translation, Jean-Claude Cornu, et al., Swiss Federal Statute on Private
International Law of December 18, 1987 (LSU translation), 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 193, 196 (1989)).
The Convention on Choice of Court Agreements appears to have adopted the European model. See
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 9, art. 3(b) ("(A] choice of court agreement,
which designates the courts of one Contracting State or one or more specific courts of one Contract-
ing State shall be deemed to be exclusive unless the parties have expressly provided otherwise.").
314. See Yackee, supra note 3, at 61 (quoting Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 23, 2001 O.J.
(L 12 1)).
315. See id. at49, 51-52, 54, 56-57.
316. Id. at 52; see also Federale, supra note 313, at 196.
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gard.3t7 Accordingly, a party seeking enforcement of an FSA with for-
mal validity deficiencies would be better served using United States FSA
law.
318
C. The Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
On June 30, 2005, the twentieth session of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law concluded the Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements ("Convention"). 31 9  The Convention has yet to enter into
force due to lack of requisite ratifications. 320  However, if ratified by the
United States, 321 the Convention will limit322 the applicability of the rule
espoused in Yavuz. The Convention settles questions regarding the law
applicable to FSAs by creating a single set of rules covering certain is-
sues 3 2 3 and specifically designating the law of a particular State to cover
other issues. 324  As these rules trump the domestic law of Contracting
States, the Convention would replace much of the ground covered by the
rule espoused in Yavuz. However, the Convention, if ratified by the
United States, will not obviate the necessity to clarify the Yavuz holding.
Due to its limited scope,325 the Convention will not be applicable in nu-
merous cases. Thus, even if the Convention enters into force, federal
courts' need of a clear standard for the application of COLs to FSAs will
persist.
317. See Yackee, supra note 3, at 51.
318. However, assuming that the parties drafted the FSA with the COL in mind, the FSA
should meet the demands of the chosen law. Whether parties draft with this level of foresight is
unclear. See Phillips v. Audio Active, Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 386 (2d Cir 2007) (discussing the parties'
lack of reliance on their chosen law in interpreting the FSA in their briefs).
319. Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 9.
320. See supra note 10.
321. Currently, the Choice of Court Convention needs only one ratification to enter into force.
See id.
322. The Choice of Court Convention will limit the applicability of the Yavuz holding in some
cases, but not all. The Choice of Court Convention excludes a broad array of issues ranging from
employment contracts to certain types of intellectual property rights. Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements, supra note 9, art. 2. Moreover, The Choice of Court Convention allows ratifying
states to make declarations that limit the Convention's applicability. See id. arts. 19-21. Limitations
to the scope of the Choice of Court Convention dictate that the Convention will not render the rule
from Yavuz entirely obsolete. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit should endeavor to clarify the scope and
holding of its rule.
323. For instance, the Choice of Court Convention settles the exclusive/permissive issue dis-
cussed in supra Parts I.B, IV.B by creating a uniform rule advising that FSAs "shall be deemed to be
exclusive unless the parties have expressly provided otherwise." Id. art. 3(b).
324. For instance, the Choice of Court Convention requires that seized courts "suspend or
dismiss proceedings to which an exclusive choice of court agreement applies unless--(a) the agree-
ment is null and void under the law of the State of the chosen court, (b) a party lacked the capacity to
conclude the agreement under the law of the State of the court seised; (c) giving effect to the agree-
ment would lead to a manifest injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the
State of the court seised .... " Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 9, art. 6(a)-
(c) (emphasis added).
325. See supra note 322.
YAVUZ V. 61 MM, LTD.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Yavuz has brought parties to interna-
tional commercial transactions one-step closer to true party autonomy in
dispute resolution. Applying the law chosen by the parties to FSA de-
terminations also grants parties predictability that is an absolute necessity
in the modem international commercial world. The rule established,
while signifying a giant leap forward, is in need of clarification and doc-
trinal support. In future cases, the Tenth Circuit should clarify the scope
of its rule and address the procedural/substantive question. Regardless of
whether other circuit courts accept the rule espoused in Yavuz, the opin-
ion will almost certainly require consideration of the applicability of
COLs to FSAs. That, in itself, is a step in the right direction.
J. Zachary Courson*
* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to
thank Professor Viva Moffat for her insight and suggestions, Professor Sandeep Gopalan for sharing
his expertise on international commercial law, and the editors and staff of the Denver University Law
Review for their hard work and improvements. Any mistakes or omissions are entirely mine. Fore-
most, I thank my parents for a lifetime of support, Amber Tzinski for her encouragement and pa-
tience, and, sincerely, my brother Peter for inspiring me.
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SUMMUM V. PLEASANT GROVE CITY. THE TENTH CIRCUIT
"BINDS THE HANDS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AS THEY
SHAPE THE PERMANENT CHARACTER OF THEIR PUBLIC
SPACES"'
INTRODUCTION
In Summum v. Pleasant Grove City,2 the Tenth Circuit held that a
content-based regulation on permanent monuments in a public park must
satisfy strict scrutiny in order to survive a Free Speech challenge.3 In so
ruling, the Tenth Circuit held that permanent monuments in public parks
are traditional public forums.4 However, while parks are traditional pub-
lic forums because they "have immemorially been ... used for purposes
of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions," 5 they are not traditional public forums "insofar as the
placement of monuments is concerned.",6 In finding that the appropriate
forum in Pleasant Grove City was a traditionally public one, the Tenth
Circuit incorrectly focused on the government property at issue without
considering how the "particular channel of communication" to which
access was sought affected the nature of that property.7 Had the Tenth
Circuit done this, it would have found that a display of monuments in a
public park is a limited public forum and therefore, a content-based regu-
lation need only satisfy a reasonableness test to survive a Free Speech
challenge. 8
The precedent set in Summum v. Pleasant Grove City takes away
the government's ability to control what monuments it allows in public
parks. By ruling public parks are traditional public forums irrespective
of the particular channel of communication sought, the Tenth Circuit
leaves the government with an all-or-nothing choice when it comes to
placing monuments in public parks. The government must either pro-
hibit all monuments or allow all monuments unconditionally. This
choice is really no choice at all when one recognizes that the government
would be foolish to open a public park to any monument knowing that it
has no ability to deny other monuments.
1. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d 1170, 1174 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
2. 483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007).
3. Id. at 1051-52.
4. Id. at 1050 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983)).
5. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
6. Summum, 499 F.3d at 1173 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
7. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985).
8. Id. at 806.
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Underlying Summum v. Pleasant Grove City is the Tenth Circuit's
inability to recognize a distinction between temporary and permanent
speech when defining a forum. While temporary speech (e.g., protests,
lectures, and demonstrations) occurs for a few hours, a few days, or
maybe even a few weeks, permanent speech (i.e., monuments) occurs
from the moment it starts for so long as the forum exists. Because of
this, government must have the ability to limit permanent speech in any
forum if for no other reason than for preserving property. As such, any
forum in which there is permanent speech will have to be a limited pub-
lic forum with regards to all other permanent speech. Unfortunately, the
Tenth Circuit failed to recognize this speech distinction and need for a
limiting factor in Summum v. Pleasant Grove City and decided that a
display of monuments in a public park was a traditional public forum
merely because a public park is treated as a traditional public forum with
regards to temporary speech. This failure risks parks becoming so clut-
tered with monuments that they become little more than glorified junk-
yards bursting at the seems.
Part I of this comment discusses traditional public forums, desig-
nated public forums, limited public forums, and nonpublic forums. Part
II discusses Summum v. Pleasant Grove City as well as the history and
cases before it. Part III discusses cases from the Ninth, Second, and Sev-
enth Circuits, all of which recognize that monuments should be consid-
ered separate from temporary speech when defining their forum. Part IV
analyzes the Tenth Circuit's decision in Summum v. Pleasant Grove City
and argues that a display of permanent monuments in a public park is a
limited public forum. Finally, this comment concludes by recommend-
ing guidelines to ensure that a content-based regulation in a limited pub-
lic forum satisfies the reasonableness test.
I. BACKGROUND9
Within the First Amendment, the Free Speech Clause states that
"Congress shall make no law .. .abridging the freedom of speech."' 0
Whether speech relates to open political discussion, the marketplace of
ideas, individual expression, tolerance, or other activities, the right is a
fundamental one protected by the Constitution.1" As such, the Free
9. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1123-44 (Aspen Publishers, 3rd ed. 2006); Seth D. Rogers, A Forum by Any Other Name... Would
Be Just as Confusing: The Tenth Circuit Dismisses Intent from the Public Forum. First Unitarian
Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2002), 4 WYO. L. REV. 753, 762-71
(2004); Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the
Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1715 (1987).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
11. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 925-30.
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Speech Clause prohibits government from censoring speech "because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content.'0
2
However, "speech often requires a place for it to occur."1 3  Most
people do not have access to television, radio, or newspapers to broad-
cast their message. Rather, they rely on access to government property
to assemble and communicate their message.' 4 But, the Supreme Court
holds that the "First Amendment does not guarantee access to property
simply because it is owned or controlled by the government."' 5 Instead,
certain government properties are allocated as forums for speech. The
Supreme Court holds that there are four types of government property:
traditional public forums, designated public forums, limited public fo-
rums, and nonpublic forums. 16 The Court further holds that the constitu-
tionality of a regulation of speech depends on the forum and the nature of
the government's action.
1 7
A. Traditional Public Forum
A traditional public forum is government property that is open to all
speech activities.' 8 In other words, traditional public forums exist, have
always existed, and will always exist for the directed purpose of Free
Speech activities. Streets and parks are examples of traditional public
forums. One of the earliest cases discussing Free Speech and a tradi-
tional public forum was Hague v. CIO. 19 In Hague, a labor organization
challenged a city law that prevented the organization from holding meet-
ings in public places.20  Ruling in favor of the labor organization, the
Court held that "such use of the streets and public places has, from an-
cient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties
of citizens."'al This concept has been reiterated time and again,22 most
notably in Perry Educational Association v. Perry Local Educators' As-
12. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972). There are obvious ex-
ceptions to the type of speech that is protected. For example, speech intended to incite or intimidate
is not protected under the Free Speech Clause. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49
(1969) (holding Free Speech does not permit advocacy directed to incite imminent lawless action
that is likely to incite such action); see also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 367-68 (2003) (holding
cross burning done with intent to intimidate was not protected under Free Speech Clause).
13. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 1123.
14. Id.
15. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civil Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129
(1981).
16. Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
17. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 1127.
18. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 667 (1998); Rogers, supra note
9, at 762.
19. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
20. Id. at 500-01.
21. Id. at 515; see also Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939) (holding as uncon-
stitutional an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of leaflets on public sidewalks).
22. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951); Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
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sociation,23 when the Court characterized streets and parks as "quintes-
sential public forums" because they are places "which have immemori-
ally been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts be-
tween citizens, and discussing public questions."
24
Because a traditional public forum exists for the purpose of acting
as a venue for demonstrations, rallies, and other speech activities, the
Court looks unfavorably at any government regulation prohibiting speech
in a traditional public forum.25  The Supreme Court holds that govern-
ment may enforce a content-based regulation in a traditional public fo-
rum only when its reasons for doing so meet strict scrutiny.26
A government regulation is content-based when it discriminates as
to either viewpoint or subject matter.27 Viewpoint discrimination occurs
when the government regulates speech based on "the ideology of the
message. 28 Subject matter discrimination occurs when the government
regulates speech based on the topic of the speech.29 Once the Court finds
that a regulation is content-based, the regulation must satisfy strict scru-
tiny to be upheld.30 In order to meet strict scrutiny, the government must
prove that the regulation is "necessary to serve a compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.",3' The Supreme Court
has never found a content-based regulation on Free Speech to satisfy
strict scrutiny.32 For example, in Schneider v. State of New Jersey,33 the
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a city ordinance that prohibited
the distribution of leaflets on public property.34 The Court held that the
city's interest in reducing litter and preserving the aesthetic value of its
23. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
24. Id. at 46-47 (holding that internal school mailing system was a limited public forum).
Although the Court in Perry did not deal with a traditional public forum, it is considered the Court's
leading authority discussing all three forums.
25. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 1126.
26. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
27. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 932-33.
28. Id. at 934; see Amy Sabrin, Thinking About Content: Can It Play an Appropriate Role in
Government Funding of the Arts?, 102 YALE L. J. 1209, 1220 (1993); see, e.g., Boos v. Berry, 485
U.S. 312, 317 (1988) (declaring unconstitutional a District of Columbia regulation prohibiting the
display of signs criticizing foreign countries within 500 feet of any embassy). Here, the Court held
that the regulation was viewpoint discrimination because it drew a distinction between what you
could and could not say about foreign governments.
29. Sabrin, supra note 28, at 1217; see, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980)
(declaring unconstitutional a Chicago regulation prohibiting all picketing in residential neighbor-
hoods unless the picketing involved a labor dispute). Here, the Court reasoned that the regulation
was subject matter discrimination because it allowed speech so long as the topic concerned labor and
employment, but not otherwise.
30. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
31. Id. at45.
32. The Court has some times found seemingly content-based regulations to be content-
neutral. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 724 (2000) (upholding regulation on protests outside
abortion clinics as content-neutral); see also Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)
(upholding zoning ordinance that prohibited adult movie theatres as content-neutral).
33. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
34. Id. at 163.
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streets was not sufficiently compelling to prohibit "a person rightfully on
a public street from handing literature to one willing to receive it."
35
B. Nonpublic Forum
A nonpublic forum is government property that is closed to all
speech activities. 36 For example, in Adderly v. Florida,37 the Supreme
Court held that the government could prohibit protesting outside of jails
and prisons.38 In upholding the convictions of protestors outside a jail
who refused to disperse, the Court declared that, "[t]he State, no less than
a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its
control for the use which it is lawfully dedicated., 39 Similarly, in Greer
v. Spock,40 the Court held that a military base was a nonpublic forum
even though areas inside the base, such as walkways and parks, were
open for public use because "it is the business of a military installation
... to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum.'
'4
C. Designated Public Forum and Limited Public Forum
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the government can take a
nonpublic forum and turn it into a public forum.42 When the government
affirmatively acts in a way in which it opens nonpublic property for
speech activities, it creates either a designated public forum or a limited
public forum.43
It is important to distinguish a traditional public forum from a des-
ignated public forum and a limited public forum. A traditional public
forum exists for all speech activities notwithstanding any government act
while a designated public forum and a limited public forum only exist
after the government has taken some kind of affirmative act allowing
speech activities. 44 In other words, whereas a traditional public forum is
always open for speech activities, if the government does not take an
affirmative action to create a designated public forum or a limited public
forum, that property remains a nonpublic forum closed to all speech ac-
tivities.
35. Id. at 162.
36. Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
37. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
38. Id. at 47-48; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 1139 (discussing nonpublic forum).
39. Adderly, 385 U.S. at 47.
40. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
41. Id. at 838.
42. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
43. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
44. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, at 1137-38.
2008]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
Because the property in a designated public forum and a limited
public forum is initially nonpublic, the government may control or limit
the kind of speech allowed on this property.45
When the government opens nonpublic property to all speech activi-
ties it creates a designated public forum.46 Because a designated public
forum is opened for all speech activities, it is treated the same as a tradi-
tional public forum, namely, a content-based regulation must satisfy
strict scrutiny to be upheld by the Court.47
However, when the government only opens nonpublic property to
certain speech activities, it creates a limited public forum.48 Unlike a
designated public forum where property is opened to all speech and
thereafter all speech must be allowed, property in a limited public forum
is opened only to certain speech and thereafter all similar speech must be
allowed. However, dissimilar speech may still be prohibited because it
was never affirmatively authorized in the first place.
The Supreme Court has held that a content-based regulation in a
limited public forum will be upheld so long as it satisfies a reasonable-
ness test.4 9 A reasonableness test is met when the regulation is reason-
able in light of a government interest and does not discriminate as to
viewpoint.50 In other words, in a limited public forum, the Court allows
subject matter discrimination but not viewpoint discrimination. 5' For
instance, the Court in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund, Inc.,52 stated that "[c]ontrol over access to a nonpublic fo-
rum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the
distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum and are viewpoint neutral. '' 53  Cornelius is important because it
recognizes that when the government opens property for speech activi-
ties, that property does not automatically get treated like a traditional
public forum where strict scrutiny applies. Rather, the government can
impose limits on the type of speech permitted. These limits will be
45. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995); Perry,
460 U.S. at 46 n.7.
49. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. While the Supreme Court initially applied strict scrutiny to a
content-based restriction in a limited public forum, Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981)
(holding unconstitutional a policy opening campus facilities to student organizations other than
religiously based ones), review of more recent Supreme Court cases shows that the Court now ap-
plies a reasonableness test to a Free Speech regulation in a limited public forum. See also Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985); Good News Club v. Mil-
ford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001) (holding that denying religious group access to after
school activities was viewpoint discrimination).
50. GoodNews Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07.
51. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809.
52. 473 U.S. 788.
53. Id. at 806.
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evaluated by the Court under a reasonableness test that allows content
discrimination.54
However, the Court emphasizes that while content discrimination is
permissible in a limited public forum, viewpoint discrimination is not. In
Good News Club v. Milford Central School,55 the Court held that a pro-
hibition on speech in a limited public forum was unconstitutional be-
cause it did not pass the reasonableness test.56  Here, a town statute
opened its school for use by clubs and organizations that promoted well-
being in children. 7 Good News Club, a private Christian organization,
sued Milford School alleging that its Free Speech rights had been vio-
lated after the club was denied access to the school.58 Finding in favor of
Good News Club, the Court stated that while government may be justi-
fied "in reserving [its forum] for certain groups or for the discussion of
certain topics, ' '59 "the restriction must not discriminate against speech on
the basis of viewpoint, and the restriction must be 'reasonable in light of
the purpose served by the forum."' 60  The Court then stated that the
school's purported reason for denying Good News Club access to the
school-that it did not promote well-being in children-was a fagade for
viewpoint discrimination and therefore failed the reasonableness test.
61
II. SUMMUM V. PLEASANT GROVE CITY
A. Historical Background and Precursor Cases
In the 1950's and 1960's, the Fraternal Order of Eagles ("Eagles")
donated several granite monuments of the Ten Commandments to towns
and cities across the United States.62 The monuments were erected on
government property.63  Thereafter, municipalities that received and
erected these monuments faced continued challenges from religious
groups, civil liberties organizations, and individuals alike who argued
that the monuments violated the United States Constitution's Establish-
ment Clause. 64 Opponents of the Ten Commandments monuments ar-
54. Id.
55. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
56. Id. at 107.
57. Id. at 108.
58. Id. at 103-04.
59. Id. at 106 (alteration in original) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)).
60. Id. at 106-07 (citation omitted) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
61. Id. at 108-09.
62. Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995,998 (10th Cir. 2002).
63. Keith T. Peters, Note, Small Town Establishment of Religion in ACLU of Nebraska Foun-
dation v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005); Eagles Soaring in the Eight Circuit, 84
NEB. L. REv. 997, 1000; see also Books v. City of Elkhart, Indiana 235 F.3d 292, 295-97 (7th Cir.
2000); Summon v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906,909 (10th Cir. 1997).
64. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682 (2005); McCreary County v. ACLU, 545
U.S. 844, 844 (2005).
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gued that the monuments purported to establish a religion or religious
form of government, while proponents of the monuments argued that
they served a valid secular purpose as a history lesson in the foundation
of laws of American government or "in recognizing and commending the
Eagles for their efforts to reduce juvenile delinquency.,
65
Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp.,6 6 the first Tenth Circuit case in-
volving a Ten Commandments monument on government property, was
an Establishment Clause challenge. In Anderson, a group of Utah citi-
zens challenged an Eagles' Ten Commandments monument that had
been erected on property outside a courthouse as government promotion
of religion. 67 Finding against the citizens, the Tenth Circuit held that the
monument did not violate the Establishment Clause because it was pri-
marily secular.68
After Anderson, Summum, a religious organization based in Utah,
tried to erect its own monuments on the same government properties that
had erected Ten Commandments monuments. 69 Summum reasoned that
because the government had opened properties to the display of religious
monuments, and that these monuments were permissible so long as they
were primarily secular, there was no reason that a Summum monument
should not be allowed onto these properties so long as they were also
primarily secular.7° When requests to erect its monuments were denied,
Summum challenged these denials as Free Speech violations. 7'
In Summum v. Callaghan,72 Summum argued that Salt Lake City
had violated its Free Speech rights after the city council denied a Sum-
mum request to erect one of its monuments next to the aforementioned
Eagles' monument.73 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that Salt Lake
65. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 682; see also Peters, supra note 63, at 999-1000 (discussing
Eagles' Ten Commandments monuments and the Establishment Clause).
66. 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1973).
67. Id. at 30.
68. Id. at 33-34 (holding that the Ten Commandments Monument did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause because the monument was primarily secular and religiously passive). Anderson
has received much criticism but has never been overturned. Because the Tenth Circuit holds that the
Eagles' Ten Commandments Monument is primarily secular, I will more often than not refer to it as
the Eagles' Monument rather than the Ten Commandments Monument or the Eagles' Ten Com-
mandments Monument. My intention in doing this is to have the reader view the Eagles' Monument
as a secular one, as Anderson instructs, rather than a religious one, a distinction that is beyond the
scope of this comment.
69. E.g., Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 997-98 (10th Cir. 2002); Summum v.
Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1997).
70. See City of Ogden, 297 F.3d at 999, 1011; Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 910.
71. See City of Ogden, 297 F.3d at 999; Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 910.
72. 130 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 1997).
73. Id. at 909-10. Summum is a religion and philosophy that began in 1975 as a result of
Claude "Corky" Nowell's encounter with beings he describes as "Summa Individuals." According
to Nowell, these beings presented him with concepts regarding the nature of creation, concepts that
have always existed and are continually reintroduced to humankind by advanced beings who work
along the pathways of creation. As a result of his experience, Nowell founded Summum in order to
share the "gift" he received with others. Summum.us, Welcome to Summum!,
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City had created a limited public forum for permanent monuments when
it permitted the Eagles' monument on its courthouse lawn.74 The court
further stated that a limited public forum is a type of nonpublic forum
and therefore "control over access.., can be based on subject matter and
speaker identity so long as the distinctions ... are reasonable ... and are
viewpoint neutral. 75
The Tenth Circuit, however, reversed and remanded the lower
court's decision dismissing Summum's complaint, holding that Salt Lake
City's denial of the Summum monument may not have been viewpoint
neutral. 76 The court held that Salt Lake City's lack of standards for de-
termining access to its forum "made it far too easy for officials to use
'post hoc rationalizations' and 'shifting or illegitimate criteria' to justify
their behavior, and thus make it difficult for courts to determine whether
an official has engaged in viewpoint discrimination. 77 The court further
found that the city's shifting positions for denying Summum's monu-
ment-that the courthouse lawn was being reserved for construction of a
jail; that the lawn was being preserved for aesthetic values; and that ac-
cess was only given to monuments with historical significance to the
city-indicated a pretext for viewpoint discrimination.78
In 2002, a similar challenge arose in Summum v. City of Ogden.
79
In City of Ogden, Summum requested that the city install a Summum
monument next to an Eagles' monument that had already been installed
amongst several historical markers on a lawn outside a city municipal
building.80 After the city of Ogden denied this request, Summum sued
for violation of its Free Speech rights.8!
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit stated that determining the relevant fo-
rum requires consideration of "(1) the government property to which
http://www.summum.us/about/welcome.shtml (last visited Feb. 4, 2008). The proposed monument
at issue here is a "Seven Aphorisms of Summum" Monument. Summum contends that Moses de-
scended from Mount Sinai with a tablet evoking the Seven Aphorisms in addition to the tablet evok-
ing the Ten Commandments. Summum.us, The Aphorisms of Summum and the Ten Command-
ments, http://www.summum.us/philosophy/tencommandments.shtml (last visited Feb. 2, 2008). The
Seven Aphorisms are: Psychokinesis; Correspondence; Vibration; Opposition; Rhythm; Cause and
Effect; and Gender. Summum.us, Seven Summum Principles,
http://www.summum.us/philosophy/principles.shtm (last visited Feb. 2, 2008). Summum's pro-
posed monument would display these aphorisms. Summum.us, Help Us to Support Freedom of
Speech and Prevent Discrimination, http://www.sunimum.us/about/freespeech.shtml (last visited
Feb. 2, 2008).
74. Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 919.
75. Id. at 916 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
806 (1985)).
76. Id. at 921-22.
77. Id. at 920 (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 758
(1988)).
78. Id.
79. 297 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2002).
80. Id. at 997-98. The Eagles' monument was surrounded by a police officer memorial, a
sister city tree and plaque, and various other historical markers. Id. at 998.
81. Id. at 999.
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access is sought and (2) the type of access sought.,82 In City of Ogden,
the access sought was "not merely to converse or post temporary signs
on the lawn, but the right to place permanent monuments on the lawn
... .,83 Thus, the Tenth Circuit found, as in Callaghan, that the city of
Ogden had created a limited public forum for permanent monuments
when it permitted the Eagles' monument and other historical markers on
municipal grounds.84
However, just as it had done in Callaghan, the Tenth Circuit re-
versed and remanded the case back to the lower court, holding that the
city of Ogden's denial of Summum's monument may not have been
viewpoint neutral.85  The Tenth Circuit stated that while the city of
Ogden's criterion for allowing access to its municipal grounds-allowing
only those monuments that had historical relevance to the city-may have
been acceptable, "Ogden failed to employ adequate safeguards to ensure
that the 'historical relevance' criterion did not devolve into a ... fagade
for viewpoint discrimination., 86 The court further stated that in order to
comply with the Free Speech Clause, a municipality should employ writ-
ten guidelines or, short of this, a well-established practice for determin-
ing which monuments to erect on municipal grounds. 87 The court con-
cluded that because the city of Ogden had no written guidelines and there
was scant evidence of an established practice of a "historical relevance
criterion," there was insufficient support to convince the Tenth Circuit
that there was not impropriety in Ogden's decision to reject Summum's
monument.S8
In both Callaghan and City of Ogden, the Tenth Circuit acknowl-
edged that it will apply a reasonableness test to a content-based regula-
tion on Free Speech in a limited public forum, but it also stressed that it
will pay close attention to anything that may be a fagade for viewpoint
discrimination.89 In Callaghan, the Tenth Circuit was suspicious of
viewpoint discrimination because the government had no established
criteria for determining what kinds of monuments were allowed in the
forum.90 In City of Ogden, the Tenth Circuit was suspicious of viewpoint
discrimination because the government's criteria for determining what
kinds of monuments were allowed in the forum-that they be historically
relevant to the city-appeared to have been created after the government
82. Id. at 1001-02 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 800-02 (1985)).
83. Id at 1002.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 999, 1012.
86. Id. at 1006.
87. Id at 1007.
88. Id. at 1008-09.
89. Id. at 1002-03, 1006; Sunmurn v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 914, 920 (10th Cir. 1997)
(citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 811 (1985)).
90. Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 920.
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had already denied Summum's monument rather than criteria already in
place prior to the denial of Summum's monument.
91
Callaghan and City of Ogden are important because they create a
balancing test when it comes to the placement of monuments on gov-
ernment property. This balancing test allows the government to put limi-
tations on the kinds of monuments allowed on nonpublic property so
long as the government implements specific guidelines or safeguards to
prevent viewpoint discrimination. These guidelines are to be followed
anytime a person or group requests that a monument be erected on gov-
ernment property.
But, both Callaghan and City of Ogden were cases that involved
nonpublic forums that had been turned into limited public forums by the
government. In Summum v. Pleasant Grove City,92 the Tenth Circuit
dealt with the placement of monuments in a traditional public forum.
B. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City: Facts and Procedural History
In September 2003, Summum sent the mayor of Pleasant Grove
City a letter requesting permission to erect a monument containing the
Seven Aphorisms93 of Summum in Pleasant Grove City's Pioneer Park.94
In its letter, Summum stated that its monument would be similar in size
and nature to the Eagles' monument already in Pioneer Park.95  The
Mayor of Pleasant Grove City denied Summum's request, stating that all
permanent displays in its park must "directly relate to the history of
Pleasant Grove" or be "donated by groups with long-standing ties to the
Pleasant Grove community. 96  Pleasant Grove City codified this re-
quirement after Summum's request.97
In 2005, Summum renewed its request to install its monument in
Pioneer Park.98 When the city failed to respond to its request, Summnum
sued Pleasant Grove City for violation of Summum's First Amendment
rights, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, installation of Sum-
mum's monument in Pioneer Park, and monetary damages. 99 In its com-
91. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d at 1006-08.
92. 483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007).
93. See supra note 73.
94. Pleasant Grove, 483 F.3d at 1047.
95. Id.
96. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Beside the Eagles' Monument, other structures in
Pioneer Park are: the Old School Bell; the Log Cabin; the Well; the Granary; the Nauvoo Temple
Stone; the Town Hall; the Winter Stable; the Gazebo; the Fire Shed; the 9/11 Monument; the Ginko
Tree; and the Old Mill Stone. Brief of Appellees at 5-7, Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d
1044 (No. 06-4057).
97. Pleasant Grove, 483 F.3d at 1047.
98. Id.
99. Id. Summum filed its suit in Utah District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Civil Action
for Deprivation of Rights. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (2008); Pleasant Grove, 483 F.3d at 1046-47. Sum-
mum also filed suit for violation of Utah's constitutional free expression and establishment provi-
sions. Id. at 1047. Summum subsequently dropped these allegations. Id. at 1248 n.3.
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plaint, Summum contended that its Free Speech rights were violated
when its monument was excluded from Pioneer Park while other monu-
ments were allowed access.'
00
At the preliminary injunction hearing, "the District Court indicated
that Summum would not prevail on the merits if Pleasant Grove proved it
had a well-established policy for evaluating proposed monuments that
was reasonable and viewpoint neutral."' 0 ' The Utah District Court then
denied Summum's preliminary injunction request, holding that because
"the facts regarding the city's policy ... were in dispute ... Summum
had not established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits."
' 0 2
C. Judge Tacha's Majority Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit, in a 2-1 vote, reversed the district
court's preliminary injunction denial.
10 3
The Tenth Circuit found that the display of monuments in Pioneer
Park was a traditional public forum.' 0 4 The Tenth Circuit stated, "[T[he
Supreme Court has characterized streets and parks as 'quintessential pub-
lic forums' because people have traditionally gathered in these places to
exchange ideas and engage in public debate."'15 The Tenth Circuit fur-
ther noted, "[T]he fact that Summum seeks access to... the display of a
monument ... is relevant in defining the forum, but it does not determine
the nature of the forum."' 1 6 The Tenth Circuit then distinguished Pio-
neer Park from the property in Callaghan and City of Ogden, stating that
the property in both Callaghan and City of Ogden "was not by tradition
or designation a forum for public communication," while the property in
Pleasant Grove City was. 10 7 After this, the Tenth Circuit concluded that,
because Pioneer Park was a public park and a public park is open to all
speech activities despite an affirmative government act, all speech activi-
ties within Pioneer Park had to be treated with regard to a traditional
public forum irrespective of the use for which access was sought.
0 8
The Tenth Circuit stated that the Utah District Court erred when it
found that the forum in Pleasant Grove City was a nonpublic one.'0 9
Because Pioneer Park is a public park, and public parks are always tradi-
100. Id. at 1047.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1057.
104. Id. at 1050.
105. Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(citation omitted)).
106. Id. at 1051 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985)).
107. Id. (quoting Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1002 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
108. See id. at 1050-52.
109. Id. at 1051.
[Vol. 85:3
SUMMUM V. PLEASANT GROVE CITY
tional public forums, the Utah District Court should have found that Pio-
neer Park was a traditional public forum.' 10
Moreover, because Pioneer Park was not a nonpublic forum that had
been turned into a limited public forum but rather a traditional public
forum, the Utah District Court should have applied strict scrutiny to
Pleasant Grove City's denial of Summum's monument instead of a rea-
sonableness test.'* As such, Pleasant Grove City's denial of Surnmum's
monument should only have been upheld if it was "necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and the exclusion [was] narrowly drawn to
achieve that interest," rather than being upheld so long as it satisfied a
reasonable government interest and did not discriminate as to view-
point.1 2 Had the Utah District Court used this strict scrutiny test instead
of a reasonableness test, it would have found that Pleasant Grove City's
purported reasons for denying Summum's monument-that it did not "di-
rectly relat[e] to the history of Pleasant Grove" or wasn't "donated by
groups with long-standing ties to the Pleasant Grove community"-did
not satisfy strict scrutiny.
13
Because the Utah District Court failed to find the display of monu-
ments in Pioneer Park to be a traditional public forum, it erred in failing
to apply strict scrutiny to Pleasant Grove City's denial of Summnum's
monument. 14 Had the Utah District Court applied strict scrutiny to
Pleasant Grove City's denial of Summum's monument instead of a rea-
sonableness test, it would have found that Summum's Free Speech rights
had been violated.115 This failure led the district court to deny Sum-
mum's preliminary injunction request when it should have granted it.
16
As such, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the Utah District
Court decision with instructions to grant injunctive relief." 7 Rehearing
en banc was subsequently denied." 
8
110. Id. at 1050.
111. Id. at 1051, 1054.
112. Id. at 1051 (quoting Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678
(1992)).
113. Id. at 1047, 1051-52.
114. Id. at 1051-52.
115. See id. at 1057.
116. Id. at 1049.
117. Id. at 1057.
118. Sunmum v. Pleasant Grove City, 499 F.3d 1170, 1170 (10th Cir. 2007), petition for cert.
filed, 76 U.S.L.W. 3289 (U.S. Nov. 20, 2007) (No. 07-665).
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D. Judge Lucero's Dissent' 19
In his dissent, Judge Lucero argued that a public park is not a tradi-
tional public forum for permanent speech just because it is a traditional
public forum for temporary speech.
120
Judge Lucero stated that the majority gave too much weight to the
"conception that city parks are 'quintessential public forums.""' 2 1 And,
while public parks are traditional public forums, they are only traditional
public forums in the sense that they derive from "a well established
common law right to assemble and speak one's mind in the com-
mons." 122 Thus, because "permanent displays do not fall within the set
of uses for which parks have traditionally been held open to the pub-
lic,' ' 123 "a park is not a traditional forum insofar as the placement of
monuments is concerned."'
124
Judge Lucero argued that in identifying the forum, the court must
look at the access sought as well as the property. 125 He stated that "[t]he
panel's claim that access 'is relevant in defining the forum, but ... does
not determine the nature of that forum,' confuses the forum analysis.'
126
"Only by defining the forum with reference to the access sought can a
court determine the nature of that forum.' 12 7 Judge Lucero then argued
that the majority in Pleasant Grove City mistakenly looked only at the
property when defining the forum when it instead should have first
looked at the access sought and then looked at the property when defin-
ing the forum.'2 8  Therefore, instead of finding that Summum sought
access to permanent speech within a public park, the Tenth Circuit ma-
jority found that Summum sought access only to a public park.
129
Judge Lucero argued that the display of monuments in Pioneer Park
is a limited public forum. 130 He noted that Pleasant Grove City had al-
lowed "a few monuments to be erected for specific purposes" where that
119. Judge McComell and Judge Gorsuch also dissented from denial en banc for reasons
concerning the Establishment Clause. Id. at 1174-75 (McConnell, J., dissenting). For purposes of
this discussion, their dissent will be omitted.
120. Id. at 1173 (Lucero, J. dissenting).





125. Id. at 1172 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800
(1985)) (Lucero, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (quoting Summum v. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d 1263, 1269 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007))
(Lucero, J., dissenting).
127. Id. (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801) (Lucero, J., dissenting).
128. See id. (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800); Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995,
1001 (10th Cir. 2002) (Lucero, J., dissenting).
129. Summum, 499 F.3d at 1172-73 (citing Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044,
1050 (10th Cir. 2007)); Duchesne, 482 F.3d at 1269 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
130. Summum, 499 F.3d at 1171 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
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right did not previously exist.' 3' He further noted that, with regard to the
display of monuments, Pleasant Grove City had not "allowed the kind of
general access or indiscriminate use of park property that is a hallmark of
a designated public forum.' ' 132 Instead, Pleasant Grove City had "created
a channel for a specific limited type of expression" that distinguished a
limited public forum.133 Having created a limited public forum for per-
manent monuments that relate to the history of Pleasant Grove City, the
government "may make reasonable content-based, but viewpoint-neutral,
decisions as to who may install monuments in [Pioneer Park].' 34
Judge Lucero's argument that the Tenth Circuit majority failed to
look at the access sought when defining the forum in Pleasant Grove
City is correct. His argument that the Tenth Circuit majority would have
found that the display of monuments in Pioneer Park was a limited public
forum had the majority looked at the access sought when defining the
forum is also correct. In fact, Judge Lucero's entire argument seems to
be correct with one minor exception.
Judge Lucero's argument is somewhat confusing because he
seemed to indicate that the appropriate property in Pleasant Grove City
is the display of monuments within Pioneer Park rather than Pioneer Park
altogether. Judge Lucero stated that the majority is incorrect when it
"asserts that the relevant forum is the entire park, regardless of the type
of access sought.' ' 35 This is correct. Then, to show that the relevant
forum is not Pioneer Park but rather the display of monuments within
Pioneer Park, Judge Lucero cited Perry as an example where "the Su-
preme Court first narrowed the forum to the mail delivery system within
a school, and only then . . . consider[ed] the nature of this forum."'
136
While Perry is correct, Judge Lucero's use of Perry may not be correct.
The problem with citing Perry here is that it makes Judge Lucero's
argument seem as if it involves map drawing rather than distinguishing
between temporary and permanent speech. By citing Perry, Judge
Lucero alludes that the display of monuments in Pioneer Park is its own
self-contained property within Pioneer Park. The problem with this is
that if the display of monuments in Pioneer Park is its own self-contained
property, then the government may only place monuments within this
131. Id. at 1174 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
132. Id. (quoting Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 915 n.13 (10th Cir. 1997) (Lucero, J.,
dissenting)).
133. Id. (quoting Child Evangelism Fellowship of Md., Inc. v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs.,
457 F.3d 376, 382 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006) (Lucero, J., dissenting)).
134. Id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)
(Lucero, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted)).
135. Id. at 1172.
136. Id.
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self-contained property and not in other places of the park. 3 7 This raises
a concern because the government should be permitted to scatter monu-
ments throughout the entire park rather than only in subsections of the
park. If, in fact, Judge Lucero is trying to argue that the display of
monuments in Pioneer Park is a subsection of Pioneer Park, his argument
is missing the main issue in Pleasant Grove City.
The main issue in Pleasant Grove City is the importance of distin-
guishing between temporary and permanent speech, not the importance
of sectioning off different parts of a traditional public forum in order to
make a limited public forum subsection. The Ninth, Second, and Sev-
enth Circuits appropriately recognize this importance.
III. OTHER CIRCUIT DECISIONS DISCUSSING STRUCTURES ON
GOVERNMENT PROPERTY
The Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuits all draw distinctions be-
tween temporary and permanent speech by discussing whether the gov-
ernment must affirmatively open a traditional public forum to struc-
tures.' 38 Moreover, by drawing distinctions between temporary and per-
manent speech, the Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuit conclude that
permanent speech is not a traditional public forum.
In Kreiser v. City of San Diego,'39 the Ninth Circuit stated that "[n]o
affirmative action is required to open a traditional public forum to a spe-
cific type of expressive activity.' 140  By stating this, the Ninth Circuit
rejected petitioner's argument that Balboa Park was not a traditional fo-
rum for "large unattended displays."'141 While this finding does not sup-
port the government's ability to limit monuments in public parks, the
Ninth Circuit did indicate in Kreiser that the City of San Diego may have
been able to close Balboa Park to "large unattended displays," but had
failed to provide sufficient evidence that it had done so.'
42
This finding supports the government's ability to limit monuments
in public parks because it draws a distinction between temporary and
permanent speech. According to the Ninth Circuit, while the government
could never close a public park to a demonstration, it may be able to
close a park to a monument. In other words, while the government could
137. Judge Lucero does argue that a court can make "conceptual distinctions" when defining a
forum. Id. This statement indicates that Judge Lucero may be trying to distinguish between tempo-
rary and permanent speech rather than advocating map drawing.
138. See generally Kreisner v. City of San Diego, 1 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 1993); Kaplan v. City of
Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1989); Lubavitch Chabad House, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 917
F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1990).
139. Kreisner, I F.3d at 775.
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not prohibit an anti-war rally in a public park, the government could pro-
hibit the erection of an anti-war monument in a public park provided that
the government was able to show that its reasons for doing so were le-
gitimate. The reason behind this distinction between a demonstration
and a monument is the impracticality of allowing all monuments in a
public park.
The Second Circuit holds that where permanent speech is con-
cerned, the forum can only be either a designated public forum or a lim-
ited public forum. 143 In Kaplan v. City of Burlington,144 the Second Cir-
cuit held that the government must affirmatively open its public parks to
permanent speech. 145 Here, the Second Circuit found that City Hall Park
was "indisputably a traditional public forum."1 46 However, it then found
that the City of Burlington "had not created a forum in City Hall Park
open to the unattended, solitary display of religious symbols.' 47 By
finding it necessary to affirmatively open property that is a traditional
public forum to monuments, the Second Circuit emphasized that there is
no implicitly held tradition of permanent speech being permitted in pub-
lic parks. In other words, because the government must act before per-
manent speech is allowed on any property, permanent speech cannot be a
traditional public forum. Rather, permanent speech must either be a des-
ignated public forum or a limited public forum.
The Seventh Circuit holds that the Free Speech Clause does not pro-
vide a constitutional right to erect a structure in a traditional public fo-
rum.' 48  In Lubavitch Chabad House, Inc. v. City of Chicago,
149
Lubavitch, a Jewish religious organization, sued the city of Chicago for
violating its Free Speech rights after the city refused to erect a menorah
in O'Hare International Airport during the holiday season. 50 Upholding
the district court's dismissal of the Lubavitch complaint, the Seventh
Circuit held that the Free Speech Clause does not guarantee the right to
erect a structure on public property.' 5' The Seventh Circuit continued:
We are not cognizant of... any private constitutional right to erect a
structure on public property. If there were, our traditional public fo-
rums, such as our public parks, would be cluttered with all manner of
structures. Public parks are certainly quintessential public forums
where Free Speech is protected, but the Constitution neither provides,
143. Kaplan, 891 F.2d at 1031.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1031 (holding that placement of a menorah in City Hall Park violated the Establish-
ment Clause).
146. Id. at 1029.
147. Id.
148. See generally Graff v. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309 (7th Cir. 1993); Lubavitch Chabad
House, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 917 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1990).
149. Lubavitch, 917 F.2d at 341.
150. Id at 342-43.
151. Id. at 347.
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nor has it ever been construed to mandate, that any person or group
be allowed to erect structures at will.
152
In other words, the Seventh Circuit held that there is no Free Speech
right to erect a monument on government property. 53 Because there is
no Free Speech right to erect a monument on government property, the
government's refusal to erect a monument cannot be a Free Speech rights
violation.
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Lubavitch coupled with the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Kreiser and the Second Circuit's holding in Kaplan
reveal that three other Circuits have not found permanent speech to be a
traditional public forum when that permanent speech is on property that
is otherwise considered a traditional public forum. Instead, the Seventh,
Second and Ninth Circuits hold that permanent speech can be a limited
public forum no matter what kind of property the permanent speech sits
on. As such, the government may refuse to place a monument on any
property so long as the reasons for doing so are reasonable and viewpoint
neutral.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit failed to distinguish between temporary and per-
manent speech in Pleasant Grove City. Because it failed to make this
distinction, it erroneously found that the display of monuments in Pio-
neer Park was a traditional public forum rather than a limited public fo-
rum. As such, the Tenth Circuit incorrectly applied strict scrutiny to
Summum's monument denial when it should have applied a reasonable-
ness test. This, in turn, created a debilitating precedent that takes away
the government's ability to control what monuments it allows in its pub-
lic parks.
A. The Type ofAccess Sought and Its Impact on Defining the Forum
The Supreme Court has held that a forum is not merely defined by
the government property at issue but also by "the particular channel of
communication" to which access is sought. 154 Moreover, the Tenth Cir-
cuit recognized in City of Ogden that determining the relevant forum
requires consideration of "(1) the government property to which access is
sought and (2) the type of access sought.' 55 In other words, one type of
speech activity may be a different forum from another type of speech
152. Id.
153. The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed this holding in Graffv. City of Chicago when it held that
the Free Speech Clause did not give someone the right to erect a newsstand on a public sidewalk.
Graff, 9 F.3d at 1314.
154. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985).
155. Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1001 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 800-02).
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activity on the same property. Cornelius and Perry illustrate this distinc-
tion.
In Cornelius, the Supreme Court found that the relevant forum was
nonpublic rather than public.' 56 The petitioners argued that the relevant
forum was public because they sought access to the federal workplace. 
5 7
However, the Court found that, although the relevant property was the
federal workplace and the federal workplace was indeed a public forum,
the petitioners had initiated their complaint because they wanted access
to the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) charity drive. 58 The Court
therefore limited its focus to the CFC charity drive rather than the federal
workplace as a whole and found that the drive had been affirmatively
created by the government and the "Government's consistent policy...
to limit participation" made it a nonpublic forum. 5 9
In Pleasant Grove City the Tenth Circuit should have found that the
relevant forum was nonpublic rather than public. Similar to Cornelius,
Summum initiated its complaint because it wanted access to the display
of monuments in Pioneer Park. 60 Had the Tenth Circuit limited its focus
to the display of monuments in Pioneer Park rather than Pioneer Park as
a whole, it would have found that the government had affirmatively cre-
ated the display and access therein was limited.
In Perry, the Supreme Court likewise found that the relevant forum
was nonpublic rather than public. 161 In Perry, the respondent, a labor
union, initiated its complaint because it wanted access to a school's mail-
ing system so that it could solicit teachers. 62 The Supreme Court found
that the system had been affirmatively created by the school and that
access was only available to school personnel and the Teachers' Un-
ion.
163
Moreover, the Court found that the school's past acts granting mail-
ing access to the Cub Scouts, YMCA, and parochial schools, only ex-
tended the constitutional right of access to other "entities of similar char-
acter." 164 Thus, while the mail facilities might be a forum open to the
Girl Scouts, local boys' club, and other similar organizations, "they
would not as a consequence be open to an organization ... concerned
with the terms and conditions of teacher employment.'
165
156. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806.
157. Id. at 800-01.
158. Id. at 793.
159. Id. at 804.
160. Summnum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1047 (10th Cir. 2007).
161. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-48 (1983).
162. Id. at41.
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In Pleasant Grove City, the government had only opened the dis-
play of monuments in Pioneer Park to those monuments that "directly
related to the history of Pleasant Grove" or to monuments that were "do-
nated by groups with long-standing ties to the Pleasant Grove commu-
nity.' 66  Thus, the display of monuments was open to other historical
monuments or groups with ties to Pleasant Grove. The display was not,
however, open to Summum's monument, which did not relate to the his-
tory of Pleasant Grove. Nor was it open to Summum, an organization
with few, if any, ties to the Pleasant Grove Community.
B. The Importance of Sumnimum v. Pleasant Grove City
Summum v. Pleasant Grove City is important because it forces the
government to either allow all monuments in its public parks or allow
none at all. This effectively denies the government from shaping the
permanent character of its parks.
As a threshold issue, Pleasant Grove City may have been engaging
in viewpoint discrimination when it denied Summum's monument. The
facts of Pleasant Grove City indicate that the government did not codify
its criteria 16 for determining whether monuments were permitted in the
display of monuments in Pioneer Park until after Summum had made its
request to erect a monument in Pioneer Park. This indicates that the
Tenth Circuit probably believed that Pleasant Grove City's reasons for
denying Summum's monument were just a fagade for viewpoint dis-
crimination. 168  And perhaps because the Tenth Circuit believed that
Pleasant Grove City had engaged in viewpoint discrimination and more
importantly believed that the Utah District Court had erred by not recog-
nizing this viewpoint discrimination, the Tenth Circuit wanted to create
an ironclad rule that would take the factfinding powers out of the hands
of lower courts when presiding over these kinds of issues. After all,
Summum v. Pleasant Grove City was the third consecutive case where
the Tenth Circuit was forced to reverse a lower court decision that had
failed to find viewpoint discrimination where there was sufficient evi-
dence to make such a finding.
169
Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit went too far with its rule to combat
viewpoint discrimination. In Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, the Tenth
Circuit held that whenever a public park is the property at issue, the fo-
166. 483 F.3d 1044, 1047 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Monuments need to have historical significance to the community or be donated by some-
one with longstanding ties to Pleasant Grove City. Id.
168. Moreover, a companion case, Summum v. Duchesne City, 482 F.3d 1263 (2007), appeared
to be obvious viewpoint discrimination even though the district court upheld the government's
action (finding possibility of viewpoint discrimination where a plot of land upon which Eagles'
monument sat in public park had been sold to a private party). Id. at 1273.
169. The previously two obviously being Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906 (10th Cir.
1997) and Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 997 (10th Cir. 2002).
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rum must be a traditional public forum, irrespective of the particular
channel of communication sought.170 As such, the government's denial
of a request for access to any speech activity in a public park is only ap-
propriate when it meets strict scrutiny.' 7' Because strict scrutiny is an
almost impossible level of scrutiny to satisfy, the government's denial of
a request for access to any speech activity in a public park will almost
never be appropriate.
While this rule is good for most speech, it is inappropriate for per-
manent speech, such as monuments, because permanent speech does not
have a long tradition of access in a public park and it unduly burdens
park property.
CONCLUSION
Following the Tenth Circuit's approach, all of our public parks will
be cluttered with monuments or void of all monuments. This all or noth-
ing approach does not give the government flexibility to distinguish its
public parks by choosing which monuments to place in them. Similarly,
this all or nothing approach effectively denies an individual or group
from having a monument erected in a public park because the govern-
ment will be hesitant to do so knowing that, by erecting one monument,
it will be opening the door to all monuments.
The real issue that concerned the Tenth Circuit in Summum v.
Pleasant Grove City, and should concern the Tenth Circuit, is viewpoint
discrimination. But, instead of Pleasant Grove City's all or nothing ap-
proach to permanent speech, the Tenth Circuit should apply a balancing
test. The balancing test would look at the government's denial of a re-
quest to access permanent speech in a public park to make sure there is
no viewpoint discrimination while at the same time allowing the gov-
ernment to establish criteria regarding which monuments will be allowed
in its public parks.
City of Ogden discusses this balancing test. There, the Tenth Cir-
cuit stated that in order to comply with the Free Speech Clause, a mu-
nicipality should employ written guidelines or a well-established practice
for determining which monuments to erect on government property.'
72
Moreover, in City of Ogden, the Tenth Circuit stated that these guidelines
had to be well established and in place before the government denied a
request to place a monument in a public park or the denial will be con-
sidered a facade for viewpoint discrimination. This balancing test is a
more specifically enumerated reasonableness test and should give the
170. Pleasant Grove, 483 F.3d at 1050.
171. Id.
172. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d at 1007.
2008]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
government the ability to control the monuments it allows in its public
parks while at the same time preventing viewpoint discrimination.
In sum, temporary speech must be distinguished from permanent
speech. While temporary speech in a public park should be treated as a
traditional public forum, permanent speech in a public park should be
treated as a limited public forum. While a content-based regulation on
temporary speech in a public park must satisfy a strict scrutiny test, a
content-based regulation on permanent speech in a public park need only
satisfy the reasonableness test in City of Ogden. A reasonableness test is
satisfied where the government's reasons for denying access to the forum
are reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Further, a denial will not be con-
sidered viewpoint neutral where the government has not employed writ-
ten guidelines or well-established practices for determining access to
government property prior to a request for access to the government
property.1
73
The Tenth Circuit should reconsider its holding in Summum v.
Pleasant Grove City to allow for a content-based regulation of permanent
speech in a public park so long as the regulation satisfies the City of
Ogden reasonableness test.
Keenan Lorenz*
173. Of course, just because these guidelines are created does not mean that a court must find
that the government's denial was viewpoint neutral.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to
thank Prof. Martin J. Katz and the Denver University Law Review board and staff for their help with
this Comment. I would also like to thank my fiancee Lindsey, parents Brian and Rosemary, and
sister Judy for their support. I would finally like to thank Kurt Vonnegut, whose writings taught me
the joy of decoding 26 letters, 10 numbers, and 8 punctuation marks.
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FOREST GUARDIANS V. FORSGREN AND NFMA PLANNING
REFORM: THE RETURN OF MAXIMUM FOREST SERVICE
DISCRETION
INTRODUCTION
In Forest Guardians v. Forsgren,1 the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held United States Forest Service "forest plans" do not constitute
ongoing agency action sufficient to confer standing under the Endan-
gered Species Act ("ESA"), 2 except at adoption, amendment, revision, or
when authorizing site-specific decisions.3 Forest Guardians is the latest
in a line of cases limiting federal court jurisdiction over claims challeng-
ing federal land management plans, including Ohio Forestry Association
v. Sierra Club4 and Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance ("Nor-
ton").5 Opposing this line of cases limiting standing in plan challenges is
a body of case law, generally coming out of the Ninth Circuit, broadly
interpreting ESA's "action" requirement. 6 This comment contrasts the
Forest Guardians decision and other pertinent case law with the wider
push by the Forest Service to maximize its discretion through rulemak-
ing. The Forest Service will soon adopt planning regulations limiting its
legal obligations to a greater degree than that contemplated by the Tenth
Circuit in Forest Guardians.
Part I briefly outlines the basic legal and factual issues surrounding
the Forest Guardians controversy. Part II examines in more detail the
statutory background to the case and the forest planning reform process,
discussing the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), ESA, and
the National Forest Management Act ("NFMA"). Part III reviews the
Forest Guardians opinion. Part IV assesses some proposed revisions to
Forest Service planning regulations, arguing that the proposed rules go
too far in weakening legal obligations and public oversight constraining
national forest management. This part also discusses some likely impli-
cations of the new planning regulations and suggests a proper balance
between Forest Service managerial discretion and public accountability.
This comment concludes by contrasting the likely impact of Forest
Guardians and the new planning regulations on national forest manage-
1. 478 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2007).
2. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (2008).
3. 478 F.3d at 1154-56, 1159-60.
4. 523 U.S. 726 (1998).
5. 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
6. See generally Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 340 F.3d
969 (9th Cir. 2003); Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994); Citizens for
Better Forestry v. USDA, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2007); see also Sierra Club v. U.S.
Dep't of Energy, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1189 (D. Colo. 2002).
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ment in coming years and briefly revisiting the controversy over protec-
tions for the lynx in New Mexico.
I. REINTRODUCTION OF THE CANADA LYNX AND THE FOREST
GUARDIANS CONTROVERSY
Forest Guardians involved the refusal of Forest Service managers
in New Mexico to initiate consultation over the 1999 reintroduction and
2000 ESA listing of the Canada lynx (lynx canadensis) as threatened just
across the state line in southern Colorado. In early 1999, the Colorado
Division of Wildlife ("DOW") began to reintroduce the lynx in Colo-
rado.7  Although historical evidence indicated a lynx presence in Colo-
rado,8 considerable controversy surrounded both state reintroduction
efforts9and the national movement to protect the lynx under the Endan-
gered Species Act ("ESA").' ° The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
("FWS") issued a final rule listing a Distinct Population Segment
("DPS") of Canada lynx as threatened in 14 states, including Colorado
but excluding New Mexico, in 2000.11 In time, some lynx released in
Colorado emigrated to neighboring states. Colorado DOW tracked re-
leased lynx into Nebraska, Utah, and New Mexico by 2001.12
In 2004, Forest Guardians, 13 an environmentalist group, filed suit
against the United States Forest Service for failing to review its forest
management plans in the Carson and Santa Fe National Forests 14 to en-
7. See TANYA SHENK, GENERAL LOCATIONS OF LYNX (LYNX CANADENSIS) REINTRODUCED
TO SOUTHWESTERN COLORADO FROM FEBRUARY 4, 1999 THROUGH FEBRUARY 1, 2005, 1 (2005),
http://wildlife.state.co.us/NR/rdonlyres/F92E6FCD-BCB5-4711-8EE6-
A9398EA77999/O/LynxLocationsFeb2005.pdf.
8. See, e.g., Colo. Env't Coal. v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1168-69 (10th Cir. 1999); Final
Rule Determining Threatened Status for the Canada Lynx, 65 Fed. Reg. 16052 (2000) (to be codified
at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) [hereinafter 2000 Listing]; Erika Trautman, Will Listing Hurt the Colorado
Lynx?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Jan. 21, 2002, available at http://www.hcn.org/servlets/
hcn.Article?articleid= 10963.
9. See, e.g., Mindy Sink, The Long-Elusive Lynx Is Returned to Colorado, N.Y.TIMEs, Feb.
4, 1999, at A20; see also Allen Best, Lynx Reintroduction Links Unexpected Allies, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, May 10, 1999, available at http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article id-4976.
10. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (2008); see Mark Matthews, Case of the Missing Lynx Sparks
Studies, Debate, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 16, 1998, at A3.
11. 2000 Listing, supra note 8.
12. See TANYA M. SHENK, POST-RELEASE MONITORING OF LYNX REINTRODUCED IN
COLORADO: ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE DECEMBER
2001 (2001), available at http://www.cde.state.co.us/artemis/nr6/nr6219920054intemet.pdf.
13. See Forest Guardians, http://www.fguardians.org (last visited Feb. 2, 2008).
14. See Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2007). The Carson National
Forest covers 1.5 million acres of land in northern New Mexico ranging from 6,000 to 13,161 feet in
elevation, including mountainous terrain similar to that designated as critical lynx habitat across its
northern border, the Colorado state line. Parts of the forest are located in a portion of the southern
San Juan Mountains geographically contiguous with the portion of the San Juans in which lynx were
originally released in Colorado. See Carson National Forest, http://www.fs.fed.us/r3/carson/
index.shtml [hereinafter Carson National Forest Homepage] (last visited Feb. 2, 2008). The Santa
Fe National Forest is located on 1.6 million acres generally located on the southern borders of the
Carson, and is comprised of similar terrain, including the southern end of the San Juan Mountains.
See Santa Fe National Forest, http://www.fs.fed.us/r3/sfe/about/about-forest.htmt [hereinafter Santa
Fe National Forest Homepage] (last visited Feb. 2, 2008).
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sure activities authorized under the plans did not harm lynx inhabiting
these northern New Mexico forests.' 5 In the suit, Forest Guardians ar-
gued the ESA listing required the Forest Service to review the impact of
its forest plans for the Carson and Santa Fe forests on the lynx and to
consult with Fish and Wildlife on how to mitigate any harm caused to the
lynx, or lynx habitat, in the forests.'
6
The U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico rejected
Forest Guardians' claims.' 7 Forest Guardians appealed to the Tenth Cir-
cuit, which affirmed the trial court ruling on different grounds.18 The
Tenth Circuit failed to reach the issue of the 2000 DPS listing's exclu-
sion of New Mexico, 19 holding instead that national forest management
plans developed pursuant to NFMA20 do not constitute "ongoing agency
action" under Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA.21 Section 7(a)(2) requires fed-
eral agencies contemplating action to consult with FWS (or the National
Marine Fisheries Service, "NMFS") concerning the potential impacts of
the action on threatened and endangered wildlife and critical habitat.
22
The Tenth Circuit's decision relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's 2004
holding in Norton that Bureau of Land Management land management
plans were not ongoing agency action under the National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA");23 the court used the Norton holding to limit the
instances in which plaintiffs could challenge agency inaction with regard
to forest plans and the ESA duty to consult.
24
The Tenth Circuit's consideration of the planning issue in Forest
Guardians occurred during a lengthy process of Forest Service rulemak-
ing likely to result in removal of significant substantive and procedural
standards for developing forest plans.25 The Forest Service's proposed
planning rules maximize agency flexibility in the planning process, es-
chewing the more prescriptive, accountability-oriented approach of the
recent past.26 Although the Forest Service claims its new managerial
approach will enable it to better manage the national forests in the future,
removal of protections embedded in the forest planning process threatens
to purchase managerial flexibility and decisional efficiency at the price
15. Adam Rankin, Groups'Suit Says Lynx Not Protected, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL, Feb. 11,
2004, at 5.
16. Id.
17. Forest Guardians, 478 F.3d at 1152.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-1687 (2008).
21. Forest Guardians, 478 F.3d at 1159.
22. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2) (2008).
23. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 73 (2004); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-
4370f (2008).
24. See Forest Guardians, 478 F.3d at 1152-56.
25. See generally UNITED STATES DEPT. OF AGRIC., USDA FOREST SERVICE STRATEGIC
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of binding legal obligation and effective public oversight of national for-
est management.2 7
II. SOURCES OF STATUTORY OBLIGATION: NEPA, ESA, AND NFMA
Forest Guardians involves two statutes-ESA28 and NFMA.2 9 Ac-
cordingly, this Part focuses on federal agencies' duty to consult under
ESA and the Forest Service's planning obligations under NFMA. Dis-
cussion of the impacts of NEPA on forest planning, to the extent this
comment discusses such impacts in any depth, is limited to Section IV;
however, a brief introduction to some general NEPA requirements is
appropriate at this point.
A. NEPA: The Duty to Assess Environmental Impacts
NEPA requires federal agencies to "take a hard look at the envi-
ronmental consequences of their actions., 30 To this end, NEPA requires
federal agencies to prepare "a detailed environmental impact statement
("EIS") for 'all major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment.' 31 Given the qualified language of the stat-
ute and the complexity of environmental factors involved in forest man-
agement and planning, the EIS requirement has generated an enormous
amount of litigation involving the Forest Service. 32 In addition to impos-
ing procedural requirements on federal agencies, NEPA also vests agen-
cies with some discretion as to the manner of complying with those re-
quirements. NEPA permits the agency to complete an environmental
assessment ("EA") "as a preliminary step in determining whether the
environmental impact of the proposed action is significant enough to
warrant an EIS. ' 33 If the EA leaves questions "as to whether the project
may cause a significant degradation of some human environmental fac-
tor," the agency must prepare an EIS. 34 If the agency finds no such im-
pact is likely to occur, it may issue a "finding of no significant impact"
("FONSI") and proceed with the project.
35
Regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality
("CEQ") have provided agencies a third, more controversial means of
27. See id.
28. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (2008).
29. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-1687 (2008).
30. Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(quoting High Sierra Hikers Ass'n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 639 (9th Cir. 2004)).
31. Id. at 1080 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(C) (2008)).
32. See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc. v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 18 (2d Cir. 1997) (Forest Service's
decision not to prepare EIS in conjunction with building of a logging road was arbitrary and capri-
cious where the agency ignored substantial evidence in the administrative record that significant
impacts were likely); Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 615-17 (7th Cir. 1995) (Forest Service
required to prepare EIS prior to adoption of forest plan).
33. Citizens, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 1080.
34. Id. at 1081.
35. Id.
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NEPA compliance, the categorical exclusion ("CE"). An agency may
"categorically exclude" from NEPA analysis categories "of actions
which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the
human environment., 36  Perhaps unsurprisingly, federal agencies have
attempted to use CEs to exclude major projects from NEPA analysis,
with mixed results.37 Given the complexity of NEPA's environmental
analysis requirements, 38 litigation arising from Forest Service compli-
ance efforts has been a perennial thorn in the side of the agency.
B. ESA: Agencies'Duty to Consult
Congress passed the Endangered Species Act in 197339 in order to
protect threatened and endangered species and their habitat.40 The ESA
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior (through the federal wildlife
agencies) to designate species as endangered or threatened and to desig-
nate "critical habitat" for such species.4 ' Upon designation and "listing,"
federal agencies contemplating action must develop and implement "re-
covery plans" as appropriate for aiding in species recovery. 42  Listing
also triggers applicability of a number of enumerated offenses involving
takings of the listed species,4 3 although parties may obtain "incidental
take permits" for listed species. 44 Likewise, federal agencies may apply
for exemption from ESA mandates under provisions added in 1978 and
1979.45 The ESA also contains a broad citizen-suit provision.46
Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires federal agencies to consult with
federal wildlife authorities to insure proposed actions are "not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or result in
the destruction or adverse modification of [the critical] habitat of such
species. '' 47 Upon determining a species may be present in the area of a
proposed action, the agency must prepare a biological assessment to
36. Id.
37. Compare West v. U.S. Dep't of Trans., 206 F.3d 920, 928-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
Federal Highway Administration's application of a CE for "changes in access control" to construc-
tion of a major highway interchange was arbitrary and capricious) with Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 853-54 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming Forest Service's application of
CE for "approval, modification, or continuation of minor short-term ... special uses of National
Forest land" to issuance of commercial helicopter permits).
38. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370f(2008).
39. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 159 (1978).
40. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531(b) (2008) ("The purposes of this [Act] are to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered and threatened species depend may be conserved,
to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species .....
41. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1533(a)-(b) (2008).
42. § 1533(f).
43. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1538, 1540 (2008).
44. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2008).
45. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(g) (2008); see also Jared des Rosiers, The Exemption Process under
the Endangered Species Act: How the "God Squad" Works and Why, 66 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 825
(discussing ESA exemption process).
46. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540(g) (2008).
47. § 1536(a)(2).
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identify "any endangered species or threatened species" likely to be af-
fected by the proposed action.48 If the agency's biological assessment
concludes that the proposed action is likely to produce adverse effects, it
must initiate formal consultation. 49 Formal consultation culminates with
issuance of a biological opinion by the responsible wildlife agency.50
The biological opinion expresses the wildlife agency's opinion as to
whether the proposed action is likely to have adverse impacts on threat-
ened or endangered species or critical habitat, and provides alternatives
to the proposed action that will allow the acting agency to avoid violating
Section 7(a)(2)'s substantive "no jeopardy" mandate.5' If the agency
goes forward with the action over a biological opinion finding adverse
impacts or jeopardy are likely to result, it will be in violation of the Sec-
tion 7(a)(2) mandate.
Given that an agency must contemplate some "action" in order to
trigger Section 7(a)(2)'s consultation and "no-jeopardy" requirements,
the question of precisely what constitutes "action" under the ESA has
generated significant litigation.53 ESA regulations define action as "all
activities or programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in
whole or in part, by Federal agencies in the United States or upon the
high seas" 54 but also state that Section 7 requirements apply only to "ac-
tions in which there is discretionary involvement or control. 55 The regu-
lations list specific categories of agency "action" including actions "in-
tended to conserve listed species or their habitat" or "directly or indi-
rectly causing modifications to the land, water, or air," agency rulemak-
ing, contracting, licensing, and so on.56  The Supreme Court's recent
decision in National Association of Home Builders reads Section 7(a)(2)
narrowly where actions arguably non-discretionary in nature are con-
48. § 1536(c)(1).
49. See § 1536(a)(2); Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 1985).
50. § 1536(b)(3).
51. See id.
52. Thomas, 753 F.2d at 763 (noting agency failure to adopt prudent alternative to proposed
action as outlined in biological opinion likely to constitute a violation of ESA); Am. Rivers v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 271 F. Supp. 2d 230, 257-58 (D.D.C. 2003) (agency in violation of ESA
where failure to adopt prudent alternatives outlined in biological opinion rendered significant take of
threatened species imminent).
53. See generally Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 341 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2003) (agency
decision to relax forest planning requirements an "action" under § 7(a)(2)); Pac. Rivers Council v.
Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994) (forest plan an agency action requiring consultation with FWS
under § 7(a)(2)); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (agency decision to complete
construction and commence operation of a dam constituted "action" under § 7(a)(2)); but see Nat'l
Assoc. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007) (§ 7(a)(2) consultation
requirement does not apply where agency action is non-discretionary and required by statute); Cal.
Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. FERC, 472 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2006) (operation of project under FERC
license not agency action under § 7(a)(2)); Envir. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d
1073 (9th Cir. 2001) (FWS lacked sufficient discretionary control over previously issued incidental
take permit to require re-initiation of § 7(a)(2) consultation).
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cerned;57 other circuits have adopted this approach as well.58 However,
past cases where the meaning of agency "action" under the ESA was at
issue show the courts formerly took a broader view on what constitutes
"action" under Section 7(a)(2).59
1. Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas
60
In Pacific Rivers, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the
U.S. Supreme Court's Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA") v. Hill6l
opinion to support its holding that a Forest Service land and resource
management plan constituted ongoing agency action under Section
7(a)(2) of the ESA.62 In TVA v. Hill, the Court held that the ESA insti-
tuted a discretion-constraining policy of "institutionalized caution" that
required federal agencies, "in the plainest of words," to ensure their ac-
tions did not adversely impact threatened or endangered species or their
critical habitat.63 Relying on the TVA v. Hill opinion, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed a district court preliminary injunction on future Forest Service
actions in the Wallowa-Whitman and Umatilla National Forests of Ore-
gon pending consultation with the NMFS on potential impacts on the
recently listed Snake River Chinook salmon, and reversed the lower
court's denial of a requested injunction against ongoing projects in the
two forests.64
The Forest Service urged the Ninth Circuit to recognize that forest
plans constitute agency action for Section 7(a)(2) purposes only when
adopted, amended, or revised, as opposed to on an ongoing basis.65 The
Ninth Circuit flatly disagreed, adopting a rule that forest plans are "ongo-
ing agency action" under the ESA because they have an "ongoing and
long-lasting effect" on individual projects implemented in a forest unit,
even after adoption, amendment, or revision.66 The court stated that the
plain language of both the statute and corresponding regulations 68 indi-
cated clear congressional intent to define agency action broadly,69 back-
ing its claim by citing TVA v. Hill's "institutionalized caution" discus-
sion.70 Consistent with its view that forest plans "have ongoing effects
57. Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2536 (2007); but see id. at 2542 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding § 7(a)(2)
consultation duty not triggered where agency action was non-discretionary in nature).
59. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1978).
60. 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994).
61. Id. (agency decision to complete construction and commence operation of a dam consti-
tuted "agency action" triggering ESA § 7(a)(2) consultation requirements).
62. Id. at 1053.
63. Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 172-74, 194.
64. Pac. Rivers, 30 F.3d at 1051-52.
65. Id. at 1053.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1054.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1054-55.
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extending beyond their mere approval, 71 the court held that forest plans
are ongoing agency action under Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA.72
2. National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife
73
In National Association of Home Builders ("Home Builders"), the
Supreme Court held that the Section 7(a)(2) consultation and "no-
jeopardy" requirements were not triggered by agency actions non-
discretionary in nature. 74 Home Builders concerned a challenge by envi-
ronmentalist groups to FWS's determination that transferal of pollution
discharge permitting authority from the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") to the State of Arizona did not require the EPA to con-
sider "indirect impacts" of the transfer on threatened and endangered
species in the consultation process. 75 As the EPA was bound by the
Clean Water Act ("CWA") 76 to transfer permitting authority to the state
upon state compliance with nine criteria contained in the statute,77 the
Court treated the transfer as a non-discretionary act within the meaning
of ESA regulations,78 holding the transfer did not trigger Section
7(a)(2)'s consultation and "no-jeopardy" requirements.79
3. Summary: Scope of the Agency Duty to Consult and Forest
Planning
In general, the ESA offers protections to threatened and endangered
species and their critical habitat, and offers citizens standing to challenge
agency actions and inactions, but both the substantive protections and
standing conferred are limited by the terms of the statute, corresponding
regulations, and case law. 80 On the other hand, the issue of Forest Ser-
vice discretion in land use management and planning is far broader than
ESA compliance, which deals exclusively with species preservation and
protection. 8 1 To the extent Forest Guardians uses the issue of Section
7(a)(2) requirements as a starting point for analyzing the legal effect of
forest plans, the opinion hinges on legal sources of obligation extraneous
to the ESA.82 The Forest Service, to a greater extent than any other fed-
eral land management agency, is subject to a myriad of statutory and
71. Id. at 1055.
72. Id. at 1056.
73. 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007).
74. Id. at 2533-36.
75. Id. at 2528-29.
76. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (2008).
77. See Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2531.
78. Id. at 2535-36.
79. Id. at 2536, 2538.
80. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (2008).
81. See Forest Guardians v. Forsgen, 478 F.3d 1149, 1151 (10th Cir. 2007).
82. See id. at 1151-52.
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regulatory authorities. 83  Primary among these, perhaps, is the Forest
Service's "second" organic act, NFMA.84
C. NFMA, Planning, and Forest Service Discretion
Timber is the central character in the story of the Forest Service and
NFMA. Timber resources in the United States were exploited at an in-
credible rate during the 19th century.85 In 1891, Congress moved to stop
the alarming "collapse" of the nation's timber supply, passing legislation
permitting the President to "reserve" forestlands in the federal public
domain.8p In 1897, after several years of haggling over statutory lan-
guage, 87 Congress passed the "Forest Service Organic Act" ("FSOA"),88
which created a national forest reserve system to provide for watershed
protection and timber conservation and supply.89  The Forest Service
focused, from the outset, on ensuring a stable and perpetual commercial
timber supply.90 Gifford Pinchot, the first chief of the Forest Service, 91
viewed the national forests as a vast warehouse of natural resources, and
viewed "sustained yield" timber production as their central purpose.92
Pinchot's "multiple use" philosophy, which argued that the forests could
successfully accommodate logging, watershed protection, grazing, wild-
life habitat, and recreation through scientific management, did not come
into conflict with the sustained yield mandate during the early years
when timber demand was low. 93 Multiple use initially translated into
maximized Forest Service discretion, which "in practice meant freedom
to log wherever logging could be accommodated." 94 War demand and
the postwar housing boom, which coincided with a decline in private
timber reserves, led to an explosion in timber demand and harvesting on
the national forests during the 1940s and 1950s, 95 with large-scale har-
vesting peaking in the 1960s and 1970S.96 As part of a new "intensive
management" approach to maximizing production,97 the Forest Service
83. Robert Breazeale, Is Something Wrong with the National Forest Management Act?, 21 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 317, 323 (2001).
84. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-1614 (2008).
85. See W. Va. Div. of Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945, 950 (4th Cir.
1975) (noting only 500 million acres out of approximately one to one and one quarter billion acres of
American forests existing at the end of the 18th century remained uncut in 1893).
86. PAUL W. HIRT, A CONSPIRACY OF OPTIMISM: MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL FORESTS
SINCE WORLD WAR Two xvii (1994).
87. Izaak Walton League, 522 F.2d at 950-52.
88. Id. at 952 (also known as the "Pettigrew Amendment"); see also 16 U.S.C.A. § 476 (re-
pealed 1976).
89. Izaak Walton League, 522 F.2d at 950-52; see also 16 U.S.C.A. § 476 (repealed 1976);
HIRT, supra note 86, at 32.
90. See HIRT, supra note 86, at 31-32.
91. Id. at 31-33.
92. Id. at 32, 34.
93. Id. at 35-36.
94. Id. at 36.
95. See id. at 45, 50-53.
96. See id. at xxiv.
97. See id. at 55-57.
2008]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
instituted "even-aged management," including major clear-cutting, on a
wide scale, beginning in the western forests and then moving east.
98
Simultaneous to the spike in timber harvesting was a dramatic in-
crease in recreational use of the national forests,99 inevitably leading to
use conflicts and straining the multiple use concept. 100 In reaction to
these developments, Congress passed the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield
Act ("MUSYA") in 1960.101 As its name indicates, the law attempted to
reconcile the evolving policies of managing the forest for multiple uses'
0 2
and sustained yield of its renewable surface resources. 0 3 Section 528 of
MUSYA required the administration of forests for "range, timber [and]
watershed" uses, but also for "outdoor recreation" and "fish and wildlife
purposes."' 4 MUYSA also provided that the listed purposes were "sup-
plemental to, but not in derogation of, the purposes for which the na-
tional forests were established,"' 0 5 (i.e., timber production and watershed
protection).
0 6
Perhaps because it left so much discretion in the Forest Service,
MUYSA failed to ameliorate growing use conflicts.'0 7 In the wake of
MUSYA, the stage was set for passage of NFMA:
During the 1960s the Forest Service had continued to increase timber
sales and also had expanded the use of clearcutting. These practices
generated severe criticism [across] the country. Critics of the Forest
Service called for remedial action by Congress. The agency's legal
authority to clearcut was also challenged in court. On August 21,
1975, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled in the famous
Monongahela case that the 1897 [FSOA] effectively prohibited cle-
arcutting in the national forests. The Forest Service and timber inter-
ests sought congressional relief to correct the offending language in
the [FSOA].' 8
Congress passed NFMA'0 9 in 1976, ostensibly to rein in the Forest
Service's timber-centric management practices. 10 NFMA repealed the
98. See W. Va. Div. of Izaak Walton League of America v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945, 955 (4th Cir.
1975).
99. See HIRT, supra note 86, at 52-53 (discussing dramatic increase in recreational use of the
national forests during 1940s and 1950s).
100. Id. at 53.
101. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 528-531 (2008); see CHARLES F. WILKINSON & H. MICHAEL ANDERSON,





106. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 714-15 (1978); see also 16 U.S.C.A. § 476
(repealed 1976).
107. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 101, at 69-70.
108. Id. at 41-42; see also W. Va. Div. of Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945,
955 (4th Cir. 1975).
109. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-1614 (2008).
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FSOA 11 and implemented a planning regime to guide forest manage-
ment 1 2 and required the Forest Service to develop a comprehensive
management plan for each national forest ("forest plan"). 13 The forest
plan serves as a statement of policy and information to guide future man-
agement decisions in the forest" 14 and designates which areas within a
unit are suitable for timber harvesting
15 and a myriad of other uses." 16
NFMA also requires forest plans be "implemented" through "site-
specific" projects such as timber sales, area closures, orders changing
approved uses of specific sections of the forest, and so on,17 and that all
site-specific activities be consistent with the forest plan for the forest unit
where they take place."
8
Section 6 of NFMA outlines substantive and procedural require-
ments for Forest Service forest plans, 19 requiring forest managers to
"develop, maintain, and, as appropriate, revise" a written forest plan for
each unit in the system. 120 Forest managers must use "a systematic inter-
disciplinary approach to achieve integrated consideration of physical,
biological, economic, and other sciences,"' 12' and must develop regula-
tions governing the development and revision of forest plans.' 22 Regula-
tions must provide for NEPA compliance, 123 ensure plans contain infor-
mation on use designation 124 and biological diversity, 125 and require the
agency to study the impacts of the forest plan management system on
forest productivity. 126 A temporarily convened "committee of scientists"
appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture aids the agency in developing
these regulations. 127 Plan development is subject to public notice and
comment requirements 128 and plans must conform to a number of spe-
cific restrictions on timber harvesting. 29  Unlike the ESA,13 ° NFMA
110. See Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2007);
see also Izaak Walton League, 522 F.2d at 953; GAIL L. ACHTERMAN, K. NORMAN JOHNSON &
SUSAN K. STEVENS, NFMA and FLMPA: Fifteen Years of Planning, in PUBLIC LAND LAW 5-1, 5-13
(Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation 1992); WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 101, at 70-
72; HIRT, supra note 85, at 260-65.
111. HIRT, supra note 86, at 263.
112. See Citizens, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 1064.
113. See id. (forest plans are also referred to as "land resource management plans" or
"LRMPs" );see also § 1604(a).
114. Citizens, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 1064; see § 1604(f)-(g), (i).
115. § 1604(k).
116. See § 1604(e)(1).
117. Citizens, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 1064.
118. ld; § 1604(i).
119. See § 1604.








128. §§ 1604(d), 1612(a).
129. See § 1604(g)(3).
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lacks a citizen-suit provision, and thus challenges to NFMA forest plans
have generally been made under the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"). 131 Because agency action is a threshold question for standing
and reviewability under the APA, the success or failure of claims chal-
lenging NFMA planning, like Section 7(a)(2) ESA claims, often turns on
how courts define "agency action."
1. Ohio Forestry Association v. Sierra Club
132
In Ohio Forestry Association v. Sierra Club, the Supreme Court en-
dorsed the proposition that forest plans do not constitute "ongoing"
agency action sufficient to confer APA standing. In Ohio Forestry, the
Sierra Club challenged a forest plan developed for the Wayne National
Forest in southeastern Ohio, which permitted extensive logging and
clear-cutting in the forest. 133 Sierra Club variously alleged the plan vio-
lated NFMA, NEPA, and the APA. 34  The Court rejected the claim,
holding forest plans do not constitute agency "action" for standing pur-
poses. 135 The Court determined that adoption of the plan did not create
any immediate legal or practical harm necessitating review,"36 that the
agency was entitled the opportunity to revise or refine plan provisions
through site-specific proposals before review,137 and that the plan did not
provide an adequate factual basis for review. 38  The Court noted the
inconvenience of challenging plan-level prescriptions via individual site-
specific actions, but instructed plaintiffs to wait until such projects were
proposed before trying to challenge provisions within a forest plan.'39
2. Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
140
In Norton, the Supreme Court held that BLM resource management
plans do not generally impose legally binding requirements on the
agency.'41 The Federal Land and Policy Management Act ("FLPMA")
142
requires the BLM to prepare unit-level "land management plans" for
130. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2) (2008).
131. See, e.g., Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 731 (1998). Claims under
NFMA and NEPA are usually made under § 702 of the APA, which provides a right of action to any
person "adversely affected or aggrieved" by or "suffering legal wrong because of' agency action. 5
U.S.C.A. § 702 (2008). Section 706 permits the courts to "compel agency action unlawfully with-
held or unreasonably delayed." 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(1) (2008). Section 704 reads, in pertinent part,
"[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review." 5 U.S.C.A. § 704 (2008).
132. 523 U.S. 726 (1998).
133. Id. at 729-30.
134. Id. at 731.
135. Id. at 732-39.
136. Id. at 733-35.
137. Id. at 735-36.
138. Id. at 736-37.
139. Id. at 733-35.
140. 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
141. Id. at 72.
142. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1785 (2008).
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BLM lands 143 just as NFMA requires the Forest Service to prepare unit-
level forest plans for the national forests. 44 The Southern Utah Wilder-
ness Alliance ("SUWA") claimed the BLM's land management plan for
the Henry Mountains unit of central Utah required the agency to develop
and implement an intensive, formal monitoring program for off-road
vehicle ("ORV") use in the Factory Butte area.
145
The Court rejected this argument, concluding that "a land use plan
is generally a statement of [agency] priorities,"' 146 not a prescriptive
document imposing affirmative obligations on the agency. 147 Acknowl-
edging that land use plans constrained the range of actions an agency
could take, 148 the Court concluded that plan language that seemed to re-
quire specific agency actions only "projected" future agency actions.
149
Plans could "guide and constrain" agency action, but could not prescribe
such action. 1" ° The Court reasoned that judicial interference with agency
planning would simply lead agencies to create deliberately vague plans
to limit grounds for legal challenges, "ultimately operat[ing] to the det-
riment of sound environmental management."' 151  Overall, the Norton
Court viewed land management plans as non-binding, aspirational docu-
ments. 1
52
3. Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA
153
The Northern District of California considered the forest planning
issue in early 2007 in Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA ("Citizens"),
which involved a challenge to a Forest Service planning rule, the 2005
Final Rule ("2005 Rule"). 54 Adopted without public notice and com-
ment, completion of an EIS, or ESA consultation or study, 155 the 2005
143. See Norton, 542 U.S. at 58-60.
144. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1604 (2008); see also WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 101, at 64
(citing 43 U.S.C. §§ 1715, 1716, 1751-1753 (1982)) (noting FLMPA contains sections applicable to
the Forest Service, including provisions on "acquisition of land, exchanges of land, and grazing
within the national forests.").
145. Norton, 542 U.S. at 68.
146. Id. at 71.
147. Id. at 69-71.
148. Id. at 69.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 71.
151. Id. at 71-72. But see Justin C. Konrad, Comment: The Shrinking Scope of Judicial Re-
view in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 515, 540 (2006) (arguing
that clear legal obligations increase quality of federal land management).
152. Compare Norton, 542 U.S. at 71, with Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726,
733 (1998), and 2005 Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023, 1031 (Jan. 5, 2005) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R.
pt. 219). See also 2005 Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1032 (citing Ohio Forestry for the proposition
that "timber management provisions of land management plans are tools for further agency planning
and guide, but do not direct future development.").
153. 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
154. 2005 Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023 (Jan. 5, 2005).
155. Citizens, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 1067. Simultaneously, the Forest Service issued a separate
categorical exclusion exempting "all proposals to develop, amend, or revise land use plans which did
not approve particular projects or site-specific activities." Id.
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Rule relaxed forest planning requirements to a far greater degree than
earlier planning rules.' 56 Although the Citizens controversy centered on
planning rules as opposed to plans themselves, the case crystallized
competing interpretations of forest planning. An assortment of environ-
mentalist plaintiffs argued the Forest Service's failure to provide for pub-
lic notice and comment, complete NEPA analysis, or conduct ESA con-
sultation on the 2005 Rule violated NFMA, NEPA, and ESA. The Forest
Service argued these requirements were inapplicable because planning
rule changes had a "practical effect"'157 that was "minimal" and the 2005
Rule "simply establishe[d] a process for planning" and was "not an ac-
tion having a direct effect on threatened or endangered species.' 58
This take on the nature of planning regulations mirrors the Forest
Service's position on forest plans in Ohio Forestry - that planning has
minimal impact on forest conditions and is basically administrative and
"aspirational" in nature. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument and
ordered the Forest Service to resubmit the 2005 Rule for APA, NEPA,
and ESA compliance; the agency responded by essentially re-issuing the
2005 Rule as a "2007 Proposed Rule."
III. FOREST GUARDIANS V. FORSGREN
159
A. Facts/Procedural History
In Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, Forest Guardians argued the For-
est Service was required under the ESA to consult with Fish and Wildlife
regarding impacts on the Canada lynx under the Carson and Santa Fe
forest plans. 60 To support its position, Forest Guardians argued the Car-
son and Santa Fe forest plans constituted consultation-triggering "ongo-
ing agency action,' 1 61 relying on the Ninth Circuit's holding in 1994's
Pacific Rivers Council. 1
62
The U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico granted the
government's motion to dismiss the complaint. 63 Because the 2000 list-
ing of the lynx as threatened did not include New Mexico, where the
entirety of the Carson and Santa Fe National Forests are located, the dis-
trict court held that the Forest Service was not obligated to consult with
FWS on the potential impacts of the forest plans on the lynx. 64 Forest
156. See id. at 1067, 1073-74, 1076.
157. Id. at 1075.
158. Id. at 1068.
159. 478 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2007).
160. Id. at 1151.
161. Id. at 1152.
162. Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 1994).
163. Forest Guardians, 478 F.3d at 1152.
164. Id.
[Vol. 85:3
FOREST GUARDIANS V. FORSGREN




In considering whether the Forest Service was required under Sec-
tion 7(a)(2) of the ESA to consult on the impacts of the forest plans, the
Tenth Circuit began with the Supreme Court's holding in Norton that
BLM land use plans do not constitute agency action once adopted.
166
The court then reviewed provisions in NFMA and Forest Service plan-
ning regulations. 67 The court noted the regulations define a "plan" as "a
document or set of documents that integrates and displays information
relevant to management of a unit of the National Forest System.' 68 The
court further noted that forest plans had to be implemented by site-
specific projects consistent with their terms16 9 and were subject to NEPA
analysis. °70 Although the court expressed "little doubt" that forest plans
could constitute agency action under the ESA at adoption, amendment or
revision, or when approving a site-specific decision, the court concluded
that forest plans were not "ongoing, self-implementing action under §
7(a)(2)" of the ESA.
17 1
The court noted that if forest plans did not constitute ongoing
agency action and Forest Guardians failed to allege any other agency
action triggering Section 7(a)(2)'s consultation requirement, then the
Forest Service was not required to consult with FWS on the impact of the
Carson and Santa Fe plans on the lynx. 72 The court noted that Forest
Guardians failed to cite "an authorized program, practice, project, or
activity that might amount to 'action' threatening the continued existence
of the lynx" and sustaining the complaint. 73 For this reason, the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint.
74
Acknowledging that "policies, directions, and allowances" con-
tained in a forest plan might have "indirect" adverse impacts on wildlife
and critical habitat, the court concluded that such effects did not trans-
form forest plans into agency "action" triggering Section 7(a)(2) consul-
tation. 175 As the court noted, "[p]olicies and directions only guide the
Forest Service in determining whether an 'action' may be properly un-
165. See id at 1152.
166. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 73 (2004); Forest Guardians, 478
F.3d at 1153.
167. Forest Guardians, 478 F.3d at 1153.
168. Id; 36 C.F.R. § 219.16 (2005).
169. Forest Guardians, 478 F.3d at 1154.
170. Id. Compare id, with Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1067-
68 (N.D. Cal. 2007), and 2005 Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023-01, 1032, 1040 (Jan. 5,2005).
171. Forest Guardians, 478 F.3d at 1154-55.
172. Seeid. at 1156.
173. Id. at 1157.
174. Id. at 1160.
175. Id. at 1157.
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dertaken" under a given plan and do not "commit the Forest Service to
anything."' 76 Designations of permitted uses in certain unit areas like-
wise did not constitute agency action under Section 7(a)(2), as these des-
ignations were subject to change through revision or amendment of the
forest plan. 1
77
The court rejected the Ninth Circuit's holding in Pacific Rivers
Council that forest plans constitute ongoing agency action under Section
7(a)(2) of the ESA.178 The court argued that site-specific decisions con-
stituted the "action" contemplated by Section 7(a)(2), not the plans them-
selves, and that the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding otherwise.
179
IV. FOREST GUARDIANS, NFMA PLANNING REFORM, AND THE AGENCY
DISCRETION QUESTION
Forest Guardians stands for two basic propositions: that forest
plans are not "ongoing" agency action for purposes of the ESA, and that
citizens necessarily lack standing under the ESA to challenge forest plans
except at adoption, amendment, or revision, limiting the scope of agency
"action" under which citizens can seek review. The Tenth Circuit's deci-
sion to affirm on these grounds transplanted the rule that land manage-
ment plans are not challengeable "ongoing agency action" from the
NEPA context in Norton to the ESA context, 180 adopting the Forest Ser-
vice's interpretation of forest plans as not legally binding on an ongoing
basis. Forest Guardians supports the treatment of forest plans consistent
with increased managerial discretion in federal land agencies like the
Forest Service.1
8 1
There are good arguments to be made on both sides of the "a plan is
just a plan" debate. As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Pacific Rivers,
forest plans guide project-level activities on an ongoing basis.' 82  Be-
cause NFMA requires all site-specific actions to be consistent with the
guidelines and provisions of an individual forest plan, 183 forest plans
clearly exercise some ongoing, constraining influence on forest man-
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1158.
178. Id. at 1159.
179. Id.
180. Compare id. at 1158, with Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 71 (2004).
181. Forest Guardians, 478 F.3d at 1153; see also id. at 1156 n.9. Interestingly, the court also
declined to rely on Ohio Forestry for its holding that forest plans are unchallengeable except at
adoption, amendment, or revision, even though the Supreme Court essentially laid out the same rule
in the same context-NFMA forest planning, as opposed to BLM planning at issue in Norton. The
explanation for reliance on Norton instead of Ohio Forestry likely lies in the nature of the agency
"action" challenged. In Norton, agency inaction was at issue, whereas the challenge in Ohio For-
estry was to the forest plan's authorization of specific harvesting practices. The Tenth Circuit likely
chose to rely on Norton instead of Ohio Forestry because Forest Guardians sought to compel the
Forest Service to initiate consultation rather than revise a specific provision of the plan (i.e., to
compel specific action in the face of agency inaction rather than enjoin an agency action).
182. See Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 1994).
183. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1604(i) (2008).
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agement actions. 184 If forest plans legally bind the Forest Service on an
ongoing basis, it is reasonable to argue they confer standing under the
applicable statutory citizen-suit provisions (e.g., APA and ESA) on an
ongoing basis as well. On the other hand, the inconsistency of a site-
specific decision with the applicable forest plan is perhaps best addressed
by challenging the decision itself rather than the plan.185
Forest Guardians is the latest in a line of cases limiting citizen
standing to challenge forest and other federal land use plans. 186 The For-
est Service's revision of its forest planning regulations over the last sev-
eral years, by contrast, noticeably weakens the agency's statutory obliga-
tions to a greater degree than Forest Guardians.187 Contrasting in detail
some major differences between the 1982 Forest Service planning regu-
lations, under which the vast majority of forest plans currently in place
were developed, and new proposed regulations likely to take effect
within the next year illuminates the agency's use of rulemaking to
maximize its discretion.
A. Revising NFMA Planning Regulations
In 1996, legal scholar and historian Charles Wilkinson reviewed the
evolution of Forest Service management in the twenty years since pas-
sage of NFMA, noting improvements in the Service's technical ap-
proach, changes in the makeup of agency leadership and personnel, the
slow decline of the timber industry's influence on the agency, the central
role of biodiversity in modem Forest Service land management, and the
agency's success in democratizing the planning process by engaging the
public in management decisions. 88  The Forest Service, which essen-
tially exercised "unquestioned professional judgment" over forest man-
agement prior to passage of NFMA in 1976,189 has pointed to these and
other developments to justify its push toward maximizing its managerial
discretion. 90
184. Pac. Rivers, 30 F.3d at 1051-56.
185. See Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 734 (1998).
186. See, e.g., id. at 734-35.
187. See, e.g., 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514, 48526-27 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to be
codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219) (authorizing categorical exclusion of forest plans from environmental
analysis under NEPA); Robert B. Keiter, Ecological Concepts, Legal Standards, and Public Land
Law: An Analysis and Assessment, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 943, 950 (2004).
188. Charles Wilkinson, The National Forest Management Act: The Twenty Years Behind, the
Twenty Years Ahead, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 659, 673-74 (1997).
189. Martin Nie, The 2005 National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning
Regulations: Comments and Analysis, 27 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 99, 105 (2006).
190. See id. at 100. The Forest Service has also cited project delays caused by litigation under
various federal statutes as justification for its regulatory reforms. See U.S. FOREST SERVICE, THE
PROCESS PREDICAMENT: How STATUTORY, REGULATORY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS
AFFECT NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT 7, 19 (2002) [hereinafter PROCESS PREDICAMENT],
available at http://www.fs.fed.us/projects/documents/Process-Predicament.pdf (discussing litigation
related delays to California timber salvage project and wildfire recovery project).
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Although parts of the 1982 Planning Rule mirrored the broader, less
prescriptive language of NFMA, 191 other provisions subjected planners to
meaningful substantive constraints; 92 the rule required each forest plan
to embody meaningful limits on timber harvesting' 93 and to provide for
species viability194 and biodiversity, 195 and required the agency to com-
plete a comprehensive EIS for each forest plan.' 96 By the 1990s, how-
ever, the Forest Service was chafing under what it viewed as unreason-
able and unnecessary administrative burdens imposed by the 1982
Rule.' 97 The Clinton Administration provided the political will to follow
through on developing a new rule in the late 1990s.' 98
The resulting 2000 Planning Rule controversially placed biodiver-
sity at the heart of agency planning priorities.' 99 The 2000 Rule simpli-
fied and streamlined the planning process by updating planning standards
to reflect changes in the Service's scientific knowledge and technical
capabilities, 20 0 but did not abandon the standards-based approach of the
1982 Rule.20' Whatever its merits, the 2000 Rule had no impact on forest
202 TeBsplanning. The Bush Administration suspended the 2000 Rule pending
administrative review in early 2001.203 The Forest Service subsequently
decided the 2000 Rule failed to sufficiently simplify and streamline the
planning process2°4 and issued a transitional rule in 2002 pending open-
ing of notice and comment on new planning regulations. 205 The agency
then issued a final planning rule on January 5, 2005, without doing
NEPA or ESA compliance.20 6 In contrast to the 2000 Rule, the 2005
Rule relaxed existing planning requirements considerably.20 7 The North-
191. See, e.g., Keiter, supra note 187, at 946.
192. See, e.g., id at 946-47.
193. See, e.g., 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.14-.27 (1982).
194. Id. § 219.19.
195. Id. § 219.26.
196. Id. § 219.12.
197. See, e.g., 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed Reg. 48514-01, 48515 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to be
codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219); 2005 Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023-01, 1024, 1027 (Jan. 5, 2005).
198. See Keiter, supra note 187, at 948 (noting the Clinton Administration's commitment to
"instilling a new ethic in the public land agencies . .
199. See id. at 964.
200. See 2000 Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 67514, 67516 (Nov. 9, 2000); see also Citizens for Better
Forestry v. USDA, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Wilkinson, supra note 188, at 672-
73.
201. See Keiter, supra note 187, at 962.
202. See Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth, 483 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting the
transitional provision of the 2000 Rule permitted forest planners to base site-specific decisions on a
"best available science" standard instead of the substantive provisions of the 2000 Rule); Ecology
Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1183, 1190-91 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting the substantive provisions
of the 2000 Rule were never implemented).
203. Citizens, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 1065.
204. See 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514-01, 48515 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to be codified at
36 C.F.R. pt. 219).
205. Ecology Ctr., 451 F.3d at 1190; 2002 Proposed Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 72770 (Dec. 6, 2002)
(to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219).
206. Citizens, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 1067-68.
207. See infra notes 187-272 and accompanying text.
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em District of California, however, invalidated the new rule in 2007,
ordering the agency to comply with the APA, NEPA, and ESA when
developing new planning rules. 20 8 The Forest Service complied with the
court order by essentially re-proposing the same rule. 209 Notice and
comment on the proposed rule ran until October 22, 2007.2'0 A brief
review of some of the changes proposed in the 2007 Rule is appropriate.
1. Species Viability and Monitoring
Section 219.19 of the 1982 Rule required forest planners to provide
for the management of fish and wildlife habitat by devising plans geared
toward "maintain[ing] viable populations of existing native and desired
non-native vertebrate species in the planning area.",21' Section 219.19
specifically defined a "viable population" as "one which has the esti-
mated numbers and distribution of reproductive individuals to insure its
continued existence is well distributed in the planning area," and re-
quired plans to provide for habitat sufficient "to support, at least, a
minimum number of reproductive individuals.., well distributed so that
those individuals can interact with others in the planning area.,
212
Section 219.19(a)(1) required the Forest Service to monitor the ef-
fects of forest management on "management indicator species"
("MIS"). 213 MISs were to be selected, "where appropriate," from federal
and state endangered and threatened species, species with "special habi-
tat needs," species "commonly hunted, fished, or trapped," "non-game
species of special interest," and "additional plant or animal species se-
lected because their population changes are believed to indicate the ef-
fects of management activities on other species of selected biological
communities or on water quality.,
214
Section 219.19(a)(1) further required that the agency analyze the ef-
fects of management practices on species viability "on the basis of avail-
able scientific information". 21 5 By contrast, the 2007 Rule requires only
that monitoring "take into account" the best available science, weakening
the standard.216 The 2007 Rule also relaxes procedures for changing a
208. Citizens, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 1100.
209. 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48515.
210. Id.
211. 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (1982).
212. Id.
213. Id. § 219.19(a)(1).
214. Id.
215. Id. (emphasis added).
216. Compare id., with 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514-01, 48536, 48538 (Aug. 23,
2007) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219). The term "best" is wholly subjective and practically
meaningless; because courts will be especially reluctant to second-guess agency discretion on tech-
nical matters, this term is likely to allow the Service to substitute science, consistent with its pre-
ferred policies for more valid science that contradicts those policies. Second, "available" narrows
further the range of science the Service must account for-namely, to the science the Service
chooses to avail itself of prior and up to adoption of a plan. Third, "take into account" is vague and
lends itself to an interpretation of implied discretion more than "on the basis of." The latter phrase
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plan monitoring program; whereas such changes formerly required plan
amendment (triggering public participation and NEPA analysis require-
ments),1 7 the new rule permits agency officials to change a monitoring
program by administrative correction.' 8 The 2007 Rule dispenses with
the species viability and MIS requirements entirely, replacing these re-
quirements with broad language requiring plans "describe the monitoring
219program" to be adopted for a planning area.
2. Adaptive Management and Environmental Management Systems
("EMS")
The 2007 Rule embraces adaptive management, 22 a cyclic approach
to natural resource management that "contemplates contingent or provi-
sional resource management decisions, which are then subject to revision
to accommodate scientific uncertainty. '22' To this end, the 2007 Rule
requires that managers "establish an environmental management system
[EMS] for each unit of the National Forest System., 222 EMS is a "proce-
dure designed to audit an individual forest's overall environmental per-
formance, 223 and is based on environmental standards developed by the
International Organization for Standardization ("ISO").224 Many scien-
tists have argued in favor of adaptive management,225 citing the problem-
atic nature of "the one-time decision, prediction based NEPA model. 226
Others believe the agency's adoption of "adaptive management" is a
pretext for a return to policies maximizing timber harvests.227 The "ISO
14001" standard on which EMS is to be based 228 notably "does not spec-
ify levels of environmental performance, 229 a fact which lends credence
to these reservations. The Forest Service's historical predilection for
implies agency decision making driven by science as opposed to agency politics, budgetary pres-
sures, or public opinion. If plans are to be "based on" available science, the Service is, at least, tied
to a specific methodology with regard to the role of science in planning. On the other hand, the
"take into account" language does not imply such constraints on agency discretion, for better or
worse.
217. 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(0 (1982) (requiring responsible official to follow ordinary
plan adoption procedures where proposed plan amendment would "result in a significant change in
the plan").
218. 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48528.
219. Id. at 48536; see also PROCESS PREDICAMENT, supra note 190, at, 24.
220. 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48535; PROCESS PREDICAMENT, supra note 190, at
23.
221. Keiter, supra note 187, at 975.
222. 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48535.
223. Keiter, supra note 187, at 951.
224. See International Organization for Standardization 14000 Essentials, available at
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_14000_essentials (last visited Feb. 2, 2008) [hereinafter ISO 14000 Es-
sentials].
225. Nie, supra note 189, at 106 (discussing the Committee of Scientists report and "dozens of
scholarly books and articles" calling for adoption of adaptive management by the Forest Service).
226. Id.; see also PROCESS PREDICAMENT, supra note 190, at 23-24.
227. See, e.g., Nie, supra note 189, at 106.
228. 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514-01, 48535 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to be codified at 36
C.F.R. pt. 219); ISO 14000 Essentials, supra note 224.
229. ISO 14000 Essentials, supra note 224.
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placing timber harvesting above all other uses230 lends credence to con-
cerns about a potential return to intensive timber harvesting. Although
adaptive management may be a good idea, there is reason to fear agency
misuse of the considerable flexibility the approach provides.
3. Biodiversity
Congress inserted a biodiversity provision in NFMA 231 requiring the
Forest Service to provide for "diversity of plant and animal communi-
ties" in planning and adoption of planning regulations.232 This provision
was subject to qualifying language, however, as planning remained tied
to satisfaction of "overall multiple-use objectives" and the adoption of
guidelines for preservation of tree species diversity was required only
"where appropriate" and "to the degree practicable." 233 Section 219.26
of the 1982 Rule adopted the NFMA language almost verbatim, though
notably omitting some of the qualifying language.
234
Section 219.26, and the species viability requirement of Section
219.19,235 imposed meaningful substantive requirements on forest plan-
ners to provide for both species and ecosystem diversity. By contrast,
the 2007 Rule transfers specific requirements for species diversity from
the planning regulations to Forest Service manuals ,236 authorizes but does
not require forest plan provisions for species diversity, 237 and couches
both ecosystem and species diversity language in a "sustainability" pro-
vision instructing the Service to balance "[s]ocial, economic, and eco-
logical" dimensions of sustainability in developing forest plans.23' Di-
versity provisions in the new planning regulations leave the agency with
a significant amount of discretion to determine how, and to what extent,
plans must include provisions ensuring biodiversity; although the pro-
posed rule "acknowledge[s]" the agency's "diversity obligations," it does
not impose "specific and, thus, enforceable protective duties" on the
agency at "either the planning or project levels.,
239
230. See supra notes 88-130 and accompanying text.
231. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (2008).
232. Keiter, supra note 187, at 946.
233. § 1604(g)(3)(B).
234. Compare id., with 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.26 (1982).
235. 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.19.
236. See 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514-01, 48530 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to be codified at
36 C.F.R. pt. 219).
237. Id. at 48538.
238. Id. This approach is antithetical to the 2000 rule, which exalted biodiversity above other
values. See sources cited supra note 199-201.
239. Keiter, supra note 187, at 963. Although Keiter writes about the now-enjoined 2005 Rule,
his discussion is entirely applicable to the 2007 Rule, as the latter's biodiversity language is bor-
rowed from the language of the former word for word. Compare 2005 Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023,
1059 (2005), with 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48538.
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4. Public Participation and Collaboration
Section 219.6 of the 1982 Rule contemplated forest planning deci-
sions made on an "information base ... broaden[ed]" by public partici-
pation.240 The rule provided for public input in the earliest stages of
planning, imposing clear procedural requirements for public participa-
tion during the NEPA process 242 in addition to NFMA-specific notice
and comment requirements, which included "meetings, conferences,
seminars, workshops, tours, and similar events designed to foster public
review and comment., 243 The rule also required the Forest Service to
analyze public input by issue and geographical area, noting "the variety
and intensity of viewpoints about ongoing and proposed planning and
management standards and guidelines." 244 By contrast, the 2007 Rule
provisions on public participation are more permissive, requiring the
Forest Service to use "a collaborative and participatory approach" 245 in
planning and provide for public notice and comment periods but leaving
the "methods and timing of public involvement opportunities" to the
agency.246 Because the new rules categorically exclude forest planning
from NEPA analysis, 247 they relieve the agency of public participation
obligations triggered by completion of an EIS.248
5. NEPA Compliance
Where the 1982 Rule explicitly required completion of an EIS for
forest plans,249 the new rule permits the responsible official to categori-
cally exclude forest plan approval, amendment, or revision from in-depth
environmental analysis requisite for completion of an EIS or an EA.
Although the new rule provides that completion of an EIS or EA may
still be required at the project level,251 this requirement is illusory, as the
Forest Service is legally authorized to categorically exclude site-specific
projects. 2" Because the 2007 Proposed Rule also eliminates regional
240. 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.6(a)(1).
241. Id. §§ 219.6(b)-(c).
242. See id. § 219.6(b).
243. See id. § 219.6(d).
244. See id § 219.6(e).
245. See 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48537.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 48526.
248. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.7, 1502.9, 1502.19, 1503.4, 1506.6 (2007).
249. See 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.12(a), (f)-(k).
250. See 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48535.
251. See id.
252. See Colo. Wild. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 435 F.3d 1204, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2006) (affirming
agency's categorical exclusion of major timber sales where agency decision not to do ElSs was not
arbitrary and capricious); Joshua Nathaniel, Survey, Forests on Fire: The Role of Judicial Over-
sight, Forest Service Discretion, and Environmental Regulations in a Time of Extraordinary Wildfire
Danger, 84 DENV. U. L. REv. 923, 937-39 (discussing 2003 announcement of the Healthy Forests
Initiative [HFI] and passage of the Healthy Forests Restoration Act [HFRA] and categorical exclu-
sions of major timber harvests from NEPA analysis under HFI and HFRA); Nie, supra note 189, at
102 (discussing Forest Service's categorical exclusion of major timber sales).
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planning253 required under the 1982 Rule,254 categorical exclusion of
both forest plans and site-specific projects may eliminate scientific
evaluation of cumulative impacts from the planning process entirely,
providing only for piecemeal review of individual parts of the manage-
ment scheme without any review of large-scale environmental effects.
255
The 2007 Proposed Rule's provision permitting changes to forest plans
by administrative correction gives the agency another potential opportu-
nity to evade in-depth NEPA analysis.
256
6. Timber Management
The 2007 Rule's dramatic attempt to increase Forest Service plan-
ning discretion is reflected in its elimination of the diversity provision of
the 1982 Rule covering "tree species. 257 The 1982 Rule regulated silvi-
cultural practices to a significant degree,258 and required the Forest Ser-
vice to study the ecological effects and economic implications of its tim-
ber harvesting practices in detail. 259 By contrast, the 2007 Rule lacks
specific timber harvesting standards, continuing to require the agency to
designate areas suitable for timber harvesting but removing most detailed
information, such as the method for determining harvest volumes, to
Forest Service directives. 260 Taken together with the 2007 Rule's cate-
gorical exclusion of forest plans from NEPA analysis, 26' and the increas-
ingly frequent categorical exclusion of substantial site-specific timber
harvests,262 the timber provisions of the 2007 Rule leave the Forest Ser-
vice remarkable discretion to determine the proper scope of timber har-
vesting in the national forests.
7. Overview of Planning Reforms
It is fair to say the 2007 Rule weakens the Forest Service's planning
obligations considerably in comparison to the 1982 Rule. Specific re-
quirements in the 1982 Rule on NEPA compliance,263 biodiversity,26 and
timber harvest practices 265 are absent from both the 2005 Rule and the
2007 Proposed Rule. In total, the 2005 and 2007 Rules contain more
253. See 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48535.
254. See 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.4(b)(2).
255. See Keiter, supra note 187, at 970-71.
256. See 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48537.
257. See 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.26.
258. See id.
259. See 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.14.
260. See 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48530.
261. See supra notes 248-57 and accompanying text.
262. See, e.g., supra note 253 and accompanying text.
263. The 1982 Rule required completion of an EIS for each forest plan adopted. See 1982
Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.12(a), (f)-(g), (j).
264. See 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.26.
265. 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.14. The 1982 Rule mandated cost-benefit review of produc-
tion on lands identified for potential timber harvest. See § 219.14(b).
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generalized language intended to afford the agency greater flexibility,
266
eschewing the prescriptive standards that guided planning, to a greater or
lesser degree, under the 1982 Rule.267 Where planners were formerly
constrained by substantive requirements embedded in the planning regu-
lations, 268 the new rule transfers considerable discretion on "whether and
how to change" unit-level forest plans
269 to agency officials.270
These changes may have dangerous effects on the political relation-
ship between Forest Service management and budgeting: agency man-
agers will be tempted to use their new discretion to curry favor among
political factions in Congress, and broad agency planning discretion will
help these interests maximize returns on political capital, encouraging
political interference with the agency.271  As Wilkinson notes, concepts
like sustainability, ecosystem management, and biodiversity really only
"gain specific meaning when they are applied in discrete contexts.' 272
Whether the dangers raised by the 2007 Rule's adoption of a flexibility-
oriented "adaptive management" approach lead to irresponsible practices
will depend on future interpretations of the new rule's wide-open lan-
guage.273
B. Assessing Some Potential Effects of the 2007 Proposed Planning Rule
Forest planning is essential to effective management of an adminis-
trative unit as massive as the National Forest System.274 NFMA's im-
plementation of comprehensive land use planning fairly revolutionized
forest management, for good or ill.275 On the other hand, the view of the
2007 Rule that forest plans are purely aspirational and make no man-
agement decisions raises serious questions as to the value of public par-
ticipation in the planning process and the scope of agency discretion in
the future. The dramatic and controversial changes to planning proposed
in the 2007 Rule are virtually certain to trigger litigation as expanded
discretion in the agency raises reasonable fears abuse.276
266. See, e.g., 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514, 48515-16 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to be
codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219); see also, Nie, supra note 189, at 100.
267. See Keiter, supra note 187, at 249-50.
268. See, e.g., 1982 Rule, 36 CFR § 219.19 (imposing species viability and management indi-
cator species requirements on Forest Service).
269. 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48536.
270. See id. at 48535.
271. See HIRT, supra note 85, at 295-96.
272. Wilkinson, supra note 188, at 679; see also Keiter, supra note 187, at 960-61 (discussing
the open-ended nature of statutory language in federal public land and wildlife laws and the agen-
cies' role in defining the scope of statutory terminology); Nie, supra note 189, at 104.
273. See Nie, supra note 189, at 104.
274. See, e.g., Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 728 (1998) (noting Forest
Service jurisdiction encompasses "nearly 300,000 square miles of land located in 44 states, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands.").
275. See Wilkinson, supra note 188, at 669-77 (discussing changes in national forest manage-
ment and forest conditions since passage of NFMA).
276. See, e.g., HMRT, supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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1. Public Policy: Improving the Utility of Forest Planning Under
the 2007 Rule
Development and adoption of a forest plan is a costly, time-
consuming, and remarkably complex undertaking. 277 The Forest Service
estimates its annual planning and assessment costs to be roughly $250
million, more than twenty percent of its yearly budget.278 Planners cur-
rently engage in extensive scientific analysis and documentation; re-
peated, lengthy public comment periods over the course of the planning
process are the norm. Adoption of forest plans used to require comple-
tion of an EIS,279 an enormous undertaking in itself given an EIS must
consider in painstaking and voluminous detail multiple alternatives to the
proposed plan.280 ESA requirements also generate impact studies, consul-
tations, and additional planning.28 1 Simply because plan development
requires such a massive investment of agency resources, the process
raises questions as to its own value.282
Forest planning under the old regulations presented other problems.
Plans must be revised at least once every fifteen years 283 but can take
almost as long to complete.284 The science supporting plan content be-
comes outdated relatively quickly. 285 The "one-time decision approach"
embodied in adoption of a fifteen-year forest plan is arguably incompati-
ble with forest-level planning given the dynamic nature of forest condi-
tions.286 Completing an EIS presents a host of problems. The agency
must expend considerable resources analyzing the ecological effects of
hypothetical projects under hypothetical forest conditions, lacking suffi-
cient data on conditions and projects fifteen years in the future.2 87 Data
277. See, e.g., Roger A. Sedjo, Streamlining Forest Service Planning, in NEW APPROACHES ON
ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 101 (Richard D. Morgenstern and Paul R. Portney, eds., 2004)
available at http://www.fs.fed.us/ems/includes/article3.pdf.
278. See PROCESS PREDICAMENT, supra note 190, at 34; see also Jodi Peterson, The End of
'Analysis Paralysis'?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 19, 2007, available at
http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?articleid=16838 ("Each [forest] plan took five to seven
years of effort and cost around $5 million to $7 million.").
279. See Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1067-68 (N.D. Cal.
2007). Compare 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(b) (1983), with 2005 Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023,
1032, 1056 (Jan. 5, 2005), and 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514, 48535 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to
be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219).
280. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.12-1502.16 (2008).
281. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
282. See William J. Wailand, Note: A New Direction? Forest Service Decisionmaking and
Management of National Forest Roadless Areas, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 418, 428 (2006); Wilkinson,
supra note 188, at 681.
283. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1604(f)(5) (2008); 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(g).
284. Interview by Ray Suarez with Rick Cables, U.S. Forest Service Regional Forester, Region
2, Newshour with Jim Lehrer: Forest Rules (PBS television broadcast Dec. 23, 2004) (transcript
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/environmentljuly-dec04/forestI 2-23.html).
285. See, e.g., 2005 Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023, 1041 (Jan. 5, 2005).
286. See id. at 1031 (discussing 1997 Committee of Scientists criticisms of the use of EIS at
the forest plan level).
287. Id. (discussing the speculative nature of plan content where agency realizes "over the 15-
year life of a plan it can only expect the unexpected.").
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collection on present conditions is difficult to obtain given the size of
forest units and detail necessary to make forest-level environmental
analysis useful at the project level; planning-level NEPA analysis is typi-
cally duplicated at the project level.28 8 These are precisely the practical
difficulties the agency wishes to address by revising its planning rules for
maximum discretion and flexibility.
2. Public Participation in the Planning Process Under the 2007 Pro-
posed Rule
Because the 2007 Rule leaves so much of the planning process
solely to the Forest Service's discretion, 89 it calls into question the value
of public participation in plan development. Aside from legal obliga-
tions imposed by NFMA (and NEPA, ESA, etc.) and the planning rules,
the Forest Service has maintained considerable discretion to determine
rule and plan content regardless of the tenor of public comments on a
given issue.290 Obviously, that discretion is significantly broadened
where sources of legal obligation are weakened or abandoned. The pub-
lic participation obligations in the 2007 Rule are fairly hollow. Typical
notice and comment is provided for at plan adoption, amendment, and
revision, but the agency is under no obligation to base the plan on that
input.29' Despite requirements to consult with and provide for open and
meaningful participation by the public in the planning process, the rule
also gives the responsible official "the discretion to determine the meth-
ods and timing of public involvement opportunities. 292 Transforming
forest plans from prescriptive, theoretically enforceable instruments into
purely "aspirational," non-binding documents allows the Forest Service
to maximize flexibility without visibly shutting the public out of the
planning process. Unfortunately, marginalizing public input may en-
courage capture of the planning process by the interest groups whose
input the agency has tried to manage in the past.293
C. Future Implications and the Agency Discretion Question
Following Ohio Forestry and Norton, the Forest Service realizes the
planning issue is an important key to maximizing its managerial discre-
288. See id. (noting difficulties with data collection over the breadth of national forest system
and management units and duplication of NEPA analysis at planning and project levels).
289. See 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514, 48516 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to be codified at 36
C.F.R. pt. 219) ("Land management plans are strategic" and "do not command anyone to do any-
thing or to refrain from doing anything... do not grant, withhold, or modify any formal legal li-
cense, power, or authority... do not subject anyone to any civil or criminal liability [or] create legal
rights or obligations.").
290. See Nie, supra note 189, at 104.
291. See 2007 Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48537-38.
292. Id.
293. Interview by Ray Suarez with Rick Cables, U.S. Forest Service Regional Forester, Region
2, The Newshour with Jim Lehrer: Forest Rules (PBS television broadcast Dec. 23, 2004) (transcript
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/environment/july-decO4/forest 12-23.html). These are
the "paid gladiators" Cables mentions.
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tion.2" The 2007 Proposed Rule vests the agency with unprecedented
planning discretion, categorically exempting plans from NEPA,295 insu-
lating the agency from plan-level challenges under that statute, and ex-
pressly categorizing plans as "non-actions,,, 296 possibly blocking the ESA
challenges upheld in the Ninth Circuit and other challenges made under
the APA. Where Forest Guardians boxes off the timing of triggering of
the consultation obligation, limiting the list of triggering events to adop-
tion, amendment, or revision of a plan or plan approval of a site-specific
decision,297 the new Forest Service rule renders forest plans potentially
unreviewable.
Where project-level categorical exclusions are upheld on review, or
expressly authorized by Congress or the Executive Branch, 298 maximiz-
ing agency discretion may mean agency actions evade all in-depth NEPA
review. NEPA "guarantees a particular procedure, not a particular re-
sult. ' 299 Because an agency's failure to comply with NEPA procedures
injures potential litigants as soon as it occurs, NEPA can provide a strong
basis for satisfying standing.300 Categorically excluding major projects
from NEPA analysis under color of law potentially eliminates this reli-
able and important means of obtaining review. The Forest Service will
not hesitate to categorically exclude site-specific projects of considerable
magnitude from NEPA analysis.30'
To the extent the 2007 Rule removes important plan content to the
302administrative directive level, courts may view that content as "inter-
pretive" and intended to "clarify" policy, engaging in very deferential
review and frustrating citizen challenges to unit-level management.3 3
Standing issues arising under federal land management statutes are likely
294. See 2007 Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48516 (citing Ohio Forestry and Norton for the proposi-
tion that forest plans are not agency action).
295. Id. at 48535.
296. Id. at 48516.
297. See Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1154, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007).
298. See Nathaniel, supra note 252, at 937-39 (discussing categorical exclusions of major
timber harvests under HFI and HFRA).
299. Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 737 (1998). But see Thomas v. Peter-
son, 753 F.2d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 1985).
300. Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737.
301. See National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Limited Timber
Harvest, 68 Fed. Reg. 44598 (July 29, 2003) (authorizing categorical exclusion of three types of site-
specific actions: 70 acre live tree harvests with /2 mile of road construction; 250 acre salvage of
dead/dying trees with V2 mile of road construction; and 250 acre commercial harvest "of any trees
necessary to control the spread of insects and disease" with '2 of road building); Nie, supra note 189,
at 103 (discussing HFRA's authorization of project-level NEPA categorical exclusions).
302. See, e.g., 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514, 48537 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to be codified
at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219) (providing for changes to monitoring program and program information by
administrative correction); id. at 48536 (providing for a variety of changes to plan content by admin-
istrative correction, including timber management projections and other "non-substantive" changes).
303. See Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1078-80 (N.D. Cal.
2007) (holding Forest Service did not violate APA by issuing a 2004 rule without notice and com-
ment as that rule clarified applicability of various planning regulations to agency planning and was
interpretive in nature).
2008]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
to suffer scrutiny in the courts, given standing falls squarely within the
scope of traditional jurisprudential concerns, 304 but agency statutory in-
terpretations and administrative decisions are commonly afforded defer-
ence on review.30 5 Although the Ninth Circuit continues to view forest
plans as challengeable on an ongoing basis,30 6 the court is in the minor-
ity. 30 7  The Supreme Court weighed in on this issue in Ohio Forestry
(originating in the Fourth Circuit), reaching an opinion contrary to the
Ninth Circuit's view, albeit in a slightly different context.308 Various
federal circuits, in addition to the Tenth Circuit, have adopted the Ohio
Forestry-Norton position that forest plans generally do not constitute
ongoing agency action.30 9  The Forest Service's 2005 and 2007 Rules
leave no doubt as to the agency's position on forest planning. Ohio For-
estry and Norton provide the federal circuits ample authority to disallow
"ongoing action" challenges to forest plans as the Tenth Circuit did in
Forest Guardians. Were the Supreme Court to review Forest Guardi-
ans, its decisions in Ohio Forestry and Norton strongly indicate it would
affirm the Tenth Circuit's holding, and perhaps go further and adopt the
Forest Service's position that plans are never agency action.
The new rule does not entirely abandon the older planning ap-
proach. Forest plans under the 2007 Rule will continue to address de-
sired conditions and plan objectives, provide guidelines for project-level
decisionmaking, and identify suitable uses for specific areas within the
planning unit.310  For all the 2007 Rule's faults, "the streamlining and
discretion [it includes] ... may prove... an ingenious way of practicing
the theory of adaptive management in the messy administrative state."
31'
Cutting the red tape involved in plan development is intended to put
304. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984).
305. See Norton v. S. Utah Wild. Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 66-67 (2004); Chevron v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 619 (7th Cir. 1995)
(noting scope of review of agency action is narrow and that "court is not permitted to submit its
judgment for that of the agency"); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review ofAgency Inaction: An
Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1657, 1702-03 (2004); Keiter, supra note 187, at 961
(distinguishing agency regulations and policies and discussing the application of Chevron deference
to agency decisions).
306. See, e.g., Citizens, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (noting forest plans are ongoing agency action
under § 7(a)(2) of the ESA).
307. See Michael J. Gippert & Vincent L. DeWitte, The Nature of Land and Resource Man-
agement Planning Under the National Forest Management Act, 3 ENVTL. LAW 149, 182-83 (1996)
(noting Eighth Circuit only other to have "expressly found that Forest Plans are reviewable" on an
ongoing basis).
308. Compare Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998) (holding chal-
lenge to forest plan unripe where "delayed review would [not] cause plaintiffs hardship... judicial
intervention would inappropriately interfere with further administrative action [and] ... [where) the
courts would benefit from further factual development of the issues presented"), with Pac. Rivers
Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1053-56 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding forest plans constitute ongoing
agency action under the ESA).
309. See Gippert & DeWitte, supra note 307, at 183-86.
310. See 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514, 48536 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to be codified at 36
C.F.R. pt. 219).
311. Nie, supra note 189, at 106.
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more agency personnel "on the ground" in the national forests, hopefully
improving agency performance and forest health.31 2 Maximized discre-
tion under the new planning rules logically opens the possibility of a
more ecologically sensitive forest management, not just unenlightened
management geared toward extractive industry.3 13
Unfortunately, the Forest Service wants to streamline the planning
process and simultaneously enact in law the idea that plans have no legal
effect, claiming unprecedented discretion in the process. Perhaps if the
agency took one tack or the other, it might come closer to achieving the
elusive balance between accountability and discretion it has sought over
the years since NFMA's passage. Reforming the planning process to
maximize flexibility and planning effectiveness and efficiency is a good
idea in the abstract, but using forest planning reform as a means to trans-
fer greater authority to the agency, and the planning process as a venue
for unilaterally exercising that authority, is the wrong approach. NFMA
was enacted to constrain Forest Service discretion, not expand it.
314
The Tenth Circuit's approach in Forest Guardians avoids permit-
ting too much agency discretion by preserving judicial review of forest
plans at certain critical times in the planning process. 315 Where Forest
Guardians balances consideration of both the purpose and perils of forest
management, the managerial "paradigm shift ' 316 proposed by the Forest
Service raises the possibility of a return to the unlimited discretion of
317years past. Lynx in both New Mexico and Colorado would be imper-
iled in such an event.
Future plans for Colorado forests are likely to be excluded from
NEPA analysis, 318 removing a significant, program-level layer of mana-
gerial protection for critical habitat of the lynx and other threatened and
endangered wildlife. The Forest Service will amend forest plans by ad-
ministrative correction 319 rather than formal notice-and-comment proce-
dures contemplated by NFMA and NEPA. Given that the 2007 Rule
expressly disclaims any binding effects of forest plans, 320 the agency will
probably be able to convince the Tenth Circuit that its forest plans do not
constitute ESA Section 7(a)(2) action even at adoption, amendment, or
312. See Interview by Ray Suarez with Rick Cables, U.S. Forest Service Regional Forester,
Region 2, Newshour with Jim Lehrer: Forest Rules (PBS television broadcast Dec. 23, 2004) (tran-
script available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/environment/july-dec04/forest_ 2-23.html).
313. See Nie, supra note 189, at 106.
314. See supra notes 108-130 and accompanying text.
315. See Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1154-56 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting forest
plans are subject to judicial review at adoption, amendment, or revision, or when making site-
specific decisions).
316. See 2005 Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023, 1033 (Jan. 5, 2005).
317. See supra notes 92-111 and accompanying text.
318. See 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514, 48535 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to be codified at 36
C.F.R. § 219.4(b)).
319. Id. at 49536 (permitting plan amendment by administrative correction).
320. Id. at 48535.
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revision: in other words, that forest plans are legally meaningless. To
the extent Forest Guardians symbolizes a cautious approach to limiting
Forest Service statutory obligations, there is no guarantee this approach
will be the primary one the court uses in the future.
CONCLUSION
Forest Guardians provides a bright-line rule respecting the legal
function (or lack thereof) of forest plans, consistent in kind, if not degree,
with the Forest Service's admittedly radical32' approach to the new rules
but free of the rules' excesses. Under Forest Guardians, citizens seeking
to challenge forest management as environmentally inadequate must base
their claims on site-specific projects (or plans approving such projects) as
opposed to unit-level plans, or on adoption, amendment, or revision of a
plan.322 The 2007 Rule, by contrast, may be easily read to preclude any
substantive review of forest plans. It categorically excludes all facets of
planning from NEPA, and will result, in many if not most cases, in plan
content so vague as to be of little practical or legal effect. Assuming the
2007 Proposed Rule is adopted as a final rule, it now appears Forest Ser-
vice actions under the new management regime will determine whether
the new discretion benefits our national forests or revives the irresponsi-
ble, timber-centric practices of years past.
Following the Tenth Circuit decision, Forest Guardians petitioned
FWS to list the lynx under ESA in New Mexico. 323 The group's petition
noted that suitable lynx habitat extends along the San Juan Mountains
from the release areas in Colorado into New Mexico, and that at least six
of approximately 81 lynx to enter New Mexico have been killed.32 4
Given FWS's 2003 Clarification of the Listing, which explicitly rejected
listing the lynx in New Mexico, the chances for the petition's success are
questionable.325 Should FWS reject the petition, lynx in New Mexico
will have run out of options for acquiring federal protection, at least at
the present time, since Forest Guardians foreclosed a major avenue for
review. Perhaps local Forest Service officials will incorporate special
protections for lynx in the Carson and Santa Fe national forests in their
respective forest plans. On the other hand, such action is unlikely to bind
the Forest Service under present case law, and certainly will not bind the
agency once the 2007 Rule is finalized. Pending judgment on the peti-
321. See Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
("By the USDA's admission, the 2005 Rule 'embodies a paradigm shift in land management plan-
ning."').
322. See Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1159-60 (10th Cir. 2007).
323. See FOREST GUARDIANS, PETITION TO CHANGE THE LISTING STATUS OF CANADA LYNX
TO ENCOMPASS THE MOUNTAINOUS REGION OF NORTH-CENTRAL NEW MEXICO 3 (2007), available
at http://www.fguardians.org/supportdocs/petition-canada-lynx_8-1-07.pdf.
324. Id. at 1-2.
325. See Notice of Remanded Determination of Status for the Contiguous United States Dis-
tinct Population Segment of the Canada Lynx, 68 Fed. Reg. 40076, 40083 (2003).
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tion, the Forest Service now holds the cards concerning survival of the
lynx in New Mexico. In the coming years, concerned citizens seeking to
preserve lynx on federal wild lands will have to rely on the agency's
good judgment, as whatever actions the Forest Service takes--or de-
clines to take-are likely to evade judicial review as the agency strives
for maximum discretion.
David Mason*
* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. Thanks to Pro-
fessor Federico Cheever for guidance and clarifications. Thanks to Denver University Law Review
editors and staff for their hard work in seeing this comment through to publication, especially
Melissa Meitus. Thanks to my family and friends, especially Krystina Moister-Hitchen and James P.
Mason, for their love and support.
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FINSTUEN V. CRUTCHER: THE TENTH CIRCUIT DELIVERS A
SIGNIFICANT VICTORY FOR SAME-SEX PARENTS WITH
ADOPTED CHILDREN
INTRODUCTION
Though the estimates vary, there are roughly 250,000 children being
raised by same-sex couples in the United States today.' Further, there
are children in approximately one-third of all lesbian and one-fifth of all
gay male households.2 While some of these children are biologically
related to at least one parent, many are adopted.3 However, numerous
states do not grant the rights that accompany adoptions by heterosexual
couples to both parents in a same-sex couple.4
In states where parents in a same-sex couple are not both recognized
as legal parents, the parent without legal rights is treated by the law as a
stranger to the child.5 Thus, the non-legal parent cannot make medical
decisions, sign school permission slips, and the child cannot inherit or
receive social security benefits upon the parent's death.6 In addition,
should a separation occur, the non-legal parent is not obligated to pay
child support, and may also be denied visitation or custodial rights, creat-
ing an unfair situation for both parents and, more importantly, their chil-
dren.7
Because some states allow same-sex couples to adopt, a new con-
flicts of law quagmire has emerged. If both parents are legally recog-
nized as the parents of an adopted child in one state and then travel or
move to another state, is their legal status still enforceable in the foreign
state? The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals provided an answer to this
debate in the recent case of Finstuen v. Crutcher,8 finding that adoptions
created in one state must be recognized nationwide under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.
Part I of this comment provides a broad look at the current laws that
affect same-sex adoptions in the nation. Part II discusses the Tenth Cir-
1. LambdaLegal.com, Adoption and Parenting, http://www.lambdalegal.org/our-
work/issues/marriage-relationships-family/parenting/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2008).
2. Jennifer L. Rosato, Children of Same-Sex Parents Deserve the Security Blanket of the
Parentage Presumption, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 74, 74 (2006).
3. Id.
4. DENNIS CLIFFORD, FREDERICK HERTZ & EMILY DoSKOw, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN
& GAY COUPLES, 79-80 (Emily Doskow, ed., 14th ed. 2007).
5. Id. at 80.
6. See id. at 79-80.
7. Rosato, supra note 2, at 76.
8. 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007).
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cuit Court of Appeal's decision in Finstuen. Finally, Part III examines
the true impact of Finstuen, and what the future holds for this battle.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Full Faith and Credit Clause
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings in every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof" 9
The Full Faith and Credit Clause was included in the Constitution to
ensure that the fifty states could operate as a unified nation.' 0 Therefore,
according to the first sentence of the Clause, judgments rendered in one
state court are enforceable in all other states, ending possible re-litigation
of the same issue in different forums." I
The Supreme Court has made it clear that judgments are treated dif-
ferently than the statutory laws of other states under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. 12  With respect to recognition of another state's judg-
ments, the Full Faith and Credit Clause creates an "exacting" obligation
on states to accept the judgment of another state's court. 13 The issue may
not be re-litigated.1 4 Conversely, statutes of other states do not have to
be enforced in the forum state if the forum state has a strong public pol-
icy against recognizing the statute.' 5
The second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is called
the "Effects Clause."' 16 Under this provision, Congress is able to deter-
mine what effects the judgments and statutes of one state would have in
sister states. 17 Thus, while the Full Faith and Credit Clause generally
requires states to recognize the judgments of other states, using the Ef-
fects Clause, Congress can pass laws to narrow the general rule that
judgments in one state are entitled to the same effect nationwide.18
The Full Faith and Credit Clause has emerged as a powerful tool for
both sides of the gay rights debate. The Defense of Marriage Act was
passed using the Effects Clause, curtailing the impact of same-sex mar-
9. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
10. Lisa S. Chen, Comment, Second Parent Adoptions: Are They Entitled to Full Faith and
Credit?, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 171, 179 (2005).
11. Martino v. Cottman Trans. Sys., Inc., 554 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
12. Mark Strasser, When is a Parent Not a Parent? On DOMA, Civil Unions, and Presump-




16. Lynn D. Wardle, Non-Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage Judgments Under DOMA and
the Constitution, 38 CREIGHTON L. REv. 365, 393 (2005).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 393-94.
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riages nationwide. 9 Conversely, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Finstuen used the Full Faith and Credit Clause to create a powerful vic-
tory for same-sex parents and their adopted children.
20
B. The Current State of the Law Regarding Same-Sex Couples and
Adoption
Because the topic of same-sex relationships is so controversial, it is
not surprising that state laws regarding same-sex couples vary widely.
This patchwork of laws can have serious ramifications on a same-sex
couple's adoption rights.
1. Methods of Adoption for Same-Sex Couples
Currently, there are three situations where the law recognizes both
members of a same-sex couple as legal parents of a child. First, in states
that allow gays and lesbians to marry or enter into civil unions, children
born into the marriage are automatically treated as children of both par-
ents, even though one parent may not be biologically related to the
child.2' No adoption proceeding is necessary.22 In addition to parental
rights created by virtue of marriages or civil unions, at least nine states,
and the District of Columbia, currently allow same-sex couples to adopt
through a one step adoption process.2 a Through this process, a court
proceeding is required where a judge signs a final order granting the
adoption.
24
Finally, at least twenty-seven states allow same-sex second parent
adoptions in all or some circumstances. A second parent adoption is
used for non-biological or legally recognized parents to adopt their part-
ner's child.26 As in the single adoption process, second parent adoptions
also conclude with a court proceeding.27 After the court has ruled on the
19. See infra notes 37-51 and accompanying text.
20. See Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1152-56 (10th Cir. 2007).
21. CLIFFORD ET AL., supra note 4, at 80-81. Current states that allow same-sex marriage or
civil unions include Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, Vermont, and New Jersey. Id. at 79-80.
22. See id.
23. BRETF MCWHORTER SEMBER, GAY & LESBIAN PARENTING CHOICES 22 (Gina Talucci,
ed., Career Press 2006). Along with the District of Columbia, the states that allow same-sex cou-
ples to adopt through a one step adoption process include Vermont, New Jersey, California, Con-
necticut, Illinois, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, and Massachusetts. Id.
24. Id. at 51. Of note for same-sex couples, however, is that private adoption agencies gener-
ally are allowed to use marital status and sexual orientation as reasons to deny an adoption, no matter
what a state's law is, and therefore there are still some hurdles for gay couples wishing to adopt in
these states. Id. at 36.
25. Id. at 54. For an up to date list of state cases on second-parent adoption, visit the National
Center for Lesbian Rights, www.nclrights.org.
26. SEMBER, supra note 23, at 53. Thus, in a second parent adoption situation, at least one
parent already has legal control over the child, either by virtue of being the biological parent, or
because they previously adopted the child through the single adoption process.
27. CLIFFORD ET AL., supra note 4, at 82, 84. This process can also involve home studies and
inspections by the adoption agency to judge the fitness of the second parent, as well as consent by
any other living biological parent. SEMBER, supra note 23, at 56-57.
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adoption, the final step often involves amending the child's birth certifi-
cate to list both parents.28
2. Limitations on the Adoption Rights of Same-Sex Couples
There are currently only a small handful of states that specifically
ban adoptions by same-sex couples. Florida is the only state that explic-
itly bans all homosexuals, either single or in a couple, from adopting.29
Mississippi bans adoptions for gay couples, and Utah restricts adoptions
to married couples only, effectively banning same-sex couples from
adopting because gays cannot marry in Utah.30 In addition, the Attorney
General of the state of Michigan announced in 2004 that "gay adoption is
against Michigan law and that, as a matter of policy, Michigan will not
recognize adoptions performed in other states.'
Also looming on the horizon are possible state constitutional
amendments aimed at banning same-sex couples from adopting.32 In
2006 alone, sixteen states considered putting such amendments on the
ballot.33 Conservative groups see this as the next logical step in the on-
going battle over gay rights.34 While none of these amendments were
actually placed on the ballot, activists in Arkansas are already preparing
a ban for the 2008 election. 35 However, these bans have not gained the
same amount of traction as the same-sex marriage bans, and even con-
servative presidential candidates such as Mitt Romney have conceded
that same-sex couples have an interest in adopting in some circum-
stances.36 Nevertheless, the drastic impact these bans could have on the
adoption rights of same-sex couples cannot be understated.
3. The Impact of DOMA
While not expressly aimed at same-sex adoptions, the Federal De-
fense of Marriage Act37 ("DOMA") has created even more problems for
28. CLIFFORD ET AL., supra note 4, at 85.
29. Dyana Bagby, Only One State Now Facing Gay Adoption Ban, SOUTHERN VOICE, Feb.
24, 2006, available at http://www.southernvoice.com/2006/2-24/news/national/nat 1.cfm.
30. Id.
31. Staff Editorial, Parenting Prejudice: Gay Adoption Decision Unmerited, MICH. DAILY,
Sept. 21, 2004, available at
http://media.www.michigandaily.com/media/storage/paper85 1/news/2004/09/21/Opinioneditorials/F
rom-The.Daily.Parenting.Prejudice-1425120.shtml. This policy will likely be susceptible to attack
using the arguments in Finstuen, however.
32. Andrea Stone, Drives to Ban Gay Adoption Heat Up in 16 States, USA TODAY, Feb. 20,
2006, at LA, available at http:www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-02-20-gay-adoptionx.htm.
33. Id. Bills were drafted or discussed in the following states: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia. Id.
34. Id.
35. Gay Adoption Ban Proposal Submitted to Arkansas A.G., 365GAY.cOM, Aug. 24, 2007,
http://www.365gay.com/Newscon07/08/082407ark.htm.
36. Glen Johnson, Romney Seeks Gay-Adoption Exemption, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 14,
2006, available at http://www.gay.com/news/article.html?2006/03/14/1.
37. Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (2008).
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same-sex parents. DOMA was signed into law by President Bill Clinton
on September 21, 1996.38 DOMA contains two provisions: the first part
reserves the term "marriage" exclusively for couples composed of one
man and one woman; the second, and more controversial part, gives the
option to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other
states.39 Congress passed DOMA using its powers under the "Effects
Clause" of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 40 allowing states to deny full
faith and credit to other state's decisions granting same-sex marriages.4'
Thus, in addition to a basic same-sex marriage ceremony, declaratory
judgments granted in one state recognizing a same-sex marriage do not
have to be recognized in other states under DOMA.42
Using this authority granted to them by section two of DOMA, at
least forty states 43 have also passed their own version of DOMA, often
called "mini-DOMAs." 44 However, not all of these mini-DOMAs are
created equal, resulting in three categories. The most lenient category is
the basic mini-DOMAs that simply define marriage as between "one man
and one woman" and refuse to recognize marriages celebrated in other
states between same-sex couples.45 The second category consists of
states that not only refuse to recognize out of state same-sex marriages,
but also refuse to recognize any other rights arising out of the marriage.46
38. Oren Goldhaber, "I Want My Mommies ": The Cry for Mini-DOMAs to Recognize the
Best Interests of the Children of Same-Sex Couples, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 287, 290 (2007).
39. Id. (referring to I U.S.C.A. § 7 (2008)). Section two of DOMA states:
No state, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to
give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory,
possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or
a right or claim arising from such relationship.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (2008).
40. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. While there are numerous arguments
debating whether Congress has the power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to create DOMA
under the Effects Clause, it is beyond the scope of this comment.
41. Wardle, supra note 16, at 387. It is important to recognize that DOMA allows states to
choose whether to recognize same-sex marriages in other states; it does not actually require them to
take any action one way or another. Id.
42. Id. at 388.
43. For an up-to-date list of what states have passed laws or amended their state constitutions
with mini-DOMAs, visit Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Laws, available at
http://www.hrc.org/issues/5594.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2008).
44. Strasser, supra note 12, at 305.
45. Id. at 305-06. For example, North Carolina's DOMA states that "marriages, whether
created by common law, contracted, or performed outside of North Carolina, between individuals of
the same gender are not valid in North Carolina." N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-1.2 (West 2008); see
also 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 2008) ("It is hereby declared to be the strong and
longstanding public policy of this Commonwealth that marriage shall be between one man and one
woman. A marriage between persons of the same sex which was entered into in another state or
foreign jurisdiction, even if valid where entered into, shall be void in this Commonwealth.").
46. Strasser, supra note 12, at 305-06. Arkansas' DOMA, for example, refuses to recognize
any rights or obligations created by any contract arising out of the marriage, including divorce pro-
ceedings. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208(b) (West 2008) (making obligations such as child support
not enforceable in Arkansas); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.03(4)(b) (West 2008) ("A marriage
entered into by persons of the same sex, either under common law or statute, that is recognized by
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The third category consists of the most extreme states which not only ban
same-sex marriages, but also civil unions and any other rights that may
arise out of a legally created same-sex relationship.47
The second and third categories of mini-DOMAs can have a drastic
impact on same-sex adoptions. In these states, because contractual obli-
gations that arise out of the legally created relationship are not recog-
nized, any adoptions recognized by virtue of the marriage or legal union
may not have to be recognized in the mini-DOMA state.48 Thus, in the
states that automatically make both parents of a child born into their mar-
riage or civil union legal parents,49 the non-biological parent's rights are
stripped away because these parental rights were created as a result of the
marriage/civil union. ° In addition, any obligations created in a divorce
proceeding cannot be enforced in these states, such as child support or
visitation rights .5  For example, if one mother in a same-sex civil union
in Vermont had a daughter, Vermont would recognize the non-biological
parent as a legal parent because of the civil union. If the family subse-
quently moves to Florida, however, Florida would not have to recognize
the non-biological mother as a legal parent because the state would not
recognize the underlying civil union. Thus, DOMA and the many classi-
fications of mini-DOMAs have greatly altered the legal landscape for
same-sex parents.
On the other hand, while the legal rights of parents in marriages or
unions can be voided by mini-DOMAs, what about second-parent adop-
tions? Is this a more reliable method for same-sex couples to ensure
their parental rights will be recognized in mini-DOMA states? The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed this question in Fin-
stuen v. Crutcher.
II. FINSTUEN V. CRUTCHER
A. Facts
Lucy and Jennifer Doel, two women in a relationship, resided in
Oklahoma with their adopted child E, who was born in Oklahoma.
5 2
another state or foreign jurisdiction is void in this state and contractual rights granted by virtue of the
marriage or its termination are unenforceable in this state.").
47. Strasser, supra note 12, at 305-06. The language of Florida's statute prohibits recognition
of any same-sex marriages, as well as any "relationships between persons of the same sex which are
treated as marriages in any jurisdiction," thus negating legally created civil unions as well as mar-
riages. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212(1) (West 2008); see also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-603
(West 2008) ("A public act, record or judicial proceeding of any other state, territory, possession or
tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the
laws of any other state ... shall not be given effect by this state.").
48. See Goldhaber, supra note 38, at 287.
49. CLIFFORD ET AL., supra note 4, at 79-80 (including Massachusetts, California, Connecti-
cut, Vermont, and New Jersey).
50. See Strasser, supra note 12, at 306.
51. See id.
52. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir. 2007).
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Neither parent was the biological parent of E.53 Lucy officially adopted
E in California in January of 2002. 5 4 Six months later, through Califor-
nia's second parent adoption process, Jennifer also adopted E.55 Upon
return to Oklahoma, the Oklahoma State Department of Health
("OSDH") refused to issue a birth certificate with both Lucy and Jennifer
listed as parents, instead only naming Lucy as E's mother.5 6 Despite
repeated requests for a corrected birth certificate, OSDH refused.
5 7
Prior to the filing of the case, the Oklahoma Attorney General's Of-
fice issued an opinion stating that, under Oklahoma's current laws, the
state would have to recognize out-of-state adoptions by homosexual cou-
ples.58 While the Doels' request for an amended birth certificate was
pending, the Oklahoma state legislature amended the state's adoption
statute in response to the Attorney General's opinion, explicitly denying
recognition to out-of-state adoptions by homosexual couples. 59 The
amended statute read in full:
The courts of this state shall recognize a decree, judgment, or final
order creating the relationship of parent and child by adoption, issued
by a court or other governmental authority with appropriate jurisdic-
tion in a foreign country or in another state or territory of the United
States. The rights and obligations of the parties as to matters within
the jurisdiction of this state shall be determined as though the decree,
judgment, or final order were issued by a court of this state. Except
that, this state, any of its agencies, or any court of this state shall not
recognize an adoption by more than one individual of the same sex
from any other state orforeign jurisdiction.
60
In order to justify the denial of the revised birth certificate to the Doels,
OSDH relied on this amended statute forbidding the recognition of adop-
tions by same-sex couples.6'
The Doels, along with two other same-sex couples with adopted
children, filed suit against the State of Oklahoma in the United States





57. Id. at 1146.
58. Id.
59. Id
60. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 7502-1.4(A) (West 2008) (emphasis added). Commentators
have interpreted the statute to be so broad and overarching that a child of a same-sex couple would
legally become an orphan if traveling through the state of Oklahoma, if neither parent was the bio-
logical parent. See Press Release, Lambda Legal, Lambda Legal Celebrates Oklahoma Decision Not
to Appeal 10th Circuit Court Gay Parent Adoption Decision (Aug. 17, 2007),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/oklahoma-not-to-appeal.html.
61. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1146.
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enforcement of the amendment.62 The defendants in the suit were the
Governor of Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Attorney General, and the Com-
missioner of OSDH. 63  The plaintiffs alleged that the amendment vio-
lated three constitutional provisions: the Full Faith and Credit Clause;
the Equal Protection Clause; and the Due Process Clause.64 After finding
that the Doels and one other couple had constitutional standing to chal-
lenge the statute, the district court granted summary judgment to the
plaintiffs on all three claims.65 Only the OSDH Commissioner appealed
to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.66
B. Decision
67
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Oklahoma adop-
tion statute was unconstitutional because it violated the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.68 The Court states, "The Constitution states that 'Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other state.' 69 The purpose behind the
Clause is to make all of the states "integral parts of a single nation"
62. Id. at 1142. Because the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the other two couples
lacked constitutional standing, the facts of their claims are omitted. Id. at 1143-45.
63. Id. at 1142.
64. Id. at 1143.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Before addressing the substantive issues of the case, the Tenth Circuit addressed whether
the couples had constitutional standing to bring the case and whether it was moot. The Hampel-
Swaya family lacked standing because they did not live in Oklahoma, and the court held that the
threat of visiting the child's birth mother in Oklahoma without any scheduled visits did not give
them an injury-in-fact, especially since they already had an adoption certificate from their home state
of Washington with both fathers listed as parents. Id. at 1144. The Finstuen-Magro family also
lacked standing because they could not identify any encounters with state officials that could demon-
strate that the amended statute had caused them direct harm, and therefore also could not identify an
injury-in-fact. Id. at 1145. The Doels, however, did have standing. First, OSDH had refused to
issue a new birth certificate with both mothers listed as parents, creating an injury-in-fact. Id.
Moreover, during a medical emergency for their child, the ambulance and emergency room told
them that only "the mother" could accompany the child, further solidifying the injury-in-fact. Id.
Secondly, the court held that OSDH had directly caused this injury, and that the adoption amend-
ment was, at least in part, OSDH's justification for refusing to issue an amended birth certificate,
satisfying the causation prong of standing. Id. at 1145-46. Finally, the court recognized that invali-
dating the amendment and ordering OSDH to issue a new birth certificate would redress the injury.
Id. at 1147.
The court also found that the case was not moot. Id. at 1149-51. At the lower court level,
OSDH "conceded" that the adoption amendment would not apply to the Doels, since under the
department's interpretation of the statute, same-sex parents who adopted through a two-step process
(such as second parent adoptions) would not be impacted, because the language of the statute refers
only to single adoptions. Id. at 1149; see also supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the single adoption process. Thus, OSDH argued that the case was moot since the de-
partment had agreed to give the Doels what they wanted. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1150. The Court
refused OSDH's interpretation of the statute, finding that the public policy behind the amendment
applied to all same-sex adoptions, and the alleged concession by OSDH to issue a new birth certifi-
cate in this particular instance did not render the case moot, especially since OSDH had yet to issue a
new birth certificate. Id. at 1149-51. In the concurrence/dissent, however, Justice Hartz seemed to
agree with OSDH's interpretation of the statute. See infra note 88.
68. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1151-56.
69. Id. at 1152 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1).
FINSTUEN V. CRUTCHER
where a remedy obtained in one state may be enforced in every other
state. 70 Therefore, the Court states "If in its application local policy must
at times be required to give way, such is part of the price of our federal
system.",
71
However, the court noted that the Clause treats statutes and judg-
ments of other states differently.72 Regarding foreign statutes, full faith
and credit is not always required, and occasionally a state may choose
not to enforce another state's laws if the forum state's public policy is
contrary to the policy behind the foreign state's law.73 Conversely, with
respect to judgments of other states, "it is clear there is no 'public policy'
exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause., 74 Judgments made in
other states create an "exacting" obligation on all other states to recog-
nize the judgment, giving it nationwide force.
75
In the case at hand, the Tenth Circuit accordingly held that "[a]
California court made the decision, in its own state and under its own
laws, as to whether Jennifer Doel could adopt child E. That decision is
final. 76  Because Oklahoma has a statute providing for supplemental
birth certificates for adopted children, it must therefore issue the Doels'
requested amended birth certificate.77
OSDH made two counterarguments to this decision. First, it argued
"that requiring Oklahoma to recognize an out-of-state adoption judgment
would [give another] state control over the effect of its judgment in
Oklahoma. 78 For example, OSDH argued that all of the rights that are
synonymous with adoption in Oklahoma would flow to the Doels, such
as the right to inherit private property, making Oklahoma apply Califor-
nia law within its own state.79 The court responded that while a state
must recognize another state's judgment, the forum state is then free to
decide how to enforce that judgment.80 Thus, the actual adoption judg-
ment is the only California decision that Oklahoma must recognize.8'
Otherwise, the court found, Oklahoma's adoption laws govern8 2 and




73. See id. (implying that a public policy exception does apply to statutes because they are
treated differently than judgments, to which a public policy exception does not apply).
74. Id. at 1153. But see State ex rel. Smith v. Smith, 662 N.E.2d 366, 369 (Ohio 1996) (hold-
ing that a forum state's public policy could be used to void a foreign adoption).




78. Id. at 1153.
79. Id
80. Id. at 1153-54.
81. See id. at l154.
82. Id
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parent and child, those rights flow from an application of Oklahoma law,
not California law. 83 Because Oklahoma's adoption statutes grant in-
heritance and other rights to all adopted children, these rights would
naturally flow to the Doel family by virtue of the California adoption.
84
Second, OSDH argued that it is not bound to recognize out-of-state
judgments in which it was not a party. 85 The court swiftly disposed of
this argument, stating that "[t]he Doels do not seek to enforce their adop-
tion order against Dr. Crutcher in his official capacity;" rather, they sim-
ply want Oklahoma to recognize their out-of-state adoption as adjudi-
cated by California.86 In conclusion, the court stated:
We hold today that final adoption orders and decrees are judgments
that are entitled to recognition by all other states under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. Therefore, Oklahoma's adoption amendment is
unconstitutional in its refusal to recognize adoption orders of other
states that permit adoption by same-sex couples.
87
Because the court decided the issue using the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, it did not address whether the adoption amendment infringed the
Doels' due process or equal protection rights.88
III. LOOKING FORWARD
A. The Doomsday Scenario: A Narrow Reading of the Finstuen Holding
Complying with long-standing precedent, the Finstuen court held





86. Id. at 1155.
87. Id. at 1156.
88. Id. Judge Harris Hartz filed a brief concurrence/dissent, stating that the court should not
address any constitutional issues because "[t]he OSDH concedes in its brief that the statute chal-
lenged by the Doel plaintiffs does not preclude issuance of the birth certificates they seek," based on
OSDH's interpretation of the statute. Id. at 1156-57 (Hartz, J., concurring and dissenting). As a
result, according to Judge Hartz, the district court's order should have been affirmed without discus-
sion of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Id. at 1157.
89. While not the focus of this comment, the Finstuen court did not address numerous other
legal arguments that could have been used to strike down the Oklahoma law. In addition to the
equal protection and due process arguments that the court did not address, the plaintiffs also ad-
vanced a constitutional right to travel argument that was dismissed by the district court. Appellee's
Principal Brief at 2, Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-6213).
In addition, the Parental Kidnapping and Prevention Act ("PKPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A
(2000), which Congress added as an addendum to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, also could be
used as an argument against the validity of the Oklahoma law. The PKPA was enacted in order to
ensure that states would respect the custody decrees of other states, creating stability for children
nationwide. Wardle, supra note 16, at 407. The heading of the PKPA, for example, states: "Full
faith and credit given to child custody determinations." § 1738A. A recent Virginia decision,
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330 (Va. Ct. App. 2006), held that the PKPA required
Virginia to recognize a custody decree between a same-sex couple adjudicated in Vermont, even
though Virginia's mini-DOMA would not recognize the civil union between the parties in Vermont
that created the parental rights for the non-biological parent in the couple. Id. at 337.
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requires recognition of adoption decrees nationwide. 90 However, while
the court was decisive in its reiteration that adoptions are judgments, it
may have left a window open for Oklahoma to still modify its adoption
laws for the purposes of treating same-sex adoptive parents differently:
Full faith and credit, however, does not mean that States must adopt
the practices of other States regarding the time, manner, and mecha-
nism for enforcing judgments. Enforcement measures do not travel
with the sister state judgment as preclusive effects do; such measures
remain subject to the even-handed control of forum law.
91
Read plainly, these sentences still allow Oklahoma to modify all of its
existing adoption laws and narrow the rights that flow from an adoption
to be given only to heterosexual couples. This case only requires Okla-
homa to re-issue a birth certificate, because a state statute allows for
adoptive parents to ask for supplementary birth certificates.92 As the
Court said, "Oklahoma continues to exercise authority over the manner
in which adoptive relationships should be enforced in Oklahoma and the
rights and obligations in Oklahoma flowing from an adoptive relation-
ship., 93 Because Oklahoma's adoption statutes do not distinguish based
on sexual orientation, these rights flow to the adoptive children.94 How-
ever, Oklahoma apparently could amend all of these statutes to explicitly
deny these rights to homosexual couples. Alternatively, the state could
amend its adoption statutes to state that the child may inherit from its
An argument using the PKPA has not been advanced yet in the context of same-sex adop-
tions. Is an adoption a "custody determination," within the meaning of the PKPA? The act defines a
"custody determination" as "a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the custody
of a child, and includes permanent and temporary orders, and initial orders and modifications."
§ 1738A(b)(3). Several courts have already held that the PKPA applies to heterosexual adoption
proceedings, and the common sense interpretation of the statute implies that it covers all adoptions.
E.g., In the Matter of B.B.R., 566 A.2d 1032, 1034 (D.C. 1989); see also Robert G. Spector, The
Unconstitutionality of Oklahoma's Statute Denying Recognition to Adoptions by Same-Sex Couples
From Other States, 40 TULSA L. REv. 467, 472-74 (2005). No courts have ruled that the PKPA does
not apply to adoption proceedings. Spector, supra at 474. Thus, if the plaintiffs in Finstuen had
argued for the application of the PKPA, the Oklahoma statute would have to be found unconstitu-
tional because Congress has ordered all states to recognize the adoptions adjudicated in other states.
Id.
90. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1156; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 290 (1971) ("An adoption rendered in a state having judicial jurisdiction... will usually
be given the same effect in another state as is given by the other state to a decree of adoption ren-
dered by its own courts. The status of adoption, created by the law of a state having jurisdiction to
create it, will be given the same effect in another state as is given by the latter state to the status of
adoption when created by its own law."). Some analysts have argued that adoptions are not "judg-
ments" for the purposes of the Full Faith and Credit Clause because adoptions do not involve adver-
sarial proceedings. See Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Interstate Recognition of Lesbigay
Adoptions, 3 AVE MARIA L. REv. 561, 583-84 (2005). However, there is no legal authority support-
ing such a contention.
91. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1153-54 (citing Baker ex rel. Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522
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adoptive "father" and/or "mother."95 This language could be interpreted
to restrict the statute to only one father or mother per child, effectively
excluding children with two mothers or fathers.9 6  The only thing that
Oklahoma cannot do, according to this case, is pass a statute explicitly
refusing to recognize adoptions of same-sex couples in foreign states.
97
Oklahoma can, however, strip these foreign adoptions of practically all
effect if it wishes to do so.
9 8
As the court pointed out, the Full Faith and Credit Clause is only
truly binding with respect to judgments.99 With regard to statutes, how-
ever, states are often allowed to use their public policy as a guide when
deciding whether to apply a foreign state's statutory laws. 100 For exam-
ple, the right to make medical decisions for an adopted child or allow an
adopted child to inherit property are based on the statutes of the state
granting the adoption.10' These rights, according to the Finstuen deci-
sion, are not at issue in the adoption proceeding. Because these rights
were not granted in any official court proceeding involving a judgment,
every other state has the power to determine whether these rights should
also be granted under its own statutory laws.
This decision is fully in line with other Full Faith and Credit Clause
interpretations. The United States Supreme Court's rulings have consis-
tently stated that states are free to choose the "time, manner, and mecha-
nisms" for enforcing other states' judgments.10 2  Inheritance rights for
adopted children, for example, have long presented a conflict of laws
question. For example, if a child is adopted in State A, which allows
adopted children to inherit property, but the child's adoptive parents have
a house in State B that does not allow adoptive children to inherit, the
law of State B will control whether the child can inherit the house. 10 3 In
95. ld
96. See Carissa R. Trast, You Can't Choose Your Parents: Why Children Raised by Same-Sex
Couples Are Entitled to Inheritance Rights from Both Their Parents, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 857, 889
(2006).
97. See Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1156.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 1152.
100. See id at 1152-53 (citing Baker ex rel. Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232-
33 (1998)).
101. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
102. Baker, 522 U.S. at 235.
103. See In re Crossley's Estate, 7 A.2d. 539, 540 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1939); see also C. C. Marvel,
Annotation, Conflict of Laws as to Adoption as Affecting Descent and Distribution of Decedent's
Estate, 87 A.L.R.2d 1240, § 8 (1963); RESTATEMENT, supra note 90. But see McNamara v. McNa-
mara, 135 N.E. 410, 412 (111. 922) (holding that the status, including the rights and duties between
parent and adopted child, are established by the law of the domicile); Shick v. Howe, 114 N.W. 916,
916 (Iowa 1908) (finding that the status and legal relationship between adopted child and parent is
fixed by the law of their domicile); Barrett v. Delmore, 54 N.E.2d 789, 790 (Ohio 1944) ("Generally,
the status of adoption, created by the law of a state having jurisdiction to create it, will be given the
same effect in another state as is given by the latter state to the status of adoption when created by its
own law."); Slattery v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., 161 A. 79, 80 (Conn. 1932) (ruling that an
adopted child's ability to inherit is governed by the laws of the state of adoption).
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addition to inheritance rights, other rights not including real property,
such as the right of a parent to discipline a child in a certain manner, are
governed by the state in which the parent and child are located, not
where the adoption occurred.'0 4 The only issue that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause protects in the adoption context is preventing one party to
the suit from bringing the exact same suit in another state to try and reach
a different result (i.e., whether the adoption itself is valid).1
0 5
Under this narrow reading of the court's language in Finstuen, this
doomsday scenario for same-sex couples seems possible. However,
should Oklahoma attempt to change the statutory rights that accompany
adoptions to exclude gay couples, the state would expose itself to a wind-
fall of legal problems.
B. Can Oklahoma Really Try to Deny State Statutory Adoption Rights to
Gay Couples?
While the language of Finstuen and traditional recognitions of statu-
torily granted rights to adopted children could paint a bleak picture of the
true impact of Finstuen, Oklahoma would have an uphill battle if it spe-
cifically tried to deny statutory rights to adopted children of same-sex
couples. Using either the Full Faith and Credit Clause or Equal Protec-
tion Clause, it is clear that Finstuen is much more than a hollow victory
for gay rights supporters.
1. The Full Faith and Credit Clause
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not allow a state to ignore the
laws of other states arbitrarily. There must be a strong public policy
against the application of foreign law before declining to apply it.1
0 6
Under a public policy analysis, would it really be in the best interests of
the child to take away its adoptive parents' parental rights?
Unlike the debate over whether to recognize same-sex marriages
and similar unions, this is a debate concerning the rights of a child, and is
therefore much more difficult to attack.10 7 Finstuen makes clear that the
actual adoption cannot be questioned, and thus there is nothing the court
can do to actually take the child away from the parents. In any case con-
cerning adopted children, the legal standard in determining custody is
what is in the "best interest of the child."'08 Without the option to liter-
ally remove the child, courts are likely to concede that the parents should
therefore at least be granted rights over the child. If the child has been
raised for multiple years by same-sex parents, it cannot be better to sud-
104. Ralph U. Whitten, Choice of Law, Jurisdiction, and Judgment Issues in Interstate Adop-
tion Cases, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 803, 807 (2003).
105. See id at 805-10.
106. See Strasser, supra note 12, and accompanying text.
107. See Johnson, supra note 36, and accompanying text.
108. See Chen, supra note 10, at 194.
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denly deny those parents the right to sign a permission slip for the child
or to make medical decisions on the child's behalf. In addition, the psy-
chological damage that the child would suffer from being separated from
its parents alone would weigh against upholding any amended statutes.
Further, in an increasingly mobile age, where travel is often a necessity,
no policy should favor stripping same-sex parents of all adoptive rights
simply because they have to travel through one state to reach their even-
tual destination. This would create chaos in the legal system from state
to state, which certainly is what the authors of the Constitution were try-
ing to prevent when passing the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 09
2. Equal Protection Clause
In addition to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a court would be
much more likely to entertain an equal protection argument if Oklahoma
were suddenly to amend multiple statutes denying parental rights to
same-sex couples with adopted children.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment estab-
lishes that all persons are created equally under the law and should not be
discriminated against for arbitrary reasons. 10 In an equal protection
analysis, a court must choose a level of scrutiny to apply to the affected
class, ranging from heightened scrutiny for racial or suspect discrimina-
tion to the rational basis level of scrutiny for unprotected classes."' De-
spite strong arguments for applying a heightened standard of scrutiny to
homosexuals, the Supreme Court has consistently applied a rational basis
level of scrutiny in cases involving laws allegedly discriminating against
gays and lesbians.' 1 2 Under the rational basis test, the government must
prove that a challenged law "bears a rational relationship to some legiti-
mate end."
'"13
In Romer v. Evans, the United States Supreme Court held that an
amendment to the Colorado State Constitution denying protection to
homosexuals under anti-discrimination laws was irrational, and therefore
unconstitutional, because it was "born of animosity toward the class of
persons affected."'"14 In addition, the Court held that the sole "desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest" even under the lowest level of scrutiny. 115
109. See Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1152 (10th Cir. 2007).
110. See CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
111. See, e.g., Pace Memb. Warehouse v. Axelson, 938 P.2d 504, 506 (Colo. 1997).
112. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 629, 631-32 (1996); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 579-80 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring). While the analyzed scenario would almost certainly
be struck down under a higher level of scrutiny, it would also lose under the rational basis level and
thus the application of the higher levels of scrutiny is beyond the scope of this article.
113. Romer, 517U.S. at631.
114. Id. at 634.
115. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Even though some question whether an equal protection argument
would have been successful in Finstuen,116 it would certainly prevail if
Oklahoma were to amend the statutory rights granted to adopted children
by denying those rights specifically to adopted children of gay couples.
Similar to Romer, statutes amended specifically to deny rights to homo-
sexuals would be based on animosity towards homosexuals. While it
could be argued that the state would do this to protect the children from
being raised in a "non-traditional" household that could damage their
development, the true impact of the law would be to rip children away
from the same-sex parents that raised them, or at least to significantly
reduce the rights they have over their children. Gay couples already
cannot adopt in Oklahoma. Therefore, arguing that the amended laws
would prevent gay adoptions in the state is a moot point. The only peo-
ple impacted by these new laws would be pre-existing same-sex families
who have since traveled or moved to Oklahoma. Voiding the parental
rights of these foreign residents would not be in the best interests of the
children nor would it be a legitimate government interest, especially con-
sidering the psychological damage that children would endure as a result.
Such blatant discrimination would almost surely fail under an Equal Pro-
tection Clause analysis.
Thus, despite the language of Finstuen, it would be difficult for
Oklahoma to deny the rights California granted to adopted children, even
though they are statutorily granted. Both the Full Faith and Credit and
Equal Protection Clauses create a strong argument protecting same-sex
families with adopted children from such a doomsday scenario. As a
result, the holding in Finstuen is a crucial victory for protecting the rights
of same-sex couples and their adopted children.
CONCLUSION
Despite the victory in Finstuen, it is clear that same-sex couples will
continue to face legal hurdles in the future, whether it be a lack of ex-
plicit legal protection or an outright ban on same-sex adoptions. The
patchwork of current laws, both for and against homosexuals, will con-
tinue to result in interstate conflicts of laws, and possibly create splits
between the circuits on how to best address the issues.
Regardless, Finstuen will be persuasive authority nationwide, and
binding in the Tenth Circuit, ensuring some protections for same-sex
couples traveling or moving into states that do not allow same-sex cou-
ples to adopt. In addition, both the Full Faith and Credit and Equal Pro-
tection Clauses provide security for gay couples who fear the possibility
that states might amend specific statutes to deny parental rights to them.
While gay rights advocates will continue to have numerous battles for
116. See Spector, supra note 88, at 468 n.4.
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the foreseeable future, it should be comforting to know that children of
gay couples are entitled to the same protection as all others.
Spencer B. Ross*
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Catherine Smith for her input and advice in preparing this comment, the Denver University
Law Review office for its support, and my family for encouraging me to pursue a legal career.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, PASSWORD-PROTECTED
COMPUTER FILES AND THIRD PARTY CONSENT SEARCHES:
THE TENTH CIRCUIT BROADENS THE SCOPE OF
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
INTRODUCTION
When ninety-one-year-old Dr. Bailey Andrus opened the door in his
pajamas, he was greeted by state and federal law enforcement agents.'
The agents had been investigating a company called RegPay, which pro-
vided, among other things, access to Internet sites displaying child por-
nography.2 During the investigation the agents obtained a list of Reg-
Pay's customers, and on this list was the name of fifty-one-year-old Ray
Andrus, Dr. Andrus's son.3
Eight months into the investigation, agents "believed they did not
have enough information to obtain a search warrant ... [and] attempted
to gather more information by doing a knock and talk interview with the
hope of being able to conduct a consent search." 4 Ray Andrus was at
work when the agents knocked on the door.5 The agents obtained con-
sent from Andrus's father and-using high-tech computer forensics
software--quickly collected information from Andrus's computer.6 The
agents used a software program that copied Andrus's hard-drive without
first determining whether any of the files were password-protected.7 So
without a search warrant, and without Andrus being present, government
agents used high-tech equipment to search his password-protected com-
puter files.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution declares
that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
8
1. United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 713 (10th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, No.
07-0753 (U.S. Nov. 21, 2007).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 713-14.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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The key question in United States v. Andrus was whether it was reason-
able for the government to conduct a search in the manner described
above.
The text of the Fourth Amendment has two clauses: "one speaking
to unreasonable searches and seizures, and the other discussing the re-
quirements for the issuance of warrants." 9 Over the two-hundred plus
years since the drafting of the amendment, the Court has struggled to
develop a coherent approach to its interpretation of these two clauses.
The result is what one commentator referred to as a "vast jumble of judi-
cial pronouncements that is not merely complex and contradictory, but
often perverse."' 0 Or, even more bluntly, "[t]he Fourth Amendment to-
day is an embarrassment.""
In spite of past difficulties with interpretation, courts have devel-
oped longstanding rules and doctrines that guide police in the conduct of
searches and seizures. However, there are significant new challenges
facing the courts in determining what constitutes a search and a seizure
of data from a computer. Thus, not only did Dr. Andrus open the door
allowing agents to enter his home, but he also unknowingly opened an-
other door into the extraordinarily important legal issue of searches and
seizures in the digital age.
This comment will discuss and analyze the issues implicated in
Andrus in three parts. Part I will trace the historical development of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It has been argued that modem ap-
proaches to understanding this area of the law are insufficient.' 2 The
goal in this Part is to identify patterns and trends that will provide a con-
text for understanding Andrus. Part II includes a detailed presentation of
the Tenth Circuit's holding in Andrus, including the dissent. Part III will
include an in-depth analysis of the Tenth Circuit's holding in Andrus in
light of the background cases and history of the Fourth Amendment.
Part III also concludes that the outcome could have been different had
Andrus invoked the Court's holding in Kyllo v. United States.3
I. BACKGROUND
One of the most abiding concerns in the American experience has
been the tension between individual freedoms and the security of its peo-
ple. The Founding Fathers were keenly aware of this tension, and, since
its birth over two-hundred years ago, the Fourth Amendment has served
9. Sam Kamin, The Private is Public: The Relevance of Private Actors in Defining the
Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 83, 88 (2004).
10. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1 (1997).
11. Id. at 1.
12. See id. at 2 ("[S]cholars ponder every nuance of the latest Supreme Court case but seem
unconcerned about the amendment's text, unaware of its history, and at times oblivious or hostile to
the common sense of common people.").
13. 533 U.S. 27,40 (2001).
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as a primary check on the power a government can exercise over its citi-
zens. These concerns have remained at the center of the national debate
as the tensions between freedom and security continue to make their way
into the news headlines of the day.
A. Historical Development of the Fourth Amendment
1. Eighteenth-Century Origins of the Fourth Amendment
The framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights were united in
their concerns about the power of the newly formed federal government.
It was their familiarity with the expansive powers of the King of England
that led to the Fourth Amendment.' 4 While the Fourth Amendment "was
prompted by complaints pressed during the Constitution's ratification...
its real source . . . [was] a trio of famous cases from the 1760s, two in
England and one in the colonies."' 5 The two English cases involved "au-
thors of political pamphlets critical of the King's ministers."' 6 The au-
thors of the pamphlets "suffered the ransacking of their homes and the
seizure of all their books and papers . ,, The authors sued govern-
ment officials and won on the holding that the government had tres-
passed on their property.
18
More importantly, however, a historic opinion-written by Lord
Cramden-got the attention of the American colonists. 19 Lord Cramden
condemned the practice of "general warrants," which allowed the King's
officials to search and seize private property on a mere suspicion, and did
not require the officials to make any attempt to identify with specificity
the materials that were the subject of the search.20 Essentially, under
British law the King's officials could enter a person's home on mere
suspicion and search anything they deemed necessary to determine if
there was any wrongdoing.2' It was this unfettered government power
that most concerned Lord Cramden. He announced that "[i]f such a
power is truly invested in a secretary of state, and he can delegate this
power, it certainly may affect the person and property of every man in
this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.,
22
During this time there were widespread concerns of illegal smug-
gling in the colonies resulting largely from the strict controls on colonist
14. See William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J.
393, 396-97 (1995).
15. Id. at 396.
16. Id. at 397. One of the authors was John Wilkes, a member of English Parliament who had
secretly written a pamphlet called The North Briton. Id. at 398.
17. Id. at 397.
18. Id. at 397-98.
19. Id. at 399.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
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trade activities.23 Predictably, officials wanted to squelch this activity
and thus relied on British law that allowed officials to "enter, and go into
any House, Shop, Cellar, Warehouse or Room, or other Place, and in
Case of Resistance, to break open Doors, Chests, Trunks and other Pack-
age[s] .... ,4 Consequently, colonists were targeted in an attempt to
find evidence of smuggling, and a lawsuit was filed in Boston to chal-
lenge the validity of these laws. 25 The thrust of the argument was that
should these so-called "writs of assistance" be upheld, they would "to-
tally annihilate" the long-standing principle that "[a] man's house is his
castle .... The court held that the searches were valid,27 but the lar-
ger point had been made: the colonists were displeased with the broad
search and seizure powers of the government and they would continue to
challenge them.
With this background, it is not surprising that the framers of the
United States Constitution sought to restrict the power of the government
to invade the homes of its citizens. Drawing upon the experiences of the
colonies and nascent states, the Fourth Amendment text was adopted "as
a specific response to a specific grievance that had arisen in a specific
historical context and had been shaped by a specific vulnerability in the
protections afforded by common-law arrest and search authority. 28
2. The United States Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment and the Warrant Requirement
The Court appeared to establish early that the amendment was not
simply a tool to limit the powers of the government, but that it essentially
stood for the right of individuals to be free from improper government
invasions into their personal lives. An early example of this perspective
can be found in the 1886 case of Boyd v. United States.29 In Boyd, Jus-
tice Bradley and the Court declared that "[i]t is not the breaking of his
doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of
the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty and private property" that forms the underlying
concern for regulating the government's power to search.30
The first question courts ask when faced with a search and seizure
issue is whether the Fourth Amendment is even implicated. It then be-
23. Id. at 404-05.
24. Id at 404.
25. Id. at 405-06. John Otis represented the colonists in their attempt to eliminate the use of
the writs of assistance by the British government. Even though Otis lost the case, his challenge of
the writs prompted John Adams to later say that "Otis had, in effect, fired the first shot of the Revo-
lution." Id. at 406.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547,
723 (1999).
29. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
30. Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
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comes important to understand what has to occur to even trigger an
analysis of the constitutionality of a particular search or seizure. Gener-
ally, there are two requirements. First, there must actually be a "search"
of something deemed to be private, and second, the search must stem
from government action. 31 Once a search has occurred by a government
actor, the analysis then turns to whether the search violated the Constitu-
tion.
Generally, if a search was conducted without a warrant then the
search is deemed "per se unreasonable." 32 In order to get a warrant, gov-
ernment agents must persuade a judge that the evidence sought will
likely result in an arrest. 33 In analyzing the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, courts place great emphasis on whether a warrant
was obtained prior to conducting the search. Some commentators have
questioned this rule on the basis that the text of the Fourth Amendment
does not have a "warrant requirement," but only requires, in the cases
where a warrant is obtained, that the search be reasonable. 34 Neverthe-
less, the Court has held that "[t]he Fourth Amendment proscribes all un-
reasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that [war-
rantless searches] ... are per se unreasonable... subject only to a few
specifically established and well delineated exceptions."
35
3. Warrantless Searches: Exceptions to the Per Se Rule
The Court has carved out several scenarios where the government
can attempt to justify a warrantless search after the search is completed.
Whereas the per se unreasonable rule provides for judicial review of rea-
sonableness prior to the search, the warrantless search exceptions pro-
vide judicial review after the search is conducted to determine whether it
was reasonable. If a court-after a search has been completed-
determines that the government violated the Fourth Amendment, then the
evidence that was obtained in the illegal search is inadmissible in crimi-
nal proceedings.36 Even if a defendant's guilt is obvious, if the police did
not follow constitutional standards the evidence cannot be used against
the defendant at trial.37 Consequently, this "exclusionary rule" compels
31. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2001) (explaining that "a Fourth Amendment
search occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recog-
nizes as reasonable.").
32. DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 189 (2004).
33. Id.
34. AMAR, supra note 10, at 9-10 (stating that "[w]e need to read the amendment's words and
take them seriously: they do not require warrants, probable cause, or exclusion of evidence, but they
do require that all searches and seizures be reasonable.").
35. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).
36. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 1.6 186-87 (4th ed. 2004).
37. Id.
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police to conduct warrantless searches in a constitutionally valid man-
ner.
38
The Court has upheld several instances of warrantless searches.39
Some examples of valid warrantless searches include: searches prior to
arrest,4° searches as a result of emergency situations, 41 and searches of
items in "plain view.', 42 However, the Court has validated another type
of warrantless search that was at issue in Andrus, which involves consent
searches.43  The consent obtained in Andrus was from a third party.
4
Therefore, the Court's approach to third party consent should be consid-
ered in more depth.
4. Consent Search Requirements
The right to be free from unreasonable searches from the govern-
ment can be waived.45 The Court has further held that knowledge of the
right to refuse to consent to a search is no hindrance to the legitimacy of
a consent search.46 That is, the police do not have to tell a person that he
has the right to refuse to consent to a warrantless search. This is differ-
ent from other constitutional rights that cannot be waived and require
government officials to inform citizens of their rights.47 When govern-
ment agents find it necessary, they may ask for consent to search private
property, and, as long as the consent is voluntary,48 the search is valid
under the Fourth Amendment.
38. Id. § 1.1(f) at 21-22.
39. 36 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 3, 38 (2007) (listing thirteen scenarios where "cer-
tain kinds of searches and seizures are valid as exceptions to the probable cause and warrant re-
quirements.").
40. Id. at 59-62.
41. Id. at 73-82.
42. Id. at 68-72.
43. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 8.1 at 4-8 (4th ed. 2004).
44. United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 720 (10th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, No.
07-0753 (U.S. Nov. 21, 2007).
45. LAFAVE, supra note 36, § 44, § 8.1(a) at 8-9; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412
U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (stating that "[i]n situations where the police have some evidence of illicit
activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid consent may be
the only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence.").
46. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231-32 (reasoning that "it would be thoroughly impractical to
impose on the normal consent search the detailed requirements of an effective warning. Consent
searches are part of the standard investigatory techniques of law enforcement agencies. They nor-
mally occur on the highway, or in a person's home or office, and under informal and unstructured
conditions."). But see Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (holding that consent is to be
determined by the totality of the circumstances; thus, if a person had already been told they could
refuse, then this information could be considered in the analysis of whether the subsequent consent
search was reasonable under the circumstances).
47. See LAFAVE, supra note 36, at § 44, § 8.1 (a) at 8-9.
48. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 546-48 (1968) (holding that when consent is
based on an erroneous claim by government officials that they do, in fact, have a search warrant, the
consent is invalid thus rendering the search unconstitutional).
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The Court has also held that consent can be obtained from third par-
ties. For example, in United States v. Matlock,4 9 the Court declared:
[W]hen the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof
of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that consent was given
by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was ob-
tained from a third party who possessed common authority over or
other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be in-
spected.
50
The reasoning of the Court in Matlock is premised on the third party hav-
ing actual authority to consent to the search. For example, when a police
officer gets permission to search a house from a roommate-rather than
the actual target of the search-the search will be valid as long as the
roommate possesses "common authority over or other sufficient relation-
ship" to the house.51
But what if police later learn that the third party did not possess the
requisite authority to consent? Justice Scalia-writing for the Court in
Illinois v. Rodriguez52-stated that the analysis will not turn on whether
the police officer was right about the third party's authority, but whether
his presumption of authority was reasonable.53 So, if a police officer
reasonably believes that the person providing the consent meets the re-
quirements set forth in Matlock, then whether he actually does or not is
irrelevant. Justice Scalia reasoned that police officers will have to make
decisions based on the facts they are provided in any given circumstance;
therefore, if the judgment is reasonable given the information they are
provided, then that should not change the underlying validity of the
search if it is later learned that the information was false or inaccurate.54
Allowing the government to search private homes and property un-
der the authority of third party consent appears to give broad powers to
the government. Recently, however, the Court narrowed the rules of
consent searches when it held that third party consent is invalid when the
person that is the target of the search is present, and they object to the
search. 55 For example, if the police want to search the house of a hus-
band and wife because they believe the husband is engaged in some ille-
gal activities, the wife's consent is invalid if the husband is both present
and he objects to the search.56
49. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
50. Id. at 171.
51. Id.
52. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
53. Id. at 185.
54. Id. at 185-86.
55. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120 (2006).
56. See id. at 125.
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In sum, the Fourth Amendment requires that the government obtain
a warrant based on probable cause to validly search a person's property.
Moreover, the warrant cannot be general, but must specify "the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 5 7 If the government
has not obtained a warrant, then the search is considered per se unrea-
sonable unless the government can justify the search under one of the
recognized exceptions for warrantless searches. 58 Of particular impor-
tance for this comment is the third party consent exception because this
is what the government obtained from Andrus's ninety-one-year-old fa-
ther.59
B. Emerging Technologies and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
The Fourth Amendment was originally applied to searches and sei-
zures of tangible items.60 This perspective was grounded in the text of
the amendment, which lists items such as "persons, houses, papers, and
effects ....,,6' Historically, this made sense, for as Justice Brandeis ob-
served, "[florce and violence were then the only means known to man by
which a government could ... secure possession of his papers and other
articles incident to his private life ... ,,62 Consequently, the Court took
a narrow approach to the determination of whether a particular search
implicated the Fourth Amendment. Predictably, this approach was put to
the test as new technologies developed allowing the government to gain
access to private information without resorting to "force and violence."
1. From Olmstead to Katz and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
In Olmstead v. United States,63 the United States charged over sev-
enty defendants with violating the National Prohibition Act.64 Over a
period of several months government agents listened to phone conversa-
tions confirming the illegal activities of the defendants. 65 The agents had
conducted wiretapping "without trespass upon any property of the defen-
dants., 66 The wiretap technology thus allowed agents to get information
without resorting to "force and violence." Accordingly, invoking the
literal language and historical origins of the text, Chief Justice Taft-
writing for the majority-declared that the Fourth Amendment "does not
forbid what was done [in this case]. There was no searching. There was
no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing
57. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
58. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001).
59. United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 720 (10th Cir. 2007),petition for cert. filed, No.
07-0753 (U.S. Nov. 21, 2007).
60. Orin Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARv. L. REv. 531, 533 (2005).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
62. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 455-56.
64. Id
65. Id. at 457.
66. Id.
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and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defen-
dants.
, 67
Olmstead appears to adhere to the text and original meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.68 However, Justice Brandeis dissent foreshadowed
the underlying flaws in Olmstead by observing that "[t]ime works
changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a
principal to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mis-
chief which gave it birth.
69
Almost forty years after Olmstead, the Court addressed the issue of
whether bugging a phone booth implicated a search under the Fourth
Amendment.70 The government suspected defendant Katz of participat-
ing in illegal wagering over wire communications and consequently in-
stalled a bugging device into the phone booth where he was believed to
make the calls.71 At trial, the government presented the evidence ob-
tained from the calls and won a conviction. 72 Katz objected to the ad-
missibility of the evidence, arguing that it was obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment.73
Understandably, both the district court and the appellate court relied
on Olmstead in their determinations that the bugging of the phone booth
did not implicate the Fourth Amendment because there was no physical
breach.74 Moreover, it was reasonable to infer from the Court's past
holdings that the issue would turn on whether a phone booth was a "con-
stitutionally protected area.",
75
However, writing for the Court, Justice Stewart explained that
[b]ecause of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the
parties have attached great significance to the characterization of the
telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. The peti-
tioner has strenuously argued that the booth was a "constitutionally
protected area." The Government has maintained with equal vigor
that it was not. But this effort to decide whether or not a given
"area," viewed in the abstract, is "constitutionally protected" deflects
attention from the problem presented by this case.
76
With the context of the issue properly situated, Justice Stewart then de-
livered a fatal blow to Olmstead by announcing that "the Fourth
67. Id. at 464.
68. See Kamin, supra note 9, at 94 (stating that "[a]s a reading of the text, this interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment is almost entirely unassailable.").
69. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
70. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349 (1967).
71. Id. at 348-49.
72. Id. at 348.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 348-49.
75. See id. at 350.
76. Id. at 351.
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Amendment protects people, not places."77  Consequently, a new ap-
proach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was established.
Katz emphasized the expectations of privacy manifested by the in-
dividual. Specifically, "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area ac-
cessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected., 78 Knowledge
of whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy is thus
what determines if the Fourth Amendment is implicated. In Katz, the
defendant was in a public place and exhibited a reasonable expectation
because he closed the door to the phone booth, manifesting a desire for
privacy. 9
Katz provides the guidelines for a court to determine whether the
Fourth Amendment has been implicated in a search. Since Katz, the
Court has interpreted a reasonable expectation of privacy to consist of a
manifested subjective expectation of privacy by the individual that soci-
ety would recognize as objectively reasonable. 80 Thus, the individual has
to demonstrate that he expects privacy and society has to accept that ex-
pectation as reasonable.
2. Issues in Determining Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
Predictably, applying Katz presents questions such as how a court
determines whether a person has an expectation of privacy. Or, how
does a person actually manifest that he has an expectation of privacy that
society would find reasonable? In United States v. Miller,81 the Court
held that when a person voluntarily turns over private financial informa-
tion to a bank, the person has thus exhibited that he does not have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy because "[t]he depositor takes the risk, in
revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by
that person to the Government. '' 82 Accordingly, there was no search in
Miller that required Fourth Amendment protection.83
In Smith v. Maryland,84 the police had a phone company install a
device that recorded all the numbers dialed from Smith's home.85 Police
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. Id.
79. See id. at 352 (stating that "one who occupies [the phone booth], shuts the door behind
him, and pays the toll ... is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece
will not be broadcast to the world.").
80. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988).
81. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
82. Id. at 443. The Court added that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by [the third party] to Government authorities,
even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose
and confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed. Id.
83. Id. at444.
84. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
85. Id. at 737.
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had suspected Smith of committing a crime, but had not yet obtained a
search warrant.86 The question was whether it is reasonable to expect
that phone numbers dialed from one's home are not being recorded.87
The Court rejected Smith's argument by doubting "that people in general
entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial."88
The Court invoked Miller in concluding that Smith "voluntarily con-
veyed numerical information to the telephone company ... [and thus]
assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he
dialed., 89 Read together, Miller and Smith "establish a general rule that
if information is in the hands of third parties, then an individual lacks a
reasonable expectation of privacy" thus forfeiting his right to Fourth
Amendment protections.9"
Broadening Miller and Smith, the Court held that when a person
puts his garbage out on the curb of a public street-for the purpose of
being picked up by a third party-this will "defeat [the] claim to Fourth
Amendment protection" because, even though there may be a subjective
expectation of privacy, it is not one society would recognize. 91
Notably, the Court has also faced issues involving the use of new
surveillance devices. In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,92 the Court
held "that the taking of aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex
from navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment." 93 More recently, however, the Court held that the use of a
thermal imaging device that detects heat inside of buildings was improp-




87. Id. at 736.
88. Id. at 742.
89. Id. at 744.
90. SOLOVE, supra note 32, at 201. Professor Solove adds rather ominously that "[g]athering
information from third party records is an emerging law enforcement practice with as many potential
dangers as the wiretapping in Olmstead." Id.
91. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (reasoning that "[i]t is common knowl-
edge that plastic garbage bags left on ... a public street are readily accessible to animals, children,
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public") (footnotes omitted). But see id. at 45-46
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (protesting that going through someone else's garbage "is contrary to
commonly accepted notions of civilized behavior" and that "members of our society will be shocked
to learn that the Court... [disagrees]"); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 131 (2006) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (challenging the Court's holding on the grounds that it relies on the interpretation of
social norms).
92. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
93. Id. at 239. The Court pointed out, however, that the holding was based partly on the fact
that the photographs did not reveal "intimate details," suggesting that had the photographs had been
more detailed then the search might have been prohibited. Id. at 237-38.
94. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
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3. Kyllo v. United States: The Use of Special Technologies and the
Fourth Amendment
Federal agents had suspected that Kyllo was growing marijuana in
his home but had not obtained a search warrant. 95 Reasoning that grow-
ing marijuana typically requires the use of heat lamps, the agents used a
thermal imaging device-which detects levels of heat-that confirmed
there was an unusually high level of heat emanating from Kyllo's apart-
ment.96 Partly on the basis of this information, the agents successfully
obtained a search warrant and subsequently found "an indoor growing
operation involving more than 100 plants. 97
After conviction, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court be-
cause Kyllo "had shown no subjective expectation of privacy because he
had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home .... 98
The Court now had an opportunity to explore the impact of radically
changing technologies on existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
99
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia acknowledged that "[i]t would be
foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the
Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of tech-
nology." 100  Consequently, the Court would have to establish what-if
any-limits should be placed on these powerful new technologies in the
hands of government law enforcement agents.'
0 '
Ultimately, Kyllo held that "where... the Government uses a de-
vice that is not in general public use ... the surveillance is a 'search' and
is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant."' 1 2 Thus, a key princi-
ple emerging from Kyllo is the importance of technology that "is not in
general public use."' 1 3  Interestingly, while Kyllo appears to broaden
individual freedoms, at least one commentator has suggested that this
holding significantly narrows Fourth Amendment protections for indi-
viduals. °4 At any rate, Kyllo will be critical to lower courts as they con-
front the challenges of applying old rules to new technologies.
95. Id. at 29-30.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 30.
98. Id. at 31.
99. See Kamin, supra note 9, at 114 (suggesting that the Court missed an opportunity because
"[i]nstead of confronting the technology question directly... the Court looked to the past, princi-
pally to Katz and Dow Chemical, in search of answers").
100. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34.
101. Id. at 34.
102. Id. at40.
103. Id.
104. See Kamin, supra note 9, at 117 (predicting that "[o]nce individuals can be fairly charged
with an awareness of a technology and its implications.. . they are responsible for protecting them-
selves from its possible invasions").
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A. Facts, Holding and Rationale of the Trial Court
As part of a federal investigation into RegPay-a company provid-
ing access to Internet sites containing child pornography-federal agents
obtained Ray Andrus's name from a list of RegPay's customers.105 The
information included a credit card number and an address, which re-
vealed that Andrus lived with his elderly father.'06 After eight months of
surveillance, "agents believed they did not have enough information to
obtain a search warrant for the Andrus residence."'1 7 Consequently, the
agents "attempted to gather more information by doing a 'knock and
talk' interview with the hope of being able to conduct a consent
search."
, 108
On the morning of August 27, 2004, two federal agents and one lo-
cal police detective arrived at the Andrus residence. 0 9 One of the federal
agents was a "forensic computer expert ... [who] waited outside in his
car for ... authorization to enter the premises."' 1° Dr. Bailey Andrus-a
ninety-one-year-old retired physician-greeted the agents at the door and
invited them inside."' Once inside, the agents "learned that Ray Andrus
lived in the center bedroom in the residence ... [and] did not pay rent
and lived in the home to help care for his aging parents."
'" 2
The federal agent "testified he could see the door to Ray Andrus' [s]
bedroom was open and asked Dr. Andrus whether he had access to the
bedroom."'"13 Dr. Andrus informed agents that he did have access and
"felt free to enter the room when the door was open, but always knocked
if the door was closed."
'"14
After the agents obtained written consent from Dr. Andrus to search
any computers inside the house, the computer forensic specialist was
brought inside to conduct a forensic search of Ray Andrus's computer." 5
The court described the process as follows:
Kanatzar [the computer analyst] removed the cover from Andrus'[s]
computer and hooked his laptop and other equipment to it. Dr.
Andrus testified he was present at the beginning of the search but left
the bedroom shortly thereafter. Kanatzar testified it took about ten to
105. United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 713 (10th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, No.
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fifteen minutes to connect his equipment before he started analyzing
the computer. Kanatzar used EnCase forensic software to examine
the . . . hard drive. The software allowed him direct access to the
hard drive without first determining whether a user name or pass-
word were needed. He, therefore, did not determine whether the
computer was protected by a user name or password prior to pre-
viewing the computer's contents.
116
While still at the house Kanatzar identified "depictions of child pornog-
raphy" on Andrus's computer." 7
Meanwhile, the other federal agent learned from Dr. Andrus that the
only computer in the house was the one in Ray Andrus's room." 8 At this
point, the court notes that there was conflicting testimony during the
trial. Either the father or the federal agent suggested that Ray Andrus be
contacted about the search at his place of employment. 19 Regardless,
the father made the call and then handed the phone to the agent to speak
with Andrus.120  After Andrus agreed to come home, the federal agent
went into the bedroom and asked Kanatzar to stop the computer
search.' 21 Next, "Kanatzar testified he shut down his laptop computer
and waited in Ray Andrus' [s] bedroom with the computer until [the other
federal agent] came back into the room to tell [Kanatzar] Andrus had
personally consented to the search and Kanatzar could continue.
'1 22
When Andrus arrived home a few minutes later, the federal agent
informed him "that officers had already been inside the residence and
had looked through his room.' 123  After explaining that he obtained
Andrus's father's consent to search the computer, the federal agent "ver-
bally asked Andrus for consent to search his room and his computer.'
124
Andrus agreed and the agents then resumed the search.125
Andrus was subsequently indicted for possession of child pornogra-
phy. 126 Andrus filed a motion to suppress the evidence on grounds that it
116. Id. at 713-14 (emphasis added). The court added in a footnote that "Kanatzar testified that
someone without forensic equipment would need Ray Andrus'[s] user name and password to access
files stored within Andrus'[s] user profile." Id. at 714 n.1.
117. Id. at 714.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. There was also conflicting testimony about the content of this phone call. The federal
agent testified that he did not inform Andrus of the nature of the search, but Andrus testified that the
agent "told him during the phone call that pornography had been discovered during a search of his
computer." Id. at 714 n.3. However, the court noted that because the consent search ultimately
rested upon apparent authority, there was no need to resolve this dispute. Id. Accordingly, because
the voluntariness of Andrus's consent to search his computer was not the basis for the consent
search, it does not matter what the agent said to him during the phone conversation. See id.





126. Id. at 712.
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was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 127  Specifically,
Andrus argued that his father did not voluntarily consent to the search;
that his father "lacked actual authority to consent to a search of the com-
puter, even if he had authority to consent to a search of [his] room"; and
that his father "could not reasonably be seen as having authority to con-
sent to a search of the computer and, thus, lacked apparent authority.
'" 128
The court concluded that the father did voluntarily consent, but that
the father did not have actual authority for the computer search. 129 The
court reasoned that the father "did not know how to use the computer,
had never used the computer, and did not know the user name that would
have allowed him to access the computer."1 30 However, the court con-
cluded that the father did possess apparent authority, reasoning that "the
agents' belief that [the father] had authority to consent to a search of the
computer was reasonable up until the time they learned there was only
one computer in the house."1 3' Further, because Kanatzar was instructed
to "suspend the search at that point, there was no Fourth Amendment
violation."1 32 Consequently, because the motion to suppress was denied
Andrus pled guilty and was sentenced to seven months in prison.
1 33
B. The Tenth Circuit Affirms Andrus's Conviction
1. Majority Opinion
Writing for a 2-1 majority, Judge Murphy began the discussion of
Andrus by reviewing cases dealing with consent searches and the Fourth
Amendment. 34 Specifically, he identified and discussed the cases ad-
dressing third party consent searches.1 35 After reviewing several relevant
cases, Judge Murphy noted that "[t]his court has not previously consid-
ered expectations of privacy associated with a home computer in a third
party consent situation. 1 36 Moreover, "Tenth Circuit precedent thus far
has dealt only with computer searches where police have a warrant or




131. Id. The court based its conclusion that the father had apparent authority on five factual
findings: (1) the e-mail address used to register for the website was in the father's name; (2) the
father told the agents that he paid the bill for the Internet access; (3) the agents were aware that
several other people lived in the household; (4) Ray Andrus's bedroom was unlocked, suggesting
that the members of the household had access to it; and (5) "the computer itself was in plain view of
anyone who entered the room and it appeared available for anyone's use." Id
132. Id.
133. 1d. at 712.
134. Id. at 716.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 717.
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other justification for searching the computer, or when the defendant
computer owner himself has consented to the search.'
137
Next, Judge Murphy addressed the issue of whether computers are
like other containers, or if they are something entirely different.138 The
majority acknowledged that "[g]iven the pervasiveness of computers in
American homes, this court must reach some, at least tentative, conclu-
sion about the category into which personal computers fall.' 39 Subse-
quently, the majority reasoned that because computers play such a cen-
tral role in multiple areas of our lives, "it seems natural that computers
should fall into the same category as suitcases, footlockers, or other per-
sonal items that command... a high degree of privacy."'
40
The court then addressed the issue of whether one has a reasonable
expectation of privacy by having a password-protected computer file. 14
In an analysis regarding containers such as footlockers or suitcases, the
key inquiry is whether the "container is physically locked."' 42 However,
the court quickly recognized the challenge in identifying whether a con-
tainer is locked and whether a computer-which has been categorized by
the court as a container-is also locked. Essentially, one can visibly see
a lock on containers, but how is one to tell if a computer is locked, "es-
pecially when the computer is in the 'off position prior to the
search[?]"'' 43 The court determined that "a critical issue in assessing a
third party's apparent authority to consent to the search of a home com-
puter ... is whether law enforcement knows or should reasonably sus-
pect because of surrounding circumstances that the computer is password
protected."' 44 So, whether a person has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in a password-protected computer file depends primarily on
whether the police have any reason to suspect the person's password is
needed to access the computer.
Finally, the court addressed the "critical issue [of] whether, under
the totality of the circumstances known to [the agents], these [agents]
could reasonably have believed Dr. Andrus [had] authority to consent to
a search of the computer."'' 45 Emphasizing that "[i]f the circumstances
reasonably indicated Dr. Andrus had mutual use of or control over the
computer, the officers were under no obligation to ask clarifying ques-
137. Id. (The cases Judge Murphy cited are: United States v. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir.
2005); United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2002); and United States v. Carey, 172
F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999)).






144. Id. at 719.
145. Id. at 720.
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tions ....,,146 Hence, there is no burden on the police to confirm what
they already reasonably believe. This is true "even if. . . the burden
would have been minimal in this particular case."' 147 Consequently, the
majority concluded that it was reasonable to believe that Dr. Andrus had
apparent authority, thus holding that the subsequent search of Andrus's
computer was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
48
2. Judge McKay's Dissent
Judge McKay was concerned with "the majority's implicit holding
that law enforcement may use software deliberately designed to auto-
matically bypass computer password protection based on third-party con-
sent without the need to make a reasonable inquiry regarding the pres-
ence of password protection and the third party's access to that pass-
word., 149 He suggested that the majority's holding would allow police to
maneuver around the Fourth Amendment with regard to passwords. In-
voking the reasoning of Chief Justice Roberts's dissent in Georgia v.
Randolph-another third party consent case-Judge McKay suggested
that the majority holding in Andrus denied a computer owner the ability
to manifest an expectation of privacy by utilizing a password. 5 ° Specifi-
cally, "[t]he unconstrained ability of law enforcement to use forensic
software ...to bypass password protection without first determining
whether such passwords [exist] does not exacerbate this difficulty ...
rather, it avoids it altogether, simultaneously and dangerously sidestep-
ping the Fourth Amendment in the process."' 5' Under the majority rule,
having a password is a meaningless protection unless the user makes it
clear that there actually is a password requirement to access the com-
puter.
Judge McKay also noted that even though password protection is
not immediately visible, this "does not render it unlocked."' 52 So, be-
cause law enforcement agents cannot see a lock, that does not mean that
it is not there, and, furthermore, this reality only heightens the need for
inquiry about the presence of a lock.
Judge McKay reasoned that "[g]iven the inexcusable confusion in
this case, the circumstantial evidence is simply not enough to justify the
agents' use of... software without making further inquiry [regarding the
146. Id.
147. Id. (responding to the dissent's charge that the police should carry some burden to resolve
any ambiguities about actual authority).
148. Id. at 722.
149. Id. (McKay, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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presence of a password]. 153  In order to remedy this situation, Judge
McKay recommended that-given relevant case law on consent searches
and computer searches-the law should require government agents to
"inquire or otherwise check for the presence of password protection and,
if a password is present, inquire about the consenter's knowledge of that
password and joint access to the computer."
154
3. Andrus's Petition for Rehearing
The Tenth Circuit subsequently denied Andrus's request for rehear-
ing. 155 The court noted in its order denying rehearing that "its opinion is
limited to the narrow question of the apparent authority of a homeowner
to consent to a search of a computer ... in the specific factual setting
presented .... Further, the court did not address "the extent of capa-
bility and activation of password protection.., on home computers...
or the degree to which law enforcement confronts password protection
... on home computers.1 57 Although Andrus presented key questions
about issues of privacy and passwords, the court did not offer an explicit
opinion about how to confront these issues.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Other Circuit Court Opinions
Andrus was a case of first impression for the Tenth Circuit.
158
There were only two other appellate court cases identified involving third
party consent of a password-protected computer and both were heard by
the Fourth Circuit. 159  Trulock v. Freeh160 involved a couple living to-
gether and sharing a computer, but they each had password-protected
files to which the other did not have access. 61  A key factual distinction
between Freeh and Andrus was that in Freeh, the "agents queried [the
girlfriend] about [appellant's] personal records and computer files" and
153. Id. at 725 (McKay, J., dissenting) (adding that the agents were clearly aware of the uncer-
tainty of the father's authority to consent when they stopped the search to wait for Andrus to arrive
home).
154. Id.
155. United States v. Andrus, 499 F.3d 1162, 1162 (10th Cir. 2007) (opinion denying rehear-
ing) (reporting that eight judges voted to deny rehearing and five judges voted to grant rehearing).
156. Id. (opinion denying rehearing).
157. Id. at 1163 (opinion denying rehearing).
158. United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 717 (10th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, No.
07-0753 (U.S. Nov. 21, 2007) (stating that "[t]his court has not previously considered expectations
of privacy associated with a home computer in a third-party consent situation. Tenth Circuit prece-
dent thus far has dealt only with computer searches where police have a warrant ... or when the
defendant computer owner himself has consented to the search.").
159. There are a few more cases involving third-party consent of a non-password protected
computer. See, e.g., United States v. Aaron, 33 F. App'x 180, 182 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Smith, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1113 (C.D. I11. 1998).
160. 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001).
161. Id. at 403.
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were told that there was a password.162 Reasoning that "because he con-
cealed his password from [his girlfriend], it cannot be said that [he] as-
sumed the risk that [she] would permit others to search his files," the
Fourth Circuit concluded that third party consent was valid as to a gen-
eral search of the computer but did not extend to the password-protected
files.
163
The Fourth Circuit emphasized that the presence of a password
conveyed that the appellant had "affirmatively intended to exclude ...
others from his personal files."''64 Hence, the appellant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy that narrowed the scope of the third party con-
sent. 165 Importantly, however, Freeh appeared to suggest that it is not
unreasonable for law enforcement to enquire about the presence of a
password in the course of obtaining third party consent to search a com-
puter.
In United States v. Buckner,166 government agents obtained consent
from the appellant's wife to search his password-protected computer for
evidence of online fraud. 167 The Fourth Circuit held the apparent author-
ity of the wife was reasonable and thus held the search valid.168 Buckner
addressed the issue of the use of technology that bypasses passwords
because the agents were never informed about the presence of a pass-
word. 169  Further, "[e]ven during the ... forensic analysis processes,
nothing the officers saw indicated that any computer files were encrypted
or password-protected."'' 70 Echoing Kyllo, the court added in a footnote
that "[w]e do not hold that the officers could rely upon apparent authority
to search while simultaneously using . . . technology to intentionally
avoid discovery of [a password] put in place by the user.' 17 1 Interest-
ingly, this is precisely what government agents did in Andrus.
172
B. The Relevance of Kyllo
Andrus's defense was an attack on the court's holding that his father
had authority to consent to the search. 173 Andrus challenged the reason-
ableness of the agent's reliance on information provided by his father
162. Id. at 398.
163. Id. at 403.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 473 F.3d 551 (4th Cir. 2007).
167. Id. at 552.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 553.
170. Id. at 555.
171. Id. at 556 n.3.
172. There is no evidence that the agents in Andrus used the technology to intentionally avoid
having to ask about the presence of a password. United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 723 (10th
Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, No. 07-0753 (U.S. Nov. 21, 2007). However, because the soft-
ware itself is capable of deliberate avoidance of a password, it is reasonable to conclude that this
eliminates the need to ask about the presence of a password.
173. Id. at 712.
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and argued that the court erroneously concluded it was reasonable to
believe that his father had authority to consent.1 74  At trial, however,
Andrus did not challenge the use of specialized technology that bypasses
password-protection on computers.175 Consequently, Andrus missed an
opportunity to let Kyllo do the heavy lifting of his defense.
In order to support this assertion, Andrus would have needed to lay
the following groundwork. First, courts-including the Tenth Circuit in
Andrus-have held that computers are like containers for purposes of
search and seizure rules. 176 Second, courts have consistently held that
locked containers carry a higher expectation of privacy, and thus the
scope of a third party consent search is limited. 77 These two premises
lead to the critical question: is a password like a lock?
1. The Andrus Court Held That a Computer is Like a Container.
The court recognized that computers have similarities and differ-
ences from traditional containers.178 After all, containers are used to
place personal items in for storage and safe-keeping and transporting
from place to place. When computers first appeared they were largely
viewed as "glorified typewriters" which could hardly be compared to a
container. 7 9 But over time computers have gradually become the central
storage space for large swaths of individuals' personal lives. Conse-
quently, the court concluded that "[b]ecause intimate information is
commonly stored on computers, it seems natural that computers should
fall into the same category as suitcases, footlockers, or other personal
items that command a high degree of privacy."'
80
2. The Presence of a Lock on a Container Receives More Fourth
Amendment Protection.
When government agents opened up a locked footlocker-without a
search warrant and without consent-the Court held that "by placing
personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker, respondents mani-
fested an expectation [of privacy.] No less than one who locks the doors
of his home against intruders, one who safeguards his personal posses-
sions [with a lock] is due the protection of the Fourth Amendment War-
rant Clause."' 8' The Tenth Circuit followed this by observing that the
174. Id. at 715.
175. United States v. Andrus, 499 F.3d 1162, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007) (opinion denying rehear-
ing) (reasoning that "appellant's argument premised on Kyllo v. United States ... was made for the
first time in his petition for rehearing and was not initially presented to the panel. The argument is
therefore forfeited.").
176. Andrus, 483 F.3d at 718.
177. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977); United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535,
541 (4th Cir. 1978).
178. Id. at 718.
179. Kerr, supra note 60, at 569.
180. Andrus, 483 F.3d at 718 (internal quotation) (empty brackets omitted).
181. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11.
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presence of a lock on a container is a factor in determining the expecta-
tion of privacy. 82 The Fourth Circuit has also held that when a mother
did not have a key, her third party consent did not extend to her son's
locked footlocker.
1 83
Conversely, the absence of a lock carries with it an inference that
the owner does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, thus broad-
ening the scope of the consent of a third-party to authorize a search. The
salient point is that a locked container triggers increased protections un-
der the Fourth Amendment. If something is locked, and the only key is
in the hands of the owner, courts require more than third party consent
for the search to be valid.
84
3. The Critical Question: Is a Password on a Computer Like a
Lock on a Container?
If Andrus could convince the court that a password is like a lock,
then the argument would be over because the syllogism would be com-
plete. All locked containers get more protection; all password-protected
computers are like locked containers; therefore, all password-protected
computers get more protection.
The court made the following statements on the issue of whether a
password is like a lock: "Determining whether a computer is locked...
presents a challenge distinct from that associated with other types of
closed containers"; and "[u]nlike footlockers or suitcases . . . a lock on
the data within a computer is not apparent from a visual inspection ... of
the computer . . ."; and "[d]ata on an entire computer may be protected
by a password, with the password functioning as a lock .. ,,85 The
court also quoted from a dictionary definition of "password" which de-
scribed it as "[a] sequence of characters, known only to authorized per-
sons, which must be keyed in to gain access to a particular computer
,,186
After reading these comments, it appeared that the court was about
to announce that a password was like a lock and hold that unless
Andrus's father had the password, the search of the computer was inva-
lid. However, the court reasoned that because the password was not im-
mediately visible to the agents, and because the agents were under no
obligation to ask about the presence of a password-absent ambiguities
suggesting the need for further inquiry-then, as a matter of law, there
182. United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 864 (10th Cir. 1992).
183. United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 537, 542 (4th Cir. 1978).
184. Id.
185. Andrus, 483 F.3d at 718-19 (10th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (internal quotation omit-
ted).
186. Id. at 719 (quoting Oxford English Dictionary Online, http:// dictionary. oed.com (entry
for "Password," definition 1.b).
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was no password. 187 In other words, the test of whether a password on a
computer is like a lock is not whether the password actually operates as a
lock, but whether "law enforcement knows or should reasonably suspect
because of surrounding circumstances that the computer is password
protected.' 88 So, even though Andrus locked his computer-thus exhib-
iting an increased expectation of privacy that carries with it increased
protections-the court reasoned that his computer was not locked be-
cause there was no way for the agents to know that it was locked. This
holding, combined with the holding that the father had apparent author-
ity, provided the Tenth Circuit with the support it needed to affirm the
conviction.
4. Could Kyllo Have Helped Andrus?
Kyllo could have helped Andrus because "where ... the Govern-
ment uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of
the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreason-
able without a warrant.' 89 Similarly, in Andrus, "the Government use[d]
a device [called EnCase software] that is not in general public use, to
explore details of [Andrus's computer] that would previously have been
unknowable without" turning on the computer, entering the password
and accessing the files. 190
Imagine a person has locked their personal container-like a foot-
locker-by using a magnetized locking device not immediately visible to
others. 191 Also, the device is unlocked by waving a demagnetizing wand
over it that only the owner has access to. If law enforcement agents get
valid third party consent to search the container, they are accordingly
armed with the authority to try to open it and search its contents. How-
ever, upon realizing they cannot open it because it is locked by the un-
seen magnet, and because only the owner has the demagnetizing wand,
the third party consent to search the container evaporates. Unless the
third party consenter also has a demagnetizing wand that will open the
container, the third party consent is rendered toothless and the agents will
be unable to search the container without a warrant or consent of the
owner. Simply put, the presence of a lock-seen or unseen-that effec-
tively keeps the agents out is supported by the Constitution.
Now, in the same scenario, would it be reasonable for agents to use
an imaging device that identifies the contents of the container without
187. Id. at 721.
188. Id. at 719.
189. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
190. Id.
191. These types of mechanisms are becoming more common on doors and the magnets are
turned on and off to control access in the same way deadbolts are used. The obvious difference
being that deadbolts are visible whereas magnets are not.
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first trying to open it? Put another way, if agents had a tool like x-ray
machine, would it be reasonable for them to use this tool on the container
without ever having to open the container, thus rendering the presence of
a lock irrelevant? According to the United States Supreme Court, the
answer is no. 192 Kyllo stands for the proposition that the government
cannot use certain special technologies to gather information in areas
protected by the Fourth Amendment without a search warrant.193 Thus, it
is reasonable to conclude that a Kyllo-based argument could have
changed the Tenth Circuit's decision in Andrus.
It is possible that Andrus stands for the proposition that the use of
Kyllo-like technology is constitutional when there is third party consent.
However, this would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Consider that if it were Andrus's locked
footlocker agents wanted to search for images of child pornography, the
agents would have had to have the father's apparent authority and a key.
Now, if Andrus is allowed to stand, all agents need to search a container
is third party apparent authority and something less than a key.
The Andrus rule essentially does three things: first, it removes the
requirement for a third party consenter to have a key to a locked con-
tainer; second, it replaces the key requirement with a government actor's
reasonable belief that there is no need for a key; and third, it allows the
use of technology to bypass a key (or password) without first determin-
ing whether the container (or computer) is locked. This new rule will
likely result in increased litigation over Fourth Amendment protections
because of the unfettered discretion given to law enforcement agents in
searches of private containers, including computers.
It is hard to imagine what private citizens could reasonably do to
protect themselves against excessive government intrusion into their pri-
vate lives when all that is required is for a police officer to not suspect
the presence of a lock and to possess the technology to bypass it. One of
these tools without the other is limited and within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment in certain contexts. But the combination conveys formida-
ble powers to the government and delivers a significant blow to any rea-
sonable expectations of privacy a citizen might have over private infor-
mation.
192. Id. at 40.
193. Specifically, Kyllo limits the technology to that "not in general public use." Id Thus,
Andrus would have had to convince the Tenth Circuit that EnCase software is not in general public
use. Further, the use of the technology in Kyllo was on a house, not a computer. However, given
that the computer was located in a bedroom inside the house, it seems reasonable to infer that the
Court would view this as an area protected by the Fourth Amendment.
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CONCLUSION
It is clear that the digital age has ushered in new challenges for the
courts. What remains unclear, however, is the approach that will prop-
erly balance the tension between individual freedoms and valid state in-
terests in an unprecedented time of technological development.
The Tenth Circuit's approach in Andrus appears to narrow individ-
ual protections in favor of broader state authority to search for private
information. But is this an accurate reading of Andrus in light of the
context? While this case comment presents an argument that could have
won for Andrus, it may be important to briefly ask whether Andrus
should have won. In fairness to the Tenth Circuit, the narrowing of indi-
vidual freedoms appears to be the national trend as the government seeks
to balance freedom and security. Further, as criminal activity becomes
more sophisticated through the use of computer technology, it is reason-
able to conclude that government agents charged with fighting computer
crime should be given some latitude and discretion in how to confront
these complicated matters.
The Andrus court, however, went a step beyond what is reasonably
necessary to combat computer crimes. There were alternative methods
available to government agents-such as getting a search warrant or ask-
ing about the presence of a password. Also, because of the increasingly
central role that computers play in the storage of personal information,
courts should be less deferential to government attempts to access that
information without search warrants.
Consequently, courts will-and should-face increased scrutiny as
they review critical matters involving the scope and authority of govern-
ment agents to investigate crimes in the digital age.
Michael Smith*
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. The author would like
to thank Professor Sam Kamin and Melissa Meitus for guidance and support with this comment, as
well as Shannon Brown, Brad Brickhouse, Kelly Wilson, and the Denver University Law Review




THE NEED FOR THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT TO
ADOPT THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S DEFINITION OF
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
INTRODUCTION
"Before 1965, healthcare services [in America] were described as
'dual tracked': the wealthy received care from private physicians while
the poor-if they accessed service at all-received care in ambulatory
clinics and emergency rooms."'
This perception changed in 1965 when Congress created the Medi-
caid program.' Since then, scholars and courts have examined whether
Medicaid creates an individually enforceable right to health care. Courts
are split on which, if any, provisions of the Medicaid statute create a
federally enforceable right, but generally agree that Medicaid eligible
individuals have a federally enforceable right to receive benefits with
reasonable promptness, services comparable in amount, duration and
scope to non-beneficiaries, and early and periodic screening, diagnostic
and treatment services (EPSDT) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 3 While courts
generally hold that there is a federally enforceable right to prompt and
comparable medical assistance, courts have failed to provide a uniform
remedy when that right is violated. The Medicaid statute defines the
term "medical assistance" as financial assistance, however some courts
interpret the statute differently.4 Some circuits require states to provide
actual medical assistance to eligible Medicaid recipients,5 while other
circuits reject the idea that states must provide actual medical services,
1. Abigail R. Moncrieff, Comment, Payments to Medicaid Doctors: Interpreting the "Equal
Access" Provision, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 673, 675 (2006).
2. Medicaid Statute, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396a-1396v (2008). Congress created the Medicaid
program by amending the Social Security Act, and as such, the program remains in the Social Secu-
rity Act.
3. See Okla. Chapter of the Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 472 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th
Cir. 2007) (assuming, without deciding, that the EPSDT requirement creates a federally enforceable
right); Mandy R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2006) (agreeing with the Ninth and
Third Circuits which have held the reasonable promptness and comparability requirements create a
federally enforceable right); Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 719 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (affirming district
court holding that the reasonable promptness clause of the Medicaid Act is enforceable under 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983 (2007)). But see Sanders ex. rel. Rayl v. Kan. Dep't of Soc. and Rehab. Servs., 317
F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1250 (D. Kan. 2004) (holding that the reasonable promptness requirement does
not create an enforceable right).
4. § 1396d(a) (defining medical assistance as "payment of part or all of the cost of the fol-
lowing care and services").
5. See Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 89 (1 st Cir. 2002); Chiles, 136 F.3d at 719.
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and instead hold that the Medicaid program requires states only to pro-
vide financial assistance to eligible Medicaid recipients.6
This comment addresses the differing interpretations of medical as-
sistance as defined in the Medicaid statute. Part I begins with a brief
historical analysis of public health assistance and the Medicaid program.
Next, Part II examines federal circuit court opinions that interpret medi-
cal assistance. Part III then proceeds with an analysis of why the United
States Supreme Court should grant certiorari to define medical assis-
tance. The analysis concludes with an explanation of how defining medi-
cal assistance as financial assistance best serves the Medicaid eligible
population and accomplishes the goals of the Medicaid program.
I. THE HISTORY OF MEDICAID AND MEDICAID TODAY
Medicaid is a federal and state partnership program that provides fi-
nancial assistance for medical care to the "most vulnerable populations in
society."7 Between 37.5 million and 55 million people 8 are covered by
the Medicaid program, including poor children, parents, seniors, and
disabled persons. 9 The Medicaid program is an opt-in program; Con-
gress does not mandate state participation, however all 50 states and the
District of Columbia participate in the program.' °
A. Public Health Assistance Prior to Medicaid
Prior to the creation of Medicaid, most sources of funding in the
health care industry were private."' The creation of Medicaid began after
the Second World War, when the focus on medical care in America
shifted from infection and treatment to chronic disease and research.
12
Initially, federal government funding for medicine supported research
and infrastructure rather than medical care.' 3  However, in 1960, the
Kennedy administration began to discuss community based medical ser-
vices as a way to combat poverty. 14 In response to political pressure to
6. See Mandy R., 464 F.3d at 1146; Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 540 (6th
Cir. 2006); Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 910 (7th Cir. 2003).
7. HEALTH CARE FINANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, A PROFILE OF MEDICAID: CHARTBOOK 2000 6 (2000), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/TheChartSeries/downloads/2Tchartbk.pdf. As evident in this definition,
the Medicaid statute and agencies responsible for administering Medicaid often consider themselves
responsible only for financial assistance.
8. Sidney D. Watson, The View from the Bottom: Consumer-Directed Medicaid and Cost
Shifting to Patients, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 403, 405 (2007).
9. Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a Post-Deficit
Reduction Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 5, 5 (2006); see also ELICIA J. HERZ, CRS
REPORT FOR CONGRESS: MEDICAID: A PRIMER 12, available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33202_20051222.pdf (last updated Jan. 24, 2007) ("In FY 2006, a
total of 63.2 million people were enrolled in Medicaid at some time during the year.").
10. HERZ, supra note 9, at 1.
11. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 338-39 (1982).
12. Id. at 336-40.
13. Id. at 338-51.
14. Id. at 365-66.
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provide medical care for certain vulnerable populations, Congress passed
the Kerr-Mills Act. 5
The Kerr-Mills Act established a federally funded program to pro-
vide elderly individuals with financial assistance for uncovered medical
expenses. 16 Under the Act, states provided up to half of the funding for
medical services for the elderly poor. 17 The Kerr-Mills program was
intended to allow each state to establish a medical care program so that
every aged individual could have adequate medical care.18 The Kerr-
Mills Act met opposition because of its inconsistent goals. On one hand
the legislation encouraged states to create individual programs to avoid a
national health care scheme, but on the other hand the legislation was a
commitment to national responsibility for medical welfare.19
While the Kerr-Mills Act addressed the policy of providing medical
services to a limited number of aged poor, it "rocked no boats" in com-
parison to other proposed medical welfare programs.2 0 Because the Act
was a moderate attempt to provide health care to individuals, neither
conservatives nor liberals were happy with the policy,21 and both politi-
cal parties introduced myriad proposals to modify the Kerr-Mills Act.22
In an effort to avoid public disappointment, Representative Mills pro-
posed combining some of these proposals into a three-tiered medical
welfare system.23 The resulting proposal created a mandatory hospital
insurance program under Social Security (Medicare Part A), government
reimbursement voluntary insurance for physician bills (Medicare Part B),
and expanded federal assistance to the states for medical care for the
poor (Medicaid).24
B. The Creation of Medicaid and the Federal-State Partnership
Congress amended the Social Security Act in 1965 to adopt Repre-
sentative Mills's proposal and in doing so created the Medicaid pro-
gram.2 5 The creation of Medicaid "reflected Congress's decision to 'lib-
eralize and extend' [the Kerr-Mills system] of federal grants to states for
specific health care purposes. 2 6 Additionally, the creation of the Medi-
15. Id. at 368; Kerr-Mills Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 87-778, 74 Stat. 924 (1960) (codi-
fied as amended at I.R.C. § 3126 (2008)); I.R.C. § 3308 (2008); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1324 (2008); 42
U.S.C.A. § 1312 (2008).
16. HEALTH CARE FINANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, supra note 7, at 6.
17. STARR, supra note 11, at 369.
18. ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE
STUDY OF MEDICAID 29 (2003).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 28.
21. Id. at 31.
22. STARR, supra note 11, at 369.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Medicaid Statute, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396a-1396v (2008).
26. Rosenbaum, supra note 9, at 9.
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caid program embodied Congress's intent to provide "mainstream medi-
cal services" to the poor and disabled.27
While Medicaid is a federal-state partnership in which states elect to
participate,28 if a state chooses to participate in the Medicaid program, it
must develop a medical assistance program that complies with federal
requirements.2 9 The federal requirements can be split into two classifi-
cations: financial requirements and categorical requirements.3° Some of
the groups states must cover are only eligible if they meet both the finan-
cial and categorical requirements. Groups that states must provide ser-
vices to because of financial requirements include poor families that
qualify for the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) cash
assistance program, and families that are transitioning from welfare to
work.3 1 Groups that states must provide services to because of categori-
cal requirements include some legal permanent residents like new refu-
gees.32 Groups that states must provide services to because of a combi-
nation of financial and categorical requirements include pregnant women
and children whose families fall below at least 100 percent of the federal
poverty level, poor individuals with disabilities, and poor seniors who
qualify for cash benefits from the Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
program.
33
In addition, states may choose to provide Medicaid coverage to op-
tional additional populations. 34  Optional coverage includes long-term
care, care for the medically needy, care for the working disabled, and
care for other poverty-related groups.3 5 Long term care coverage is lim-
ited to persons who require institutional care or who require care in
community settings if they fall 300 percent below the SSI income re-
quirements. 36 The medically needy are individuals who fit into one of
the categorical groups but do not meet the financial requirements.37 The
poverty related groups include pregnant women and children who do not
meet the financial requirements.38
27. Moncrieff, supra note 1, at 675.
28. See e.g., KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, HENRY J. KAISER
FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICAID: A TIMELINE OF KEY DEVELOPMENTS (2008), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaidtimeline/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).
29. Moncrieff, supra note 1, at 675.




34. CENTER FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, MEDICAID PROGRAM: GENERAL INFORMATION, TECHNICAL SUMMARY 3, avail-
able at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidGenlnfo/03_TechnicalSummary.asp#TopOfPage (last
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Although states must provide coverage to the federally-mandated
groups, states retain much flexibility in "determining requirements for
eligibility, in establishing the scope of benefits coverage, and in setting
rates for reimbursement. 3 9 Because states retain so much flexibility,
there is no typical program; rather, there are "essentially 56 different




The joint federal-state nature of the Medicaid program requires
many different agencies to administer Medicaid. On the federal level,
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) administers
Medicaid. 41 Each state has its own executive body to administer the state
aspect of the Medicaid program.
Medicaid is jointly funded by the states and the federal government.
States provide the initial funding for the program and the federal gov-
ernment reimburses states for a portion of the state's costs. 42 The federal
government provides fifty to eighty-three percent of the state program
costs. 43 The federal reimbursement funding is based on each state's av-
erage yearly per capita income. As a result, the federal reimbursement
rate varies from state to state and from year to year.44 States generally
determine their own reimbursement rates for medical service providers.45
Currently, the federal Medicaid eligibility rules provide financial
assistance to the poor, elderly, and children and parents in working fami-
lies.46 Generally, Medicaid covers "inpatient and outpatient hospital
services; doctors' and nurse practitioners' services; nursing home care;
rural health clinic services; home health-care services; laboratory and X-
ray charges; and transportation to and from health-care providers. '47
While states must provide the mandatory services outlined in the
Medicaid statute, states also retain much flexibility to administer optional
programs as well as waiver programs. Optional services include interme-
diate care facilities for the developmentally disabled (ICF/DD or
ICF/MR).48 Waiver programs are services not enumerated in the Medi-
39. Moncrieff, supra note 1, at 675-76.
40. MEDICAID PROGRAM: GENERAL INFORMATION, TECHNICAL SUMMARY, supra note 34.
41. 2 WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, CENTERS FOR MEDICAID & MEDICARE
SERVICES 301 (Jeffrey Lehman & Shirelle Phelps eds., 2nd ed. 2005). The Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) preceded CMS.
42. See HERZ, supra note 9, at 6.
43. See id. at 6.
44. MEDICAID PROGRAM: GENERAL INFORMATION, TECHNICAL SUMMARY, supra note 34.
45. See HERZ, supra note 9, at 8.
46. Watson, supra note 8, at 410.
47. THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION LEGAL GUIDE FOR AMERICANS OVER FIFTY 166-67
(2006).
48. Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 714 (11 th Cir. 1998).
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caid statute that states provide in order to further the goals of the Medi-
caid program. To provide waiver programs, states must obtain waivers
from CMS. 49 Approved Medicaid waiver programs are not subject to the
same requirements as mandatory or optional services.50 In an effort to
allow states to find less expensive and perhaps more effective systems of
care, CMS permits waiver programs "to allow states to experiment with
methods of care, or to provide care on a targeted basis, without adhering
to the strict mandates of the Medicaid system.",51 A subcategory of
waiver programs is the model waiver program. Model waiver programs
exist as a way for states to exercise flexibility to find the best programs
for the populations they treat.5 2 Model waiver programs are limited to
serving no more than 200 individuals at any one time. 3 A common
waiver is the home and community-based service (HCBS) waiver.54
Under HCBS waivers, "individuals who would otherwise be treated in an
institutional setting" are instead treated in their homes or in small home-
based facilities.55
States-whether they provide the minimum mandatory services, in-
clude additional services, or provide waiver programs-must follow cer-
tain federal requirements regarding the nature of care provided. The
Medicaid statute provides that each state's plan for medical assistance
must provide "for making medical assistance available [to all Medicaid
eligible individuals]. 56 Among other requirements, states must furnish
this medical assistance with "reasonable promptness to all eligible indi-
viduals' 57 and the medical assistance "shall not be less in amount, dura-
49. HERz, supra note 9, at 9.
50. Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 82 (1 st Cir. 2002).
51. Id at 82-83.
In theory, waiver plans are expenditure-neutral; the average estimated per capita expendi-
ture under the waiver plans must not be more than the average estimated expenditure ab-
sent the waiver program. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(c)(2)(D) (2007). In practice, the waiver
programs may be costly to the states, because even though the individuals served by the
waiver plan are no longer being served by nursing homes or other care facilities, other pa-
tients may take those nursing home spots. Many patients not currently being served un-
der Medicaid may also apply for the waiver program. The states thus have a financial in-
centive to keep their waiver programs small, or at least, to begin with small programs and
grow them incrementally.
Id. (citations omitted).
52. See U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, Medicaid State Waiver Program Demonstration Projects - General Information, Over-
view, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidStWaivProgDemoPGI/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).
53. 42 C.F.R. § 441.305(b)(1) (2008).
54. See, e.g., Mandy R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1141-42 (1Oth Cir. 2006); Bryson, 308 F.3d
at 82; see also Jane Perkins & Randolph T. Boyle, Addressing Long Waits for Home and Commu-
nity-Based Care Through Medicaid and the ADA, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 117, 126 (2001) (explaining
that in 2001 there were about 240 home and community based waiver programs nationwide).
55. Bryson, 308 F.3d at 82.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (2006).
57. Id. § 1396a(a)(8).
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tion, or scope than the medical assistance made available to any other
such individual. 58
While the Medicaid statute requires states to provide medical assis-
tance with reasonable promptness and comparability, courts disagree as
to whether the medical assistance provided must be actual medical ser-
vices or financial assistance.
II. MEDICAL ASSISTANCE: ACTUAL SERVICES OR FINANCIAL SUPPORT?
The existence of a circuit split was recognized by the Third Circuit
in Sabree v. Richman.59 The Third Circuit remarked in a footnote that
"there appears to be a disagreement among our sister courts of appeals as
to whether, pursuant to Medicaid, a state must merely provide financial
assistance to obtain covered services, or provide the services them-
selves., 60 The Third Circuit did not address whether medical assistance
meant financial assistance or medical services.6 1 Since the Third Cir-
cuit's observation, the Tenth Circuit has twice addressed the issue of
what medical assistance means, and has concluded that medical assis-
tance means financial assistance.
62
A. Circuits Holding that Medical Assistance Means Actual Services
1. Eleventh Circuit: Doe v. Chiles
63
The Chiles court's main consideration was whether the reasonable
promptness requirement was a federally enforceable right.64  The Elev-
enth Circuit found that the reasonable promptness requirement did create
an individually enforceable right, and in its holding found that medical
assistance as described in the Medicaid statute meant actual medical ser-
vices .65
a. Facts and Procedural History
The Chiles plaintiffs were a group of developmentally disabled in-
dividuals on waiting lists for Intermediate Care Facilities for the Devel-
opmentally Disabled (ICF/MR).66 The plaintiffs claimed that the Florida
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services failed to provide
Medicaid assistance with reasonable promptness.67 The plaintiffs alleged
they had been waiting for over five years for the services they needed,
58. Id. § 1396a(a)(10)(B)(i).
59. 367 F.3d 180, 181 n. 1 (3d Cir. 2004).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Okla. Chapter of the Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 472 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir.
2007); Mandy R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1143-44 (10th Cir. 2006).
63. 136 F.3d 709 (1 Ith Cir. 1998).
64. See id. at 715-19.




DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
and the State admitted that the waiting period was several years long.68
The district court found for the plaintiffs and enjoined the Florida Medi-
caid Administrators. 69  The administrators appealed from the district
court's judgment. 0
b. Circuit Court Holding
In holding that the reasonable promptness language created a fed-
eral enforceable right under § 1983, the court used the three part Blessing
test.7 1 First, the court concluded that the plain language of the Medicaid
Act, "assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all
eligible individuals," demonstrated that Congress intended the provision
to benefit the plaintiffs.72 Second, the court concluded that the reason-
able promptness requirement was "sufficiently specific and definite"
enough for a court to evaluate.7 3 The court noted "delays of 'several
years' . . . are far outside the realm of reasonableness. 74 Finally, the
court concluded that the language of the Medicaid statue was "cast in
mandatory rather than precatory terms. 75
After holding that the Medicaid statute did create an enforceable
right under § 1983, the court noted that '[medical] assistance under the
[Medicaid] plan' has been defined as medical services. The [State] is
obliged to furnish medical services ....,76 The court did not provide
additional reasoning as to why it interpreted medical assistance as mean-
ing actual medical services.
2. First Circuit: Bryson v. Shumway
77
The First Circuit considered whether the reasonable promptness
provision required states to fill all available waiver program slots.
78
While the court did not expressly consider what medical assistance
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 712.
71. Id. at 713. The court explained the Blessing test as follows:
In order to seek redress through § 1983, however, a plaintiff must assert the violation of a
federal right, not merely a violation of the federal law. We have traditionally looked at
three factors when determining whether a particular statutory provision gives rise to a
federal right. First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit
the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by
the statute is not so "vague and amorphous" that its enforcement would strain judicial
competence. Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the
States. In other words, the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in
mandatory rather than precatory terms.
Id.
72. Id. at 715.
73. ld. at 717.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 718.
76. Id. at 711.
77. 308 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2002).
78. Id. at81.
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meant, the court's holding, in effect, implied that actual services were
required when a state had unfilled waiver program slots.
79
a. Facts and Procedural History
The plaintiffs, Bonnie Bryson and Claire Shepardson, represented a
class of individuals who were being treated in New Hampshire in various
treatment facilities. 80 Bryson and Shepardson were eligible for care un-
der the Medicaid program because they both suffered from acquired
brain disorders.
81
New Hampshire Medicaid administered a model waiver program
providing home and community based services (HCBS) for individuals
with such acquired brain disorders. 82 New Hampshire's HCBS program
initially served only 15 individuals in its first year, but the goal was to
increase the number of slots up to 130.83 There were always more appli-
cants for the HCBS programs than available slots, so the State created a
waiting list for the services. The number of eligible individuals on the
waitlist ranged from 25 to 87.84 The plaintiffs applied for the HCBS
program but were never admitted and were instead placed on the waiting
list.85
The plaintiffs sued the State administrators of the Medicaid program
alleging that New Hampshire failed to fill the available HCBS slots
within a reasonable time.86 The district court granted summary judgment
for the plaintiffs, finding that the state violated Medicaid's reasonable
promptness requirement.87 The State appealed the district court's ruling.
b. Circuit Court Holding
The Third Circuit applied the three-part Blessing test and found that
the reasonable promptness provision of the Medicaid statute created a
federally-enforceable cause of action under § 1983.88 In doing so, the
court noted that "[once] the waiver plan is created and approved, it be-
79. Id. at 89.
80. Id. at81.
81. Id. Acquired brain disorders "manifest before age sixty, are neither congenital nor caused
by birth trauma, and present 'a severe and life-long disabling condition which significantly impairs a
person's ability to function in society."' Id.
82. Id. at 82-83.
83. Id. at 83.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 81. Plaintiff's also alleged that "if New Hampshire set up a model program at all,
Congress required that the waiver program have at least as many slots as the number of applicants,
up to a limit of 200." Id. The court ruled that the Medicaid statute did not require states to provide
services for the number of individuals who desired such services, but rather that states were free to
set up model waiver programs serving as many individuals as each state desired, as long as that
number did not exceed 200. Id. at 86. This discussion is beyond the scope of this comment.
87. Id. at 84.
88. Id. at 89.
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comes part of the state plan and therefore subject to federal law; the
waiver plans must meet all requirements not expressly waived.,
8 9
After finding a federally-enforceable right, the court considered
whether New Hampshire had violated the reasonable promptness re-
quirement by failing to fill unfilled waiver slots in a reasonable amount
of time.9° The court remanded this issue to the trial court because there
was no factual record as to whether unfilled waiver slots existed.91
While the court did not expressly decide the issue, it did discuss it. In
doing so, the Third Circuit said:
[When] an individual ceases to use the waiver plan services, there is
necessarily a time gap while an individual on the waiting list is cho-
sen to take the unfilled slot and while services are made available.
Because of that lag in time, the fact that some slots are unfilled may
be consistent with New Hampshire diligently filling the empty slots
with reasonable promptness. It may also indicate that New Hamp-
shire is not being reasonably prompt in its provision of medical assis-
tance. 
92
The Third Circuit, then, in dicta, implied that New Hampshire must fill
available slots. 93 By articulating the requirement that New Hampshire
fill available slots in its waiver program, the Third Circuit indirectly held
that states must provide actual medical services in order to discharge
their duty of providing medical assistance with reasonable promptness.
B. Circuits Holding that Medical Assistance Means Financial Support
1. Seventh Circuit: Bruggeman v. Blagojevich
94
The Bruggeman Court also examined the issue of whether the Illi-
nois Medicaid program violated Medicaid's statutory requirement of
reasonable promptness of medical services because there were more va-
cancies in Intermediate Care Facilities for the Developmentally Disabled
(ICF/DD) in the southern part of the state than the northern part of the
state.95
a. Facts and Procedural History
The Bruggeman plaintiffs were seven developmentally disabled
adults living at home with their parents in the Chicago area.96 The par-
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 89-90.
92. Id. at 89 (emphasis added).
93. Id.
94. 324 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 2003).
95. Id. at 910. The court also considered whether the disproportional distribution of ICF/DD
facilities violated the Rehabilitation act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. These claims are
beyond the scope of this comment.
96. Id. at 908.
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ents wanted the plaintiffs to live in ICF/DD facilities; however, the facili-
ties with vacancies were located in the southern part of Illinois.97 The
parents did not want to send their children to those facilities because of
the time and expense they would incur in traveling to visit their chil-
dren.98
The plaintiffs brought suit against the state officials who, in their of-
ficial capacity, were in charge of administering Illinois' Medicaid pro-
gram. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants "prefer[red] the plaintiffs
to live at home because it would cost the state more to pay for their care
in an institution, and so the defendants refuse[d] to write letters urging
authorization of additional ICF/DDs in the northern part of the state
.... "99 Without these letters from state officials, the agency responsible
for authorizing additional facilities would refuse such authorizations.100
The plaintiffs argued that by refusing to write the necessary letters, de-
fendants violated the reasonable promptness and comparability require-
ments because no new facilities would be authorized. 10'
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs Medicaid claim for lack
of standing, deciding "that the plaintiffs have no right to live in an
ICFiDD that is near their parents' home."'1 2 The court found that be-
cause this right did not exist, there was no injury and thus no standing.
0 3
b. Circuit Court Holding
The Seventh Circuit began by examining standing. The court found
that the district court's ruling that there was no injury was based on the
merits of the case rather than jurisdictional grounds.' 4 Instead, the court
found that "if [plaintiffs] claim a right to a wider choice of ICF/DD va-
cancies than the defendants are willing to permit the planning agency to
authorize, then they are likely to have standing, because the absence of
the plan they seek is a denial of such an entitlement.' 1 5 After finding




98. Id. at 908-09.
99. Id. at 909.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(1), (8), (10)(B)(i), (19), (23) (2006)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 909-10.
105. Id. at 909. The court went on to note that the plaintiffs "seek merely a plan, which might
not lead to the increase in the ICF/DD capacity in their immediate geographic area." Id. This specu-
lative situation is what left the court to decide that Plaintiffs only likely had standing. The court
nonetheless found standing because the possibility that new ICF/DD facilities would not increase
vacancy was "not so speculative as to negate standing, which is a matter of probabilities rather than
certainties." Id. (citing North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1991)).
106. Id. at 910.
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The court first addressed the statutory requirement of reasonable
promptness to medical assistance. The court found that the requirement
was "not infringed by the maldistribution . . . of ICF/DDs across the
state." 10 7 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs did not require relocation
to the southern part of the state because it was not "as if plaintiffs re-
quire[d] relocation to such a facility on an emergency basis, in which
event the remoteness of any such facility from their homes . . . would
deprive them of prompt treatment."'' 08  The court then considered the
situation where the plaintiffs would need to be transported in an emer-
gency situation, and in doing so, determined that the Medicaid statute
only requires financial assistance.'09 The court said:
Even if they did require emergency treatment, their theory of viola-
tion would be a considerable stretch because the statutory reference
to "assistance" appears to have reference to financial assistance
rather than to actual medical services, though the distinction was
missed in Bryson v. Shumway and Doe v. Chiles. Medicaid is a pay-
ment scheme, not a scheme for state-provided medical assistance, as
through state-owned hospitals. The regulations that implement the
provision indicate that what is required is a prompt determination of
eligibility and prompt provision of funds to eligible individuals to
enable them to obtain the covered medical services they need ... [A]
requirement of prompt treatment would amount to a direct regulation
of medical services.110
The court then addressed the Plaintiffs' claims that the State was
failing to provide identical ICF/DD services because the number of va-
cancies in the southern part of the state "favors the people living there
over those who live in the northern part.""' To fix this problem, the
plaintiffs argued there should be a ICF/DD within thirty miles from their
homes, and that that ICF/DD must be specifically tailored to the Medi-
caid beneficiaries' needs." 2 The court concluded that the plaintiffs' de-
sires were "[a]n unattainable goal that cannot rationally be attributed to
the statute."
113
The court also considered the plaintiffs' argument that the defen-
dants' refusal to write the necessary letters violated the "right to obtain a
needed medical service from a provider 'who undertakes to provide him
such services.""'14 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that the




110. Id. (internal citations omitted).
111. Id.
112. Id. at910-11.
113. Id. at 911 (citing Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1011 (11th Cir. 1997)).
114. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.A § 1396a(a)(23) (2008)).
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facilities, not to require the creation or authorization of new facili-
ties."
115
Overall, the court found that the Medicaid claims lacked merit, and
explicitly stated that Medicaid is only a payment scheme."l
6
2. Sixth Circuit: Westside Mothers v. Olszewski
l l7
In Westside Mothers, the court directly considered what medical as-
sistance requires, and the Sixth Circuit held that medical assistance
meant financial assistance."
8
a. Facts and Procedural History
Plaintiffs, Westside Mothers, and other advocacy groups along with
five Medicaid beneficiaries brought suit against the defendants-those
responsible for administering Michigan's Medicaid program. The plain-
tiffs brought suit under § 1983 alleging that that the defendants had failed
to implement an appropriate Medicaid system by (1) refusing to provide
comprehensive screening to eligible individuals; (2) not requiring pro-
viders to provide diagnostic services and treatment; (3) failing to effec-
tively inform eligible patients of the available treatment and screening;
(4) failing to provide transportation to physician visits; and (5) by devel-
oping a program that lacked the capacity to provide care to eligible chil-
dren. 119
The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the
case, holding that Medicaid was a contract between the state and the fed-
eral government so the proper defendant was really the state instead of
the state officials.120 The court dismissed the case because the state was
protected from suit by sovereign immunity.' 2' The plaintiffs appealed the
dismissal and the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case, finding
that the Medicaid statute did create an enforceable cause of action
against the state officials.
1 22
On remand, the district court granted in part the defendant's motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 123 In doing so, the court concluded
that the Medicaid Act "[requires] the State to pay some or all of the costs
of certain medical services available to eligible individuals, but [does
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 910-11.
117. Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2006).
118. Id. at 539-40.
119. Id. at 536.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 536-37.
123. Id. at 537.
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not] require the State provide the services directly."'124  The plaintiffs
again appealed from the district court's dismissal.
b. Circuit Court Holding
The Sixth Circuit considered "whether the individual rights to
'medical assistance' ... [impose] an obligation on the State to provide
services directly." 125  The court recognized that while other courts inter-
preted the medical assistance provision differently, the statute clearly
provided a definition. "Medical assistance" the court wrote, "means
'payment of part or all of the cost of the [enumerated] services' to eligi-
ble individuals."",126  The plaintiffs encouraged the court to adopt a
broader interpretation of medical assistance, but the court relied on the
language and structure of the Medicaid statute to reject the plaintiffs'
suggestion. 127  In rejecting a broader interpretation of the statute, the
Sixth Circuit wrote:
The most reasonable interpretation of [the reasonable promptness re-
quirement] is that all eligible individuals should have the opportunity
to apply for medical assistance, i.e., financial assistance, and that
such medical assistance, i.e., financial assistance, shall be provided to
the individual with reasonable promptness. The most reasonable in-
terpretation of [the comparability requirement] is that medical assis-
tance, i.e., financial assistance, must be provided for at least the
[mandatory] care and services listed in [various] paragraphs [of the
Medicaid statute].
128
The Sixth Circuit's explicit holding set the stage for the Tenth Cir-
cuit's consideration of the same issue.
3. Tenth Circuit: Mandy R. ex rel. Mr. and Mrs. R. v. Owens'
29
The Mandy R. court considered three issues associated with the
Medicaid Act: reasonable promptness, comparability, and sufficient
payments. 130 The court held that the Medicaid requirements of reasonable
promptness and comparability did not require the state to provide actual
medical services to Medicaid recipients. 13' The court discussed the suf-
124. Id. at 539.
125. Id. at 539-40.
126. Id. at 540 (citing 42 U.S.C.A § 1396d(a) (2008)).
127. Id.
128. Id. The court also addressed whether 42 U.S.C.A § 1396a(a)(30) (2008), the requirement
that state Medicaid programs must provide access to eligible children and § 1396a(a)(43)(A), the
requirement that States provide notice to eligible individuals about certain programs, created feder-
ally enforceable rights. Id. at 541. The court concluded that § 1396a(a)(30) did not create a feder-
ally enforceable right but that § 1396a(a)(43)(A) may. Id. at 544. Further discussion about these
arguments is beyond the scope of this comment.
129. Mandy R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006).
130. Id. at 1141.
131. Id.
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ficient payments requirement separately, and this comment does not ad-
dress that analysis.
a. Facts and Procedural History
Colorado offers a number of Medicaid-funded services for devel-
opmentally disabled persons. The services at issue here were Intermedi-
ate Care Facilities for the Mentally Retarded (ICF/MR) and Home and
Community Based Services (HCBS).132  Colorado had three ICF/MR
facilities, which are larger institutional settings "generally reserved for
persons with extreme needs."133 ICF/MRs in Colorado served, at the
time of suit, approximately 86 individuals. 134 HCBS programs, in con-
trast, were smaller waiver programs that served between one and eight
people per program.' 35 HCBS programs are less isolating and less ex-
pensive than ICF/MR programs. 136 At the time of the trial, approximately
3,800 developmentally disabled individuals were being treated in HCBS
programs. 
37
During the same time, approximately 733 individuals were waiting
for enrollment in HCBS programs, but the services were unavailable.
38
In contrast, only 21 individuals were waiting for enrollment in an
ICF/MR program. 1
39
The plaintiffs, six developmentally disabled individuals seeking
ICF/MR services (an association of service providers), brought suit
against the state alleging that it violated the Medicaid Act by failing to
provide the developmentally disabled with comprehensive residential
services that meet the statutory "requirements of reasonable promptness
and comparability."'40 The district court held a four day bench trial and
found for the state. 14 1 The plaintiffs appealed.
142
b. Circuit Court Holding
The court began by assuming that the statutory requirements of rea-
sonable promptness and comparability conferred a federally-enforceable









140. Id. at 1142-43 (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 1142.
142. Id.
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other circuit courts that addressed the issue found a private right ex-
isted.
43
The court characterized the plaintiffs' claims that the state was not
providing medical assistance with reasonable promptness and compara-
bility as one problem: "that the individual plaintiffs are not receiving the
comprehensive residential services they need."' 44 In order to determine
the merits of the claim, the court began by asking "[w]hat is the 'medical
assistance' that the state must provide promptly and equally?"' 45 In de-
fining medical assistance, the court considered the statutory definition,
statutory "contextual clues," and policy rationale. 146 This analysis led the
court to conclude that the Medicaid Act required states to provide finan-
cial assistance rather than actual medical services.
47
First, the court looked at the definition of medical assistance as de-
fined in the Medicaid Act. The Act "defines 'medical assistance' as
'payment of part of all of the cost of the [described] care and ser-
vices.""' 148 The court reasoned that because the definition provided in the
statute "mention[ed] payment for, but not provision of services" that
medical assistance only included financial assistance. 149 Thus, the court
concluded, the Medicaid Act only requires participating states to "pay
promptly and evenhandedly for medical services when the state is pre-
sented a bill" rather than provide medical services promptly and even-
handedly.
150
In reaching its conclusion based on the statutory definition, the
court relied on the Seventh Circuit's interTretation of medical assistance
and recognized the potential circuit split.' 1 In a footnote, the Tenth Cir-
cuit recognized that while there may be a circuit split, it is not explicit. It
noted "two circuits have held that 'medical assistance' requires only fi-
nancial assistance .... Another circuit has reserved the question ....
Without expressly addressing the issue, two other circuits appear to have
treated the statute as requiring the provision of actual services."'
52
Second, the court quickly rejected each of the plaintiffs' arguments
that five specific "contextual clues" in the Medicaid Act pointed to the
143. Id. at 1142-43 ("Since the Supreme Court clarified when a statute creates an enforceable
private right in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002)... several courts have considered
whether one or both of these subsections [42 U.S.C.A § 1396a(a)(8) (2008) reasonable promptness
and § 1396a(a)(10) comparability] creates an enforceable private right. Each has concluded that the
provision in question does.").
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1143-45.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1143 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A § 1396d(a)) (emphasis added).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1143 n.2.
152. Id.
740 [Vol. 85:3
THE DEFINITION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
interpretation that medical assistance means actual medical services.'
53
Plaintiffs first alleged that section 1396a(a)(2) of the Act, which requires
states to "assure that lack of adequate funds from local sources" will not
decrease the quality of care under Medicaid, meant states must provide
medical assistance.1 54 The court rejected this argument, noting that the
provision only mentions funding and "says nothing about providing the
services themselves.' 55  Secondly, plaintiffs alleged the comparability
requirement requires states to provide beneficiaries with actual medical
services because the provision requires that the "'medical assistance' []
be the same 'in amount, duration or scope."",156 The court found that the
comparability provision did not indicate which meaning should be given
to medical assistance because the provision "can apply to the payment
for services no less logically than to the provision of services." '157 Third,
the plaintiffs argued that the requirement that states provide care and
services 'in a manner consistent with simplicity of administration in the
best interests of the recipients"' required the state to provide actual
medical services. 158 The court declined to adopt this argument because it
saw "no logical end" to state provided care if the state was required to
provide all actual medical services that were in the best interest of the
recipients. '" Fourth, plaintiffs argued that the language in the state's
waiver application promised to provide ICF/MR services "with 'No
Limitations.,, 1 60 The court rebuffed this argument, noting that by choos-
ing the "no limitations" language, "the State was abjuring limits such as
length of ICF/MR services for which it would pay, but there [was] no
indication that . . . the State promised to build, staff, and maintain as
many ICFs/MR as would be needed to meet the demand in Colorado."
16'
Lastly, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the waiver pro-
gram was a "commitment to ensuring that every eligible patient re-
ceive[d] services either from ICFs/MR or HCBS. 162 The court reasoned
that the waiver application did not confer responsibility upon the state to
ensure that ICF/MR or HCBS are available for every individual who
desired such a program.
163
Third, the court rejected plaintiffs' public policy argument for de-
fining medical assistance as actual medical services.1 64 Plaintiffs argued
that by accepting federal funds for Medicaid, the state was "promising to
153. Id. at 1144.
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. Id.
156. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(B)(i) (2008)).
157. Id.
158. Id. (quoting § 1396a(a)(19)).
159. Id.
160. Id.
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pay for services for the developmentally disabled and then suppressing
the supply of these services."' 65 The plaintiffs' only argument support-
ing the assertion that the state was suppressing the supply of ICF/MR
facilities was that the state "ha[d] discouraged efforts to build new
ICFs/MR by responding coolly to initial inquiries."'166 The court found
this "too nebulous a basis to support a legal claim" and refused to honor
plaintiffs' suggestions that the state become the hospital of last resort or
that the state include a good faith requirement in the medical assistance
requirement. 167
After analyzing the statutory definition, contextual clues from the
statute, and policy considerations, the Tenth Circuit adopted the conclu-
sion of the Seventh Circuit by holding that the definition of medical as-
sistance in the Medicaid Act referred solely to financial assistance, not
actual medical services.
4. Tenth Circuit: Oklahoma Chapter of the American Academy of
Pediatrics (OKAAP) v. Fogarty
68
The OKAAP court considered three provisions of the Medicaid Act:
early and period screening, diagnostic and treatment services (EPSDT),
providing necessary care and services with reasonable promptness, and
provider reimbursements. 169
a. Facts and Procedural History
Two non-profit organizations, the OKAAP and the Community Ac-
tion Project of Tulsa County, Inc. (CAPTC), along with thirteen individ-
ual children, brought suit against the State of Oklahoma and the Okla-
homa Health Care Authority (OHCA). 70 OHCA implements and admin-
isters Oklahoma's Medicaid program.i7 1 The plaintiffs alleged that the
policies and procedures of the administration of Oklahoma's Medicaid
program "denied or deprived eligible children . . . of the health and
medical care to which they were entitled under federal law."
172
The district court conducted a bench trial and dismissed OKAAP's
claim for lack of standing. 73 In its holding, the district court found that
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1145-46.
167. Id. at 1146.
168. Okla. Chapter of the Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 472 F.3d 1208, 1208 (10th Cir.
2007).
169. Id. at 1210. Provider reimbursement is beyond the scope of this comment, so the case




173. Id. On appeal OKAAP contended that the district court erred in dismissing the group for
lack of standing. The appeals court did not consider the issue because the court's "conclusion on the
parties' other issues, which necessitate reversal of the district court's judgment, have rendered this
issue moot." Id. at 1216.
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the State and OHCA violated the Medicaid Act by failing to ensure that
physician reimbursements for care were sufficient and by failing to fur-
nish medical assistance with reasonable promptness. 74 In reaching its
conclusion, the district court noted that the plaintiffs demonstrated that
children who needed care were not receiving it and that "system-wide
delays in treatment exist and have presented convincing evidence that
those delays are not reasonable. In violation of [the reasonable prompt-
ness requirement], defendants are not ensuring that medical assistance is
furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.'
175
The court noted that the Seventh Circuit interpreted medical assis-
tance to mean financial assistance, but distinguished the OKAAP claims
from the claims the Seventh Circuit considered. 76 In doing so, the dis-
trict court held that while the Medicaid statute only required financial
assistance, the state could still have violated the Medicaid statute's rea-
sonable promptness requirement by not providing sufficient financial
assistance. 177 The court reasoned that failing to provide sufficient finan-
cial reimbursement would mean fewer providers would accept Medicaid,




The district court ordered the plaintiffs and defendants to meet and
submit a proposed injunctive order to remedy the violations of the Medi-
caid statute on which the court would base its final order. 79 After the
court received the proposed injunctive order, the district court issued a
permanent injunction. The injunction and final judgment outlined how
the state must create and comply with a new payment scheme to "assure
reasonably prompt access to health care for minor children."' 180  Both
parties appealed. 181
b. Circuit Court Holding
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's hold-
ing.' 8 2 The court held that Oklahoma's Medicaid program did not violate
the "'reasonable promptness' requirement by allowing system-wide de-
lays in treatment of Medicaid beneficiaries .... .18 Additionally, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that the comparability requirement "requires a
174. Id. at 1210. While the district court considered the reimbursement issue, reimbursement is
beyond the scope of this comment.
175. Id. at 1213-14 (quoting Okla. Chptr. of the Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 366 F.
Supp. 2d 1050, 1109 (D. Okla. 2005) [hereinafter OKAAP II].
176. Id. at 1214.
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting OKAAP 11, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 1109).
179. Id. at 1210.
180. Id. at 1210-11 (citing Aplt. App. at 422-25).
181. Id. at 1211.
182. Id. at 1216.
183. Id. at 1209 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(8) (2008)).
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state Medicaid plan to pay for, but not to directly provide, the specific
medical services listed in the Medicaid Act."'
184
The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its holding from Mandy R. that medi-
cal assistance as provided in the Medicaid statute refers only to financial
reimbursement and not actual medical services. 185 In doing so, the Tenth
Circuit rejected the district court's ruling that the state must conduct a
study of rates and reimbursements.
In rejecting the need for a study, the Tenth Circuit noted that the
reasonable promptness requirement does not make a state Medicaid pro-
gram "directly responsible for ensuring that the medical services enu-
merated in the Medicaid Act (i.e. those that are reimbursable) are actu-
ally provided to Medicaid beneficiaries in a reasonably prompt man-
ner."
186
The Tenth Circuit recognized the district court's conclusion that low
reimbursement rates result in fewer providers which in turn creates a
longer wait time for Medicaid beneficiaries, but made an important dis-
tinction. The court noted that while reduced rates of reimbursement may
increase the time a Medicaid beneficiary must wait for treatment, that
"does not mean that defendants failed (or will fail in the future) to be
reasonably prompt in paying for services actually rendered by available
providers, as required by [the reasonable promptness requirement]. 187
Following the discussion of reasonable promptness, the Tenth Cir-
cuit rejected plaintiffs' argument that the statute created a federally en-
forceable right to receive EPSDT services. The court considered the
EPSDT argument separately because the Mandy R. court did not address
an EPSDT claim. The court again reasoned that the Medicaid Act re-
quired Oklahoma's Medicaid plan to pay for EPSDT services rather than
ensure such services were being provided or directly provide such medi-
cal services. 188
III. WHY COURTS SHOULD INTERPRET MEDICAL ASSISTANCE AS
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari of the two Tenth
Circuit cases that held medical assistance meant financial assistance,
Mandy R. and OKAAP, and denied certiorari in the Eleventh Circuit case
that held medical assistance meant actual medical services, Doe v.
184. Id. at 1209-10.
185. Id. at 1214.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1215.
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Chiles. 189 Thus, the Supreme Court has, in effect, accepted both interpre-
tations. However, because Medicaid is a federally-funded program, and
because federal circuits interpret the Medicaid statute inconsistently, the
United States Supreme Court should grant certiorari to define medical
assistance.
The reasons for this circuit split are somewhat puzzling for a num-
ber of reasons, and the circuits holding that Medicaid programs require
actual medical services do a poor job of explaining away the disparities.
The most logical interpretation of the medical assistance provision is
provided in the Tenth Circuit's analysis in Mandy R. concluding that
medical assistance means financial assistance.
This part addresses why the financial assistance interpretation of
medical assistance is more persuasive than the actual medical services
interpretation, and why future courts should reject the notion that the
Medicaid statute requires states to provide actual medical services to
Medicaid beneficiaries. First, the legislative history behind the creation
of Medicaid points to the idea that Congress intended for Medicaid to
serve as a type of health insurance program by providing financial assis-
tance to those who could not afford medical care on their own. 190 The
language of the Medicaid statute and explanations about what Medicaid
is by CMS describe the program as a financial assistance program.'
9'
Second, and more compelling, the problems facing Medicaid are vast and
best alleviated by only requiring states to provide financial assistance.
A. Legislative History and Statutory Language
When Congress passed the Medicaid program, it defined medical
assistance "to mean payment of all or part of the cost of care and services
for [eligible] individuals.' 92 This definition only requires states to pro-
vide payment for the costs of care and services rather than provide actual
medical services. Had Congress intended for states to provide the actual
189. Mandy R. v. Ritter, 127 S. Ct. 1905 (2007); Okla. Chapter of the Am. Acad. of Pediatrics
v. Fogarty, 128 S. Ct. 68 (2007); Kearney v. Does 1-13, 534 U.S. 1104 (2002). The Mandy R. v.
Ritter plaintiffs asked the Court to consider whether:
federal Medicaid law, which requires that medical assistance be furnished with reason-
able promptness to all eligible individuals and may not be less in amount, duration, and
scope to the medical assistance made available to similarly situated others, impose on a
state an obligation to ensure that the care and assistance specified in the state's Medicaid
plan is promptly furnished .... Or may the state discharge its federal Medicaid obliga-
tion by merely making prompt payment when presented with a charge for such care and
assistance ... ?
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, Mandy R. v. Ritter, 127 S. Ct. 1905 (2007) (No. 06-1002), 2007
WL 178418.
190. See generally STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 18.
191. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1296 d(l) (2008); see also Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
Medicaid Eligibility - Overview, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidEligibility/ (last visited Feb. 1,
2008) ("Medicaid is health insurance that helps many people who can't afford medical care pay for
some or all of their medical bills.").
192. S. REP. No. 89-404 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 2020.
2008]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
medical care, surely it was familiar enough with the legislative process to
write such a requirement into the bill.
In addition, CMS recognizes that "Medicaid operates as a vendor
payment program. States may pay health care providers directly on a
fee-for-service basis, or States may pay for Medicaid services through
various prepayment arrangements ...., Because CMS is the agency
charged with administering the Medicaid program, it is a logical conclu-
sion that CMS's understanding of how the Medicaid program is run is
accurate.
Examining the history surrounding the creation of the Medicaid
statute enhances the statutory language and agency interpretation of the
Medicaid statute. The Medicaid program was an expansion of the Pub-
lic Assistance Acts of 1960, which implemented a national vendor pay-
ment system for elderly who could not pay for their medical care.1 94
Scholars have long recognized that Medicaid is a vendor payment system
and that under the program states are responsible for providing direct
reimbursement to medical providers.'95 By creating the Medicaid pro-
gram, Congress shifted public medical assistance from "a series of ven-
dor payment programs ... to . . . one (Medicaid)."' 96 In creating Medi-
caid, Congress gave states "a green light to reorganize and expand their
vendor payment schemes."' 97 Had Congress intended for states to actu-
ally provide the medical services, there would be no need for a vendor
payment system. Instead, states would use the federal matching funds to
supplement the state budget and provide additional infrastructure.
The legislative history of Medicaid, combined with the statutory
language, illustrates that Congress intended Medicaid to serve needy
individuals by providing financial assistance. The statutory language
does not require states to provide actual medical assistance, and inter-
preting the Medicaid statute as such ignores Congress's intent.
B. Lessening the Burdens on the Medicaid Program
Limited financial resources and administrative burdens are two of
the major problems facing Medicaid today. 98 Not only do these prob-
lems create challenges for the agencies administering Medicaid, but more
importantly they create access issues for eligible Medicaid beneficiaries.
As fewer physicians accept Medicaid patients because of low reim-
193. MEDICAID PROGRAM: GENERAL INFORMATION, TECHNICAL SUMMARY, supra note 34.
194. See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 18, at 61.
195. Id. at66.
196. Id. at 69.
197. Id. at73.
198. Another problem plaguing the Medicaid program is fraud and abuse. A discussion of
fraud and abuse is beyond the scope of this comment. For a discussion of agency measures in place
to help combat Medicaid fraud, see generally 42 C.F.R. § 455 (2008), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MDFraudAbuseGenlnfo/.
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bursement payments, beneficiaries are forced to wait longer and travel
further for care. Interpreting the medical assistance language to mean
financial assistance will help lessen the impact of these challenges facing
Medicaid. If this interpretation does not increase access to care, it will at
least help prevent access from continuing to decline.
1. Limited Financial Resources
One of the biggest financial concerns of states in 2005 was Medi-
caid spending. In fact, "[i]n their 2005 fiscal outlooks, thirty states listed
spiraling Medicaid costs as one of their top three fiscal priorities, and
sixteen states anticipated Medicaid-induced spending overruns in
2005."' 99 In 2003, the House Energy and Commerce Committee Sub-
committee on Health held a hearing about problems facing Medicaid
("Medicaid Hearings"). Florida Governor Jeb Bush, Former Connecticut
Governor John Rowland, and New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson
testified about the fiscal challenges their states were facing as a result of
Medicaid. Governor Richardson testified "[f]rom my new vantage point,
I can tell you that the costs of this program can and do produce great
challenges for my State and all States."200
The fiscal challenges have led many states to reduce the scope of
their Medicaid programs.20' States have been forced to reduce benefits
and eligibility to Medicaid beneficiaries. At the 2003 Medicaid Hearings,
former Governor John Rowland testified that "in 22 states, including my
own, Medicaid eligibility has been reduced. Medicaid benefits have
been reduced in 22 states, and many others are seeking to implement
premiums, co-payments, preferred drug lists, and other techniques rou-
tinely applied in the private sector to contain health care costs." 202
Requiring states to provide actual medical services as opposed to fi-
nancial assistance for Medicaid beneficiaries would increase the already
cumbersome financial burdens on states. If states were forced to provide
medical care services, they would be "required to pay millions in con-
struction for publicly funded facilities., 20 3 The resources already allo-
cated to Medicaid beneficiaries would be redistributed to pay for new
hospitals and treatment centers instead of paying for the medical treat-
199. Moncrieff, supra note 1, at 673.
200. Medicaid Today: The States' Perspective: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health,
108th Cong. (2003), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/reparchives/108/Hearings/03122003hearing815/print.htm (state-
ment of Honorable Bill Richardson, Governor, State of New Mexico).
201. Moncrieff, supra note 1, at 673.
202. Medicaid Today, supra note 200 (statement of Honorable John G. Rowland, Governor,
State of Connecticut).
203. Press Release, Attorney General of Colorado, Attorney General Suthers Comments on
U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Medicaid Case (Mar. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.ago.state.co.us/press-detail.cfm?presslD=846.
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ment beneficiaries need. The existing funding problems inherent in the
Medicaid structure are not because of a lack of infrastructure.
Furthermore, it is reasonable to conclude that the costs of requiring
public facilities would greatly outweigh the benefits such a policy would
provide. Medicaid beneficiaries do not live in one specific area in any
state. Rather, beneficiaries are spread out across cities and counties.
Building one Medicaid public facility in each state would not be suffi-
cient. In Colorado, for example, if only one facility was built in Denver,
Medicaid beneficiaries who did not reside in the surrounding areas, for
example a resident in Grand Junction, would have to travel for hours to
get to the public facility. Instead, if states decided to build a few facili-
ties throughout the state, the financial resources spent on infrastructure
would rise with each new facility.
2. Administrative Burdens
It has been suggested that in place of the black and white approach
of either requiring actual medical services or financial assistance courts
should instead consider the facts of each case individually "to determine
whether the plaintiffs should receive funding or be provided with ser-
vices., 204 This alternate idea to take into account a number of issues
facing Medicaid. First, the case-by-case approach ignores the financial
burdens of providing actual medical services. Second, it also fails to take
into account the already existing administrative burdens facing the Medi-
caid program, and instead, it creates more hurdles for the already vulner-
able Medicaid eligible population. Finally, this approach assumes that
courts have an in depth understanding of the administration of Medicaid
and what is best for each beneficiary.
The case-by-case approach is founded on the reasoning that:
[I]f a state chooses to include a certain benefit under its Medicaid
program and accepts federal funds for doing so, then it should ensure
that all eligible recipients receive that benefit. When all recipients
are able to receive the benefit by obtaining required services from a
public or private source, the state would then merely have to provide
the funding for that benefit .... If, however, some eligible recipients
are unable to receive the benefit, then the state should be required to
provide the actual services-instead of mere funding-so that the
benefit in question is equally available to all... 205
At first impression this reasoning seems logical. If a state provides
Medicaid services for a beneficiary, then it should ensure that all benefi-
ciaries receive the same service. However, requiring a state to provide
204. Kenneth R. Wiggins, Note, Medicaid and the Enforceable Right to Receive Medical
Assistance: The Need for a Definition of "Medical Assistance," 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1487,
1504 (2006).
205. Id. at 1507-08.
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the actual medical care is not a fiscally responsible way of implementing
Medicaid. As discussed in depth above, the financial burdens associated
with providing infrastructure for public facilities outweigh the benefits of
such a requirement.20 6
Secondly, a case-by-case approach would impose administrative
burdens on courts and Medicaid administrators. Congress foresaw that
administrative proceedings may hinder the administration of Medicaid,
and required that state plans include safeguards to assure that Medicaid
would be provided "in a manner consistent with the simplicity of admini-
stration., 20 7 Administrative burdens already plague the Medicaid system.
In the Medicaid Hearings, Florida Governor Jeb Bush described the bu-
reaucratic problems already facing the Medicaid program. Governor
Bush testified:
[B]ureaucracy is also isolating our patients from care. Providers con-
stantly complain about the difficulty of navigating patients through
the current system-with its paperwork and low fees. Patients also
must maneuver the system, and are equally discouraged. There are
costs associated with time delays, approvals, needless paperwork,
and processes for monitoring each individual component of our state
208program.
Adding courts to the administration of Medicaid would add another
hurdle to a system that is already difficult to maneuver. Requiring indi-
viduals to argue in front of the court is a cost that many could not in-
cur-both in terms of finances and in terms of time. Forcing an individ-
ual to wait for his day in court may not be reasonable if he needs imme-
diate medical assistance. Additionally, waiting for courts to rule on
whether actual services or financial assistance was the proper remedy for
each particular individual may violate the statutory reasonable prompt-
ness requirement.
The Medicaid statute requires that states promptly administer Medi-
caid. Corresponding federal regulations require states to create timeta-
bles for informing applicants of their eligibility. 20 9 Another regulatory
requirement is that the state Medicaid administrative body must "furnish
Medicaid promptly to recipients without any delay caused by the
agency's administrative procedures. 2 °10 Even circuits holding that medi-
cal assistance means actual medical services recognize and endorse this
administrative requirement. 21' Requiring courts to hear fact specific
206. See supra Section III.B. 1.
207. S. REP. NO. 89-404, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 2016.
208. Medicaid Today, supra note 200 (statement of Honorable Jeb Bush, Governor, State of
Florida).
209. 42 C.F.R. § 435.91 l(a) (1996); Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 714 (1 lth Cir. 1998).
210. 42 C.F.R. § 435.930(a) (2008).
211. Chiles, 136 F.3d at 714.
2008] 749
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
situations on case-by-case bases adds another administrative procedure to
the Medicaid program, and would create additional delay. Doing so
would violate the reasonable promptness requirement of Medicaid.
Thirdly, while the case-by-case approach strives to provide a fairer
atmosphere for eligible Medicaid recipients, surely courts would not be
able to prevent discrepancies in their rulings. This approach forces
courts to become experts on a detailed statute that is over 200 pages long,
and then apply consistent rulings affecting the medical treatment of indi-
viduals. As the system operates today, litigation about scope and access
to care already affects each Medicaid beneficiary. One scholar notes that
while litigated Medicaid cases often reflect disputes over a national
health care policy, "the outcome of each legal skirmish [affects], imme-
diately and substantially, the lives of Medicaid beneficiaries .... ,12 If
courts adopted the case-by-case approach, each individual health and
funding-related question would result in a litany of consequences for
beneficiaries who were not a party to the decision. The largest of these
consequences is perhaps inconsistency. As evident from the circuit court
split on the interpretation of medical assistance, courts are likely to inter-
pret provision of the Medicaid statute differently and often come to dif-
ferent results. Different courts that come to different conclusions about
beneficiaries who face the same or similar circumstances would not only
create unfairness, but beneficiaries would likely appeal the court's deci-
sion, leading to more and more expensive, needless litigation. Requiring
courts to become experts on the intricacies of a detailed statute and uni-
formly apply it provides another unnecessary administrative burden.
CONCLUSION
By denying certiorari on the issue of whether medical assistance
means medical services or financial assistance, the United States Su-
preme Court leaves the Medicaid program disjointed among the states.
While each state creates its own Medicaid program, states in the Elev-
enth and First Circuits are required to provide actual medical assistance
to Medicaid beneficiaries, while states in the Sixth, Seventh and Tenth
Circuits may continue their practice of providing financial services for
Medicaid beneficiaries. This circuit split creates a disparity of how fed-
eral Medicaid funds can be used in states. Some states need only provide
financial assistance with the federal funds, while other states may be
required to use the federal Medicaid funds to create public hospitals.
An analysis of the legislative history, statutory language, and prob-
lems currently plaguing Medicaid demonstrates how the program goals
are better served when medical assistance is defined as financial assis-
tance. Requiring the state to be the "service-provider of last resort"
212. Ann B. Lever, "Shake It up in a Bag": Strategies for Representing Beneficiaries in
Medicaid Litigation, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 863,863 (1991).
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would create additional burdens to an already drained system and un-
dermine the Medicaid drafters' intention.213
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